QUESTION: The Gemara cites the Mishnah in Menachos (100b) which states that when the two days of Rosh Hashanah fall immediately prior to Shabbos (that is, on Thursday and Friday), the Lechem ha'Panim is eaten in the Beis ha'Mikdash on the eleventh day after it is baked. That is, there are eleven days from the time it is baked (on Wednesday, the day before Rosh Hashanah) until the time it is eaten (Shabbos of the following week).

RASHI (DH Shenei Yamim Shel Rosh Hashanah) asks why the Mishnah specifically mentions two days of Rosh Hashanah, and not two days of any Yom Tov (that is, "Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyos")? Rashi answers that "in the times of the Lechem ha'Panim there was no second day of Yom Tov."

Rashi's question and answer are difficult to understand. The Gemara is discussing the Lechem ha'Panim in the Beis ha'Mikdash, where there never were two days of Yom Tov, other than Rosh Hashanah. Even today, when two days of Yom Tov are observed outside of Eretz Yisrael, only one day of Yom Tov is observed in Yerushalayim. What does Rashi mean when he says that "in the times of the Lechem ha'Panim there was no second day of Yom Tov"? (TZELACH)

(a) The CHASAM SOFER (in Chidushim here, and in Teshuvos YD 252) writes that in his youth he brazenly suggested an answer to the TZELACH, who nodded his head in affirmation. He answered that it was possible for a situation to arise in which there indeed were two days of Yom Tov even in Yerushalayim. The Gemara in Berachos (63a) relates that during the time that the leading Torah Sages lived outside of Eretz Yisrael, they would accept the testimony of witnesses who saw the new moon, and they would establish the new month based on that testimony. Since it took time for the messengers of Beis Din to bring news of the new month to Yerushalayim, the people of Yerushalayim would have to observe two days of Yom Tov out of doubt (just as cities outside of Eretz Yisrael kept two days of Yom Tov when the Beis Din in Yerushalayim established the new month)!

Why, then, does Rashi say that there was no second day of Yom Tov in Yerushalayim in the times of the Lechem ha'Panim? The Chasam Sofer suggests that perhaps the verse, "v'Alisa El ha'Makom" (Devarim 17:8), teaches that as long as the Beis ha'Mikdash stands, the beginning of the new month must be established by the Sages in Eretz Yisrael, regardless of whether their counterparts in Chutz la'Aretz are greater. Accordingly, Rashi is correct that in the Beis ha'Mikdash, there was never a second day of Yom Tov.

(The wording of Rashi, "Yamim Tovim Shel Galuyos," is difficult according to this explanation, as Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson points out.)

(b) RAV YOSEF SHAUL NATANSON notes (in his comments on the famous Teshuvah of the CHACHAM TZVI (#167), who reaches the opposite conclusion; his comments can be found at the end of most printings of the Chacham Tzvi) that we see from the words of Rashi that two days of Yom Tov were always observed by the people of Yerushalayim! TOSFOS (14a, DH Shtei) explains that since people from many different locations would gather in Yerushalayim during the Yom Tov, the city would observe the most stringent customs that were common among the people. Accordingly, it can be argued that the people of the city observed two days of Yom Tov in Yerushalayim. They followed the more stringent custom of the people of Chutz la'Aretz, as people from Chutz la'Aretz were constantly present during the festival. Rashi, therefore, explains that during the times of the Lechem ha'Panim, there was not yet any rabbinical enactment to observe two days of Yom Tov outside of Eretz Yisrael (Beitzah 5b). Rather, two days were observed outside of Eretz Yisrael only when there was a doubt when the new month was established. Since there was not yet a "Minhag" per se to observe two days of Yom Tov in Chutz la'Aretz, Yerushalayim observed only one day.

(c) Perhaps when Rashi says that two days of Yom Tov were not observed "in the times" of the Lechem ha'Panim, he does not mean that in the historical era of the Beis ha'Mikdash there were not two days of Yom Tov, for that is obvious. Rather, Rashi means to say that when the Gemara discusses the duration of time from when the Lechem ha'Panim was baked until it was eaten, it is not relevant to discuss two days of any Yom Tov other than Rosh Hashanah, for the very grounds on which the question is based: such a thing does not exist in Yerushalayim. (Rashi's words are to be read as follows: "When we discuss the duration of time of the Lechem ha'Panim, there is no [pertinence to] two days of Yom Tov.")

