1)

(a)The Tana of a Beraisa cites a case where Reuven asks Shimon to lend him the cow that is standing before them, and Shimon responds by forbidding his cow or all his property on him with a Konam, should he own any other cows. What is the Din if Shimon is found to possess other cows in his lifetime?

(b)Why is Reuven permitted to have benefit from the cow if Shimon is found to possess other cows and then dies, or if he gave the cow to Reuven as a gift, (according to our initial supposition)?

(c)How do we reconcile this with Rava, who, in the previous case, forbade the loaf even after the Madir had given it to the Mudar?

(d)Rav Ashi supports this answer from the Lashon 'Nitnah Lo' (instead of 'Nasnah Lo') used by the Tana. Considering that 'Nitnah' is spelt the same way as 'Nasnah', how did Rav Ashi know to read it 'Nitnah'?

1)

(a)The Tana of a Beraisa cites a case where Reuven asks Shimon to lend him the cow that is standing before them, and Shimon responds by forbidding his cow or all his property on him with a Konam, should he own any other cows. In the event that Shimon be found to possess other cows in his lifetime - the Neder is valid and the cow is forbidden to Reuven.

(b)According to our initial supposition, if Shimon is found to possess other cows and then dies, Reuven is permitted to have benefit from the cow - because the cow is no longer Shimon's.

(c)We reconcile this with Rava, who, in the previous case, forbade the loaf even after the Madir had given it to the Mudar - by establishing the Beraisa when the Mudar received the cow from a third person (who purchased it from Shimon first).

(d)Rav Ashi supports this answer from the Lashon 'Nitnah Lo' (instead of 'Nasnah Lo') used by the Tana. Despite the fact that 'Nitnah' is spelt the same way as 'Nasnah', Rav Ashi knew to read it 'Nitnah' - from tradition.

2)

(a)Rava asked Rav Nachman 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos O Lo?'. What are the ramifications of Rava's She'eilah?

(b)How did Rav Nachman resolve it from our Mishnah ('Makom she'Notlin Alehah Sechar, Tipol Hana'ah l'Hekdesh')?

(c)What would the owner have otherwise done with it?

(d)Is Rav Nachman's reply the last word on the matter?

2)

(a)Rava asked Rav Nachman 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos O Lo?'. The ramifications of Rava's She'eilah are - whether the person who transgresses the Konam needs to bring an Asham Me'ilos or not, and whether he has to pay the principle plus an extra fifth to Hekdesh for using it b'Shogeg.

(b)Rav Nachman resolve Rava's She'eilah from our Mishnah ('Makom she'Notlin Alehah Sechar, Tipol Hana'ah l'Hekdesh') - from the fact that the owner has to pay the money to Hekdesh ...

(c)... and not to throw it into the Yam ha'Melach (as is the case with other things that are Asur b'Hana'ah).

(d)Rav Nachman's reply is by no means the last word on the matter - since it is a Machlokes Tana'im (which we are about to cite).

3)

(a)The Chachamim in a Beraisa rule 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos'. Rebbi Meir disagrees. He maintains 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos'. If there is Me'ilah, what concession goes with it?

(b)What distinction does Rebbi Meir draw between a Konam Klali and a Konam P'rati?

(c)Why is that?

(d)Like whom is the Halachah?

3)

(a)The Chachamim in a Beraisa rule 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos'. Rebbi Meir disagrees. He maintains 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos'. If there is Me'ilah however - one is also permitted to redeem it.

(b)The distinction that Rebbi Meir draws between a Konam Klali and a Konam Prati is - that whereas the above is true of a Konam Klali, a Konam P'rati cannot be redeemed ...

(c)... because, seeing as other people are not Mo'el, the Kedushah is not sufficiently strong for Pidyon to take effect.

(d)The Halachah is like Rebbi Meir - that 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos'.

4)

(a)Rav Acha Brei d'Rav Ivya asked Rav Ashi who will be Mo'el in a case where Reuven forbids a loaf of bread on Shimon and then gives it to him. On what grounds might Reuven not be Mo'el, despite the fact that he is the one who declared the Konam on the loaf?

(b)How is this a disproof to the Rambam? What does the Rambam say about someone who is Madir his friend and then provides him with a meal?

(c)Why, on the other hand, might Shimon not be Mo'el?

(d)On what grounds will this case differ from a regular case of Me'ilah, where someone who takes something from the domain of Hekdesh into his own domain may well be Mo'el even though he too, is unaware that it is Hekdesh?

