Implied Question: This is incomparable to the case earlier (92a) where Reuven sold a field to Shimon without Achrayus, and Reuven bought back the field from Shimon with Achrayus.

Rava there concluded that even if Reuven had not accepted that Shimon would have Achrayus for the sale, but instead that he would ward off the creditors with money, he certainly accepted upon himself that he himself would not be cause for Shimon to have to ward off creditors. [The Maharsha notes that Tosfos' text is unlike our text in the Gemara earlier. This explanation for this text is found in the Rosh (10:7).]

Answer: The cases are incomparable. In that case, because Reuven borrowed money it is understandable that the creditor will seize the land. Shimon does not have to pay, being that Reuven received benefit from the money he received as a loan.

In this case, where the inheritors are obligated to give her food support, she is allowed to sell and go back and seize what she sold. This is because when she seizes what she sold, she is collecting her own debt and there is no miscarriage of justice at all.

Question: One might ask (see Maharsha for a more lengthy explanation of the question) , what is the difference to her whether she was selling for her food support or whether she was selling for her Kesuvah?

First Answer: The difference is that she can sell all at once an amount to cover payment for her entire Kesuvah. If she is selling for food support, she can only sell the amount needed for sixth months of food support and the buyer pays her in six monthly installments.

Second Answer: Additionally, if she gets married after she makes this sale, the buyer would only have to pay for the rest of the sale (if it was for food support) in monthly installments. She therefore would not be able to collect her Kesuvah from this sale after she gets married, as the monies are considered movable objects and she has lost the right to food support (once she remarries).

Question: It would seem that one could ask from our Gemara on Rami bar Chama's statement earlier regarding Reuven who sold a field to Shimon (92a). According to Rami bar Chama, Reuven did not even accept upon himself that his field should be seized even if was due to his own debt (see Tosfos above DH "Oh Dilma").

In our Beraisa we say that she does accept Achrayus for something caused by her own financial dealings. Certainly this should also hold true for the case regarding Rami bar Chama (where Reuven's field is seized due to his own debt, and Shimon is forced to pay because he sold Reuven the field with Achrayus)!

Answer: Rami bar Chama can answer that in our Gemara she certainly accepts Achrayus for her something that she causes. [Even though there is Achrayus from the orphans, she accepts upon herself Achrayus for her own causes.] This is because she is not making a sale that clearly does not contain Achrayus.

However, in Rami bar Chama's case Reuven clearly sold the field to Shimon without Achrayus. Accordingly, Reuven is not even accepting upon himself Achrayus for seizure that is caused by his own finances (i.e. debt).

Explanation: The case is, for example, when he made his intent clear during the sale that he is selling his field in order to buy oxen. If he was quiet, then his intent is merely words that are in his heart (meaning they would not be a reason that the sale should be retracted).

We similarly find in Kidushin (49b) that when someone sold his property with intent to go to Eretz Yisrael (and when he is later unable to go his sale can be retracted), the case is where he made his intent clear.

Observation: There are some things that are not helped (regarding retracting a sale) by making one's intent clear, until one would actually stipulate that the sale hinges on the fulfillment of the condition. For example, if someone sells his clothes and makes it clear he is doing so because he is going to Eretz Yisrael, this is something that is usually not sold based on one's going to Eretz Yisrael. [Accordingly, even if he makes his intent clear, it does not enable him to retract the sale.]

In that case making his intent clear definitely does not enable him to retract the sale. If this was not the case, no conditions would even be necessary in a sale. People could just make their intent clear and we would say this is sufficient.

In every case a condition is necessary akin to the condition of the Shevatim of Reuven and Gad (made with Moshe Rabeinu when they wanted to inherit Eiver ha'Yarden) where the condition is doubled (see Kidushin 61a). Therefore, it is clear that making one's intent known when it is not a normal intent (to be contingent on this matter) does not help unless an explicit condition is made.

Observation: There are indeed (rare) times when one does not even have to make his intent clear (as it is very obvious). An example of this is a Mivrachas document, as stated in the Gemara (79a) earlier (a woman who before she marries sells her property to someone in a way where it is obvious she merely did not want her soon-to-be husband to be able to use her properties).

Similarly, there is a case in Bava Basra (136a) recorded by a Beraisa where someone's son went overseas, and rumor had it that this son had died. The father signed over all of his possessions to other people as a present, and then his son returned.

Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya says that his present to these other people is no longer valid, as it is known that if his son would have been alive he never would have signed these possession to others as a present.