Why does Rashi find it necessary to point this out, if it is obvious? Rashi wants to explain why other Mishnayos do not discuss "Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyos" but refer instead to two days of Rosh Hashanah. For example, the Mishnah in Shabbos (137a) teaches that it is possible for Milah to be delayed until twelve days after a birth -- when the birth occurred during Bein ha'Shemashos of Friday night, and the following week "two days of Rosh Hashanah" immediately follow Shabbos. Does this law apply to when two days of any other Yom Tov intervene as well, or may the baby be circumcised on the second day of Yom Tov?

This is actually the subject of a debate among the Rishonim. Most rule that there is no difference between Rosh Hashanah and any other Yom Tov. The TASHBETZ (3:284, cited by TESHUVOS CHASAM SOFER, YD 250) understands that this is the opinion of Rashi as well. Rashi here implies that had any other Yom Tov intervened between the baking and the eating of the Lechem ha'Panim, it also would have been necessary to bake the Lechem ha'Panim before that Yom Tov. The RAMBAM (Hilchos Milah 1:15), on the other hand, differentiates between Rosh Hashanah and other Yamim Tovim, based on the wording of the Mishnah in Shabbos.

Rashi here attempts to refute the Rambam's proof from the wording of the Mishnah that discusses Milah. Rashi emphasizes the specific reason for why this Mishnah (in Menachos) does not mention Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyos. Since this Mishnah needs to mention specifically two days of "Rosh Hashanah," the other Mishnayos that discuss a delay caused by two days of Yom Tov also mention Rosh Hashanah, even though the laws of those Mishnayos apply equally to Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyos. (M. KORNFELD)

QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to prove that there is no principle of "Ho'il." The Gemara cites the Mishnah in Makos (21b) which states that one who plows a field (Choresh) on Yom Tov receives Malkus. If there is a principle of "Ho'il," however, one should not receive Malkus, because "Ho'il" says that "since he could have done it in another, entirely permissible way, he is permitted to do it in this way as well." He could have plowed the earth in a permissible manner, such as to cover the blood of a bird that he slaughtered (in fulfillment of the Mitzvah of Kisuy ha'Dam). The principle of "Ho'il" should permit him to plow even when there is no blood to cover, since blood might be brought to that place later in the day. Since the Mishnah states that one does receive Malkus for plowing on Yom Tov, it is evident that we do not apply the reasoning of "Ho'il."

The Gemara's proof is not clear. "Ho'il" means that a Melachah is permitted on Yom Tov if it is possible to benefit from that Melachah later on Yom Tov. Even if one does not actually benefit from the Melachah, as long as it is possible to benefit from it, the Melachah is permitted. In the case of plowing, however, even if one is permitted to plow in order to cover the blood of a bird, the allowance to plow applies only when blood is actually present at the moment that he plows. At that moment, the Mitzvas Aseh of Kisuy ha'Dam overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of plowing on Yom Tov. (The Gemara here apparently maintains that the injunction against doing Melachah on Yom Tov is only a Lo Ta'aseh, and not a Lo Ta'aseh and an Aseh, as the Gemara in Beitzah (8b) concludes. See following Insight.)

However, if the Lo Ta'aseh (of plowing) is done at a different time than the Mitzvas Aseh (of Kisuy ha'Dam), then plowing should not be permitted, because the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" applies only when the Lo Ta'aseh is done at the same time as the Aseh. One may not do the Lo Ta'aseh in order to fulfill an Aseh at a later time. Accordingly, even if there is such a principle as "Ho'il," it cannot permit one to plow on Yom Tov; one may not plow now in order to fulfill a Mitzvah later. Since the act of plowing now cannot become permitted by any later event, the act is forbidden and one receives Malkus. (RABEINU DAVID, MAHARAM CHALAVAH, CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN; see also TUREI EVEN, cited by the GILYON HA'SHAS.)

