When Rav's innkeeper asked Rav to litigate, he declined - because he had reminded him of the good service he had rendered (and this is akin to bribery).

So Rav sent him to - Rav Kahana ...

... who reprimanded him (the innkeeper) - because he indicated that, due to his connections with Rav, he would not accept Rav Kahana's ruling.

So Rav Kahana warned him that unless he did, he would make it clear that Rav could not help him, by placing him in Cherem.

Resh Lakish establishes the Pasuk in Devarim "ka'Katon ka'Gadol Tishma'un" in connection with attaching as much importance to a case involving a P'rutah as to one of a hundred Manah. This cannot be taken literally - because it is obvious.

What he therefore means is that - cases must be taken on a strictly 'first-come first-served' basis, and not in accordance with the sums involved.

And Rebbi Chama b'Rebbi Chanina explains the Pasuk "Ki ha'Mishpat l'Elokim Hu" by quoting Ha'kadosh Baruch Hu, who says that - not only do the Resha'im transfer money from the rightful owner to their disputant, but they also place the judgment on His Shoulders (Kevayachol), forcing Him to return the money to its rightful owner.

The Resha'im to whom he is referring are - incompetent judges who pervert justice.

Rebbi Chanina (or Rebbi Yashiyah) connects the Pasuk there "ve'ha'Davar asher Yiksheh Mikem" with the Pasuk "va'Yakreiv Moshe es Mishpatan lifnei Hash-m" - by explaining that, as a punishment for the former (boastful) statement, Moshe was forced to admit that he was unable to answer the B'nos Tz'lofchad's She'eilah, and had to take it before Hash-m.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rejects this explanation however, on the basis of the continuation of the Pasuk "Tikrevun elai u'Shema'ativ", which implies (not that he would be able to answer all problems, but) - that he would hear them out, ruling on what he did know, and asking Hash-m what he did not (which has not the least connotations of vanity).

And the reason that the Parshah ...

... of Nachalos was introduced through the query of the daughters of Tz'lofchad (and not directly at the hand of Moshe) was - due to their merit.

... of Chilul Shabbos was introduced through the actions of the Mekoshesh (the man who gathered wood on Shabbos [who some say was Tz'lofchad]) was - due to his guilt.

We learn from these two Pesukim - that Hash-m brings about merits through righteous people and punishments through people who are guilty.

According to Rebbi Elazar Amar Rebbi Simla'i, the Pasuk there ...

... "va'Atzaveh es Shofteichem ba'Eis ha'Hi" comes to teach us that - the judges should be patient with the people.

... "va'Atzaveh eschem ba'Eis ha'Hi" - that the people, for their part, should hold the judges in awe.

The connection between the former Pasuk and the Pasuk in Beha'aloscha "Ka'asher Yisa ha'Omen es ha'Yonek" (like a nurse carries an infant) is that - it teaches us the extent of the judge's patience that he is expected to display towards the people.

Rebbi Yochanan explains the apparent discrepancy between the two Pesukim, where Yehoshua is first instructed "Ki atah Tavo es ha'Am", and then "Ki atah Tavi es ha'Am" - by establishing the former as being the words of Moshe (who instructed him to go with the people as an equal [see also Rashi in Chumash]), and the latter, the words of Hash-m, who appointed him to lead the people ...

... based on the principle 'Dabar Echad le'Dor, ve'Lo Sh'nei Dabarim le'Dor' (There can only be one leader in a generation, and not two).

Rebbi Yochanan knew that the second Pasuk was said by Hash-m, and not by Moshe, like the first - because the Pasuk speaks in the first person ("to the land which I swore ... "), and not in the third ("to the land which Hash-m swore", as it did in the first Pasuk [indeed, as it does for throughout Seifer Devarim]).

The Beraisa states 'Zimun bi'Sheloshah'. This cannot refer to the B'rachah of Mezuman (in Birchas ha'Mazon - because another Beraisa mentions them both 'Zimun u'Birchas Zimun bi'Sheloshah'.

When the Beraisa states 'Zimun u'Birchas Zimun bi'Sheloshah', the latter cannot be merely an explanation of the former - because we have a third Beraisa which states - 'Zimun bi'Sheloshah, u'Birchas Zimun bi'Sheloshah', clearly indicating that 'Zimun' in this context refers to something else.

So we establish the Beraisa like Rava, who ruled that if three Dayanim send a Shali'ach to invite someone to a court hearing - he must specifically issue the invitation in the name of all three Dayanim. Otherwise, Beis-Din do not have the authority to place him in Cherem for failing to attend.

This will not be necessary however - on the actual day of judgment.

Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov how many Dayanim are required to judge Dinei K'nasos. We cannot accept the She'eilah at surface value - because our Mishnah has already taught us that Dinei Kenasos require three judges.

What he must have therefore meant to ask him was - whether a Yachid Mumcheh is permitted to judge Dinei K'nasos.

The latter replied by quoting Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda's grandfather - who forbade even ten Hedyotos to judge Dinei K'nasos. In that case, when our Mishnah states 'Tashlumei Kefel ... bi'Sheloshah', it must be referring to Mumchin, from which we can deduce that one Mumcheh cannot judge Dinei K'nasos.

Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in our Mishnah whether Motzi-Shem-Ra requires three judges or twenty-three. The case is - where the husband claims on the day after the marriage that his wife was not a virgin, and that she therefore loses her Kesubah (see also Tosfos DH 'Motzi-Shem-Ra').

We know that the husband only intends to make his wife lose her Kesubah, and not to have her sentenced to death (with witnesses) - because if he did, Rebbi Meir would not argue with the Chachamim.

Our initial problem with the Rabbanan's opinion (that Motzi-Shem-Ra requires twenty-three) is that - seeing as there are no witnesses that the woman committed adultery after the betrothal, and her husband only comes to make her lose her Kesubah, why should we take into account what would have been, had he brought witnesses that she committed adultery?

So Ula establishes their Machlokes by whether 'Chosheshin le'La'az' (the Rabbanan) or not (Rebbi Meir). 'Chosheshin le'La'az' means that - we take into account the likelihood that, following the husband's initial claim in Beis-Din, witnesses (of whom the husband was not aware) will come forward and testify that she committed adultery, and Beis-Din will need to reconvene (which makes a mockery of Beis-Din).

According to Rava, nobody holds 'Chosheshin le'La'az', and the Rabbanan's reason is because they hold 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Rishonim', meaning - that the husband appeared before a Beis-Din of twenty-three, claiming that he had witnesses that his wife had committed adultery. But when no witnesses arrived, the Dayanim went home ...

... and the husband is now asking three other judges to judge his claim (of 'Pesach Pasu'ach') - so that his wife should at least lose her Kesubah.

The Rabbanan are now concerned about the Kavod of the Dayanim who sat initially and went home (since to now judge the case with a Beis-Din of three, after a Beis-Din of twenty-three already convened to judge it, is a slight to the honor of the larger Beis-Din).

The Beraisa states 'va'Chachamim Omrim, Tav'o Mamon bi'Sheloshah - Tav'o Nefashos, be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah' (see Chidushei ha'Ran).

Rava will explain the Beraisa in exactly the same way as he just explained our Mishnah, based on the fact that he does not hold of 'La'az', but he does hold of 'Kevodan shel Rishonim'.

The problem this poses on Ula is - from the Reisha. What is the case of 'Tav'o Mamon, bi'Sheloshah', according to him?

To reconcile Ula with the Beraisa, Rava, together with Rav Chiya bar Avin, establishes the Reisha by Eidim Zom'min. Rava describes Rav Chiya bar Avin as - 'the lion of the group'.

The case is - where the husband initially brings witnesses before a Beis-Din of twenty-three, but the girl's father brings witnesses who renders them Eidim Zom'min. If the father now wants to claim payment from the husband, he only needs a Beis-Din of three (even though the initial Beis-Din comprised twenty-three).

When the Tana says 'Tav'o Nefashos, be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah', he means that - a case that can involve Dinei Nefashos (whenever the husband is the claimant), requires twenty-three [on account of La'az]).

And the reason that we are not concerned about La'az in the Reisha - is because we are now concerned with a new claimant (the father), as if it was a new case.

Some commentaries establish the entire Sugya in connection with the Manah that the father is claiming from the husband (see Tosfos on the previous Amud DH 'Motzi-Shem-Ra'). We reject this explanation however - because if the husband did not bring witnesses, he would be believed outright to make his wife lose her Kesubah. So the Mishnah must be speaking where he brought witnesses, and the father brought Eidei Hazamah. In that case, La'az will no longer be applicable, as we explained.

According to Abaye, even Rebbi Meir agrees with both 'Chosheshin le'La'az' and 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Rishonim', and they argue over the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and the Tana Kama in a Beraisa. According to the Tana Kama, the other condition required to sentence someone to death, besides a Beis-Din of twenty-three, witnesses and warning is - informing him that his sin renders him subject to the death-penalty.

According to Rebbi Yehudah - he must also inform him which form of death he is due to receive.

In similar vein, the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan is confined to a case - where the witnesses brought by the husband failed to warn the woman which form of death she was due to receive, in which case, Rebbi Meir holds like Rebbi Yehudah. Consequently, it is no longer a case of Dinei Nefashos, and three judges will suffice; whereas the Chachamim here conform to the Chachamim there.

With regard to the previous case, we know that there is not another pair of witnesses ready to testify (in which case it would remain within the realm of Dinei Nefashos) - because once one of the parties brings witnesses, we assume that, had there been additional witnesses, the party concerned would have brought them.

Rav Papa learns basically like Abaye. Only to explain the Rabbanan, he establishes them like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who says - that a Chaver (a Talmid-Chacham) does not require a warning ...

... and the case of Motzi-Shem-Ra is - where the witnesses did not warn the woman before she committed adultery, because she was a Chaverah.

Consequently ...

... Rebbi Meir requires only three judges - because he holds like the Rabbanan, who require a warning even with regard to a Chaver, and it is no longer a case of Chayvei Misos, whereas ...

... the Rabbanan require twenty-three judge - because they hold like Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, who does not.