Rashi's Explanation: Rashi inserts in the Gemara's question the word "Vadai" - "certain" (see Rashi DH "Ee Hachi") making this into a statement, not a question.

He answered that such price hikes are common, and buyers will suspect a retraction as perhaps the boats will take a crooked route (and become delayed) and cause the sale to be invalidated.

One might think that the suspicion was that they would suddenly get wheat from a neighboring area or the people who sold the house would suddenly get a hold of some wheat. The reasoning for the retraction would be because they sold their property for money to buy wheat and they no longer need the money. This is an uncommon suspicion. There is therefore no stumbling block if we rule that in these situations a sale can be retracted, as buyers will not worry that it will happen.

Question: There is a difficulty with this explanation. What is the proof for Rashi's understanding? Perhaps the reason sellers will want to retract is that they no longer need the money. This could be for many reasons, including cases where wheat comes from a different area and where they themselves happened to obtain wheat (and we would say their retraction should be valid).

It is certain that whenever the cause of retraction is that the boats had to take a crooked route (and were therefore delayed) the sale would be proclaimed invalid. This would lend credence to the argument that sellers would not want to buy in the future since the sale will always be retracted (even in the cases where Rashi holds that the retraction would not work).

Rashbam's Explanation: Therefore, the correct explanation of our Gemara appears to be that of the Rashbam. The phrase "Ee Hachi" is a question. Being that the entire reason Rav Nachman ruled that they can retract the sale is because the boats had to travel a crooked route (and were therefore delayed), how could Rami bar Shmuel tell Rav Nachman that this was common?

It is obvious that the price hike due to the crooked route of the boats was not a common occurrence (and would therefore not scare away buyers)!

This is understandable if we indeed infer from this discussion that if someone sells something and he ended up not needing the money for the purpose he clearly intended to use it for, the sale can be retracted. This would mean that a sale that is commonly contingent on a certain reason (i.e. needing the money) may be retracted if the reason no longer applies (and the intent was stated, see previous Tosfos). This is akin to the Gemara's conclusion that Neharda often had steep price hikes (and they could still retract their sales in such cases, and we do not worry that it will scare off buyers).

It is also understandable according to this explanation that the Gemara rules like the conclusion of the question (that the sale can be retracted).

First Explanation: Rabeinu Chananel explains that a divorcee has more favor in the eyes of people as she collects the addition to her Kesuvah. Being that she can collect so much money, one might think she can sell outside of Beis Din.

Second Explanation: Alternatively, we can explain that a divorcee needs more favor in the eyes of men, as she is more scorned than a widow.

Rashi's Explanation: Rashi explains that a secondary teaching of the Mishnah is that a woman whose divorce was done in such a way where she is only possibly divorced does not collect food support from the orphans. [Although Rashi (DH "Megureshes") says this is talking about a possible divorce from betrothal and not marriage, see Maharsha who says that it is difficult to say that this is the true explanation of Rashi.]

Implied Question: This is an obvious thing, that if we are in doubt whether she really is divorced she cannot collect food support from the orphans (and therefore is clearly not being stated by the Gemara as a secondary teaching of the Mishnah).

Rach's Explanation: It therefore seems that Rabeinu Chananel's approach is correct in defining a woman who is "divorced and not divorced." The Mishnah states that a woman who does not have the rights to food support should not sell. This implies that if she does have the rights, she can sell without Beis Din.

Who is this talking about? It is discussing a widow from marriage, who can sell without Beis Din. [However, this is already obvious from the beginning of Rebbi Shimon's statement. The Maharsha explains that the Rach therefore understands that the Mishnah must be teaching us about a different woman.] This includes a woman who was married and is now only possibly divorced (that she too can sell without the permission of Beis Din).

Implied Question: One cannot ask, what is the novelty about saying that she can sell possessions without the consent of Beis Din?

First Answer: It is possible to answer that the Mishnah is trying to communicate the fact that she gets food support in the first place.

Second Answer: Alternatively, it is possible to answer that there is a novelty in saying that she can sell without Beis Din. She is not given food support because she deserves it by law, but rather because she is still tied (possibly married) to him until he gives her an unquestionably kosher get. One might therefore think that the Rabbanan did not establish that she can sell possessions for food support without Beis Din's permission. One might think that it is enough that she can sell with Beis Din. [The Mishnah therefore teaches us that even she can sell without Beis Din.]

Explanation: It seems to me to explain that this is talking about the basic one or two hundred Zuz of a standard Kesuvah.

