1)

(a)Hakamah is more stringent than Hafarah, says the Beraisa, inasmuch as a. silence is considered a Hakamah, but not a Hafarah - and b. Hakamah in one's heart is valid, but not Hafarah.

(b)An un-verbalized Hafarah is nevertheless valid - in a case where the husband first said 'Tli v'Ichli, Tli u'Shesi', as we learned earlier.

2)

(a)A husband can neither make Hafarah once he has made Hakamah - nor Hakamah once he has made Hafarah.

(b)We assume that 'Shesikah Mekayemes' refers to 'Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat' (a proof that 'Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat' is considered a Hakamah). It cannot refer to 'Shosek al-Menas Lekayem' - because then, there would be no difference between this case and that of 'Kiyam b'Libo Kayam ... '.

(c)We refute this proof - by establishing 'Shesikah Mekayemes' by Stam Shesikah.

3)

(a)From the fact that a woman's Neder is considered upheld if her husband fails to annul it by the end of the day - we learn that Hakamah b'Lev is effective (since the reason that it is considered upheld at the end of the day is because of the assumption that, if the husband has not annulled it by then, he wants it to take effect (which is effectively, a silent Kiyum).

(b)The Torah gave a husband a day before declaring his silence to be a Hakamah - because it is assumed that, up until then, he cannot make up his mind whether to uphold the Neder or to annul it.

(c)Rebbi Yochanan gives the Chumra of Hafarah over Hakamah as being 'Nish'alin al ha'Hekem, v'Ein Nish'alin al ha'Hefer'. One can only have the Hakamah revoked - by the end of that day; after that, it becomes irrevocable.

4)

(a)When the Pasuk writes ...

1. ... "Ki Hecherish Lah b'Yom Sham'o" - it is referring to 'Shosek al-Menas Lekayem.

2. ... "v'Im Hacharish Yacharish Lah Iyshah ... " - it is referring to Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat.

(b)'Shosek al-Menas Lekayem' cannot mean that he was silent with the intention of upholding the Neder immediately (like it did on the previous Amud) - because then, the Neder would be upheld immediately, and he would not have until nightfall to annul it.

(c)Rav Kahana proves from here - that Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat is considered a Kiyum, and the Neder cannot be annulled 'up to ten days' (proving Rebbi Chanina wrong).

(d)We cannot repudiate Rav Kahana's proof by establishing one of the Pesukim by Shosek al-Menas Lekayem, and the other, by Shosek Stam - because even if we do, the Pasuk "v'Im Hacharish Yacharish" appears a number of times, enabling us to Darshen one of the extra times with regard to Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat.

5)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah that if a woman declared a Neder just before nightfall on Shabbos evening, the husband should annul it immediately; otherwise it will be too late. If, as Rebbi Chanina maintains, Shosek al-Menas Lemeikat is not considered Hakamah - then Chazal should certainly have permitted the husband to wait until nightfall to annul a Neder that was declared just before nightfall (bearing in mind that there is no Tzorech Shabbos here). So we see that irrespective of the husband's motives, silence until nightfall constitutes Hakamah.

(b)Rava brings another disproof (in spite of the fact that Rav Kahana has already proved Rebbi Chanina wrong - just in case we are able to resolve Rav Kahana's Kashya.

6)

(a)The Mishnah in 've'Eilu Nedarim' says that if a husband says (after nightfall) that although he acknowledged the Nedarim that his wife declared to be Nedarim, he did not know at the time that a husband could annul Nedarim - he is still able to annul them (until the following nightfall).

(b)According to Rebbi Meir, if the same husband had claimed that he knew about Hafaras Nedarim, but not that the particular Neder that his wife declared could be annulled, he could no longer have annulled it - because, since he was aware that a husband can annul Nedarim, that is considered 'the day that he heard it'.

(c)The Chachamim say 'Yafer' - because, in their opinion, as long as a husband does not know that he can annul a particular Neder, it cannot be considered 'the day that he heard it'.

