Question: We find that Rabanan argue [with R. Shimon] regarding Oso v'Es Beno (slaughtering an animal and its child on the same day) only like it explains there (Chulin 85a);

This is because they learn Shechitah [written about Oso v'Es Beno] from Shechitah, i.e. Shechutei Chutz (Korbanos slaughtered outside the Mikdash). They do not learn "Shechitah" from "Tevichah" [written regarding what Yosef served to his brothers];

However, here, regarding Tashlumei Dalet v'Hei, it is written Tevichah. We should learn Tevichah from Tevichah, and say that an improper Shechitah is not considered Shechitah!

Answer (Ri): We can say that we learn something said at Sinai (Dalet v'Hei ) from something said at Sinai (Shechutei Chutz). We do not learn something said at Sinai from Tavo'ach Tevach, which was not said at Sinai.

Implied question: Why didn't we say so there [to explain why they learn Oso v'Es Beno from Shechutei Chutz, and not from Tavo'ach Tevach]?

Answer #1: We could have said so. We had another answer.

Answer #2: We needed the other answer there, that we learn "Shechitah" from "Shechitah", for had it said Tevichah regarding Oso v'Es Beno, we would have learned here (Dalet v'Hei) and there (Oso v'Es Beno) from Tavo'ach Tevach v'Hachen;

We would learn Tevichah from Tevichah, even though [Tavo'ach Tevach] was not said at Sinai, for these are more similar, rather than learn Tevichah from Shechitah, which are not similar, even though it [Shechutei Chutz] was said at Sinai.

However, now that it says Shechitah regarding Oso v'Es Beno, we learn Shechitah from Shechitah.

Now, we also learn about Tevichah of Dalet v'Hei (that an improper Shechitah is called Shechitah).

Suggestion: Perhaps we should learn oppositely! We learn Tevichah of Dalet v'Hei from Tevichah (Tavo'ach Tevach, i.e. it must be proper), and from there to Shechitah of Oso v'Es Beno!

Rejection: Since these are equally reasonable ways to expound, and we could learn either way, we learn a matter said at Sinai from a matter said at Sinai.

Explanation: It may be eaten on Shabbos, and even he may eat it. This is clear from Shabbos (38a);

They asked R. Chiya bar Aba about one who forgot and left a pot on a stovetop, and it cooked on Shabbos... if one cooked on Shabbos... b'Shogeg, one may eat it;

The question was about [eating it] on that very Shabbos. Do we decree to forbid, lest he say "I forgot"?

B'Mezid, one may not eat it. I.e. it is forbidden to him and others that day. After Shabbos, it is permitted even to him.

Proof #1: In Chulin (15a), on the Mishnah of one who slaughtered on Shabbos or Yom Kipur, even though he is Chayav Misah, the Shechitah is Kosher...

The Gemara asked that we should establish it to discuss Mezid, like R. Meir. We answer that we cannot, for it teaches Shabbos, [and presumably its law is] similar to Yom Kipur. Just like on Yom Kipur, whether he was Shogeg or Mezid (one may not eat it, also on Shabbos. R. Meir permits on Shabbos if he was Shogeg.)

If it is permitted to others the same day, we should ask from Mezid itself! Just like on Yom Kipur, the law is the same for him and others (no one may eat it)...

And if [b'Mezid] it is forbidden to him even after Shabbos, we should have said "the Mishnah taught that his Shechitah is Kosher. This is both for him and for others", like it said there about R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar!

Also, if so (b'Mezid it is forbidden to him even after Shabbos), this is like Mezid of R. Yehudah, like I will explain. Since R. Yehudah needed to teach the law of Mezid in his words, this connotes that he argues also about Mezid.

Explanation: Shogeg of R. Yehudah is like I explained Mezid of R. Meir, for we establish there the Mishnah of one who slaughters on Shabbos like him (like R. Yehudah b'Shogeg, and we suggested that it could be like R. Meir, b'Mezid. We rejected this only because it connotes that even b'Shogeg, it is forbidden that day.)

