1) HALACHOS WHICH INVOLVE A "REVI'IS"
QUESTIONS: Rebbi Elazar enumerates ten Halachos which depend on the presence of a Shi'ur of a Revi'is. Five of these Halachos involve wine or blood, and five involve water, oil, or other liquids. The Gemara asks why Rebbi Elazar does not mention another Halachah which depends on a Revi'is -- the Halachah of Netilas Yadayim, for which the Shi'ur is a Revi'is of water for either one person or for two people who wash from the same Revi'is. The Gemara answers that Rebbi Elazar's list does not include cases which are subject to dispute ("b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi"). In the case of Netilas Yadayim, Rebbi Yosi argues and says that each person must use his own Revi'is and may not share a Revi'is with the other person.
The Gemara continues and asks about two other omissions from Rebbi Elazar's list -- the Halachah of a Revi'is of water for a Sotah, and the Halachah of a Revi'is of water poured onto urine (Mei Raglayim) to annul it in order to permit one to pray in its presence. Again, the Gemara answers that "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi," and those cases involve arguments.
There are a number of obvious questions on the Gemara.
(a) Why does the Gemara say that Rebbi Elazar does not list cases which involve dispute? Rebbi Elazar includes in his list the Halachah of a Revi'is of blood which is Metamei even when the blood is from two corpses, but that Halachah is the subject of a dispute! The Gemara in Sanhedrin (4a) says that although Rebbi Akiva rules that blood from two corpses is Metamei, the Rabanan (who expound the verse differently) maintain that only a Revi'is of blood from a single corpse is Metamei.
(b) Why does the Gemara say that Rebbi Elazar does not include the Halachah of Netilas Yadayim because it is the subject of a dispute? The dispute in that case is only whether two people may use one Revi'is. Everyone agrees, however, that the first person who uses the water for Netilas Yadayim must use at least a Revi'is.
(c) Since the Gemara has already established, in response to its first question, that "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi," why does it ask additional questions on Rebbi Elazar from the cases of Sotah and Mei Raglayim? The same answer of "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" applies to those questions as well.
(a) The Rishonim offer a number of answers to the first question.
1. The MEFARESH explains that although the Gemara cites Rebbi Akiva's opinion that even a Revi'is from two corpses is Metamei, Rebbi Elazar is discussing the Halachah that a Revi'is from one Mes is Metamei b'Ohel, to which both Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan agree. He quotes Rebbi Akiva's statement, in which Rebbi Akiva derives his ruling from the word "Nafshos," only because that verse is the only explicit source which teaches that a Revi'is of blood from even a single Mes is Metamei (as Tosfos in Sanhedrin 4a mentions).
2. The SHITAH MEKUBETZES cites RABEINU AZRIEL who explains that Rebbi Elazar avoids cases of dispute only in his second set of Halachos of Revi'is (the "white" set). His first set (the "red" set) includes even cases of dispute. Tosfos and the Rosh prove this from the fact that the law of Nazir is included in the list, even though the Mishnah says that there is a dispute whether the Shi'ur for a Nazir is a Revi'is or k'Zayis of wine. (If Rebbi Elazar includes in the first set of Halachos even cases which are subject to dispute, why does he avoid such cases in the second set? Perhaps his intention is merely to preserve the symmetry of two sets of five Halachos each. Without including cases of dispute in his first set, he would not have five cases in his list.)
3. RABEINU AZRIEL adds that perhaps the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan is not the type of dispute which Rebbi Elazar seeks to avoid. Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan disagree only with regard to how the verse is expounded, "Nafshos" or "Nafshas" (without the "Vav").
Perhaps Rabeinu Azriel means that both Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan agree that the Shi'ur of blood to be Metamei is a Revi'is, and they argue only about from where the Revi'is of blood must come (Rebbi Akiva maintains that it may come from two corpses, and the Rabanan maintain that it must come from one corpse). In contrast, in the case of Netilas Yadayim the Tana'im argue about the Shi'ur itself (one Tana maintains that the Shi'ur of water for Netilas Yadayim is a Revi'is, and the other Tana maintains that it is less than a Revi'is).
(b) The Rishonim do not discuss why the list omits the Halachah of a Revi'is for Netilas Yadayim of a single person. The Acharonim suggest a number of answers.
