Question (Chachamim of Fum Nahara, citing Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua): The Beraisa is different than our case!

In the Beraisa, she took the money for a deposit. Since she is responsible for it, she is afraid to throw it back;

In our case, the money was given for Kidushin. If she does not want to be Mekudeshes, she should throw it back!

Objection (Rav Achai): This question is ill-founded. Not all women know the Halachah!

Perhaps she thinks that even regarding Kidushin, if she throws the money and it is lost, she is responsible!

Question (Rav Acha bar Rav): What is the law in such a case?

Answer (Ravina): We never heard Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua's question, so we rule like Rava (she is not Mekudeshes);

You (in Fum Nahara) heard his question. You must be concerned that perhaps she is Mekudeshes!

A woman was selling belts. A man came and stole one; she asked him to return it.

The man: If I do, will you be Mekudeshes to me?

She took it in silence.

(Rav Nachman): She is not Mekudeshes. She can say 'I merely took what is mine.'

Question (Rava - Beraisa #1): If one was Mekadesh a woman with something that he (openly) robbed, extorted, or (secretly) stole, or he grabbed money from her hand and was Mekadesh her with it, she is Mekudeshes.

Answer: That is when he was Meshadech her beforehand (she had agreed to accept Kidushin from him).

Question: What is the source that Shiduchin changes the Halachah?

Answer (Beraisa #2): If a man told a woman 'take this money that I owe you', and retracted and said 'be Mekudeshes to me with it':

If he retracted at the time he gave it, if she wants, she is Mekudeshes. If she does not want, she is not Mekudeshes;

If he retracted after he gave it, even if she wants, she is not Mekudeshes.

Question: What is considered 'wanting' and 'not wanting'?

Suggestion: Wanting is saying 'yes'. Not wanting is saying 'no'.

Rejection: (The latter statement) implies that had she not said 'no', but rather was silent, she would be Mekudeshes. If so, the Beraisa should say 'she is Mekudeshes. If she does not want, she is not Mekudeshes'!

Answer: Rather, wanting is saying 'yes'. Not wanting is being silent.

If she is silent, she is not Mekudeshes, because she can say that she took her property. This contradicts Beraisa #1!

(Summation of Answer (i)): In Beraisa #2, there were no Shiduchin. In Beraisa #1, there were Shiduchin.

After Rav Asi died, Chachamim gathered to recall his teachings.

(R. Yakov citing Rav Asi): Just like a woman is not acquired through less than a Perutah, also land is not.

Question (Rabanan - Beraisa): Even though a woman is not acquired through less than a Perutah, land can be.

Answer (R. Yakov): It can be acquired through less than a Perutah through Chalipin (but not via Kinyan Kesef).

(Beraisa): We may acquire (through Chalipin) with a Kli, even if it is not worth a Perutah.

(Rav Yehudah): Anyone not expert in the laws of divorce and Kidushin should have no involvement with them.

(Rav Asi): Unqualified people who rule about them are more harmful than the generation of the flood - "false oaths, murder, theft, v'Ni'uf (illicit Bi'ah) Partzu (multiplied), bloods touched bloods..." (the proof from the verse concludes below).

Interjection: What is the source (that Ni'uf refers to sin with a married woman)?

Answer: This is like Rav Yosef translated, (Partzu means that) they fathered children from others' wives; they added sin to sin.

Conclusion of the proof: The Navi continues "... therefore the land will mourn, desolate of all inhabitants, animals of the field, birds, also fish will die;

This is worse than the flood. Then there was no decree against the fish - "everything on the land died."

Suggestion: Perhaps the desolation comes only for all the Aveiros in the verse!

Rejection: "The land will mourn due to false oaths" (even one Aveirah causes it).

Suggestion: Perhaps the desolation comes for false oaths by themselves, or for everything else in the verse!

Rejection: "Partzu" is written without a 'Vov' (it is not connected with the other Aveiros).

(Mishnah): If a woman brought her Korban Chatas and died, her heirs bring the Olah that goes with it.

(Shmuel): This is only if she designated the Olah when she was alive. If not, they do not bring it.

He holds that Shibud (a lien on a person's property to pay his debts) is not mid'Oraisa.

(R. Yochanan): The heirs bring the Olah even if she never designated it.

He holds that Shibud is mid'Oraisa.

Question: We already learned this argument of Shmuel and R. Yochanan elsewhere! (Why was it repeated?)

(Rav and Shmuel): A Milveh Al Peh (a loan without a document) cannot be collected from the borrower's heirs, nor from Meshu'abadim (land that the borrower sold after he borrowed).

(R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish): It can be collected from the heirs or from Meshu'abadim.

Answer: It is necessary to teach the argument in both cases:

Had we learned only about a loan, one might have thought that Shmuel admits regarding a Korban, since that obligation is written in the Torah.

Had we learned only about a Korban, one might have thought that R. Yochanan makes the heirs pay only then, because a debt written in the Torah is as if it is written in a document, but regarding a loan, he would agree that the heirs and buyers are exempt;

We learn that this is not so.

(Rav Papa): The Halachah is, a Milveh Al Peh can be collected from heirs, but not from Meshu'abadim.

It can be collected from heirs, because Shibud is mid'Oraisa;

(Chachamim enacted that) it can not be collected from Meshu'abadim, since (there is no publicity to such loans and) buyers were unaware.

(Mishnah): A woman acquires herself through a Get or death of her husband.

Question: We know the source that a Get permits her - "he will write a Sefer of cutting...";

What is the source that a widow may remarry?

Answer #1: We learn from logical reasoning. The husband caused her Isur to other men. Now that he is dead, she is permitted.

Objection: Regarding Arayos (forbidden relatives, e.g. a step-mother), the Isur remains after the cause of the Isur (the father) dies!

Answer #2: Rather, the Torah said that if a man dies childless, his widow is forbidden (to all except the Yavam). We infer that if one dies with children, the widow is permitted!

Rejection: Perhaps we infer oppositely! If he dies childless, his widow is forbidden to strangers and permitted to the Yavam. If he dies with children, she is forbidden to all!

Answer #3: The Torah said that a widow is forbidden to a Kohen Gadol. This implies that she is permitted to a regular Kohen.

Rejection: Perhaps an Isur Aseh (derived from a positive Mitzvah) forbids her to all, and an extra Lav forbids her to a Kohen Gadol!

Question: How do we understand such a Chayavei Aseh?

If death of the husband removes the Lav of a married woman (which is punishable by death and Kares), it should also remove the Aseh!

If his death does not remove the Aseh, it should not remove the Lav, either!

Answer: It removes only the Lav, like we find regarding Korbanos that became blemished;

Before they are redeemed, one who benefits from them transgresses Me'ilah. It is forbidden to shear them or make them work;

After they are redeemed, Me'ilah no longer applies, but it is still forbidden to shear them or make them work.

Answer #4: We learn from "perhaps he will die in war, and Acher (a different man) will take (his wife)."

Question (R. Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi): Perhaps the other man referred to is the Yavam!

Answer (Rav Ashi): The Yavam would not be called "Acher".

Answer #5 (Rav Ashi): "(Her second husband will divorce her) or die" equates death of her husband to divorce;

Just like divorce fully permits remarriage, also death of the husband.