1)

(a)Our Mishnah rules in a case where the owner asks the Shali'ach to bring an object (which is Hekdesh, though he doesn't realize it) from the window, and he brings it ...

1. ... or from a bag, which he does, only he claims that he was referring to a different window or bag that - the owner is Mo'el.

2. ... from a bag instead (or vice-versa) - that the Shali'ach is Mo'el.

(b)In a case where the owner gives a P'rutah to a 'Chashu' to purchase something, who is Mo'el if the Shali'ach brings ...

1. ... what the owner instructed him to bring - the owner is Mo'el.

2. ... something else - the storekeeper is Mo'el (when he spends it).

(c)And in a case where the owner sends a Shali'ach to purchase something, but remembers that it is Hekdesh money before the Shali'ach, the Tana rule that the store-keeper is Mo'el and not ...

1. ... the owner - because the moment the Shali'ach remembered, he became a Meizid, who is not subject to Me'ilah.

2. ... the Shali'ach - because a 'Chashu' is not Chayav to perform Mitzvos.

(d)To prevent the store-keeper from being Mo'el - the owner should redeem the coin on a P'rutah or on a K'li, because Hekdesh can be redeemed with money or with something that has an intrinsic value.

2)

(a)The first ruling in the Mishnah (where the owner claims that he was referring to a different window or bag) comes to teach us - the principle Devarim she'be'Leiv Einan Devarim (we do not contend with what a person thinks but with what he says).

(b)The problem with the second ruling, which ascribes Me'ilah to the owner, provided the 'Chashu' performed his Sh'lichus, is that - a 'Chashu' does not have Da'as (intelligence), so how can he be considered a Shali'ach?

(c)Rebbi Elazar replies that the Chachamim gave the 'Chashu' the Din of an oil vat. The Mishnah in Taharos rules that - olives that begin to sweat whilst they are in ...

1. ... the vat are Muchshar Lekabel Tum'ah.

2. ... the box (after they have been picked) are not.

(d)The reason for this is - because whilst the olives are in the vat, the owner is pleased that the olives have begun to sweat, as it is a sign that they are ready to be pressed, which is not the case whilst they are in the box.

3)

(a)According to Rebbi Elazar, we learn from the Mishnah that - even though the vat does not have Da'as, it nevertheless renders the olives Muchshar Lekabel Tum'ah. Likewise, the 'Chashu' causes the owner to be Mo'el since there too, he is pleased with what the 'Chashu' did.

(b)Rebbi Yochanan answers the Kashya by comparing a 'Chashu' in our Mishnah to a Mishnah in Eruvin, which rules that if a monkey or an elephant carries the Eruv to its location - the Eruv is valid (even though they have no Da'as), because there too, the owner is pleased with what they did.

4)

(a)In a case where the owner remembers before the Shali'ach hands the money to the store-keeper, our Mishnah ascribes Me'ilah to the latter. Rav Sheishes establishes the Mishnah where the Shali'ach remembered too - because otherwise, we learned in a Beraisa that the Shali'ach would be the one to be Mo'el (and not the store-keeper).

5)

(a)In a case where the owner gives the Shali'ach a P'rutah and instructs him to purchase with half, earthenware lamp-holders, and with half, wicks, and he purchases all of one or all of the other, the Mishnah rules that - neither is Mo'el.

(b)He does not ascribe Me'ilah to ...

1. ... the owner - because his instructions were not carried out.

2. ... the Shali'ach - because the Shinuy involves half a P'rutah, and there is no Me'ilah on less than a P'rutah.

(c)The Tana also rules in a case where the owner instructs the Shali'ach to purchase ...

1. ... lamps from one location and wicks from another, and the Shali'ach switches the locations that - the Shali'ach is Mo'el.

2. ... an Esrog for two P'rutos, and he purchases an Esrog with one P'rutah and a pomegranate with the other - that both the owner and the Shali'ach are Mo'el.

6)

(a)Rebbi Yehudah holds that, in the latter case, the owner is not Mo'el - because he can claim that he expected a large Esrog but he received only a small and bad one (this will be explained shortly).

(b)Based on the previous Machlokes, in a case where the owner gives the Shali'ach a golden Dinar with the instructions to purchase a shirt, and he buys a shirt with three Dinrim (half a golden Dinar) and a cloak with the other three, the Tana Kama will hold that - they are both Mo'el, whereas according to Rebbi Yehudah, only the Shali'ach is Mo'el.