1. The KEREN ORAH proposes a simple approach. Although there is no dispute about how much water the first person must use (everyone agrees that he must use a Revi'is for Netilas Yadayim), the Tana'im disagree about the details of that Halachah -- they disagree about whether the second person may use the leftover water. Rebbi Elazar prefers not to list a Halachah whose details are subject to dispute, even though the Tana'im agree about the primary Halachah.
(Perhaps the reason why the Rishonim do not ask this question is that they follow the approach of the Keren Orah. However, this approach is not consistent with the answer of the Mefaresh to the first question. The Mefaresh explains that Rebbi Elazar includes the case of a Revi'is of blood in his count because Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan argue only about a detail in that case (must the Revi'is must come from only one Mes or may it come from two).
2. RAV CHANANYAH YOM TOV LIPA MEISLISH in his Hagahos (printed in the back of the Vilna Shas) answers in the name of the ATZEI ALMOGIM that Rebbi Elazar lists only Halachos for which the Shi'ur is a Revi'is and for which more than a Revi'is is irrelevant (that is, having more than a Revi'is is of no benefit). In contrast, with regard to Netilas Yadayim the Gemara in Shabbos (62b) says that the more water a person uses for Netilas Yadayim, the better. Therefore, Rebbi Elazar does not include this Halachah in his list.
Why does the Gemara itself not use this answer to explain why Rebbi Elazar omits the Halachah of a Revi'is for Netilas Yadayim? The answer might be as follows. The Gemara asks that Rebbi Elazar should have listed the Halachah of "Sheyarei Taharah" -- after a Revi'is has been used for Netilas Yadayim by one person, a second person may use the remaining water. When the second person washes his hands with the "Sheyarei Taharah," it makes no difference whether the first person started with one Revi'is or with a hundred Revi'iyos. In either case, the second person is left with less than a Revi'is to use for Netilas Yadayim, and therefore Rebbi Elazar should have included this Halachah in his list. The Gemara answers that "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi," and thus Rebbi Elazar does not mention the Halachah of "Sheyarei Taharah" is not mentioned. The Revi'is which the first person uses is not mentioned because the Revi'is of Netilas Yadayim is a minimum Shi'ur, but more than a Revi'is is preferable.
3. The ARZEI HA'LEVANON cites the TAM DERECH who suggests that the Gemara uses the words "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" here in a unique way. The Gemara does not mean that Rebbi Elazar prefers not to list a case subject to dispute ("Plugta"). Rather, the Gemara means that Rebbi Elazar prefers not to list a Halachah which does not always apply -- a Halachah with exceptions ("Plugta"). The Halachah of a Revi'is for Netilas Yadayim applies only to the first person, but not to the second person (according to the Tana Kama who permits the second person to use even less than a Revi'is). This is the reason for why Rebbi Elazar does not include this Halachah in his list. ("Plugta" in this context means "separation" or "division," as in Bava Basra 2b).
The wording of the Gemara is more precise according to the approach of the Tam Derech, because the Gemara writes simply "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" and makes no mention of which Tana argues, or with what Halachah he argues, in contrast to the other cases for which the Gemara mentions the dissenting view.
(c) Why does the Gemara ask that Rebbi Elazar should include other Halachos in his list when the Gemara has already explained that Rebbi Elazar does not list Halachos which are subject to dispute ("b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi")? This answer applies to all of the cases in question!
1. The TAM DERECH (see above) explains that each time the Gemara answers, "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi," it means something different. The first time the Gemara says "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" it means that Rebbi Elazar is not discussing Halachos with exceptions, as mentioned above. The second time the Gemara says "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" it means that Rebbi Elazar does not list a Halachah which depends on a Machlokes Tana'im. This answer, however, does not explain why he omits the Halachah of Mei Raglayim, because one Amora (in Berachos 25b) maintains that both the Tana Kama and Rebbi Zakai agree that a Revi'is is needed to annul the Mei Raglayim "ba'Sof" (when it is already present), and only when the water was there first, before the Mei Raglayim, does one Tana maintain that any amount ("Kol she'Hu") suffices. Another Amora there, however, asserts that the Tana Kama and Rebbi Zakai argue even when the Mei Raglayim was there first. The Gemara here answers that "b'Plugta Lo ka'Mairi" -- Rebbi Elazar excludes from his list even a Halachah which depends on a Machlokes Amora'im, such as the Halachah of Mei Raglayim.
