QUESTION: Rav Nachman quotes Rav who rules that a person is obligated to bring a Korban Chatas for accepting an Avodah Zarah as his god by saying, "You are my god." The Gemara asks that in order to be obligated to bring a Korban Chatas, one must do a physical act of sin. Why should a person who merely accepted an Avodah Zarah be obligated if his act involved nothing more than speech? Speech is not considered a "Ma'aseh," a physical act. The Gemara answers that Rav made this statement according to the view of Rebbi Akiva, who maintains that speech is enough of a Ma'aseh to obligate the person to bring a Chatas.

The Gemara then says that Rav is teaching a Chidush. One might have thought that the only sin done without a Ma'aseh for which a person is obligated to bring a Chatas is the sin of Megadef, blasphemy, because the verse explicitly states that one is obligated to bring a Chatas for that sin even though it is done only with speech. All other sins do not obligate a Chatas when done without a Ma'aseh. Rav therefore teaches that for a sin of Avodah Zarah done with speech one is obligated to bring a Chatas, and the reason why he is Chayav is that the verse (Shemos 32:8) compares Avodah Zarah done with speech to Avodah Zarah done with an act of slaughtering.

If, according to Rav, one is obligated to bring a Chatas because of a Hekesh in the Torah that compares speaking to slaughtering, then why does the Gemara say that he follows the view of Rebbi Akiva? The same Hekesh should apply even according to the Rabanan, since the verse -- through the Hekesh -- explicitly teaches that one must bring a Chatas for serving Avodah Zarah through speech even though it is done without a Ma'aseh. (TOSFOS HA'ROSH, MAHARSHA)

ANSWER: The TOSFOS HA'ROSH and MAHARSHA answer that if the verse obligates a person to bring a Chatas for a sin done through speech for Avodah Zarah, then this verse should serve as the source, through a Binyan Av, that a person is obligated to bring a Chatas for sinning through speech for all other Aveiros as well. It must be that the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Akiva do not learn such a Hekesh, and that is why Rav's statement must follow only the view of Rebbi Akiva.

According to the answer of the Tosfos ha'Rosh, what was the Gemara's question in the first place? The Gemara asks that perhaps Rebbi Akiva requires a Korban only for the sin of Megadef, since the verse mentions the punishment of Kares with regard to Megadef. Why does the Gemara say that Rebbi Akiva might require a Korban only for Megadef done without a Ma'aseh, since the verse of Megadef is written in the Parshah which discusses the Korban Chatas for the sin of Avodah Zarah? Even if the Torah specifies that a Chatas is brought for a sin done without a Ma'aseh only with regard to Megadef, one should learn from there that in all cases a Chatas is brought for a sin done without a Ma'aseh! Moreover, why does the Gemara assume in other places (65a and elsewhere) that Rebbi Akiva does not require a Ma'aseh in order to bring any Korban Chatas? Perhaps Rebbi Akiva maintains that one is obligated to bring a Chatas for a sin done without a Ma'aseh only for Megadef and for accepting Avodah Zarah! (TOSFOS to 65a, DH Man, and SHITAH MEKUBETZES, Kerisus 2a:5 and 3b:25)

The Rishonim answer that Rebbi Akiva indeed learns from Megadef that a Ma'aseh is never necessary in order to be obligated to bring a Chatas. The Shitah Mekubetzes (in Kerisus) explains that when the Gemara here says that Rebbi Akiva maintains that one who accepts Avodah Zarah is obligated to bring a Chatas because of a Hekesh, it does not mean that the Hekesh is really necessary. The Gemara could have said simply that the obligation to bring a Chatas is derived through a Binyan Av from Megadef to every other case. The Gemara mentions the Hekesh merely because there happens to be a Hekesh here, and the Binyan Av is not necessary (but, indeed, without the Hekesh this law would have been learned through the Binyan Av). (See also Shitah Mekubetzes, Kerisus 3b:25, who gives other answers.)