(d)Rav Ashi proves from Rebbi Meir's ruling - that a husband cannot annul his wife's Nedarim after nightfall, irrespective of his motives for not annulling them. And the Rabanan clearly agree with Rebbi Meir in principle, only arguing here because he was not aware that he could annul them.

7)

(a)The Tana permits a husband to annul Nidrei Inuy Nefesh. He mentions as examples, washing and Kishut - (i.e. forbidding herself to wear make-up on her face).

(b)Rebbi Yosi maintains that Kishut does not fall under the category of Inuy Nefesh - but it does fall under the category of Devarim she'Beino l'Veinah (as we shall see in the Sugya).

(c)The Rabanan will agree with Rebbi Yosi - when it comes to Nedarim forbidding Kishut on the lower part of her body.

8)

(a)We learn from the Pasuk "Bein Ish l'Ishto, Bein Av l'Vito" - that a husband and a father are permitted to annul Nedarim that affect themselves personally.

(b)Initially, we explain that the Tana of our Mishnah only mentions Nidrei Inuy Nefesh, and not Nedarim she'Beino l'Veinah - because he only mentions those Nedarim whose Hafarah is permanent, but not Nedarim she'Beino l'Veinah, whose Hafarah ceases to be effective the moment the husband divorces her (even in the event of him re-marrying her).

(c)Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri in a Mishnah later, permits a husband to annul his wife's Neder when she declares 'Konam she'Ani Osah l'Ficha' - to prevent a situation in which he divorces her, the Neder becomes effective and he is unable to re-marry her.

(d)This proves - that the husband's Hafarah of Nedarim she'Beino l'Veinah, which becomes ineffective after he divorces her, come back into effect when he re-marries her (disproving our initial explanation of the difference between Nidrei Inuy Nefesh, and Nedarim she'Beino l'Veinah).

9)

(a)We finally ascribe the Tana's omission of Nedarim she'Beino l'Veinah - to the fact that they cease to be effective in a case where her husband divorced her, and someone else married her.

10)

(a)'Im Erchatz' referred to in our Mishnah is not per se, a Lashon of Neder. The case cannot be when the woman said 'Konam Peiros Olam Alai im Erchatz' - because, based on the theory that not bathing is not considered Inuy Nefesh, why should a husband be permitted to annul such a Neder? Let her not bathe, and she will not become forbidden to eat fruit.

(b)We think that Rechitzah is not considered Nidrei Inuy Nefesh - because if it was, the Tana should have made not bathing the Neder, not the condition.

11)

(a)We learned in 'Eilu Mutarin' that if someone says 'konam Einai b'Sheinah ha'Yom Im Ishan l'Machar, Al Yishan ha'Yom' - because people are not particular about the condition (like they are about the Neder itself). Consequently, we are afraid that the Noder may sleep tomorrow, automatically causing himself to have contravened his Neder (by having slept today).

(b)In spite of that, we ask here 'Lo Tirchatz, v'Lo Litseran Peiros Olam Alah?' (without being afraid that here too, she will not pay heed to the condition and bathe, causing her to contravene her Neder) - because since she did not say 'me'ha'Yom', she will not have contravened the Neder automatically, until she eats fruit after taking a bath.

(c)The Kashya 'v'Od b'Ha Leima Rebbi Yosi, Ein Eilu Nidrei Inuy Nefesh' appears to clash with the first Kashya (where we were not in the least worried that she might bathe and become forbidden to eat). However - we are not asking on the Din of Rebbi Yosi, but on his Lashon. Since he did not say 'Ein Yachol Lehafer Mishum Nidrei Inuy Nefesh', but 'Ein Eilu Nidrei Inuy Nefesh', he seems to agree with the Tana Kama's suspicion that she might bathe and become forbidden to eat fruit. That being the case, how can he deny that this is considered Inuy Nefesh?