Explanation: This means that partial Besulim (meaning the fact that she did not commit any act of taking away Besulim) must be intact in all places (where such an act is) possible.

Implied Question: It is impossible (according to Rebbi Shimon) to say that this should exclude abnormal relations.

Answer: This is because the Pasuk should have rather abstained from implying this concept with the word "bi'Vesulehah" (see Tosfos 97b, DH "bi'Vesulehah").

Question: Isn't Rabah's question answered by an explicit Mishnah in Gitin (34b) that states that a widow cannot collect from the possessions of orphans unless she takes a vow?

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Mishnah there is only discussing a widow from betrothal, not from marriage. This is in accordance with Rebbi Shimon's opinion that a woman who does not have the right to food support cannot sell possessions from the estate unless she does so in Beis Din.

Rebbi understands that this answer is forced (and it therefore is prudent to find a different answer).

Question: There is an additional difficulty. The Gemara seems to conclude that Rav Yosef did not really answer this question.

Why didn't he answer? He should at least have deduced that the Mishnah in Gitin (34b) is discussing a widow who was married (not merely betrothed). This is apparent from the fact that the second part of the Mishnah discusses a case where they did not allow her to swear. Rebbi Zeira said in the name of Shmuel, this is only talking about a widow, but they would have a divorcee swear.

The reason that Beis Din does not always allow a widow to swear is that a widow is different. She reasons that she should be allowed to swear she did not take anything from the orphans, as she herself had toiled to help the orphans.

Rav Yosef could have therefore deduced from Shmuel's statement that this is solely discussing a widow from marriage. If it would be talking about a widow from betrothal, there would be no reason to say that she would lie because she had toiled to help the orphans, as she had always been in her father's house (and did not help raise the orphans). [If he could deduce this, that would mean he could at least answer that a widow from marriage requires a vow.]

First Answer: Rebbi answers that this vow being discussed in our Gemara is not because we fear she may have seized monies from the estate for her Kesuvah (the vow being discussed by the Mishnah in Gitin). The vow here, as Rashi explains, is concerning the suspicion that she might have collected more than she claims from her sale.

The Gemara is not asking whether or not she has to take a vow regarding her sale for food support without Beis Din, as later on we clearly rule that she must take a vow regarding such a sale.

We rule that the two things that Chanan said regarding this topic are codified as the Halachah. The Mishnah (105a) later said that if someone went abroad and his wife demands food support, Chanan says that she should swear at the end and she does not have to swear originally. When he says "at the end" he means when she collects her Kesuvah.

This is evident from the Gemara earlier (88b), where Rebbi Yirmiyah established that Chanan agrees with Rebbi Shimon who says that as long as she demands her Kesuvah the inheritors can make her swear. If she does not demand her Kesuvah, they cannot make her swear.

This implies that she is never required to make any vow until she demands her Kesuvah.

However, Rebbi understands that our Gemara's question is that we know that when she sells possessions for her Kesuvah, before collecting her Kesuvah, we make her swear that she did not retain any possessions of her husband.

After she sells possessions outside of Beis Din to actively collect her Kesuvah, the question is whether we go back and make her swear that she did not collect more money for the sales than she has declared.

Second Answer: Rebbi also states that this vow that our Gemara asks about is not like Rashi explains that she did not collect more for the sales, but rather the Gemara is asking whether she must take a vow that she did not belittle the property's value.

This is also apparent from the Gemara's question that this should require announcing (the possessions that are up for sale), as this is also in order that she should not belittle the property's value. This is also the opinion of Rabeinu Tam.

Explanation: Being that the Gemara is unsure whether or not this needs the taking of a vow, it obviously does not hold that announcing is necessary.

If announcing the sale would be necessary, it would certainly require a vow.

Observation: It is obvious that announcement is unnecessary.

First Question: Didn't we say earlier (87a) that to pay taxes (of the orphans), for food support (of the family), and for burial (him or his children) we sell the orphans' possessions without announcing the sale? This implies that for all other purposes announcement of the possessions being up for sale is announced (in order to get the best price for the estate).