QUESTIONS: The Gemara explains that according to Rebbi Ami, when a person does multiple acts of worship of Avodah Zarah which are not the normal manner (she'Lo k'Darkah) of worshipping the Avodah Zarah, he is obligated to bring only one Korban Chatas for all of his acts. This is because the Torah states, "v'Lo Sa'avdem" (Shemos 20:5), grouping all of the forms of worship together as one act. Abaye argues and says that such a person is obligated to bring many Chata'os; he does not learn from the verse of "Lo Sa'avdem" that they are all considered one Isur. What, though, does he learn from that verse? RASHI (DH li'Devarav) explains that the verse is teaching that he is liable for multiple Lavim for the Aveirah of Avodah she'Lo k'Darkah, serving Avodah Zarah in an unusual manner.

(a) Rashi seems to contradict what he writes on the Mishnah (60b, DH Over). There, Rashi explains that the verse of "Lo Sa'avdem" teaches that a person transgresses a Lav for doing any action which demonstrates a love for Avodah Zarah, even if it is not the normal manner of serving the Avodah Zarah, and it is not one of the Avodos performed in the Beis ha'Mikdash (for example, hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah). Why does Rashi here not explain that this is what the verse teaches according to Abaye?

(b) Rashi here (DH Aval ha'Megapef) further contradicts his words on the Mishnah (60b) when he cites two different verses for the source of the Lav of expressing love for Avodah Zarah, and he ignores the verse of "Lo Sa'avdem." (MAHARSHA)

(a) The Torah says "Lo Sa'avdem" twice, as Rashi notes here (DH Lo Sa'avdem) and in the Mishnah (DH Over). Rashi points out that both verses are extra. (On 60b, the words of Rashi should read, "d'Lo Sa'avdem Yeseirei Kesivei," and not "Yeseira"; see MAHARSHAL and MAHARSHA.) The first verse is teaching the Chiyuv for hugging Avodah Zarah, according to Rashi on the Mishnah. The second verse is teaching the Halachah of Rebbi Ami, or, according to Abaye, it is teaching an extra Lav.

However, this approach seems to contradict the Gemara earlier (61b) which uses one verse of "Lo Sa'avdem" to teach that it is prohibited to bow down to a person who makes himself into an Avodah Zarah. Hence, only one "Lo Sa'avdem" is extra!

Perhaps Rashi learns that the verse is not already used by the Derashah which teaches the Isur against bowing down to a person, because if that is the only thing it teaches, then the verse should say "Do not bow" twice ("Lo Sish'tachaveh v'Lo Sish'tachaveh"), instead of saying "Lo Sish'tachaveh v'Lo Sa'avdem." Since it changes the second command to the wording of Avodah, it implies that it is also including hugging and kissing. On the other hand, it cannot be referring only to hugging and kissing, because -- since those are only expressions of love and not acts of Avodah -- it should not have used the word "Lo Sa'avdem" to refer to them. It must be that it is also referring to bowing to a person who claims to be a god.

According to the original Girsa of Rashi that appears in the manuscripts and older printed editions of the Gemara (see DIKDUKEI SOFRIM to 60b, #300), the answer might be more straightforward. In those texts, Rashi on the Mishnah (60b) reads that there are two extra "Lo Sa'avdem" phrases, since the words "Lo Sa'avdem" appear three times (in the first Dibros, in the second Dibros, and in Shemos 23:24), and two of them are seemingly unnecessary. Hence, one of the two extra "Lo Sa'avdem" phrases is used to teach the Isur of hugging Avodah Zarah, and the second one to teach the Halachah of Rebbi Ami, or, according to Abaye, to teach an extra Lav. The reason why our editions read differently is due to the emendations of the MAHARSHAL in the text of Rashi. The Maharshal emends the text of Rashi because Rashi here (DH Shalosh) writes explicitly that the words written in the second set of Dibros are not considered an extra phrase, since those words are only a review of what is written in the first Dibros. (Even the MAHARSHA, who argues with the Maharshal and attempts to preserve the original Girsa, does not actually preserve the Girsa that predated the Maharshal, but rather a compromise Girsa in which Rashi (on 60b) is saying, as the Maharshal asserts, that the two Dibros are counted as one.)

If this original Girsa is correct, it apparently represents a Mahadura Kama, an earlier version, of Rashi's commentary. What he writes here (63a) is a Mahadura Basra in which he rejects the original explanation because of the Gemara which says that there are only three places where the words "Lo Sish'tachaveh" appear. (Apparently, the Mahadura Kama of Rashi did not consider "Ki Lo Sish'tachaveh" in Shemos 34:14 to be a Lo Ta'aseh. Rather, the verse there is giving a reason for why one must destroy the idols: destroy them so that you will not bow down to a foreign god.) According to the Mahadura Basra, the later version, of Rashi, it is necessary to find another source for the prohibition of hugging Avodah Zarah, and that is why Rashi later on the page provides different sources for that Isur.)

