QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Pe'ah (1:1) which lists the Mitzvos for which one receives reward ("Peros") in this world. The Mishnah there differs from the passage recited as part of the daily liturgy after Birkas ha'Torah, which lists several more Mitzvos for which one receives reward in this world.

(a) What is the source for the other Mitzvos in the list?

(b) Why does the Mishnah in Pe'ah not mention those Mitzvos?

(a) There are two sources for the list of Mitzvos which have "Peros" in this world. The first source is the Mishnah in Pe'ah (1:1), as cited by the Gemara here, which lists four Mitzvos: Kibud Av v'Em, Gemilus Chasadim, Hava'as Shalom, and Talmud Torah. (Although the Gemara earlier (39b) which cites this Mishnah mentions the Mitzvah of Hachnasas Orchim as well, that addition does not seem to be the correct Girsa of the Mishnah.) The second source is the statement of Rebbi Yochanan in Shabbos (127a) who lists four Mitzvos: Hachnasas Orchim, Bikur Cholim, Iyun Tefilah, and Hashkamas Beis ha'Midrash.

In contrast, the passage recited after Birkas ha'Torah every morning lists ten Mitzvos. That passage combines the list in Pe'ah with the list of Rebbi Yochanan.

We must point out, though, that the list in Pe'ah and the list of Rebbi Yochanan contain a total of only eight Mitzvos. What is the source for the additional two Mitzvos which the passage after Birkas ha'Torah mentions, the Mitzvos of Hachnasas Kalah and Halvayas ha'Mes? (Indeed, the Rambam's Nusach of Tefilah and the Sefardic Sidurim omit Hachnasas Kalah, Halvayas ha'Mes, and Iyun Tefilah.)

The MAHARSHAL (in his responsa) writes that Hachnasas Kalah and Halvayas ha'Mes indeed should be omitted. The LIKUTEI MAHARICH points out that Hachnasas Kalah and Halvayas ha'Mes are subcategories of Gemilus Chasadim, as the Midrash often associates these two Mitzvos with Gemilus Chasadim (see Makos 24a, and the Midrash cited by Rashi to Bereishis 47:29). The Mishnah in Pe'ah omits them because it already mentions Gemilus Chasadim, while the version of the Beraisa recited in the morning prayers includes them because it seeks to be more specific.

(b) The Mishnah in Pe'ah includes in its mention of "Gemilus Chasadim" all of the Mitzvos which involve an act of kindness to someone else (Shabbos 127b).

This answer does not explain why the Mishnah omits Iyun Tefilah and Hashkamas Beis ha'Midrash, which Rebbi Yochanan mentions. Rashi (Shabbos ibid.) explains that Iyun Tefilah also constitutes Gemilus Chasadim. Rashi cites a verse, "Gomel Nafsho Ish Chesed" (Mishlei 11:17), which associates Chesed ("Gomel") with Tefilah ("Nafsho") and implies that prayer is a form of Chesed. Rashi also explains that Hashkamas Beis ha'Midrash is included in the Mitzvah of Talmud Torah.

Another reason for why the Mishnah omits Iyun Tefilah and Hashkamas Beis ha'Midrash may be as follows. These two Mitzvos differ fundamentally from the Mitzvos mentioned in the Mishnah. The "Peros" of the Mitzvos mentioned in the Mishnah refer to the benefit the person receives when his act of kindness arouses others to reciprocate and perform acts of kindness with each other, as the RAMBAM explains (in Perush ha'Mishnayos). (The Rambam explains how this applies to Talmud Torah as well. One benefits in this world from the Mitzvah of Talmud Torah because his Torah study brings about the performance of good deeds.)

The benefit a person receives because of Iyun Tefilah is fundamentally different. When a person prays with concentration and intent, Hash-m answers his specific prayer. Although Rebbi Yochanan calls this "Peros," the Tana of the Mishnah does not list benefits which a person receives because he explicitly requested them in his prayers, but rather indirect benefits which result from the performance of good deeds.

Hashkamas Beis ha'Midrash also refers to an act of praying to Hash-m with a specific request, as the Gemara in Gitin (7a) mentions ("Hashkem v'Ha'arev Aleihem l'Veis ha'Midrash"). Through Hashkamah, a person's prayers are answered because of his zeal and diligence in coming early to the Beis ha'Midrash. In contrast, through Iyun Tefilah his prayers are answered due to his depth of concentration. The Mishnah in Pe'ah does not include this Mitzvah in its list of Mitzvos which have "Peros" in this world because this Mitzvah does not bear "Peros" as a secondary consequence of the person's act like the other Mitzvos which it lists.

