How does the Beraisa establish the Pasuk in Bechukosai (in connection with which animals must be sacrificed and which can be redeemed) "ve'Im Kol Beheimah Temei'ah ... "?
On what grounds are we forced to ignore its simple meaning (i.e. a non-Kasher species)?
And what does the Tana learn from the Pasuk there " ... asher Lo Yakrivu Mimenu Isheh la'Hashem"?
The Beraisa establishes the Pasuk in Bechukosai (in connection with which animals must be sacrificed and which can be redeemed) "ve'Im Kol Beheimah Temei'ah ... " - by a Ba'al-Mum (which it refers to as 'Tamei', the source of our previous suggestion).
We are forced to to ignore its simple meaning (i.e. a non-Kasher species) - because we already have a Pasuk to teach us that ("ve'Im ba'Beheimah Temei'ah u'Padah be'Erkecha").
And the Tana learns from the Pasuk there " ... asher Lo Yakrivu Mimenu Isheh la'Hashem" - that it is only on a permanent blemish that a Hekdesh animal may be redeemed, but not on a passing one (that prevents the animal from being sacrificed today, but is gone tomorrow).
Rav Huna bar Mano'ach queries Shmuel (who learns that 'she'Nitme'u' in the Reisha of our Mishnah is 'La'av Davka') from the Seifa of the Mishnah itself 'ha'Ofos, ve'ha'Eitzim ve'ha'Levonah u'Kelei Shareis, mi'she'Nitme'u, Ein lahen Pidyon'. Why are birds not redeemable?
What reason does Rav Huna bar Mano'ach initially give for the latter three (Eitzim, Levonah and K'lei Shareis) that poses a Kashya on Shmuel?
Eitzim and Levonah are only subject to Tum'ah because of Chibas ha'Kodesh. What does this mean?
Rav Huna bar Mano'ach queries Shmuel (who learns that 'she'Nitme'u' in the Reisha of our Mishnah is 'La'av Davka') from the Seifa of the Mishnah itself 'ha'Ofos, ve'ha'Eitzim ve'ha'Levonah u'K'lei Shareis, mi'she'Nitme'u Ein lahen Pidyon'. Birds are not redeemable - because (unlike animals) they adopt Kedushas ha'Guf the moment they are declared Hekdesh (and do not require a K'li Shareis to attain it).
Rav Huna bar Mano'ach initially explains that the latter three (Eitzim, Levonah and K'lei Shareis) are not redeemable - because Machshirei Korban (such as Menachos and Nesachim) cannot be redeemed as long as they are Tahor, and the above three are not subject to Tum'ah (as we will now explain), posing a Kashya on Shmuel, as we will now explain.
Eitzim and Levonah are only subject to Tum'ah because of Chibas ha'Kodesh - meaning that under normal circumstances, raw materials other than food are not subject to Tum'ah, and it is only because they are Hekdesh that the Torah gives them a Din Tum'ah.
Why is Chibas ha'Kodesh not applicable with regard to ...
... Eitzim?
... Levonah?
And why can Tum'ah not be the reason with regard to K'lei Shareis?
How do we refute this Kashya on Shmuel? If Nesachim and Menachos are redeemable when they are Tahor, why are Eitzim, Levonah and K'lei Shareis not?
What makes wood for the Mizbe'ach uncommon?
Chibas ha'Kodesh is not applicable here with regard to ...
... Eitzim - because we are speaking about wood that has not yet been cut to size, and ...
... Levonah - because it has notyet been sanctified in a K'li Shareis.
Neither can Tum'ah be the reason that K'lei Shareis cannot be redeemed - since they can easily be Toveled in a Mikvah.
We refute this Kashya on Shmuel however, by accepting his ruling with regard to Nesachim and Menachos - which are easy to replace, whereas Eitzim, Levonah and K'lei Shareis, which are uncommon, the Rabanan declared unredeemable.
Wood for the Mizbe'ach is uncommon - because it must be free of worms (as we learned in the ninth Perrek).