7)

(a)We try to extrapolate that if Reuven sends Shimon to purchase a Kur of land from Levi and he goes and purchases only a Lesech (half a Kur), the sale is valid - from the case in the Seifa, where the owner gave the Shali'ach a golden Dinar with the instructions to purchase a shirt, and he bought a shirt with three Dinrim ... , and where the Tana rules that even the owner is Mo'el.

(b)To refute the proof, we interpret the Tana Kama's words 've'Halach ve'Heivi lo bi'Sheloshah, Chaluk' to mean that - the shirt that the Shali'ach obtained for three Dinrim was a bargain and was really worth a golden Dinar.

(c)When Rebbi Yehudah cites the owner as saying 'Chaluk Gadol Hayisi Mevakesh, ve'Heveisa li Katan ve'Ra', he really means to say that - he did a bad bargain, because, had he paid the full Dinar Zahav, they would have given him one worth two.

8)

(a)We prove that Rebbi Yehudah means what we just said he does from his ruling in a Beraisa, where in a case where the Shali'ach purchased a golden Dinar's-worth of legumes with only half of the golden Dinar that the owner gave him - he concedes that the owner will be Mo'el too ...

(b)... because whether one pays a P'rutah or a Dinar, one receives the equivalent amount of P'rutos-worth that one paid (no bargains here, for the owner to complain), because legumes are generally sold - in multiples of P'rutos (in which case the owner would have no claim against the Shali'ach, and he would be Mo'el too).

(c)But had they been sold by assessment - then Rebbi Yehudah would absolve the owner from Me'ilah, like he does in the case of the shirt (because he can claim that, had the Shali'ach paid the full Dinar as instructed, he would have received two Dinar's-worth.

9)

(a)Our Mishnah now discusses someone who deposits Hekdesh money with his friend. If that friend would be a banker, he would be permitted to use that money (if it was not Hekdesh) - provided the money was loose, but not if it was wrapped.

(b)Consequently, in a case where the money is Hekdesh - if it is handed over wrapped, the money remains in the domain of Hekdesh, and it is the banker who is Mo'el when he spends it. But if it is handed over loose, then it is the Gizbar who is Mo'el, and not the Shali'ach.

(c)If the friend is a private person - then either way, he is forbidden to use the money, in which case he will be Mo'el when he spends it.

(d)According to Rebbi Meir, a store-keeper has the Din of private person - Rebbi Yehudah ascribes to him the Din of a banker.

10)

(a)Rebbi Akiva rules that if a P'rutah of Hekdesh falls into someone's purse or if he declares one P'rutah in his purse Hekdesh, he will be Mo'el as soon as he spends the first P'rutah. According to the Chachamim - he is only Mo'el when he spends the last P'rutah in the purse.

(b)The basis of their Machlokes is whether a Safek Mo'el (such as in our case, where each P'rutah is a Safek) is Chayav an Asham Me'ilos (Rebbi Akiva) or not (the Chachamim [see Tosfos DH 'P'rutah shel Hekdesh'])

(c)Rebbi Akiva concedes however, that if the owner declared 'P'rutah min ha'Kis Zeh Hekdesh' that - he is only Mo'el when he spends the last P'rutah (as we will now explain).

11)

(a)When Rav Dimi arrived from Eretz Yisrael, he quoted Resh Lakish, who asked in what way the previous case (where Rebbi Akiva conceded to the Chachamim) differs from the preceding one. In reply to which Rebbi Yochanan established the Seifa - where the owner specifically declared 'Lo Yiftor Kis Zeh min ha'Hekdesh' (by the time the last P'rutah is spent, Hekdesh must have taken place).

(b)According to Ravin (when he arrived from Eretz Yisrael) Resh Lakish queried Rebbi Akiva's ruling from a Mishnah in Menachos, where the Tana rules that if someone who owns one large ox and one small one, declares one of them Hekdesh - the larger one is Hekdesh (because one tends to be Makdish generously).

(c)We can extrapolate from there that - if both oxen were the same, then the first one that came to hand would be Hekdesh. If not for Rebbi Yochanan's reply, this would clash with Rebbi Akiva's final ruling in our Mishnah - according to whom the last one ought to be Mo'el (because if it were the first one, then it would make no difference which one was larger).