QUESTION: The Gemara asks why the Mishnah in Pe'ah (1:1) -- which mentions the Mitzvos for which one receives reward ("Peros") in this world -- omits the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken. The Torah says with regard to Shilu'ach ha'Ken, "... in order that it may be well with you, and that you may prolong your days" (Devarim 22:7), which implies that a person receives reward in this world for the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken.

The MAHARSHA asks that the Gemara earlier (39b) challenged the Mishnah there (ibid.) from the Mishnah in Pe'ah. The Mishnah earlier states that a person receives reward in this world for every Mitzvah he performs, while the Mishnah in Pe'ah states that one receives reward in this world only for four Mitzvos. The Gemara answered that the Mishnah in Pe'ah lists only the Mitzvos which provide a person with favorable treatment in this world even when he has an equal number of Mitzvos and Aveiros. Why does the Gemara here ask that Shilu'ach ha'Ken should be included in the list in Pe'ah? Perhaps Shilu'ach ha'Ken does not have the quality of providing a person with blessing in this world even when his Mitzvos and Aveiros are equal.

ANSWER: The MAHARSHA explains that the source that these four Mitzvos provide a person with blessing in this world even when his Mitzvos and Aveiros are equal is the double expression of reward which the Torah promises to a person who fulfills these Mitzvos (for example, "Lema'an Ya'arichun Yamecha, u'Lema'an Yitav Lach," Devarim 5:16). Since the Torah specifies a double expression of reward in this world for one who performs the Mitzvah of Shilu'ach ha'Ken (Devarim 22:7), this Mitzvah should be included in the list in Pe'ah.

The Gemara teaches that Hash-m rewards a person even when he merely thinks about fulfilling a Mitzvah, but He does not punish a person who thinks about committing an Aveirah. Hash-m punishes a person only for the actual execution of an Aveirah. The only exception to this rule is the Aveirah of Avodah Zarah, for which a person is punished merely for having a thought of Avodah Zarah.

The IYUN YAKOV finds an allusion to the Gemara's teaching in the verse, "Rabos Machshavos b'Lev Ish, va'Atzas Hash-m Hi Sakum" -- "Many are the thoughts in the heart of man, but the counsel of Hash-m is what will be upheld" (Mishlei 19:21): although a person may have many thoughts about wrongdoing, he is not punished for them because they are merely thoughts. When, however, his thoughts are thoughts of "Atzas Hash-m," intention to perform a Mitzvah for the sake of Hash-m, then "Hi Sakum," his thoughts are upheld and rewarded as though he actually performed the Mitzvah.

The CHIDA (in Nachal Kedumim) finds another allusion to the Gemara's teaching in the verse which describes the Kohen Gadol's apron (Efod), "v'Cheshev Afudaso Asher Alav, k'Ma'asehu Mimenu Yiheyeh" -- "And the belt of the Efod which is on it will be made in the same way as it" (Shemos 28:8). The Chida explains that the verse alludes to the thought about wearing the Efod ("v'Cheshev Afudaso") for which one is rewarded as though he actually wore it ("k'Ma'asehu") because, as the Gemara says, when a person has a thought to do a Mitzvah he is rewarded as though he actually performed that Mitzvah.

Why does the Torah allude to this principle in the verse which discusses the Mitzvah of wearing the Efod? The Gemara in Zevachim (88b) teaches that the Efod provides atonement for the sin of Avodah Zarah. The sin of Avodah Zarah is the only sin for which Hash-m punishes a person even when he merely thinks about the sin. Accordingly, every sin of Avodah Zarah contains two parts: the sin the person commits at the moment he thinks about the sin, and the sin he commits when he actually transgresses the prohibition against idolatry. In order to provide the necessary degree of atonement, the Efod must atone for both aspects of the sin. Therefore, when the Kohen thinks about donning the Efod he atones for the sin of thinking about serving Avodah Zarah, and when he actually dons it he atones for the sin of actually serving Avodah Zarah.

The Chida adds that the continuation of the verse may provide explanation for why the sin of Avodah Zarah is treated differently from all other Aveiros. The simple explanation is that the nature of the sin of idolatry prohibits both thought and action; one may not even accept in his mind that there is any other power in the world other than Hash-m. (See Sanhedrin 65a and Rashi there, DH Ho'il v'Yeshno ba'Lev.)

