(a)From where does Isi ben Yehudah learn the Isur to eat Basar b'Chalav?
(b)We attempt to learn the Isur Hana'ah by Basar b'Chalav from Orlah by means of a Kal va'Chomer. What is the Kal va'Chomer?
(c)On what grounds does the Gemara refute it?
(a)Isi ben Yehudah learns the Isur to eat Basar b'Chalav - from the Gezeirah Shavah "Ki Am Kadosh Ata" (in Re'eh - in connection with Basar b'Chalav) and "v'Anshei Kodesh Tihyun Li" (in connection with Terifah).
(b)If Orlah, with which no sin was performed, is Asur b'Hana'ah, then Basar b'Chalav, which comes about through the sin of cooking meat and mik together, will certainly be Asur.
(c)The Gemara refutes it on the grounds that Orlah also has a stringency over Basar b'Chalav, inasmuch as Orlah never had a moment when it was permitted (since the fruit is forbidden from the time it buds), whereas the meat and the milk were permitted - before they were cooked together.
(a)Chametz on Pesach seems to fill in the gap created by the previous problem. Chametz on Pesach however, has a Chumra over Basar b'Chalav that Kil'ei ha'Kerem does not have. What is it?
(b)According to Abaye, why does the Beraisa not ask how we can attempt to learn Basar b'Chalav from Kil'ei ha'Kerem, since there, one is Chayav even for eating it in an unusual way?
(c)Then how does the questioner justify his Kashya?
(d)Why does Abaye not agree with that?
(a)The Chumra of Chametz on Pesach over Basar b'Chalav (which Kil'ei ha'Kerem does not have) - is that one receives Kares for eating it.
(b)Abaye explains that the Beraisa cannot ask how we can attempt to learn Basar b'Chalav from Kil'ei ha'Kerem, since there, one is Chayav even for eating it in an unusual way - because the same applies to Basar b'Chalav, due to the fact that in connection with Basar b'Chalav (like by Kil'ei ha'Kerem), the Torah does not use any derivation of Achilah.
(c)The questioner, who did ask it, justifies his Kashya, because we are currently learning Basar b'Chalav from Neveilah, where the Lashon of Achilah is used.
(d)Abaye disagrees with that, because, when all's said and done, the Lashon 'Achilah' is not used directly by Basar b'Chalav.
(a)What did the Gemara think when it asked why the Beraisa did not ask 'Mah li'Kil'ei ha'Kerem she'Ken Lo Hayesah Lo Sha'as ha'Kosher'?
(b)What do we deduce from the fact that the Beraisa does not, in fact, ask it?
(c)How do we reconcile this with the Mishnah in Kil'ayim (concerning someone who passes a holed plant-pot through a vine-yard) which forbids the grain growing in the pot only if it increased by at least one two-hundredth, (implying that it is what grows that becomes forbidden, but not the original plants)?
(d)How does this conform with the two Pesukim "ha'Zera" and "ha'Melei'ah"?
(a)When the Gemara asked why the Beraisa did not ask 'Mah li'Kil'ei ha'Kerem she'Ken Lo Hayesah Lo Sha'as ha'Kosher' - it was of the opinion that it is only what grows after they mix that is Asur, and that never had a Sha'as ha'Kosher.
(b)The Beraisa does not, in fact, ask it - because the whole tree becomes forbidden, and the tree did have a Sha'as ha'Kosher, until the time that the plants took root.
(c)The Mishnah in Kil'ayim is speaking about grain that is already growing, which does not become forbidden; whereas the Beraisa in Chulin is speaking about grain that has just been planted together with the vines. They will become forbidden as soon as they take root.
(d)"ha'Zera" refers to the latter case, and "ha'Melei'ah", to the former.
(a)What is the significance of the Shi'ur of one two hundredth?
(b)What is the difference whether the plant-pot which he carried through the vine-yard is holed or not?
(a)The Shi'ur of one two hundredth is the Shi'ur that Kil'ei ha'Kerem is Batel (the Sifri learns this from Terumah, which is Mutar b'Hana'ah, and Batel in one hundred; Kil'ei ha'Kerem therefore, which is Asur b'Hana'ah, must be Batel in two hundred).
(b)Plants in a plant-pot will only nurture from the ground via a hole in the pot, but not through its walls. Consequently, if one were to pass a similar pot without a hole through a vineyard, there would be no question of Kil'ayim.
(a)Rebbi Yakov quoting Rebbi Yochanan permits anything to be used to cure a sick person, except for the wood of an Asheirah (a tree used for idol-worship). What problem does the Gemara have with that?
(b)How does the Gemara resolve this? Is it speaking when the sick man's life is in danger or not?
(c)What does Rebbi Eliezer learn from the Pasuk "b'Chol Levavecha, uv'Chol Nafshecha"?
(a)The Gemara queries Rebbi Yochanan, who permits anything to be used to cure a sick person, except for the wood of an Asheirah: If it is a matter of life-danger, then even the wood of an Asheirah should also be permitted; and if it is not, then no other Isur should be permitted, either.
(b)The Gemara establishes Rebbi Yochanan when there is life-danger; nevertheless, using the wood of an Asheirah, which is a branch of Avodah-Zarah, is not permitted even to save a life.
(c)Rebbi Eliezer learns that for those people who treasure their lives above their money, the Torah writes "b'Chol Nafshecha"; and for those who treasure their money above their lives, the Torah writes "b'Chol Me'odecha". (Note: This is not really idolatry, since one is worshipping neither the Asheirah nor any other god. Rashi writes that he appears to be thanking it - which seems to be a case of 'Abizeraihu Didhu' - a minor branch of Avodah-Zarah, which is equally forbidden.)