What does the Beraisa say about unblemished animals that one declares Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis?
What reason does the Tana give for this?
Rav Papa assumes that Shmuel had not heard of this Beraisa. Why is that? What if he had?
On what grounds do we refute Rav Papa's supposition?
The Beraisa rules - that unblemished animals that one declares Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis can only be redeemed for the purpose of bringing them on the Mizbe'ach ...
... because whatever is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach, never leaves the realm of Mizbe'ach (meaning that it does not go out le'Chulin).
Rav Papa assumes that if Shmuel had heard of this Beraisa - he would have retracted his statement (since there is no difference between animals that are fit to go on the Mizbe'ach and Menachos and Nesachim).
We refute Rav Papa's supposition however. In that - Shmuel knew of this Beraisa, yet he did not retract because he places animal Korbanos in the category of things that are uncommon (and on which the Chachamim therefore decreed), since the slightest blemish (such as eye's-web) renders them Pasul.
Rav Kahana disagrees with Shmuel. What does he say?
According to one Lashon, Rebbi Oshaya agrees with Rav Kahana. What does the second Lashon say?
Rebbi Elazar makes a compromise. Basically he holds like Rav Kahana. In which sole case does he hold like Shmuel?
And he learns it from a Pasuk in Vayikra (in connection with the Korban Oleh ve'Yored). What does he learn from the Pasuk there regarding a Korban ...
... Ashir "me'Chataso"?
... Ani "al Chataso"?
Rav Kahana disagrees with Shmuel. He maintains - that Menachos and Nesachim can only be redeemed when they are Tamei, but not when they are Tahor.
In the first Lashon, Rebbi Oshaya agrees with Rav Kahana, but in the second - he agrees with Shmuel.
Rebbi Elazar makes a compromise. Basically he holds like Rav Kahana, holding like Shmuel only with regard to - the Asiris ha'Eifah of a Minchas Chotei Ani.
And he learns it from a Pasuk in Vayikra (in connection with the Korban Oleh ve'Yored). He learns from the Pasuk (in connection with a Korban ...
... Ashir) "me'Chataso" - that if after designating a lamb as his Korban, he becomes poor, the lamb automatically goes out to Chulin.
... Ani) "al Chataso" - that if after designating an Asiris ha'Eifah for his Minchah, he becomes rich, he is obligated to redeem the flour, and use the proceeds towards purchasing a lamb or a goat for his Chatas.
Based on the Beraisa that we are about to discuss, what did Rebbi Oshaya hear about a Minchah that a Kohen rendered Pigul, according to Rebbi Shimon (regarding the Din of Tum'as Ochlin)?
What does the Tana Kama of the Beraisa say about Isurei Hana'ah (such as Orlah, K'lai ha'Kerem and Shor ha'Niskal ... )?
What is he referring to when he includes ...
... 'Shor ha'Niskal'?
... 'Petter Chamor'?
Why can he not be referring to where the ox has actually been stoned and the donkey has already stopped convulsing?
Based on the Beraisa that we are about to discuss, Rebbi Oshaya heard that according to Rebbi Shimon a Minchah that a Kohen rendered Pigul - is not subject to Tum'as Ochlin.
The Tana Kama rules that Isurei Hana'ah (such as Orlah, K'lai ha'Kerem and Shor ha'Niskal ... ) - are subject to Tum'as Ochlin.
When he includes ...
... 'Shor ha'Niskal' - he is referring to a Shor ha'Niskal that one Shechts (after Beis-Din have declared that it is Chayav Sekilah).
... 'Petter Chamor' - he is referring to a first-born donkey that one Shechts on behalf of a Nochri, and which is still convulsing ...
... because once the ox has been stoned and the donkey has stopped convulsing - they are Tamei Tum'as Neveilus, rendering the Tum'as Ochlin irrelevant (since Tum'as Neveilus is more stringent than Tum'as Ochlin [in that even a k'Zayis is Metamei, whereas Tum'as Ochlin needs to be a k'Beitzah in order to be Metamei).