(b) The MAHARSHA explains why Rashi here gives a different source for the prohibition against hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah than the one he gives in the Mishnah. He explains that Rashi on the Mishnah follows the opinion of Abaye who does not use the verse of "Lo Sa'avdem" to teach that one is obligated to bring a single Chatas for performing many Avodos. Rebbi Ami, however, uses the verse to teach that principle, and therefore he must have another source for the Lav against hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah, and those are the sources that Rashi here cites.

The BINYAN SHLOMO and the ARUCH LA'NER point out that this is inconsistent with what Rashi himself says earlier on the page because, as mentioned above, Rashi says that according to Abaye, "Lo Sa'avdem" does not teach the prohibition against hugging and kissing Avodah Zarah, but rather it simply gives an extra Lav. Moreover, if it is clear that Rebbi Ami has other sources for the prohibition against hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah, why should Rashi assume that Abaye argues with Rebbi Ami about those sources (if no mention is made in the Gemara that they argue about that)?

The Binyan Shlomo and the Aruch la'Ner answer that Rashi here finds it necessary to bring a second source for the prohibition against hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah in order to show that it is forbidden to hug and kiss the type of Avodah Zarah that is normally served in a disgraceful manner (such as Pe'or). The verse that Rashi cites in his commentary on the Mishnah teaches the prohibition against hugging and kissing an Avodah Zarah that is served in an honorable manner. In the Mishnah, Rashi does not cite the second source, because the Gemara has not yet introduced the idea that there is a distinction between idols that are worshipped in an honorable way and those that are worshipped in a disgraceful way.

Although this explains why it is necessary to bring two verses to teach the prohibition against hugging Avodah Zarah, the assumption of these Acharonim seems to contradict what TOSFOS writes (63a, DH Achas, and 61a, end of DH Minayin). Tosfos proves that once the Torah equates serving Avodah Zarah which is normally served in an honorable manner to serving Avodah Zarah which is normally served in a disgraceful manner, it is no longer necessary to bring a second verse to prohibit the latter. For this reason, it is not necessary to bring a second verse of Onesh (punishment) for bowing to an Avodah Zarah which is normally served in a disgraceful manner, and it is not necessary to bring a second verse for slaughtering to an Avodah Zarah which is normally served in a disgraceful manner. Why, then, should it be necessary to bring a second verse to teach the prohibition against hugging an Avodah Zarah that is served in a disgraceful manner?

The Binyan Shlomo attempts to answer this question by suggesting that the second verse is not necessary for Avodos which are punishable with Kares, but perhaps the second verse is necessary for Avodos which are punishable with Malkus, such as hugging. However, the opposite would seem to be true: if the greater punishment can be given without a second verse, then certainly the weaker punishment should be given without a second verse! Moreover, even if it is possible to differentiate between an act of hugging and an act of slaughtering by saying that hugging is prohibited only with a Lav, since there is no source that forces Rashi to make that differentiation why should he assume that a second verse is necessary?

According to the explanation mentioned above (end of (a), regarding the original text of Rashi on 60b), all of Rashi's words in this Sugya are easily understood. Rashi there (60b) uses the verse "Lo Sa'avdem" because he learns that there are three times when the Torah uses the phrase (Shemos 20:5, Shemos 23:24, and Devarim 5:9). Rashi here (63a) retracted that reasoning and has one less verse, and therefore he needs to find a new verse to replace the verse of "Lo Sa'avdem" as the source for the prohibition against hugging Avodah Zarah.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that all forms of mockery ("Leitzanus") are forbidden except for mockery of Avodah Zarah. This implies that mockery of other sins is not permitted. However, the Gemara in Kidushin (81a) relates that Rebbi Meir and Rabbi Akiva would mock sinners ("Ovrei Aveirah"). The Tana'im certainly would not have mocked sinners had it been forbidden to do so. What, then, does the Gemara here mean when it says that all forms of mockery are forbidden, except for mockery of Avodah Zarah?