(a)Ravin quoting Rebbi Yochanan, adds adultery and murder to the list of things that one may not use to save one's own life. What is his source for murder?
(b)And from where does he learn adultery?
(c)In what regard does he also compare murder to adultery?
(a)Ravin quoting Rebbi Yochanan's source for forbidding someone to murder to save one's own lilfe - is a Svara; because we say: "Who tells you that your blood is redder than your friend's"?
(b)Now that Rebbi Yochanan knows murder, he learns the stringency of adultery from a Hekesh, since the Torah writes in Ki Setzei(in connection with a betrothed girl who is raped) "Ki Kasher Yakum Ish Al Re'eihu u'Retzacho Nefesh, Ken ha'Davar ha'Zeh", from which we learn that just as one is forbidden to kill another person to save one's own life, so too, is it forbidden to commit adultery.
(c)He also compares murder to adultery in this way: just as one is obligated to save the girl from sinning, even if it means taking the life of her pursuer, so too, is one obligated to save the life of a man who is being murdered, even, if need be, with the life of his attacker.
(a)What is the literal meaning of the Pasuk in Ki Setzei "Ki Ka'asher Yakum Ish Al Re'eihu u'Retzacho Nefesh, Ken ha'Davar ha'Zeh"?
(b)So why can we not simply understand the Pasuk literally?
(c)What did the gentile mayor of the town inform the unfortunate man who came to ask Rava for advice?
(d)What did Rava tell him?
(a)The literal meaning of the Pasuk in Ki Setzei "Ki Ka'asher Yakum Ish Al Re'eihu u'Retzacho Nefesh, Kein ha'Davar ha'Zeh" - is that just as a murdered man cannot be blamed for his death (he is an Ones), so too, is a girl who is raped an Ones, and is not punishable.
(b)We cannot simply explain the Pasuk literally - because of the Pasuk "v'la'Na'arah Lo Sa'aseh Davar" from which we already know that she is not punishable.
(c)The gentile mayor of the town informed the unfortunate man - that unless he killed so-and-so, they would kill him.
(d)Rava told him that killing the other man to save his own life was forbidden - as we explained earlier.
(a)What did Ravina do with oil from unripe olives of Orlah that surprised Mar bar Rav Ashi?
(b)What did Mar bar Rav Ashi say to him?
(c)According to the first Lashon, Ravina replied that his daughter had a high fever, and that it was indeed a mater of life and death. How did he justify his action according to the second Lashon?
(a)Ravina smeared his daughter with oil from unripe olives of Orlah.
(b)Mar bar Rav Ashi pointed out to him that Chazal only permitted using Isurei Hana'ah if it was to save a life, but not for mere convenience (e.g. to improve his daughter's complexion).
(c)According to the second Lashon - Ravina pointed out that this was not the regular way of using olive-oil (one would normally wait until it was ripe and properly processed); and we learnt above, that it is permitted to use Isurei Hana'ah in an irregular manner (see the second Lashon of Rebbi Yochanan 24b).
(a)Abaye permits Hana'ah that comes to a person against his will. Rava forbids it. In which case or cases do they agree ...
1. ... that it is forbidden?
2. ... that is permitted?
(b)So in which case do they argue, and according to which Tana?
(c)What is the practical application of their Machlokes with regard to dragging a bench along the ground on Shabbos?
(a)Abaye and Rava agree that Hana'ah that comes to a person against his will ...
1. ... is forbidden - when he has the specific intention of benefiting from it, whether he can avoid it or not (Iy Efshar u'Michaven).
2. ... is permitted - if he could neither avoid it, nor did he deliberately mean to benefit from it (Iy Efshar v'Eino Michaven).
(b)Abaye and Rava argue in a case when he could avoid it, but did not have the specific intention of benefiting from it Efshar v'Eino Michaven). They argue according to Rebbi Shimon, who holds 'Davar she'Eino Miskaven, Mutar'.
(c)The practical application of their Machlokes is with regard to dragging a light bench along the ground on Shabbos without intending to make a groove (Efshar v'Eino Michaven). Abaye holds that Rebbi Shimon does not differentiate between heavy benches and light ones; whereas according to Rava, Rebbi Shimon permits 'Davar she'Eino Miskaven' only when it is not avoidable (Iy Efshar v'Eino MKichaven) but not when it is (Efshar v'Eino Michaven).
(a)According to the second Lashon, Rava agrees that, as long as one does not have the specific intention of sinning, whatever is unintentional is permitted (even if it could be avoided). In which case then, do Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon argue?
(b)And in which case do Rava and Abaye argue, and according to which Tana?
(a)In the second Lashon, Abaye and Rava establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon even when it could be avoided, and one did not specifically intend to benefit from it (Efshar v'Eino Michaven - which Rebbi Yehudah permits, and Rebbi Shimon forbids).
(b)Abaye and Rava will now argue by when it is unavoidable but when he specifically intend to benefit from it (Iy Efshar u'Michaven) - according to Rebbi Yehudah; Abaye holds that the criterion according to Rebbi Yehudah, is Efshar or Iy Efshar. Wherever it is unavoidable, Rebbi Yehudah permits, says Abaye. Rava however, holds that Rebbi Yehudah may be strict by Eino Michaven like Michaven by Efshar, but that does not mean that he will be lenient to make Miskaven like Ein Miskaven by Lo Efshar.