HALACHAH: The Mishnah later (57a) states that when one makes a Neder that "these fruits are prohibited to me," he is prohibited not only from eating the fruits but also from eating the "exchange" ("Chilufeihen") of the fruits (when they are traded for other fruits) and from that which grows ("Giduleihen") from the fruits (when they are replanted and produce offshoots). In the Gemara here, Rami bar Chama asks what the Halachah is when a person makes a Neder to prohibit his fruit to someone else. Is the Mudar prohibited from eating the fruit received in exchange for the prohibited fruit? Perhaps one is able to prohibit the Chilufin only to himself, since the Chilufin have the status of a "Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam" (an item which does not yet exist in his possession), and a person is able to prohibit a "Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam" to himself just as he is able to prohibit someone else's item to himself. In contrast, when one prohibits his fruit to someone else, perhaps he cannot prohibit the Chilufin since the Chilufin have not yet come into his possession, and prohibiting them is like prohibiting someone else's fruit to someone else (which one cannot do). On the other hand, perhaps the Chachamim decreed that the Chilufin have the same status as the Gidulin (which are considered to be an offshoot of the fruit itself and are Asur mid'Rabanan) and thus one can prohibit the Chilufin to someone else.

The RAN (47a, DH Ba'i Rami) explains that Rami bar Chama's question involves the reasoning for the Halachah in the Mishnah (57a) that when one prohibits fruit to himself the Chilufin are prohibited as well. If the Chilufin are prohibited because the person has intention to include the Chilufin in his Neder, then he may prohibit Chilufin only to himself but not to someone else, since Chilufin are a "Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam." If, however, the Isur of Chilufin is unrelated to his intention but is simply an Isur d'Rabanan which the Chachamim enacted (wherein they prohibited the Chilufin of any Isur Hana'ah), then the Chilufin will be prohibited to his friend as well.

The Gemara attempts to answer this question from two different sources but it rejects those proofs and comes to no conclusion.

What is the Halachah in the case of one who prohibits his fruit to someone else? Are the Chilufin also prohibited or only the fruit itself?

(a) The RAN (DH ul'Inyan Halachah) reasons that the Halachah should be lenient, and thus the Chilufin of the fruit which one prohibited to his friend are Mutar. Similarly, the Chilufin of the fruit which one prohibited to himself (when he did not say, "These fruits are prohibited to me," but only, "Fruits are prohibited to me") are permitted. The Ran rules this way based on his understanding of Rami bar Chama's question. Since the only reason to say that the Chilufin are prohibited is an Isur d'Rabanan, when there is a doubt whether or not an Isur d'Rabanan applies, the principle of "Safek d'Rabanan l'Kula" dictates that the Isur does not apply (and we rule leniently). This is also the ruling of the RASHBA.

This ruling is problematic. The Gemara in Beitzah (4b; see Insights there) quotes Rav Ashi who states with regard to an Isur d'Rabanan that a prohibited object which is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" (there is a way for it to become permitted) cannot become Batel (if it becomes unidentifiable in a mixture of permitted items), and the same applies to a Safek Isur (see Rashi there). Since a Neder is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" (one can have a Neder annulled, 59a), the Chilufin should be prohibited to his friend even though it is a Safek d'Rabanan! (MITZPEH EISAN, PORAS YOSEF)

This question does not apply to the Ran's ruling with regard to the Chilufin of fruit which one person prohibited to another person because in such a case the Neder is not a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin." In such a case the Mudar himself cannot have the Neder annulled since he is not the one who made the Neder. It makes sense that the Halachah is lenient in that case. However, in a case in which one prohibited fruit to himself, the Neder is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" and the Halachah should be stringent!

1. REBBI AKIVA EIGER (Teshuvos #65, and end of Yoreh De'ah 15) and the MITZPEH EISAN answer that this rule of Rav Ashi -- that a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" is prohibited even when it is a Safek -- applies only in situations of doubt concerning what actually happened (Safek b'Metzi'us), such as in the case in Beitzah where there is a doubt whether the egg was laid on Yom Tov and is prohibited or whether it was laid on the weekday and is permitted. However, in cases of doubt concerning the Halachic ruling (Safek b'Din), such as when there is a dispute and the Halachah has not been decided in favor of either opinion, or when the Gemara asks a question and does not answer it, we rule leniently in a case of a Safek d'Rabanan even though it is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin." The Mitzpeh Eisan cites the PRI CHADASH (Hilchos Yom Tov, OC 497:3) and the SHA'AGAS ARYEH (#90) who also express this difference. The PRI MEGADIM (introduction to Hilchos Yom Tov 2:1:27) writes this as well, and he proves it from the words of the RAN himself in Beitzah (6b and 26b).

