QUESTION: The Mishnah states that a Minchah offering from which the Kemitzah was taken she'Lo Lishmah is valid, but it does not fulfill the owner's obligation. What is a case of taking the Kemitzah of a Minchah offering she'Lo Lishmah? RASHI explains (based on the Gemara later on 2b), "Such as when one pledged to bring a Minchas Marcheshes, and he brought it and the Kohen separated a Kemitzah and said, 'I am hereby taking a Kemitzah for the sake of a Minchas Machavas.'" This is the Shinuy Kodesh of a Minchah offering to which the Mishnah refers.
The KEREN ORAH explains why the case of a Shinuy Kodesh for Menachos is different from the Shinuy Kodesh for Zevachim (animal offerings), as discussed at the beginning of Zevachim. An example of a Shinuy Kodesh for Zevachim is when one offers a Korban Olah with intention that it is a Korban Shelamim. That is, he makes a change in the essence of the Korban. Each Korban has a unique Kedushah and purpose, and intention that one type of Korban should serve as a different type is a Shinuy Kodesh. This form of Shinuy Kodesh, however, does not apply to Menachos, because the four types of Minchah offerings are essentially the same. They have the same Kedushah and serve generally the same purpose. The difference between them is merely the type of utensil used and how the flour is cooked or fried. Despite this significant difference between offerings of Zevachim and offerings of Menachos, a Hekesh teaches that the law of Shinuy Kodesh which applies to Zevachim also applies to Menachos, and intent to offer one type of Minchah as another type of Minchah, even though the only difference between them is the means of preparation, still constitutes a Shinuy Kodesh.
However, apparently there is a case of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos which is identical to the Shinuy Kodesh of Zevachim: when the Minchah is brought not as an independent offering, but as a Minchah that accompanies an ordinary Korban -- a Minchas Nesachim. When one offers the Minchas Nesachim of a Korban Olah with intention that it is the Minchas Nesachim of a Korban Shelamim, this constitutes the same type of Shinuy Kodesh that applies to Zevachim. Since each Minchas Nesachim has the Kedushah of, and provides the Kaparah of, the Korban with which it is offered, a Shinuy Kodesh of this type of Minchah is exactly like a Shinuy Kodesh of the Korban itself. Why does Rashi (or the Gemara) not give this case as an example of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos? Why must Rashi explain that there is a new type of Shinuy Kodesh, wherein even a change that does not affect the Kedushah of the offering (but changes the offering to another type of Minchah that merely was prepared differently) is also considered a Shinuy Kodesh? (NEZER HA'KODESH)
(a) The NEZER HA'KODESH answers that since a Minchas Nesachim is brought together with a Korban and is subordinate to the Korban, it is not subject to independent intentions. That is, when the Korban itself is offered with the proper intent, Lishmah, that intent establishes the purpose of the Minchah as well and it cannot be altered. Therefore, there is no case of a Shinuy Kodesh for a Minchas Nesachim (neither from a Minchas Nesachim of one type of Korban to that of another type of Korban, nor from a Minchas Nesachim to a Minchas Nedavah).
(b) The CHAZON ISH (Teshuvos #32) disagrees with the assumption of the Nezer ha'Kodesh. According to the Chazon Ish, a Minchas Nesachim does not acquire the Kedushah of the Korban with which it is offered, and it is not considered subordinate to that Korban. Although the Korban is the cause for bringing the Minchas Nesachim, the Minchas Nesachim itself is an independent Korban and has its own unique Kedushah of Minchas Nesachim.
Accordingly, one who offers the Minchah of a Korban Olah with intention that it is the Minchah of a Korban Shelamim has not made a Shinuy Kodesh, because all Menachos brought with the different Korbanos have the same Kedushah of Minchas Nesachim, and they are prepared in exactly the same manner. This is why the Gemara is forced to say that there is a new type of Shinuy Kodesh, wherein intention to offer one type of Minchas Nedavah as another type of Minchas Nedavah indeed constitutes a Shinuy Kodesh, even though the only difference between the various types of Minchas Nedavah is the manner of preparation.
(One may ask, however, that according to the Chazon Ish, why does the Gemara not say that the case of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos is bringing a Minchas Nedavah with intent that it is a Minchas Nesachim, or vice versa?) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)


QUESTION: RASHI (DH Aval Machshavah) explains that when a Machshavah to offer a Korban as a different type of Korban than the one for which it was originally designated is recognizable to everyone as false, it is not considered a Machshavah and does not disqualify a Korban Minchah. Rashi adds that when the Gemara discusses a "Machshavah" with regard to Kodshim, it refers to the verbal expression of a thought.
Rashi infers from the fact that the Gemara calls an obviously false Machshavah a "Machshavah that is recognizable" that with regard to Kodshim, a Machshavah means a verbal declaration of the thought, because it is the verbal declaration that makes the falseness of a Machshavah recognizable.
Other Rishonim (TOSFOS SHANTZ cited by the SHITAH MEKUBETZES to Bava Metzia 43b, and SEFER HA'ESHKOL, Hilchos Shechitas Chulin #13) also prove from the Gemara here that a Machshavah with regard to Kodshim must be verbally expressed in order to be effective.
However, other Rishonim (RAMBAM, SEFER HA'CHINUCH; see Insights to Zevachim 2:1) maintain that a thought alone suffices as a valid Machshavah with regard to Kodshim, and it does not need to be expressed verbally. How do these Rishonim understand the Gemara here? If the Machshavah is merely a cognition and not an articulated expression in the Kohen's mind, then how can it be a "Machshavah that is recognizable"? Even if it needs to be recognizable only to the Kohen who has the Machshavah, how is a mental cognition with no verbal expression recognizable?
ANSWER: Apparently, even the Rishonim who maintain that Machshavah alone suffices agree that the Machshavah is valid only because it has the strength and validity of a Dibur, a spoken statement. The KEHILOS YAKOV (Zevachim 1:2) proposes that even if a Machshavah alone is effective, it is not effective if the Kohen had an unarticulated thought in his mind to offer the Korban for a different purpose than the purpose for which it was designated. Rather, the Kohen must mentally articulate the words in his mind in order for the thought to be effective. He must say in his mind the words, "I hereby slaughter this animal for the sake of a Korban Olah," or "I hereby slaughter this animal for the sake of Shimon." This is similar to the other situations in the Torah where Machshavah is effective, such as making an animal a Temurah, or separating Terumah. In those cases, one must mentally articulate his intent in his mind. Accordingly, the power of the Machshavah is that it is considered as if words were actually spoken. Therefore, the Rishonim who maintain that a Machshavah alone suffices agree that the Machshavah must be comprised of acceptable words in order to have validity, and not words which -- had they been articulated -- would have been recognizably false.
The necessity for the Machshavah to be expressed in words (either mentally or orally, according to the different views of the Rishonim) may be understood as follows. The Gemara in Zevachim (2b) teaches that a Korban offered without specific intent is considered to have been offered Lishmah and is valid. Even when there is a mere thought of Lo Lishmah, that intent does not change the "Setama Lishmah" status of the Korban. Only when one articulates the Lo Lishmah intent (either mentally or orally, depending on the views of the Rishonim) does the Torah then empower his Dibur to disqualify the Korban. (See footnotes to Shitah Mekubetzes to Menachos 2b, #6.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)