Second Question: Additionally, the Mishnah in Erchin (21b) explicitly states that the evaluation of the possession of orphans takes thirty days (before they are sold).

Answer: Rebbi answers that these sources are discussing when Beis Din is in charge of the sale. Being that if they sell for less than one sixth of the real value of these possessions their sale is still valid, they are therefore mandated to first announce the sale in order not to get less than the appropriate value for the property of the orphans.

However, even if a widow sells possessions from the estate that are worth a manah and a dinar for only a manah, the Mishnah states that the entire sale is invalid. Being that she can never make a valid sale which makes the orphans lose, she can sell without announcement.

Implied Question: The Gemara later (100b) states that a Beis Din that sells without announcement is considered to have made a mistake that is apparent from the Mishnah (an obvious mistake), and their ruling is retracted. What is novel about this ruling? The Mishnah (which we just said is talking about Beis Din) clearly states that the evaluation of the property of orphans takes thirty days!

The Gemara there concludes that this is clearly talking about a messenger (and we would think it does not apply to a Beis Din, but it must be that it does). This implies that the messenger himself needs to announce, even though if he sells for even slightly less the deal is invalid.

First Answer: This is not difficult. Firstly, when the Gemara there says that the Mishnah is talking about a messenger, it is talking about a messenger of Beis Din, as explained by Rabeinu Tam.

Second Answer: Additionally, even if it would be talking about a regular messenger it would not be difficult, as the Rabbanan never gave the strength to a messenger to sell without announcement like the permission that was given to a widow.

Question: This is difficult. How can Rabah deduce from here that no announcement is necessary? Perhaps when Rav Nachman said that a widow who makes her own estimate of the value of a field has done nothing, he meant that if she would make this estimate to sell to someone else her estimation would be valid.

The situation would be if she sold possessions of the estate for her food support. She would not need to take a vow, as stated in the Gemara earlier. Accordingly, it would seem that she should also not be required to announce the sale beforehand.

Answer: Rebbi answered to me that Rav Nachman does not differentiate between selling possessions for food support and selling in order to collect her Kesuvah.

Explanation: This is as if to say, who said you can possess these possessions? Noone is allowed to possess his friend's property unless Beis Din is the one who takes it away and holds onto the property first.

This Gemara does not mean to ask who did an actual evaluation (as implied by the word "Sham"). Even though there is no Beis Din in this case, there is a Beis Din of regular judges as apparent from Bava Metzia (32a).

When this regular Beis Din possesses property, it is not really deemed to be a possession. This is because they are just like people who sit on the streetcorners, and are just good at evaluating property (not expert judges).

Question: This is difficult for Rebbi to understand. Here the Gemara implies that if Beis Din would take possession of the land (and estimate its value), she could indeed keep the land for herself.

In Bava Metzia (38a), the Beraisa discusses a case where someone deposits by his friend some wine which later started to spoil, or some honey that later started to congeal. The person who it was deposited by should help his friend (who is not present for some reason, i.e. he is overseas) and sell the items in Beis Din. When he sells them, he must sell them to others and not to himself. The Gemara there continues that the same is true regarding in other cases (a charity collector, see Gemara there).

We cannot say that the Gemara's statement that it should be sold in Beis Din actually means with the permission of Beis Din. This would indicate that if Beis Din actually knew about the evaluation that was made he possibly could buy the goods himself.

The Yerushalmi concludes regarding the incident of Yochanan Chakukah (who someone had deposited Chametz by, and it was now Erev Pesach and the depositor was not present) that is brought in Pesachim (13a), that Rebbi ruled he should go and sell the Chametz in Beis Din. This implies that even though Rebbi gave permission for Rebbi to sell the Chametz, he had to do so in Beis Din.

First Answer: Rebbi answers that there the reasoning is because of suspicion (that the person who was guarding what was deposited is taking advantage of the depositor who is not present). Therefore the Halachah is that he should not take the item for himself. This therefore only applies regarding a deposited item where suspicion is possible, as not everyone knows that Beis Din was aware of the evaluation.