The Chida explains that the reason why a person is not punished for having a thought of any other Aveirah is that a verdict of guilt is passed on a person only by the ruling of the Heavenly court. The verse says, "Hash-m Nasan va'Hashem Lakach" (Iyov 1:21). Rashi explains that whenever the verse says "va'Hashem" (with a "Vav") it means "Hu u'Veis Dino" -- "Hash-m together with His Heavenly court" (see Rashi to Bereishis 19:24, "va'Hashem Himtir Al Sedom"). Accordingly, the verse in Iyov may be read as follows: Hash-m gives reward to a person by Himself, but when Hash-m takes away from a person ("va'Hashem Lakach") and punishes him, He does so only with the decree of the Heavenly court (see also Eichah 3:38). The Heavenly court is comprised of angels, and angels do not know the thoughts of man (see Insights to Shabbos 12:3 and Sotah 33:2). Therefore, a person cannot be punished for having a thought about sinning, since the Heavenly court, comprised of angels, does not know a person's thoughts. However, with regard to the sin of Avodah Zarah, the verse (Vayikra 20:5) teaches that Hash-m Himself metes out judgment to one who serves Avodah Zarah. Since Hash-m knows a person's thoughts, a person is punished for thoughts of Avodah Zarah.

The verse alludes to this when it says, "v'Cheshev Afudaso Asher Alav, k'Ma'asehu Mimenu Yiheyeh" -- the thought about the Efod ("v'Cheshev Afudaso") is like an action ("k'Ma'asehu") which, as explained above, means that the Efod atones for the sin of Avodah Zarah, because when a person thinks about committing the sin of Avodah Zarah he is punished as though he actually performed the act. The verse continues to explain why one is punished for a thought of Avodah Zarah. He is punished because "Mimenu Yiheyeh" -- the punishment for the sin of Avodah Zarah comes directly from Hash-m!

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that a person who regrets all of the good deeds he performed in his life and dies as a sinner receives no reward for his good deeds.

The MESILAS YESHARIM (Zehirus, DH v'Im Tomar) asks a general question about reward and punishment. Why does Hash-m ever have mercy and do kindness to a person who deserves to be punished for his sins?

He answers that the mercy of Hash-m is manifest in two ways. Through His trait of "Erech Apayim," Hash-m does not punish an evildoer immediately, but rather He gives the person a chance to repent and do Teshuvah. Through His trait of "Chesed," Hash-m considers a person's sincere repentance and removal of his thoughts to do an Aveirah as the removal of the transgression of the Aveirah itself, even though His strict attribute of justice (Midas ha'Din) would dictate that one's Teshuvah should have no effect because an act cannot be revoked once it was done.

The Mesilas Yesharim implies that without the special trait of Hash-m's Chesed, regret alone cannot remove an Aveirah. How, then, does a person's regret remove a Mitzvah which he performed? (RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN in Bi'urei Agados Al Derech ha'Peshat 3)

(a) RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd writes that he posed this question to the CHAFETZ CHAIM who answered that a sinner's sincere regret for his action uproots the sin even according to Hash-m's Midas ha'Din. It is not necessarily His Midas ha'Chesed which serves to uproot the sin. The Gemara in Yoma (86b) teaches that there are two types of repentance: repentance out of fear for Hash-m (Teshuvah me'Yir'ah) and repentance out of love for Hash-m (Teshuvah me'Ahavah). When a sinner repents out of love for Hash-m, Hash-m not only uproots the sins he committed but He considers them merits ("Zechuyos"). In contrast, when a sinner repents out of fear of Hash-m, his regret is not absolute; he does not fully regret the misdeeds that he did, but only that he is liable for punishment for having done them. In that case of repentance the Chesed of Hash-m functions to uproot the sins and to allow the person to achieve atonement.

(b) RAV ELCHANAN, however, points out that the words of the Mesilas Yesharim imply that every form of Teshuvah, even Teshuvah me'Ahavah, involves some form of Chesed.

He suggests that every Aveirah is comprised of two essential parts. The first is the person's rebellion against Hash-m Who commanded him not to act in that way. The second is the negative repercussions which result from the sin; Hash-m commanded a person not to act that way for a reason, and by acting in that way a person brings about undesirable consequences upon himself and the world.

When a person regrets his sins, logically his regret should be able to uproot only the element of rebellion. His regret demonstrates that he now humbles himself to Hash-m's will and corrects his rebelliousness. However, his regret should not be able to reverse the harm which occurred as a consequence of his sin. Nevertheless, in His great kindness, when Hash-m accepts a person's Teshuvah He removes even the consequences which resulted from the sin.

Similarly, every Mitzvah is comprised of two essential parts: the subjugation of oneself to Hash-m's will and the positive consequences which occur to the person and to the world as a result of his fulfillment of the Mitzvah. When the Gemara says that a person who regrets his good deeds forfeits his reward for them, it means only that he does not receive reward for subjecting himself to Hash-m's will because, indeed, he reversed his acceptance of Hash-m's will by rebelling against Him. However, he does receive reward for the benefits his act brought to the world. For example, if he taught Torah and his students still learn Torah, he receives reward for the results which his Mitzvah caused, even though he does not receive reward for having subjected himself to Hash-m's will.