What did Rebbi Shimon say about all of the above?
On what grounds does he then concede to the Tana Kama that Basar be'Chalav is Metamei Tum'as Ochlin?
But did a Shor ha'Niskal (and the other animals mentioned in the Beraisa) not also have a Sha'as ha'Kosher before it gored?
Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan ascribes Rebbi Shimon's ruling to the Pasuk in Shemini (in connection with Tum'as Ochlin) "mi'Kol ha'Ochel asher Ye'achel". How does he learn it from there?
Rebbi Shimon ruled that all of the above - are not Metamei Tum'as Ochlin.
He concedes to the Tana Kama however, that Basar be'Chalav is Metamei Tum'as Ochlin - because it had a Sha'as ha'Kosher (it was originally permitted [see Rabeinu Gershom]) or because even after mixing them together, they remain permitted until one cooks them together (see Gilyon Maharsha).
A Shor ha'Niskal (and the other animals mentioned in the Beraisa) however, did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher before it gored - because as long as the animal is alive, it is be'Chezkas Isur until it has been proved to have been Shechted; and besides, a live animal is never subject to Tum'ah.
Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan ascribes Rebbi Shimon's ruling to the Pasuk (in connection with Tum'as Ochlin) "mi'Kol ha'Ochel asher Ye'achel" - which implies that food that one can feed to others is Tamei Tum'as Ochlin, but not food that one cannot [such as Isurei Hana'ah]).
What does Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah in the name of Rebbi Shimon learn from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' " ... ki Am Kadosh Atah la'Hashem Elokecha, Lo Sevashel G'di ba'Chaleiv Imo" (in Re'ei) "ve'Anshei Kodesh Tih'yun Li, u'Basar ba'Sadeh T'reifah Lo Socheilu" (Mishpatim)?
Why did he then give the reason for his conceding to the Tana Kama as the fact that it originally had a Sha'as ha'Kosher?
Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah in the name of Rebbi Shimon learns from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' " ... ki Am Kadosh Atah la'Hashem Elokecha, Lo Sevashel G'di ba'Chaleiv Imo" (in Re'ei) "ve'Anshei Kodesh Tih'yun Li, u'Basar ba'Sadeh T'reifah Lo Socheilu" (Mishpatim) - that Basar be'Chalav, like T'reifah, is Mutar be'Hana'ah.
When he gave the reason for his conceding to the Tana Kama that Basar be'Chalav is Tamei Tum'as Ochlin as the fact that it originally had a Sha'as ha'Kosher - he was merely adding a second reason to the previous one ('Chada ve'Od Ka'amar').
We query Rebbi Oshaya from a Beraisa. What does Rebbi Shimon there say about Nosar being Metamei Tum'as Ochlin?
'Lan Lifnei Zerikah, Eino Metamei Tum'as Ochlin, le'Achar Zerikah Metamei Tum'as Ochlin'. Why is that?
What did he say about ...
... Pigul, with regard to both Kodshei Kodshim and Kodshim Kalim?
... Pigul by a Minchah? How does this pose a Kashya on Rebbi Oshaya?
We answer that the Beraisa is speaking about a Minchah that had a Sha'as ha'Kosher, whereas Rebbi Oshaya is speaking about one that did not. What is the case of a Minchah that did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher?
We query Rebbi Oshaya from a Beraisa, where Rebbi Shimon rules - that there are cases of Nosar being Metamei Tum'as Ochlin and cases of Nosar that are not.
'Lan Lifnei Zerikah, Eino Metamei Tum'as Ochlin, le'Achar Zerikah Metamei Tum'as Ochlin' - because the former did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher, whereas the latter did.
He stated that ...
... Pigul, both with regard to Kodshei Kodshim and Kodshim Kalim - is not Metamei Tum'as Ochlin, whereas ...
... Pigul by a Minchah - is, a Kashya on Rebbi Oshaya (who said that according to Rebbi Shimon, it is not).