2. Perhaps the Gemara initially understood that Rebbi Elazar does not include in his list a Halachah which is subject to dispute only when he follows the dissenting opinion (which states that the Halachah does not require a Revi'is). He does include a Halachah which is subject to dispute when he agrees with the Tana who says that the Shi'ur is a Revi'is. (The ROSH, cited by the SHITAH MEKUBETZES, suggests such an approach with regard to the first five Halachos of Revi'is (the "red" ones) which Rebbi Elazar mentions.)
Accordingly, the Gemara assumed that Rebbi Elazar follows the view of Rebbi Yosi in the case of Netilas Yadayim, the view of Rebbi Yehudah in the case of Sotah, and the view of Rebbi Zakai in the case of Mei Raglayim. The Gemara answers that Rebbi Elazar follows the dissenting opinion in each case, and that is why he does not include those cases in his list.
2) A NAZIR WHO EATS FIVE TYPES OF GRAPE PRODUCTS
QUESTION: The Beraisa states that a Nazir who eats wet grapes, dry grapes (raisins), grapeseeds, and grape peels, and then squeezes grapes and drinks the juice, receives five sets of Malkus.
Why does he receive five sets of Malkus? If witnesses warned with (with Hasra'ah) before he ate each item, he certainly receives Malkus for each act, even if each act would not have been mentioned individually in the verse. The Mishnah in Makos states clearly that a Nazir who drinks wine five times with five separate Hasra'os before each act is liable for five sets of Malkus.
If, however, he was warned with only one Hasra'ah before he started to eat all of the different forbidden items, he should not be liable for five sets of Malkus, because the Hasra'ah applied only to the first act. By the time he eats the last of the five items, the time period of "Toch Kedei Dibur" has passed, and thus the original Hasra'ah is no longer effective to make him liable. Even when each of the items he eats is prohibited by a separate mention in the Torah ("Shemos Mechalkos"), he cannot be liable for Malkus for the separate Isurim without a specific Hasra'ah for each one.
If he mixed together all five of the items, and the mixture contains a k'Zayis of each one in an amount of "bi'Chedei Achilas Pras," and none of the Isurim annul any of the others because they are all "Nosen Ta'am" and because "k'Zayis bi'Chedei Achilas Pras" is mid'Oraisa, then the Gemara should prove from this Beraisa that Rav Dimi was correct and "k'Zayis bi'Chedei Achilas Pras" is mid'Oraisa (see beginning of 36b)! (KEREN ORAH. This question is actually posed by TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ.)
The Gemara in Makos (20b) asks a similar question with regard to the Isur of "Kore'ach" (pulling one's hair out in mourning for one who died). The Gemara cites a Beraisa which derives from a verse that a person who performs multiple acts of Korchah is liable for every act ("Korchos Mechalkos"). The Gemara asks that this law is difficult to understand: if the person performed five acts of Korchah after he received five Hasra'os, he certainly is liable for five sets of Malkus even without the verse. On the other hand, if he performed five acts of Korchah after he received a single Hasra'ah, he should be liable for only one set of Malkus because the Hasra'ah cannot apply to the second and subsequent Korchos (since those acts were done after "Toch Kedei Dibur" from the Hasra'ah, or, alternatively, even if those acts were done within "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the Hasra'ah, perhaps a single Hasra'ah cannot apply to more than a single act; see Insights to Yevamos 101:1:a).
The Gemara there answers that one is liable for separate acts of Korchos when he does five Korchos in a single action, such as by using all of the fingers on his hand to make five Korchos simultaneously. This answer obviously does not apply to the case of Nazir, since it is impossible to eat (and drink) a k'Zayis of five different items at one time.
(a) The KEREN ORAH points out that TOSFOS in Makos explains that the Gemara's answer there is not the only answer to the question. The Gemara could have answered that the person performed five Korchos one after the other with only one Hasra'ah beforehand (and he did not wait "Toch Kedei Dibur" between each Korchah). According to Tosfos there, the Gemara here also may refer to a person who eats the five items consecutively and does not pause "Toch Kedei Dibur" between each one. This indeed seems to be the intention of Tosfos and Tosfos Rabeinu Peretz here.