However, in our Gemara she can keep the property if Beis Din does an evaluation because people know that Beis Din did the evaluation and let her keep the property. The same is true regarding the fodder or coral (see Rashi DH "Kista") of the orphans. Everyone knew about the authorized sale, and therefore there was no suspicion.

Second Answer: Alternatively, in our Gemara the Beis Din themselves are the ones who deposit the field into her possession, giving her the ability to possess the field. In the case in Bava Metzia (38a), the case is where someone else (the owner) gave him the item. In such a case he should not keep it for himself.

Question: However, Rebbi has difficulty understanding the words of the Yerushalmi itself that we quoted earlier. In the case of the deposited Chametz that would be useless once Pesach arrived, why shouldn't the permission of Beis Din allow the person it was deposited by to be a messenger to sell the Chametz even without Beis Din for the good of the depositor? Why did they require there that the sale take place in Beis Din?

We see regarding the sale of property for a widow that Beis Din can designate a messenger. Some opinions even hold works like a sale by the judges themselves.

Answer: It is possible that the Yerushalmi was talking about a case where the Beis Din consisted of regular people (not expert judges).

Implied Question: One should not wonder why they are called a Beis Din (if they are not really a Beis Din of judges).

Answer: This is understandable being that it does not say that they are a real Beis Din. We see that the sale of a widow is deemed not to be in Beis Din, even though the regular people who do the evaluation are present, as explained previously. This is because the previous part of our Mishnah mentioned a real Beis Din. [The Maharam Shif explains that where a Beis Din is required, and then another case is immediately discussed and is said not to require a Beis Din, this means that the previous Beis Din comprised of expert judges is not required. However, where we have one phrase saying something has to be done in front of a Beis Din, it could mean a Beis Din of regular people.]

Observation: The Yerushalmi asks, why don't we say that the sale is invalid?

Rebbi Yochanan establishes that the case is when the sale became cheaper or more expensive. Reish Lakish says that being that she is selling property, we say that there is no Ona'ah (law that one cannot overcharge by one sixth, and that if one overcharges more than one sixth the sale is void) in a sale of property.

Rebbi Yochanan states that if the discrepancy between the actual price and the price paid was very large, there is Ona'ah (even by property). The Yerushalmi continues that there is a Mishnah in Bava Metzia that seemingly argues on Rebbi Yochanan, as it says that one of the cases where Ona'ah does not apply is property. The Yerushalmi answers that Rebbi Yochanan understands that Mishnah is only talking about a case where there is a not a very large discrepancy.

Explanation: Rabeinu Chananel explains that a discrepancy that is not very large is when the amount overcharged does not surpass the actual value of the item. This means that according to Rebbi Yochanan, the amount that was overcharged that would be required to nullify such a sale would be the actual value of the item.

This is also how Rabeinu Tam explains the Gemara in Bava Metzia (57a) that says that they do not have Ona'ah, but they do have nullification of a sale. He explains that this is not similar to the law of movable objects where overcharging more than one-sixth nullifies a sale. Rather Ona'ah regarding the sale of land is only if one overcharges double the price. For example, if a person charges two hundred instead of one hundred that is Ona'ah of property. Less than two hundred, even one small coin, the sale would be deemed valid.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (108a) states that if someone sold property for two hundred and it was worth one hundred that Nehardei say in the name of Rav Nachman that there is no Ona'ah l'Karkaos. [How can we reconcile this with what we have just said above?]

Answer: This Gemara doesn't really mean two hundred, but rather slightly less than two hundred. If it would actually be two hundred, the sale would be invalid according to Rav Nachman, as we explained above.

Implied Question: Rabeinu Tam has the following text in Kidushin (42b): "This that you said that overcharging more than one sixth causes the transaction to be invalid is only regarding movable objects, not regarding land as there is no Ona'ah regarding sales of land." [How can this be reconciled with our approach that there is Ona'ah?]

Answer: This is referring to overcharging more than one sixth up until one half, as we stated earlier.