Accordingly, it makes sense when the Gemara talks later about only selling "the rest" in Beis Din, as the Gemara is referring to the amount added to the standard amount of her Kesuvah.

Question: It seems that we can deduce from the Mishnah itself that its author is Rebbi Shimon. The Mishnah states she should only sell the rest of her Kesuvah in Beis Din. This is the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who says that whoever does not have the right to food support should only sell her Kesuvah in Beis Din.

Answer: The Chachamim also hold like Rebbi Shimon in regards to the rule that whoever does not have the right to food support should only sell her Kesuvah in Beis Din.

One might suggest the Mishnah should still obviously be Rebbi Shimon because it says that she can sell even four or five times and sell for food support without Beis Din.

This merely implies that because she has not yet lost the right to food support she can sell her Kesuvah without Beis Din.

Explanation: One cannot say until they (the Besulim) are totally present, and exclude any girl who has had relations whether in the normal fashion or in an abnormal fashion.

If this is what the Torah wanted to communicate, the Torah should have not added the extra "Beis," and it would automatically have excluded one who had relations abnormally from the "Yud" of the word "Besulehah" just as it excludes a Bogeres.

However, from the word "Besulah" alone it is impossible to say that we would have excluded a girl who had either type of relations.

Proof: This is evident from the usage of the word "Besulah" regarding the fine of a girl who was seduced or raped. She still receives a fine even if she had abnormal relations, as clearly stated by Rebbi in Kidushin (10a) that regarding a fine all of the men who would have abnormal relations with her would have to pay a fine (as she is still called a Besulah).

Similarly, regarding a betrothed girl the Torah describes her as a "Besulah." Even so, we see that all of the people who had abnormal relations with her are stoned (like the law of one who has relations with a betrothed girl). Even Rebbi who argues that only one person receives stoning does so because of his understanding of word "Levado" - "him alone" regarding the punishment for someone who has relations with a betrothed girl (not because she is not a Besulah).

Question: However, it is difficult to me why we do not say that the word "bi'Vesulehah" (as opposed to "Besulah") includes a Bogeres, and excludes a girl who had abnormal relations.

Answer: It seems to me that it makes more sense to include a girl who had abnormal relations because the word "bi'Vesulehah" implies that the focus is on the area of the Besulim. It is as if the Torah is communicating that in the area where the Besulim are located, that is where she has to have intact Besulim (in order to marry the Kohen Gadol). [Accordingly, abnormal relations are not relevant to this qualification, and such a girl is therefore included as being able to marry the Kohen Gadol.]

Question: This is difficult to Rebbi. Why, then, does the Torah have to write regarding the fine of a girl who is seduced or raped the word "Na'arah," which teaches us that a Bogeres does not have a fine? We should be able to learn this out from the word "Besulah" that is stated there, as our Gemara is telling us that the word "Besulah" itself excludes a Bogeres!

Implied Answer: One might want to thwart this question by saying that the word Besulah was needed there for a different teaching as stated in the Gemara earlier (29b).

First Question: There is still difficulty from the Gemara in Yevamos (61b) that derives that a Besulah always refers to a Na'arah.

Additionally, the Pasuk says "and the Na'arah was very beautiful, a Besulah etc." (Bereishis 24:16). According to this Tana, why does the Torah write both that she was a "Besulah" and a "Na'arah?" Whenever the Torah states "Besulah" we know it also means "Na'arah!"

Second Question: There is an additional difficulty from the Gemara (in Kidushin, 9b-10a) regarding a man who relations with a betrothed girl. The Gemara there states that if ten men have relations with such a girl and she is still a Besulah, they all receives stoning. Why? The Pasuk there describes such a girl as a Besulah. According to our Gemara (Rebbi Shimon), this should mean that she must be a total Besulah, never having had abnormal relations, in order for someone to be punished for having relations with a betrothed girl.

Even Rebbi in Kidushin (ibid. who says that only the first man receives stoning while the others are strangled) doesn't argue because the Pasuk describes her as having to be a total "Besulah." The Gemara in Kidushin (ibid.) even says that Rebbi admits that a fine is mandated for the rape or seduction of a girl, even if she had previously had abnormal relations. Why? Doesn't the Pasuk describe her as a Besulah?

Answer: It is possible that this is derived from the Pasuk "one who has had relations with her husband" (Devarim 22:22). We possibly learn from the Pasuk that only a husband can deem her as having had abnormal relations, not someone else.