According to this understanding, the Hasra'ah the person receives must be a single Hasra'ah phrased in a way which includes all five acts, such as, "Do not eat any product of the vine." If a separate Hasra'ah is given for each Isur, such as, "Do not eat moist grapes," "Do not eat dried grapes," "Do not eat grapeseeds," and so on, the person should be liable only for the first item he eats; what he eats subsequently is already after "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the Hasra'ah for that item. Since he received Hasra'ah for five separate acts of eating and not for a single act which includes all forms of eating, his acts are not considered one long act of eating which starts immediately after the Hasra'ah. This is why Tosfos here (DH v'Al Zeh b'Atzmo) explains that one who eats moist grapes and dried grapes is liable for two sets of Malkus only when the Hasra'ah given was, "Do not eat grapes" (with no specific mention of "moist" or "dry" grapes).
(b) However, RASHI in Makos (ibid.) implies that a person is not liable for five sets of Malkus (for five acts of Korchah or for give acts of drinking wine) when he does the acts consecutively after a single Hasra'ah, even when the acts are "Toch Kedei Dibur" of each other. (As discussed in Insights to Yevamos 101:1, Rashi maintains that a Hasra'ah is "used up" after the first act of Aveirah is performed, even if the second Aveirah is done "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the first.) According to Rashi, why is the person liable for five sets of Malkus in the case of the Gemara here?
Perhaps Rashi agrees with Tosfos that when a Nazir eats five items of Isur without pausing for an instant between each one, the Hasra'ah before he begins to eat applies to everything he eats. Everything he eats is included in a single act of eating which started within "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the Hasra'ah. This case is not comparable to the case in the Gemara in Makos in which a person performs five acts of pulling out his hair. There, he must finish pulling out one batch of hair before he begins to pull out the next (if he is using one hand); there must be a pause between the two acts. In contrast, a Nazir can continue to fill his mouth while he swallows whatever is already in his mouth. Like the case of multiple Korchos, a Nazir's extended act of drinking wine throughout the entire day cannot be considered one long act because it is physically impossible to swallow a liquid at the same time he puts more into his mouth. This is why Rashi in Makos writes that the Nazir is liable for only one set of Malkus when he drinks wine all day, even if he does not pause between drinks.
According to Rashi, the wording of the Gemara here is precise. The Gemara says that he is liable for five sets of Malkus for eating four different solid foods from the vine, and he is also liable for drinking juice squeezed from the grapes. According to Rashi, the Gemara deliberately mentions the Isur of grape juice only at the end of the list of the acts the Nazir performed. Had he consumed the juice (a liquid) earlier, he would have had to pause before he ate another grape product and the Hasra'ah would not have applied to whatever he ate after the pause.
(c) The previous two answers are applicable only if, in order to make the person liable for Malkus, the Hasra'ah does not need to include the words of the verse which prohibits the act punishable with Malkus. If the Hasra'ah must include mention of each of the five types of products individually, the Nazir would not be liable for Malkus until he eats all of them within "Toch Kedei Dibur" (as mentioned in (a) above). If, however, the Hasra'ah must include the source in the verse for the punishment of Malkus for that act, how can the Nazir be liable for all five acts? (See RASHI to Shevuos 20b, DH v'Azharasei and DH Achalti; see also MINCHAS CHINUCH #35 and #209.)
The answer is that perhaps the Gemara refers to a person who indeed mixes these five types of Isurim and begins to eat them all together within "Toch Kedei Dibur" of the Hasra'ah. Why, though, should the Nazir be liable for eating all five items? The Gemara in Zevachim (71a, cited by TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ) states that Isurim which are mixed together are Mevatel each other (such as in the case of a mixture of Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei; one who eats the mixture is not liable because each Isur is a Mi'ut (minority) and is Batel b'Rov). The answer may be that different Isurim which are only subcategories of a general Isur do not annul each other. Since all of the Isurim of a Nazir are subcategories of products of the vine, they cannot become Batel to each other. Therefore, even if "k'Zayis bi'Chedei Achilas Pras" is mid'Rabanan when the Isur is Batel b'Rov mid'Oraisa, in the case of this mixture the Nazir will be liable mid'Oraisa for each item since they do not become Batel when mixed together.