We answer that the Beraisa is speaking about a Minchah that had a Sha'as ha'Kosher, whereas Rebbi Oshaya is speaking about one that did not - i.e. where the owner declared the wheat Hekdesh whilst it was still attached to the ground.
What problem do we have with this answer? Why do we think that even wheat that is sanctified when it is still attached to the ground ought to have a Sha'as ha'Kosher?
We cite the first Lashon of Rebbi Oshaya himself on the previous Amud. What did he say there, that will resolve the problem?
According to the second Lashon however ('Afilu Tehorin Nifdin'), the Kashya remains. What problem do we have with the answer that since the Minchah was not redeemed, it is considered as if it did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher? What principle does Rebbi Shimon hold that clashes with this?
What reason does Rebbi Shimon in a Beraisa give for his ruling that a Parah Adumah is Metamei Tum'as Ochlin?
What does Resh Lakish add to that (creating the current problem)?
The problem with this answer is that even wheat that is sanctified when it is still attached to the ground ought to have a Sha'as ha'Kosher - because it can be redeemed.
We cite the first Lashon of Rebbi Oshaya himself on the previous Amud, where he said - 'Temei'in Nifdin, Tehorin Ein Nifdin' (in which case until it became Tamei, the Minchah did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher).
According to the second Lashon however ('Afilu Tehorin Nifdin'), the Kashya remains. The problem that we initially have with the answer that since the Minchah was not redeemed, it is considered as if it did not have a Sha'as ha'Kosher is - that Rebbi Shimon himself holds 'Kol ha'Omed li'Pados, ke'Paduy Dami' (Whatever stands to be redeemed, it is as if it has already been redeemed).
Rebbi Shimon in a Beraisa explains that a Parah Adumah is Metamei Tum'as Ochlin - because it had a Sha'as ha'Kosher.
To which Resh Lakish adds - that even if the Parah has already been Shechted and is waiting to be burned it can be redeemed (from which we can see that it is considered a Sha'as ha'Kosher because it can be redeemed, even if ultimately, it is not.
How do we answer the Kashya? What basic difference exists between a Parah Adumah (that gives it a Sha'as ha'Kosher) and a Minchah (that does not)?
What problem do we have with this from 'Lan Lifnei Zerikah' in our Mishnah, where the Tana rules 'Ein Metamei Tum'as Ochlin'?
How do we establish the Beraisa ('Yesh Nosar ... ') in a way that renders it 'Lo Hayah lo Sha'as ha'Kosher'?
And how do we answer the Kashya as to why the Tana then switches to 'Lan le'Achar Zerikah', to find a case of Haysah Lo Sha'as ha'Kosher, and not simply where there was time in the day to perform the Zerikah?
We answer the Kashya by differentiating between a Parah Adumah - which stands to be redeemed, and a Minchah - which does not.
The problem with this from 'Lan Lifnei Zerikah' in our Mishnah, where the Tana rules 'Ein Metamei Tum'as Ochlin' is - that there too, they could have performed Zerikah, and it was a Mitzvah to do so, yet the Tana, placing it in the category of 'Lo Hayah lo Sha'as ha'Kosher', rules 'Ein Metamei Tum'as Ochlin'.
So we establish the Beraisa ('Yesh Nosar ... ') - where the Korban was Shechted so close to dusk that there was not time in the day to perform the Zerikah (in which case it really was a case of 'Lo Hayah lo Sha'as ha'Kosher').
And to answer why the Tana then switches to 'Lan le'Achar Zerikah' to find a case of Haysah lo Sha'as ha'Kosher, and not simply where there was time in the day to perform the Zerikah - we explain 'Hachi Nami Ka'amar ... ' (meaning that when the Beraisa draws a distinction betwen 'Lan li'Fenei Zerikah ... and 'Lan le'Achar Zerikah', it actually means to differentiate between whether it was not fit to perform Zerikah (i.e. there was no time to do so) or whether it was (there was time to do so).

