1)

(a)According to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, Mora and Piryah v'Rivyah are not considered 'Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in k'Echad' (from which we will learn that women are Peturos from Mitzvos Aseh she'he'Zman Gerama'), because both are needed. We cannot learn ...

1. ... Piryah v'Rivyah with a 'Mah Matzinu' from Mora Av va'Eim because we would then learn from "v'Chivshuhah" that a woman who is not involved in capturing, is not obligated to perform the Mitzvah of Piryah v'Rivyah either.

2. ... Mora with a 'Mah Matzinu' from Piryah v'Rivyah because if the Torah did not specifically obligate her, we would exempt her from Mora even when she is unmarried, because when she grows up and marries, she will certainly become exempt.

(b)According to those who hold 'Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in k'Echad Melamdin', we have a problem ...

1. ... from Matzah and Hakhel (like we asked on the previous Amud) inasmuch as we ought to learn from them that women are obligated in all Mitzvos Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama.

2. ... from Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'Ben (according to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, who cannot include Piryah v'Rivyah in this list) inasmuch as we ought to learn from them that women are exempt from all Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zman Gerama.

(c)Rava cited the Papuna'i (i.e. Rav Acha bar Yakov) who answered these questions in one fell swoop.

(d)Rav Acha bar Yakov ...

1. ... learns from the Pasuk in Bo "v'Hayah Lecha l'Os Al Yadecha ... Lema'an Tiheyeh Toras Hash-m b'Ficha" that the entire Torah is compared to Tefilin, from which we exempt women from Mitzvos Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama ...

2. ... extrapolates from there that Mitzvos Aseh she'Lo ha'Zman Gerama, women are Chayav.

2)

(a)The problem with this according to those who hold that Tefilin is a Mitzvas Aseh she'Lo ha'Zman Gerama is that in that case, we ought to exempt women even from 'Mitzvos Aseh she'Lo ha'Zman Gerama'.

(b)We answer that Rebbi Meir is the Tana who considers Tefilin to be a Mitzvas Aseh she'Lo ha'Zman Gerama and he holds 'Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad, Ein Melamdin' (whereas the current problem only arose according to those who hold 'Melamdin').

(c)Rebbi Yehudah, on the other hand, who holds 'Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'in k'Echad, Melamdin, and who also considers Tefilin to be a Mitzvas Aseh she'Lo ha'Zman Gerama, will exempt women from all Mitzvos Aseh she'ha'Zman Gerama from Matzah, Simchah and Hakhel (and, as we have already explained everybody agrees that 'Sheloshah Kesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad, Ein Melamdin').

(d)Abaye may well hold 'Ishah, Ba'alah Mesamchah'. However, we are only able to include Hakhel in this list because we do not hold like him.

3)

(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav as well as Tana d'bei Rebbi Yishmael learns ...

1. ... from the Pasuk in Naso (in connection with the Korban Shevu'as ha'Pikadon by Gezel ha'Ger) "Ish O Ishah Asher Ya'aseh mi'Kol Chat'os ha'Adam" that a woman has the same Din as a man regarding all Malkus and other punishments in the Torah ...

2. ... d'bei Rebbi Eliezer learns from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ... "v'Eleh ha'Mishpatim Asher Tasim Lifneihem" that she has the same Din as a man regarding Dinim (money matters), whilst ...

3. ... d'Bei Chizkiyah learns from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "v'Im Shor Nagach Hu ... v'Heimis Ish O Ishah" that if others kill her, they are subject to the death-penalty (or to Kofer in this case) as if they had killed a man.

(b)We cannot learn ...

1. ... the second case (Dinim) from the first (Kaparah) because it may well be that the Torah does not want to deprive a woman of the opportunity to attain an atonement, whereas in matters of Dinim, seeing as it is unusual to find women in the business world, the Torah will preclude her from the Dinim involved.

2. ... the first from the second because we might have said that the Torah incorporates women in this area because women, like men, need to earn a livelihood, whereas Kaparah is perhaps confined to men, who are obligated to perform all the Mitzvos, but not to women (who are exempt from Talmud-Torah).

3. ... the first two cases from the third (death) because there we might have thought that the Torah wants to protect her life, but will exempt her from matters concerning money and Kaparah.

4)

(a)We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Emor El ha'Kohanim Bnei Aharon" that female Kohanim are not included in the Lav pertaining to Kohanim of not rendering themselves Tamei Mes.

2. ... "Lo Sakifu Pe'as Roshchem v'Lo Sachchis Es Pe'as Zekanecha" that whoever is included in the latter prohibition, is also included in the former, but not someone who is not (i.e. women).

(b)Apart from the logical fact that a woman has no beard to destroy, we attribute the prohibition of 'Lo Sashchis' not applying to women to the change of Lashon from "Roshchem" (in the plural) to "Zekanecha" (in the singular) from which we then extrapolate "Zekanecha", 've'Lo Z'kan Isht'cha'.

5)

(a)We initially establish the Beraisa 'Z'kan Ishah v'ha'Saris she'He'elu Se'ar, Harei Hein k'Zakan l'Chol Divreihem' by the Lav of "Lo Sashchis". The problem with this is that it clashes with what we just learned, that a woman is Patur from "Lo Shashchis".