(a) The TUREI EVEN answers that the Gemara here relies on another line of reasoning when it suggests that "Ho'il" should permit one to plow on Yom Tov. It does not rely on the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," but rather on the principle of "Mitoch." The principle of "Mitoch" permits one to do a Melachah based on the principle that Melachah on Yom Tov is permitted for Ochel Nefesh (food preparation). "Mitoch" states that a Melachah that is permitted to be done on Yom Tov for Ochel Nefesh may be done for any purpose. Similarly, perhaps "Mitoch" allows a Melachah to be done on Yom Tov because of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh": since a Melachah may be done in order to fulfill a Mitzvas Aseh (such as plowing when their blood needs to be covered), it may be done under any circumstances, even when there is no Mitzvah that needs to be fulfilled.

Consequently, any act of plowing that benefits a person on Yom Tov should be permitted because of "Mitoch." If it does not benefit the person until after Yom Tov, it may not be performed on Yom Tov (just as one is not permitted to cook on Yom Tov for a meal that will be eaten after Yom Tov). In such a case, "Ho'il" should apply. Any act of plowing that possibly could benefit a person on Yom Tov should be permitted because of "Ho'il" (for example, the earth turned over by the plow might be needed later in the event that a bird is slaughtered and its blood needs to be covered). The principle of "Ho'il" teaches that even if no bird is slaughtered later, the person who plowed has not transgressed an Isur.

(b) The logic of the Turei Even is problematic. "Mitoch" means that the Torah does not prohibit a Melachah on Yom Tov that could be used for Ochel Nefesh. In this case, however, the act of plowing is permitted only because of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," and not because of Ochel Nefesh. There is no reason to assume that the Torah permits the Melachah under all circumstances.

Perhaps the reason why an Aseh does not override a Lo Ta'aseh when they are not done simultaneously is because there is a concern that one might do the Lo Ta'aseh and then, later, he will not do the Aseh. That is, it is possible that the Torah itself permits one to do a Lo Ta'aseh in order to fulfill an Aseh at a later time, but, in practice, one may not rely on the Torah's allowance, either because of the doubt that one might neglect to do the Aseh later, or because the Rabanan prohibited it. If, however, one does the Lo Ta'aseh and then, later, he indeed fulfills the Aseh, perhaps retroactively he has not transgressed the Lo Ta'aseh.

According to this understanding, the Gemara's proof is straightforward. Since ("Ho'il") one might find the blood of a bird later and use the earth that he plowed for the Mitzvah of Kisuy ha'Dam, he does not transgress the Melachah d'Oraisa of plowing and thus he should not receive Malkus. (M. KORNFELD)

(c) These two explanations resolve the question according to RASHI (DH Dam Tzipor), who explains that the application of "Ho'il" in this case would permit one to plow now based on the possibility that later in the day he will find it necessary to cover the blood of birds and Chayos. However, TOSFOS (DH a'Charishah) explains that "Ho'il" would permit one to plow even when there is no blood on the ground, because had there been blood on the ground at the time of the plowing, one would have been permitted to plow.

Why, though, should "Ho'il" permit plowing in this case? A Lo Ta'aseh does not override an Aseh that will not be done until later, as we asked above.

Perhaps Tosfos understands the Gemara as RABEINU DAVID and the CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN (in the name of the RAMBAN) explain. Although there is no blood on the ground at the moment that one pushes the plow into the earth, in the fraction of a second between the time that the plow pulls up the earth and the time that the clod of earth falls down to the side of the plow, perhaps someone will come and slaughter a bird there. In such a case, the Kisuy ha'Dam will be considered done at the same time as the plowing, since one action of plowing accomplishes both the Aseh (Kisuy ha'Dam) and the Lo Ta'aseh (plowing). Therefore, "Ho'il" indeed applies, because the act of plowing now could become permitted based on what happens later (that is, a split second later) after the act of plowing.

(See the words of Tosfos in the name of the RASHBAM cited in the following Insight. Although the Rishonim reject the Rashbam's approach, it provides an additional answer to this question.)

QUESTION: The Gemara challenges the assumption that the principle of "Ho'il" would permit one to plow on Yom Tov (see previous Insight). The Gemara asks, "Is Ketishah (crushing) permitted on Yom Tov?"

Why does the Gemara assume that Ketishah is not permitted? It should be permitted because of "Ho'il," just as the Gemara assumes that plowing, Charishah, is permitted because of "Ho'il."