4)

(a)Rav Acha Brei d'Rav Ivya asked Rav Ashi who will be Mo'el in a case where Reuven forbids a loaf of bread on Shimon and then gives it to him. Reuven might not be Mo'el, despite the fact that he is the one who declared the loaf Konam - because he did not derive any benefit from it.

(b)This is a disproof to the Rambam - who rules that someone who is Madir his friend and then provides him with a meal is Mo'el.

(c)On the other hand, Shimon might well not be Mo'el - because he can counter that he only intended to receive from Reuven something that is permitted, not something that is forbidden.

(d)This case will differ from a regular case of Me'ilah, where someone who takes something from the domain of Hekdesh into his own may well be Mo'el even though he too, is unaware that it is Hekdesh - because that only applies if he actually took it himself, whereas here, it is Reuven who gave it to him.

5)

(a)Rav Ashi resolves Rav Acha's She'eilah. Who is Mo'el in the above case?

(b)Does this absolve Shimon from Me'ilah completely?

(c)What She'eilah does the Yerushalmi ask about using a loaf as fuel that one forbade on oneself with a Konam?

(d)What does the Yerushalmi rule?

5)

(a)Rav Ashi resolves Rav Acha's She'eilah. In fact - neither in the above case is Mo'el.

(b)This does not absolve Shimon from Me'ilah completely - because, should he then take the loaf out of Hekdesh's domain (by eating it or giving it to a third person), he will certainly be guilty of Me'ilah.

(c)The Yerushalmi asks - whether someone who forbade a loaf on himself with a Konam, may use it as fuel.

(d)The She'eilah remains unresolved.

35b----------------------------------------35b

6)

(a)May the Madir ...

1. ... separate Terumos and Ma'asros on behalf of the Mudar?

2. ... bring Kinei Zavin and Zavos and the Kinei Yoldos ... on his or her behalf, should he (the Madir) happen to be a Kohen?

(b)Why, on principle, is he permitted to teach him Torah?

(c)What restriction exists in this regard?

6)

(a)The Madir may ...

1. ... separate Terumos and Ma'asros on behalf of the Mudar ...

2. ... and he may bring Kinei Zavin and Zavos and Kinei Yoldos ... on his or her behalf, should he (the Madir) happen to be a Kohen.

(b)He is permitted, on principle, to teach him Torah - because 'Mitzvos Lav Lehanos Nitnu' (the essence of a Mitzvah is not the pleasure that one derives from it, but the performance of the Mitzvah itself.

(c)This concession however - is restricted to teaching him Medrash, Halachos and Agados, but not Mikra (Tanach), as will be explained later in the Sugya.

7)

(a)They asked whether Kohanim who perform the Avodah are the Sheluchim of the people or of the Torah. What difference does it make whose Sheluchim they are?

(b)Even assuming that they are the Torah's Sheluchim, why is the Madir not forbidden to bring the Mudar's Korbanos anyway, because, as a result of the Kohen's, a Zav and a Zavah ... become permitted to eat Kodshim?

(c)In Kidushin, we conclude that they must be the Torah's Sheluchim. On what is that conclusion based?

(d)Then why, in our Sugya, do we leave the She'eilah unresolved?

7)

(a)They asked whether Kohanim who perform the Avodah are the Sheluchim of the people or of the Torah - the difference being whether a Kohen who is Madir a Yisrael, may subsequently bring his Korbanos or not.

(b)Even assuming that they are the Torah's Sheluchim, the Madir is not forbidden to bring the Mudar's Korbanos anyway because, as a result of their actions, a Zav and a Zavah ... become permitted to eat Kodshim - because that Hana'ah is only indirect (Gerama).

(c)In Kidushin, we conclude that they must be the Torah's Sheluchim - because if they were Yisrael's, how would it be possible for a Shali'ach to achieve something on behalf of someone who is unable to achieve it himself?

(d)Nevertheless, in our Sugya, we leave the She'eilah unresolved - because we are only concerned with finding a source for the Halachah in a Mishnah or Beraisa.

8)

(a)How do we counter the proof (that the Kohanim are the Sheluchim of the Torah) from our Mishnah, which permits the Madir to bring 'Kinei Zavin v'Zavos ... ' on behalf of the Mudar? Why does the Tana mention specifically those Korbanos?

(b)How does Rebbi Yochanan learn from the Pasuk in Shemini "Zos Toras ha'Zav" that the Korbanos of a Mechusar Kaparah (as opposed to Korbanos that come to atone) do not require Da'as?

(c)Can we then infer that the Madir is forbidden to bring other Korbanos (that come to atone) on behalf of the Mudar (because Kohanim are Sheluchim of the people)?