(b)Abaye refutes this interpretation of the Beraisa however, on the basis of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Pe'as" "Pe'as" (see Tosfos DH 'le'Hashchasah') where we preclude women from the Lav by Yisre'elim (in Kedoshim) from Kohanim (in Emor), where the Torah writes "Emor El ha'Kohanim Bnei Aharon" ('ve'Lo Benos Aharon').

(c)We query the need for this 'Gezeirah-Shavah' on the basis of a 'Kal va'Chomer' if Kohanos are precluded, even though Kohanim have been given more Mitzvos than Yisre'elim, then Yisre'eiliyos should certainly be precluded.

(d)We refute the 'Kal va'Chomer' however, and establish the need for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah', based on the argument of 'Hifsik ha'Inyan' meaning that, if not for the need to Darshen the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (which the Torah must have inserted for a reason), we would have confined the Derashah "Bnei Aharon", 've'Lo Benos Aharon', to the Lav of Tum'ah, where it is written, and not to the other Lavin that are written later in the Parshah (such as "Lo Sashchis").

6)

(a)We query this argument however, on the grounds that we can still apply the Sevara 'Hifsik ha'Inyan', and as for the 'Gezeirah-Shavah', we need it for something else.

(b)Based on the Pasuk "Lo Sashchis" written by Yisre'elim, and "Lo Yegaleichu" written by Kohanim, we can learn from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' that one is only Chayav if one removes hair in a way that combines shaving with destruction.

(c)One is not Chayav for cutting one's beard ...

1. ... with scissors because it is not called 'Hashchasah' (it does not destroy the hair down to the root).

2. ... a plane because it is not called Gilu'ach' (since that is not the way people shave).

(d)We finally discard the Sevara of 'Hifsik ha'Inyan' and still remain with the previous Derashah from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' on account of the extra word "Pe'as" (since the Torah could have written "v'Lo Sashchis Es she'bi'Zekeinecha" [and the word "Es" would still have been considered a 'Gezeirah-Shavah', as if the Torah had actually written "Pe'as"]). And the Torah inserts "Pe'as" to teach us that the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' (connected with "Bnei Aharon" 've'Lo Benos Aharon') extends to the rest of the Parshah too.

7)

(a)So we try to establish the Beraisa 'Z'kan Ishah v'ha'Saris she'He'elu Se'ar, Harei Hein k'Zakan l'Chol Divreihem' with regard to Tum'as Nega'im meaning that the Din of Tum'ah b'Makom Se'ar (e.g. two yellow hairs instead of white ones) applies to the beard of a woman or a Saris (should they grow one), just like it does to that of a man.

(b)We initially reject this proposal on the grounds that the Torah has already incorporated women in the Din of Nig'ei Se'ar, when it begins the Parshah with the words "Ish O Ishah".

8)

(a)So we try to establish it with regard to Taharas Nega'im meaning that in the event that a woman (or a Seris) did contract Tzara'as on her beard, then, after completing the Tum'ah process, she will require shaving and bringing birds, just like a man.

(b)We reject this suggestion too however on the grounds that wherever there is Tum'as Nega'im, it goes without saying that there is Taharas Nega'im.

(c)When we conclude 'Itz'trich, Salka Da'atach Amina l'Tzedadim', we mean that we re-establish the Beraisa by Tum'as Nega'im, and that we might otherwise have thought that "Ishah" only pertains to Nig'ei Se'ar of the head ("b'Rosh") which is written next to "Ishah", but not to that of the beard ("O b'Zakan"), which is written after it.

9)

(a)Isi ben Yehudah, quoting a Beraisa, extrapolates from the word ...

1. ... "Banim (in the Pasuk in Re'eh "Banim Atem la'Hashem Elokeichem, Lo Sisgodedu v'Lo Sasimu Korchah Bein Eineichem la'Mes") that women are not subject to 'Korchah' either ("Banim", 've'Lo Banos').

2. ... "Am (in the Pasuk there "Ki Am Kadosh Atah la'Hashem Alokecha") that they are however, subject to 'Gedidah' (because women are included in 'Am').

(b)The Tana prefers to include women in Gedidah and to preclude them from Korchah (rather than vice-versa) because the former applies both to a location on the body where there is hair and to one where there is not, whereas the latter is confined to one of hair.

(c)We ask why "Banim Atem" should not incorporate both Korchah and Gedidah, and "Ki Am Kadosh" include women in the Din of 'Seritah' ("v'Seret la'Nefesh Lo Sitnu ... " [in Kedoshim]). The advantage in learning like this (even though 'Seritah' is not written in the same Parshah is that it avoids having to invert the order of the Pasuk in Re'eh, which pairs "Banim Atem" with Korchah, and "Am Kadosh" with Gedidah, even though this is not the way that they are juxtaposed.

(d)If we did learn that way, the difference between Seritah and Gedidah would be that one of them pertains to cutting with an implement; the other, to using one's hands.

10)

(a)We conclude however, that according to Isi ben Yehudah, "Ki Am Kadosh" cannot pertain to Seritah exclusively (and not Gedidah) because he considers Seritah and Gedidah to be one and the same (and there is no difference between whether one makes the cut with an implement or with one's hand.