(a) TOSFOS (DH Charishah) cites the RASHBAM who says that, indeed, the Gemara never assumed that plowing is permitted because of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." Rather, it assumed that plowing should be permitted because when one plows in order to cover the blood of a bird, it is a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah. He plows in order to obtain earth for Kisuy ha'Dam, and not in order to create a hole or furrow in the ground.

The Gemara suggests that "Ho'il" should apply here in the following way. Since the earth is fit for Kisuy ha'Dam, one who plows is considered as though he wants the earth that he plows, and not the hole. Ketishah, in contrast, is a Melachah she'Tzerichah l'Gufah even when it is done for the sake of Kisuy ha'Dam, because one needs to crumble the earth in order to spread it on the blood. Therefore, "Ho'il" cannot permit Ketishah.

(This explanation is problematic, as the MAHARAM CHALAVAH points out. "Ho'il" should not be able to make the act of plowing into a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah when the person actually intends to soften the earth in order to sow it. "Ho'il" does not change a person's intentions.)

(b) Tosfos cites RABEINU TAM who says that the Gemara certainly knows that Ketishah is not permitted, and it also knows that Charishah is not permitted. The principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" applies to neither Melachah, because the Isur of Melachah on Yom Tov is both an Aseh ("you shall rest on Yom Tov") and a Lo Ta'aseh ("do not do Melachah on Yom Tov"). "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" applies only to the Isur of plowing during the Shevi'is year, or the Isur of plowing a field of Kil'ayim.

When the Gemara asks, "Is Ketishah permitted on Yom Tov," it includes Charishah as well in its question. (That is, it could have questioned the suggestion that Charishah is permitted on Yom Tov, without mentioning the Melachah of Ketishah.)

(c) The RIVA, cited by Tosfos Rabeinu Peretz and the Chidushei ha'Ran, suggests that when the Gemara says that Charishah is permitted because of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," the Gemara does not mean to say that one is permitted l'Chatchilah to plow on Yom Tov, because the Isur of Melachah of Yom Tov is both a Lo Ta'aseh and an Aseh. An Aseh (such as Kisuy ha'Dam) cannot override both another Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh together. Rather, the Gemara means that even though Charishah is prohibited on Yom Tov, one who plows should not receive Malkus, because even a Lo Ta'aseh together with an Aseh are pushed aside for the sake of an Aseh when, b'Di'eved, the act was already done. Even though one transgressed by doing Melachah on Yom Tov, he will not receive Malkus.

In summary, the rule that an Aseh does not override another Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh ("Ein Aseh Docheh Aseh v'Lo Ta'aseh") applies only to prohibit one from doing the Lo Ta'aseh l'Chatchilah. An Aseh does override another Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh with regard to exempting the person from Malkus.

However, now that an added Melachah of Ketishah must be done in order for the person who plows to be exempt for Malkus, "Ho'il" no longer applies. "Ho'il" applies only when there is a permitted way to exempt oneself from Malkus by doing another act in the future, but not when Malkus can be prevented through the transgression of an Isur d'Oraisa (as the MAHARAM CHALAVAH suggests). After one plows, he can exempt himself from Malkus only by performing Ketishah, a prohibited act. (Ketishah is prohibited even for the sake of Kisuy ha'Dam, just as Charishah is prohibited l'Chatchilah, since Yom Tov is an Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh.) Therefore, the principle of "Ho'il" does not apply. (M. KORNFELD, based on the Riva cited here)

(Alternatively, the Gemara's question is that Charishah should not be permitted, because an Aseh can override only the Malkus of a Lav and an Aseh, but it cannot override the Malkus of two Lavim and an Aseh. Another way to interpret the Gemara's question is that since one must still do Ketishah in order to soften the earth enough to cover the blood, his act of Charishah is not being done at the time of the Aseh of Kisuy ha'Dam (RAMBAN, cited by RABEINU DAVID). It is not clear how the Ramban understands the Gemara's answer to the question of Ketishah that "it is being done k'l'Achar Yad.")

(d) TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ writes that the Gemara means that since Ketishah is also forbidden, and one must do both acts of Charishah and Ketishah in order to cover the blood, in order to permit the act it would be necessary to utilize a double "Ho'il," and we do not rely on a double "Ho'il." (See Insights to 46:2.)