When Rebbi Yochanan stated in the Yerushalmi on our Gemara that if there was a very large discrepancy there is Ona'ah (by a sale of property), he didn't literally mean that there is only a law of Ona'ah (and the sale is valid but the amount overcharged must be returned). He also meant that the entire sale is invalid, as we have explained earlier.

Question: The reasoning that our Mishnah uses to say that she has accepted her Kesuvah when she sells land worth two hundred for one hundred is slightly difficult.

Even though she made the price cheaper, she should be able to retract the sale from the purchaser, as the sale was actually invalid. The land should then go back to the orphans.

Answer: It is possible to answer that since she accepted the land when it was worth two hundred, we assume that she immediately wanted to take the land away from the possession of the orphans and bring into the possession of the buyer. It is as if she decided to acquire the land in exchange for her Kesuvah at that moment.

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam understands that both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi admit to the Halachah of our Mishnah.

Even their argument regarding an amount that is not set, where Rebbi Yosi says that the extra amount goes to the owner of the monies and Rebbi Yehuda says that the extra amount goes to the messenger, is only regarding a case where the extra was given to the messenger as an addition. This is where the seller tells the buyer to take the amount purchased due to the sale, and that he is adding some more on his own.

However, if he sold cheaply because he needed money, like the case where he sold a field two hundred for one hundred (text of the Yavetz, see Maharsha at length) even Rebbi Yehudah would agree that everything extra goes to the owner of the monies.

First Proof: If you do not say this explanation, there will be a contradiction in Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. Later, Rebbi Yehudah is quoted as saying in a Mishnah in Meilah (21a) that even in such a case (see 99a in Kesuvos) the owner has transgressed using Hekdesh. This is because he can say to the messenger that he had wanted a large shirt, and instead he was brought a small and bad shirt.

The Gemara concludes, what does it mean a bad shirt? It means a shirt that is cheap. The owner can tell the messenger that if he would have bought a shirt for six as instructed, he would have certainly gotten a shirt that was worth twelve.

If you will say that Rebbi Yehudah holds that the extra amount goes entirely to the messenger, what is the difference to the owner that he could have gotten a shirt worth twelve? He doesn't gain, as that extra amount would go to the messenger!

It therefore is certain that in such a case Rebbi Yehuda would admit that the extra money goes to the owner of the monies.

Second Proof: This is also apparent from the fact that our Gemara says "Rebbi taught here that everything extra goes to the owner of the monies," and he did not say that our Mishnah is according to the opinion of Rebbi Yosi. This implies that our Mishnah is also according to Rebbi Yehudah.

This that Rebbi says "this is as we learned in the Beraisa" means that there is another case where we see an opinion that the additional funds go to the owner and not the messenger. However, even the opinion that argues in that case agrees here that the appropriate ruling is that everything should go to the owner of the money.

Observation: One cannot say according to the explanation of the Yerushalmi quoted above (Tosfos DH "Almanah"), that our Mishnah is discussing a case where the value of the property either went down or up drastically, that if this did not happen the sale is indeed invalid. The reasoning would be because the land is considered not to have left the possession of the orphans.

If this would be true, we should also say that in a case where she sells a field worth two hundred for one hundred that the sale should be invalid. It must be that in both cases the sale is valid, as have explained.

Observation: The following is the text of Rabeinu Chananel. "The Halachah is that regarding something that is sold in set amounts, they (owner and messenger) divide it (the additional amount thrown in by the seller). If it is something that has no set amount (and the extra savings was part of the sale), the extra savings go to the owner."

Question: This text is difficult. Instead of the Gemara asking what the novelty is in Rav Papa's remarks, it should ask why he didn't merely say the Halachah follows Rebbi Yosi!

Answer: It is possible to give an explanation, albeit a difficult one, that the Gemara is indeed incorporating this in its question. It is asking what the novelty is in saying this entire statement when Rav Papa could have merely said the Halachah is like Rebbi Yosi. The Gemara's answer is that Rav Papa was verifying that Rami bar Chama's answer is the correct explanation of Rebbi Yosi.

Observation: According to the Sefarim that have the text that Rav Papa said "Therefore something etc." instead of "The Halachah is that something etc." the Gemara is more understandable.