8)

(a)We counter the proof (that the Kohanim are the Sheluchim of the Torah) from our Mishnah, which permits the Madir to bring 'Kinei Zavin v'Zavos ... ' on behalf of the Mudar - by pointing out that the Tana restricts his concession to 'Kinei Zavin v'Zavos ... ' (the Mechusrei Kaparah), whose Din differs inasmuch as they can be brought even without Da'as (the knowledge of the owner). Consequently, the Kohen who brings them will not be acting as their Shali'ach, even if normally, he would be the Shali'ach of the people.

(b)Rebbi Yochanan learns from the Pasuk in Shemini "Zos Toras ha'Zav" that the Korbanos of a Mechusar Kaparah (as opposed to Korbanos that come to atone) do not require Da'as - because "Toras" comes to include even a Zav Katan, who does not have Da'as, and on whose behalf his father brings his Korbanos.

(c)We cannot then infer that the Madir is forbidden to bring other Korbanos on behalf of the Mudar - because it may well be that the Tana specifies the Korbanos of Mechusrei Kaparah to teach us that the Madir is even permitted to bring their Korbanos, even though he is permitting them to eat Kodshim (and not to preclude other Korbanos).

9)

(a)In the Beraisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman, the Tana obligates a Ketanah, a woman who is pregnant and a woman who is feeding, to use a cloth during Tashmish. Why is a Ketanah obligated to do so?

(b)How do we reconcile this with the Sugya in Yevamos, which concludes that she is danger of dying, but not that she is bound to?

(c)Based on the Pasuk (in Shemini) "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", what Kashya does this now pose on Rebbi Yochanan?

(d)So what does he Darshen from "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", if not to include a Ketanah?

9)

(a)In the Beraisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman, the Tana obligates a Ketanah, a woman who is pregnant and a woman who is feeding to use a cloth during Tashmish. A Ketanah is obligated to do so - because of the possibility that she becomes pregnant, in which case she is bound to die.

(b)The Sugya in Yevamos, which concludes that she is danger of dying, but not that she is bound to - holds that 'Children are as good as signs of physical maturity (and perhaps even better)', meaning that bearing a child determines a girl to be a Gedolah (even if she is still a Ketanah in age) at least as much and perhaps even more, that the growth of two pubic hairs.

(c)Based on the Pasuk (in Shemini) "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", this now poses the Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan (who Darshened "Zos Toras ha'Zav" to include a Ketanah) - What will he now Darshen from "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes" (seeing as we just proved that a Ketanah cannot give birth)?

(d)In fact - he Darshens from "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", that a Shotah (who also has no Da'as) is obligated to bring a Korban Yoledes, and that her husband must bring it on her behalf.

10)

(a)We base Rebbi Yochanan's Derashah on a statement of Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa. What does Rebbi Yehudah say about a woman who is obligated to bring Korbanos?

(b)Why do we need to quote Rebbi Yehudah in order to establish Rebbi Yochanan?

10)

(a)We base Rebbi Yochanan's Derashah on a statement of Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa - where he says that a man is obligated to bring all of his wife's Korbenos Chovah (obligatory Korbanos) on her behalf.

(b)If not for Rebbi Yehudah's statement, we would not be able to establish Rebbi Yochanan's Derashah - because if the husband would not be obligated to bring his wife's Korbenos Chovah, to whom would the Torah be speaking when obligating a Shotah to bring the Korban Yoledes? To the Shotah?

11)

(a)Bearing in mind that whatever a woman owns belongs to her husband, what sort of Korban is a wealthy husband obligated to bring on her behalf, should she need to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored?

(b)What is the source of the husband's obligation?

(c)Is he also obligated to bring ...

1. ... her Nedarim and Nedavos?

2. ... the Korbenos Chovah that she was already obligated to bring from before, should he divorce her?

11)

(a)Despite the fact that whatever a woman owns belongs to her husband (which means that she is actually poor), her wealthy husband is obligated to bring the Korban Oleh v'Yored of a wealthy person on her behalf.

(b)The source of the husband's obligation - lies in her Kesuvah, where her husband specifically obligates himself to cover all her obligations.

(c)He is not however - obligated to bring ...

1. ... her Nedarim and Nedavos - because Rebbi Yehudah specifically referred to 'Korbenos Chovah'. Nor does he need to bring ...

2. ... the Korbenos Chovah that she was already obligated to bring from before, should he divorce her - because in the receipt that she writes him upon receiving her Kesuvah, she foregoes all outstanding obligations up to that time.

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