1)

(a)The Mishnah in Erchin learns from the Pasuk in Vayikra ...

1. ... "Yakriv Oso" that, if need be, Beis-Din will force a person to fulfill his Neder and bring his Korban.

2. ... "li'Retzono" that he must bring it of his own freewill.

(b)We reconcile the two seemingly contradictory Pesukim by combining the two, permitting the Beis-Din to beat him until he agrees to bring his Korban.

(c)Despite the fact that he has been forced and doesn't really want to bring the Korban, we nevertheless refute Rava's proof ...

1. ... from there that 'Devarim she'ba'Lev Einam Devarim" on the grounds that deep down, he really wants to attain an atonement (and bring his Korban). Consequently, once he has been beaten into submission, he really does agree to bring it wholeheartedly.

2. ... from the Seifa which issues the same ruling with regard to Gitei Nashim and Shichrurei Avadim (in cases where he is obligated to give his wife a Get or to set his slave free) because there too, he really wants to perform the Mitzvah of obeying the words of the Chachamim.

2)

(a)Rav Yosef attempts to prove that 'Devarim she'ba'Lev Einam Devarim' from the Mishnah in ha'Omer 'ha'Mekadesh es ha'Ishah ve'Amar Lah ke'Savur Hayisi she'Hi Kohenes ve'Harei Hi Leviyah ... ' which concludes 'Mekudeshes'.

(b)Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's proof however on the grounds that there, the Tana does not mean to say that she is definitely Mekudeshes, but that she is Safek Mekudeshes, and will still require a Get should someone else betroth her.

3)

(a)We also refute Abaye's proof from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Af-al-Pi she'Amrah be'Libi Hayah Lehiskadesh Lo, Af-al-Pi Kein Einah Mekudeshes' (implying 'Devarim she'ba'Lev Einam Devarim') on the grounds that the reason there could well be because she does not have the authority to negate his condition (as we explained there).

(b)Rav Chiya bar Avin quotes Rav Chisda who quoting Rav Huna, who finally proves that 'Devarim she'ba'Lev Einam Devarim' from the Mishnah in Me'ilah. The Tana there rules that if a Shali'ach, following instructions, brings Hekdesh money from a specific window or from a specific container the Meshale'ach is Mo'el, even if he claims that he really meant the Shali'ach to bring it from a different location (in which case the Shali'ach would have been Mo'el).

(c)We try to refute Rav Huna's proof from there on the grounds that his claim is based on an attempt to exempt himself from bringing a Korban (and that is why we cannot believe him [not on account of ('Devarim she'ba'Lev ...']). We ...

1. ... initially counter this argument however on the grounds that if that were so, he would have claimed that he was a Meizid (i.e. he asked the Shali'ach to fetch the money in the knowledge that it was Hekdesh money, whereas Me'ilah is confined to Shogeg).

2. ... counter the argument that a person would not portray himself as a Rasha by interpreting 'Meizid' to mean that he remembered that the money was Hekdesh after the Shali'ach had left to fetch it (in which case he would not be a Rasha).

(d)This Halachah is based on what we learned earlier, that as opposed to other Mitzvos, by Me'ilah we say 'Yesh Shali'ach li'D'var Aveirah'. Consequently provided the Meshale'ach is a Shogeg and the Sheli'ach does not change the Shelichus, the Meshale'ach is Moel. Otherwise, it is the Shali'ach who is Mo'el.

4)

(a)What subsequently happened to that man who sold his property in order to go and live in Eretz Yisrael (and specifically said so) was that he went, but could not settle there, so he returned.

(b)In the first Lashon, Rava invalidated the sale on the grounds that going to live in Eretz Yisrael incorporates settling there (and since he was unable to settle, it was as if he had been prevented from going).

(c)In the second Lashon he declared the sale valid, because going to live in Eretz Yisrael and settling there, are independent issues, and the fact is, that he went.

(d)In another episode, Rav Ashi, in the fist Lashon, upheld the sale of someone who sold his property in order to go and live in Eretz Yisrael, and just didn't go, on the grounds that he could have gone. The difference between this Lashon and the second Lashon, where he said 'Who stopped him from going' is a case where a slight Oneis prevented him from going. According to the first Lashon, he could still have gone with a bit of effort, and the sale is valid; whereas according to the second Lashon, one can no longer ask 'Who stopped him', because the Oneis stood in his way, and the sale is void.

5)

(a)If someone sent his Shali'ach to betroth for him a woman in one location, and he went and betrothed her in a different one, the betrothal is void. The betrothal would have been valid had he merely told the Shali'ach that he will find her in such and such a place (which is no more than an indication), without actually instructing him to betroth her there.

(b)The Tana found it necessary to repeat this Mishnah ...

1. ... in the case of a Get, despite having mentioned it here because whereas by Kidushin he wants to marry the woman, and therefore insists that the Kidushin takes effect in a place where he has many friends, who will not attempt to break-up the engagement, whereas by Gitin we may well have thought that it makes no difference to him where the Get is handed over.

2. ... here, seeing as he has mentioned it in Gitin because a Get carries with it a stigma, which he wants to avoid in places where he is known, but by Kidushin perhaps, it would make no difference to him where it takes place.

6)

(a)If someone betroths a woman on condition that she has not made Nedarim, and then discovers that she has, the Kidushin is void. In a case where he married her without stipulating and then found that she had made Nedarim however our Mishnah rules that she loses her Kesuvah

(b)She requires a Get either mi'de'Rabbanan, or mi'd'Oraysa due to the Safek that maybe he does not mind a woman who makes Nedarim (see Rashash).

(c)The Tana repeats exactly the same set of Halachos with regard to blemishes because all blemishes that invalidate Kohanim from performing the Avodah will also negate Kidushin.