What are the grounds to differentiate between these two different types of Safek? (The Acharonim do not explain the difference.) It seems that in a case of a doubt about what happened (such as in the case of an egg that might have been laid on Yom Tov), one must be stringent since there is a possibility that the item is prohibited. That possibility (that the egg was born on Yom Tov) creates a reason for doubt, and when in doubt one must be stringent in order to avoid eating a prohibited object. If he eats the item, he eats an item that might be prohibited. In contrast, when there is a Machlokes ha'Poskim about how to rule in a certain case (or an unanswered question about how to rule, such as in the case of the Gemara here), there is no object that is undeniably prohibited. If "Safek d'Rabanan l'Kula" applies in such a case, the Halachah is decided leniently and one may be assured that he is not eating an object of Isur at all (there is not even a doubt), since the Halachah dictates that we rule leniently. If he eats the item, he will have eaten an item that was certainly permissible. (M. Kornfeld)

2. The PORAS YOSEF gives another answer. According to the Ran's understanding of the Gemara, Rami bar Chama's question applies not only to cases of Neder, in which one person prohibits his fruit to another person, but to all situations of Isurei Hana'ah. His question is whether or not there an Isur d'Rabanan prohibits the Chilufin of the fruit that are forbidden, and thus his question applies to every case in which one is prohibited to derive benefit from an item (such as Chametz on Pesach, and a Shor ha'Niskal). In all cases of Isurei Hana'ah, the item received in exchange for the prohibited item might also be Asur b'Hana'ah if there is an Isur d'Rabanan that prohibits Chilufin of an object which is Asur b'Hana'ah. Since most other Isurei Hana'ah are not "Devarim she'Yesh Lo Matirin," the principle of "Safek d'Rabanan l'Kula" certainly applies, and therefore the same ruling will apply to Nedarim.

3. In the Gemara in Beitzah (4b), it is Rav Ashi alone who teaches that a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" remains prohibited even though it is an Isur d'Rabanan. Some Poskim do not rule like Rav Ashi (see BACH, beginning of Yoreh De'ah 102, in the name of "the RASH from Bonburg"). If the Ran rules like these Poskim, there is no question from the case of a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin."

However, the Ran himself in Beitzah (4b) and the other Rishonim there rule, like Rav Ashi, that the stringency of "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" applies even to an Isur d'Rabanan. Nevertheless, some Poskim rule that in the case of an Isur d'Rabanan, when there is a Chezkas Heter we are not stringent even when the item in question is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" (MORDECHAI in Beitzah, #685, and TZELACH in Pesachim 17b). According to that opinion, there is no question on the ruling of the Ran.

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Nedarim 5:16), however, rules stringently. He writes that "when one prohibits his fruit to his friend... [the] Chilufin are a Safek. Therefore, his friend is prohibited from the... Chilufin of these fruits...."

It is clear from the Rambam's ruling that even b'Di'eved, if one exchanges those fruits the Chilufin is prohibited. Why does the Rambam rule stringently with regard to the Chilufin if it is only a Safek d'Rabanan? The LECHEM MISHNEH points out that the Rambam's reason for stringency in this case cannot be that the Isur Neder is a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin," because the Rambam clearly discusses a case in which one person made a Neder to prohibit his fruit to another person, and such a Neder is not a "Davar she'Yesh Lo Matirin" (as explained above).

Apparently, the Rambam learns that Rami bar Chama's question of whether the Chilufin are prohibited to the other person involves an Isur d'Oraisa. However, the Gemara itself states clearly that, b'Di'eved, if one exchanged the item of Isur he is permitted to use the Chilufin! Why, then, does the Rambam rule that even b'Di'eved one may not use the Chilufin?

Moreover, since the Halachah of Chilufin applies to other Isurei Hana'ah as well, the Rambam should rule with regard to other Isurei Hana'ah that the Chilufin may not be used b'Di'eved, and not only with regard to the Chilufin of Nedarim. However, the Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 8:16) rules that the Chilufin of other Isurei Hana'ah (such as the money received for selling an Isur Hana'ah) are permitted!

ANSWER: The SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 1:2, DH v'Da) and the VILNA GA'ON (OC 443:3; see also RAV SHACH zt'l in AVI EZRI) explains that the Rambam understands the Sugya like the RITVA (59a). The Ritva explains that the prohibition against exchanging an Isur Hana'ah for money or another item is an Isur d'Oraisa. If the Isur is d'Oraisa, why should the Chilufin be permitted to use b'Di'eved (LECHEM MISHNEH)?

The Ritva answers that Isurei Hana'ah have no inherent value since they have no use. Hence, if money is paid in exchange for them, that money does not represent the value of the item but is just a gift or loan given by the recipient of the item. However, since one is prohibited from having Hana'ah from the item itself, he is prohibited mid'Oraisa from selling the item, because receiving money in exchange for the item is a form of Hana'ah from the item. However, if he transgressed and sold the item, the money certainly is permitted b'Di'eved, since the money was just a gift and does not represent the value of the forbidden item.

In contrast, an item which is prohibited because of a Neder is different. When a person makes a Neder to prohibit his fruit to someone else, the fruit is prohibited only to the Mudar. When the fruit is sold, perhaps the Isur of the Neder is transferred to the money since the money represents the value of the fruit, and is not just a gift. Therefore, the money (the Chilufin) might remain prohibited to the Mudar.

This is Rami bar Chama's question according to the Rambam. Perhaps the Chilufin of a Neder are Asur mid'Oraisa since the money or items received in exchange for the prohibited fruit might indeed acquire the status of Isur that the Neder created on the fruit. The Rambam rules stringently because of "Safek d'Oraisa l'Chumra."

In contrast, the Isur in the case of other Isurei Hana'ah certainly is not transferred to the money received in return for the item (but one is forbidden by the Torah from selling the item in the first place, because one gets Hana'ah from the item by selling it), and that is why the Rambam rules that the Chilufin of other Isurei Hana'ah are Mutar b'Di'eved.