Who did Rav Papa say his statement like? Rebbi Yosi. The Gemara therefore asks, what novelty is there in that? The Gemara answers that he was verifying that Rami bar Chama's answer is the correct explanation of Rebbi Yosi.

Inquiry: Rav Yakov Yisrael asked Rabeinu Tam, what is the Halachah regarding a mistaken deal that was not caused by a fluctuation in price, but rather because a mistake was made in calculating the item's value?

Answer: Rabeinu Tam answered that regarding his question about Reuven who sent Shimon to receive money from a Nochri and the Nochri made a mistake calculating how much he was supposed to give (he gave too much) and the Nochri is no longer present, Reuven and Shimon should divide the money.

This is because the money is like something that has a set amount. In such a case we say that if the seller adds one unit Rebbi Yosi says that they divide the money. However, in a case where there is no set amount, everything goes to the owner of the monies.

The reason they divide the money is that because the owner of the money doesn't care about a mistake as long as he get his money. We therefore say that since the messenger received money through the owner's money, he should give him half.

The same Halachah would apply regarding a mistake in the amount paid, as in the case of our Mishnah where a field worth one hundred was sold for two hundred which is obviously a mistake.

The Yerushalmi establishes that the case is where the buyer accepted upon himself to pay this price (because he thought the price would go up, see Maharsha). The reason the profit in this case goes to the owner is because money used (in a purchase) is considered to be something that does not have a set amount, as money is something that people cheapen. This implies that if something does have a set amount the owner and messenger should split the money, even if it comes from a mistake in amount.

Even though it is possible to give a different reason for our Gemara's ruling that they should split the money, this reason is the main reason. This is because the one who holds the monies is considered to have the upper hand, and they should therefore split the money.

Implied Question: This is true even if the messenger was the owner's worker (and one might think that any benefit received by a worker while at work should go to his boss).

Answer: Being that our workers are not day laborers, their owner is not strict enough that he does not allow them to pick up a lost object during their work. It is therefore considered as if he picked up a lost object while working.

This can also be proven from the fact that if someone finds a wallet in the marketplace while working, his employer does not acquire it.

Additionally (if you will say that he cannot acquire it while working), he is essentially quitting when he says "I have acquired this wallet." This implies that he quits, which he has the right to do as a worker can quit.

Retraction: Rabeinu Tam later retracted his opinion, and said that every mistake, whether regarding the value of the sale or the numbers involved in a sale, always goes to the owner of the monies.

Rebbi's Opinion: Rebbi argues that everything should go to the messenger, as the messenger's thievery, stealing, and leading others to err has nothing to do with the owner of the money.

Implied Question: It is not even appropriate to say that they should split the money in such a situation because the messenger only benefited based on the owner's money.

Answer: This is incomparable to other mistakes where he gives everything in exchange for money (i.e. where he knows the deal is not market value), as he thinks that the money will be worth whatever he is giving. [In such a deal it makes sense to say that the owner should get something, as the deal prompted the extra monies.] However, this is a case of an outright mistake (unintentional) which has a status of a separate transaction (not directly related to the sale).

This can also be proven logically. If the worker wanted, he would have had every right to give back the money to the Nochri. It would be difficult to say that he could not have merely given back the money to the Nochri (as if some of the money goes to the owner, it would seem that he would not even be allowed to inform the Nochri about his mistake which seems highly improbable).

Question: This is difficult. Even if we say that the messenger is still considered a messenger although he went against the instruction of the owner, why was the owner Mo'el? The guests went against the instructions of the messenger!

Rebbi's Answer: Rebbi told me that he can answer that the guests can also say that they took two pieces through following instructions of the messenger, and one piece on their own.

Tosfos' Answer: Rebbi's answer is unnecessary. The Gemara only had to give this answer regarding the messenger, so the guests should not think that when he simply said to take two pieces that he was presenting the instructions of the owner. However, when the guests take more than the messenger says they should take, they know that they are clearly doing so of their own accord and not depending on the instruction of the messenger.