(d)The Tana learns this Mishnah here because of the Din of Kidushin (inserting the Din of Kesuvah by the way), and in Kesuvos -because of the Din of Kesuvah (inserting the Din of Kidushin by the way).

7)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if someone sends Sivlonos (the gifts that a man sends to his betrothed) to ...

1. ... two women whom he betrothed with one Perutah, or to ...

2. ... a woman whom he betrothed with less than a Perutah the Kidushin is void.

(b)We do not combine the Sivlonos with the half-Perutah that he gave her because he did not send her the Sivlonos as Kidushin, but as a gift.

(c)When the Tana says 've'Chein Katan she'Kidesh', he is referring to a Katan who sent Sivlonos after he became a Gadol.

8)

(a)Having taught us ...

1. ... that if someone is Mekadesh two women with a Perutah the Kidushin is invalid, the Tana nevertheless needs to add the Din of someone who is Mekadesh one woman with less than a Perutah because even if in the former case (where he did after all, give a Perutah) people may err and believe that the Kidushin is valid (and therefore not have the intention of supplementing the Kidushin with the Sivlonos), in the latter case (where he did not give a Perutah), we might have thought that everyone surely knows that the Kidushin is not valid (and that he must therefore have given Sivlonos with the express intention of supplementing the Kidushin).

2. ... both of the above, the Tana finds it necessary to add the third case of 'Katan she'Kidesh' because, even if not everybody is an expert in the differences between a Perutah and less than a Perutah, everyone does know however, that a Katan cannot effect Kidushin (in which case, the Sivlonos that he sends when he grows up are certainly intended as Kidushin). Therefore, the Tana needs to teach us that this is not the case.

(b)When Rav Huna and Rabah say 'Chosheshin le'Sivlonos' they mean that when a man sends gifts in the presence of witnesses to a woman with whom he became engaged (but did not make Kidushin), we suspect that he means to betroth her with the gifts. Consequently, should someone else subsequently betroth her, she will need a Get from the first man, for the second Kidushin to be effective.

(c)In the first Lashon, when Rabah queries himself from our Mishnah, which does not contend with the possibility that the man sent Sivlonos as Kidushin, Abaye replies that the reason that there, the gifts are no more than a follow up (as the Mishnah explicitly writes) is because there, he already betrothed her once.

9)

(a)In the second Lashon, Rabah actually supports his opinion from the fact that the Mishnah concludes 'she'Machmas Kidushin ha'Rishonim Shalach', implying that had there not been a prior Kidushin, then we would indeed contend with the possibility that the gifts were meant to be Kidushin.

(b)Abaye counters Rabah's proof however, by suggesting that it is not for the inference that the Tana concludes in this way, but to inform us that even when there was a prior Kidushin (and we know that he was definitely interested in betrothing the woman), we still do not contend with the possibility that the gifts were meant as Kidushin.

(c)In answer to 'Mai Havi Alah', Rav Papa responds by qualifying Rav Huna and Rabah's ruling restricting it to a place where the custom is to betroth first and send Sivlonos afterwards, but not to a place where people tend to send gifts first (where the Sivlonos will not indicate anything).

(d)The Chidush is that even in a place where a distinct minority tend to send Sivlonos first and make the Kidushin afterwards, we nevertheless go after the majority, and suspect that she is Mekudeshes (see Tosfos Ri ha'Zaken).

10)

(a)Rav Acha bar Rav Huna asked Rava whether, even in a place where the custom is to send Sivlonos before the Kidushin, she would not be Mekudeshes, on account of the Kesubah that she is holding to which the latter replied that the fact that she is holding a Kesuvah is no reason to change her Chazakah.

(b)One again we ask 'Mai Havi Alah?' Rav Ashi responds by qualifying Rava's ruling to where the custom is to write the Kesuvah before the Kidushin, but where people have the custom to write it only afterwards, we do indeed suspect that she is Mekudeshes.

(c)Again, we ask 'P'shita?' meaning that where people have the custom to write the Kesuvah afterwards, is it not obvious that we suspect that she is Mekudeshes.

(d)We answer this Kashya by establishing the Chidush in a place where it is difficult to find a Sofer, and where we might have thought that, since we are not aware that Kidushin took place, they probably found a Sofer, and took the opportunity to write the Kesuvah early.

11)

(a)If a man betroths a woman and her daughter or two sisters simultaneously neither of them is Mekudeshes.

(b)'Simultaneously means that when handing one of them a Perutah on behalf of them both, he said 'Harei Sh'teichen Mekudashos Li').

(c)Our Mishnah tells the story of the man who betrothed five women, two of whom were sisters, with a basket of Sh'mitah figs that belonged to the women themselves.

(d)One of the women received the Kidushin on behalf of all the women. The Chachamim ruled there that the sisters were not betrothed.

12)

(a)Rami bar Chama learns from the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos "Ishah el Achosah Lo Sikach Litzror" the Din in our Mishnah (that if a man betroths a woman and her daughter or two sisters simultaneously neither of them is Mekudeshes).

(b)Rava refutes Rami bar Chama 's interpretation of the Pasuk there, based on the Pasuk "ve'Nichr'sah ha'Nefashos ha'Osos mi'Kerev Amam" which is only possible if one of the women was betrothed first, and he committed incest with the other one afterwards (but not in the above case, where neither woman is betrothed).

(c)So Rava establishes ...

1. ... the Pasuk when he first betrothed one of the women ... (as we just explained) ...

2. ... and our Mishnah when he betrothed them both simultaneously.

(d)Rava gives the source of the Din in our Mishnah as the principle cited by Rabah 'Kol she'Eino ba'Zeh Achar Zeh, Af be'Bas Achas Eino' ('Whatever cannot take effect one after the other, cannot take effect simultaneously either').