The Gemara in Kidushin adds that the Satan eventually showed the Tana'im how difficult it is to overpower him (the Yetzer ha'Ra) and thus their mockery was inappropriate. Accordingly, perhaps the Gemara here means that one should not mock sinners except for those who serve Avodah Zarah, because the Satan might become upset with him and attempt to teach him a lesson. However, this cannot be the intent of the Gemara here, because why should Avodah Zarah be different from other Aveiros? (REBBI TZADOK HA'KOHEN in TZIDKAS HA'TZADIK #260)

(a) REBBI TZADOK HA'KOHEN suggests that when the Gemara says that one may mock Avodah Zarah, it does not intend to limit Leitzanus to Avodah Zarah. Rather, Avodah Zarah is representative of all of the negative commandments. The Chachamim teach that the verse, "Anochi Hash-m Elokecha" (Shemos 20:2), represents all positive commandments, and the verse, "Lo Yiheyeh Lecha Elohim Acherim" (Shemos 20:3), represents all negative commandments. The Gemara is including all evil acts in the words "Avodah Zarah."

According to this answer, it is not clear what the source would be for allowing a person to mock any sin, since the two sources cited by the Gemara here refer specifically to the sin of Avodah Zarah.

RAV YITZCHAK HUTNER zt'l (in PACHAD YITZCHAK, Purim 1:4) suggests that even if one is permitted to mock all evil, perhaps the Gemara singles out Avodah Zarah since that is where mockery is most effective. Mockery serves to remove the value attached to an object or action. When a person does evil, he attaches value to an act which is really valueless. However, the most severe distortion of value is in the case of Avodah Zarah, whereby a person takes an object that has absolutely no value and no power and he gives it the highest value possible, empowering it with the status of a deity. The most appropriate weapon against Avodah Zarah, therefore, is mockery, which attacks the misplaced value that was given to the Avodah Zarah. This is why the Gemara says that Leitzanus of Avodah Zarah is permitted. The Gemara is not limiting the allowance of mockery only to Avodah Zarah, as Rebbi Tzadok points out, but rather it singles out Avodah Zarah because mockery is most effective in combating Avodah Zarah.

According to this explanation, the reason why the Gemara cites, as its source, a verse that permits the mockery of Avodah Zarah is to show that mockery is so effective against Avodah Zarah that even the prophet used that method (but it is not necessary to bring a source to permit mockery of Aveiros).

(b) Rebbi Tzadok suggests further that the Gemara prohibits the mockery of other forms of evil because of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin (81a), which says that the Satan might take revenge. Avodah Zarah, however, is different. The Satan can take revenge only if the person who is mocking the evil is himself not perfectly clean of sin or temptation. Even a Tzadik has a minimal Yetzer ha'Ra to sin with most types of sin. However, the Anshei Keneses ha'Gedolah eliminated the Yetzer ha'Ra for Avodah Zarah (64a), such that a Jew does not have even a minimal Yetzer ha'Ra for Avodah Zarah. Therefore, one is permitted to mock Avodah Zarah without fear of repercussion.

Rebbi Tzadok cannot mean that the Gemara here is based on the fact that the Anshei Keneses ha'Gedolah eliminated the Yetzer ha'Ra for Avodah Zarah, since the Gemara brings proof that one is permitted to mock Avodah Zarah from verses that were written before the Anshei Keneses ha'Gedolah eliminated that Yetzer ha'Ra! He must mean that even before the Anshei Keneses ha'Gedolah eliminated it, Jews who were not steeped in Avodah Zarah had no Yetzer ha'Ra for it, as the Gemara here says later (end of the Daf).

(c) RASHI in Kidushin (81a) explains that Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Meir would mock sinners by asserting that the sinners easily could have overcome their Yetzer ha'Ra, and thus they should be ashamed of themselves. Perhaps the Gemara here does not refer to this form of mockery since, as Rebbi Tzadok writes, one is permitted to mock any sinner for his sins (although it is inadvisable to do so because of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin, that the Satan might take revenge against the one who mocks the sinner).

The Gemara here teaches that one is permitted in one instance to mock something that is not inherently evil. The mockery in the cases the Gemara cites was not directed against the people who sinned by worshipping Avodah Zarah. Rather, it was directed against a form of the Avodah Zarah itself, making fun of how it looks. Such mockery is permitted only in the case of Avodah Zarah. (M. KORNFELD)