Explanation: He may never eat it, but others may eat.

Proof: If also others may never eat it, this is just like Mezid of R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar!

Conclusion: Mezid of R. Meir is like Shogeg of R. Yehudah. Mezid of R. Yehudah is like Shogeg of R. Yochanan ha'Sandlar.

Question: The Torah should not have written "Kodesh", and not "Lachem", and I would know that one may not eat it due to "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah" - everything I (Hash-m) abominated (forbade) to you, Lo Sochal applies to it.

Answer: If from there, one might have thought that whether he was Shogeg or Mezid [it is forbidden]. Therefore, it needed to write [Kodesh] here to put it adjacent to "Mechaleleha", to teach that this applies b'Mezid, but not b'Shogeg.

Question: The Torah should not have written "Hi", and not "Kodesh"!

Answer: If so, we would have forbidden eating it due to "everything I abominated to you". We say so explicitly in Chulin (115a).

Implied question: Why didn't we say that they do not expound "Oh" or "Tachas" to include a Shali'ach?

Answer: He did not want to say that they argue about a Shali'ach.

Question: Why do we need to teach at all one who slaughtered on Shabbos? Even for a Shechitah that is not proper at all (for idolatry, or Shor ha'Niskal), R. Meir obligates, and all the more so this, which is proper!

Answer: [The Beraisa] teaches [that R. Meir obligates for] this (a proper Shechitah, on Shabbos) and even this (Shechitah that is not proper).

Question: Also everyone who slaughters, it does not belong to the owner! Once he slaughters (cuts) a little, he acquires through Shinuy (change)!

Rather, you are forced to say that the Torah obligates in spite of this. Also here, he should be liable!

Answer (Ri): This is not considered a Shinuy to acquire it in the way.

Question: Why don't we say that R. Meir teaches like he taught elsewhere, that he judges (obligates for) Dina d'Garmi (semi-direct ways of causing damage - Bava Kama 100a), regarding one who is Mekadesh (forbids through Kil'ai ha'Kerem) another's grain, or burns another's documents (Bava Kama 98b);

All the more so he obligates Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon, like it says there in Bava Kama (98) "perhaps R. Shimon said [that one is liable] only for something that is intrinsically Mamon, but a document, which is not intrinsically Mamon, no!"

Answer #1: We can also say oppositely. Perhaps R. Meir said [that one is liable] only for burning another's documents, or being Mekadesh grain, which is proper Mamon for the entire world;

However, Shor ha'Niskal is proper only for this Shomer, to exempt himself!

Answer #2: Some say that we say that he holds like R. Shimon, because R. Shimon said that Davar ha'Gorem l'Mamon is considered Mamon regarding Dalet v'Hei. It was taught regarding this in Bava Kama (71b);

We find that R. Meir obligates Dina d'Garmi only principal. We do not find that he obligates Dalet v'Hei for it.

Answer #3 (Ritzva): He obligates Dina d'Garmi only mid'Rabanan. This is proven from Bava Kama (62a).

Inference: R. Meir holds that Lokeh u'Meshalem even regarding Mamon that is not a fine.

Support: Also the Gemara in Bava Metzi'a (91a) that I brought above (33a DH v'Ula, if one muzzles another's cow and threshes with it, he is lashed and pays) connotes like this.

Question: In Makos (4b), Ula said that R. Meir holds that Edim Zomemim are lashed and pay because he learns from Motzi Shem Ra;

We ask that he cannot learn from Motzi Shem Ra, for it is a fine, and answer that [R. Meir] holds like R. Akiva, who says that Edim Zomemim (Ka'asher Zamam) is a fine.

Inference: Regarding Mamon, R. Meir holds that Eino Lokeh u'Meshalem!

Answer: Surely, if Edim Zomemim were Mamon, he would not learn from Motzi Shem Ra, for it is a fine. Rather, he would expound from "Kedei Rish'aso" that Ein Lokeh u'Meshalem;

However, now that he holds that Edim Zomemim is a fine, and he learns from Motzi Shem Ra that Lokeh u'Meshalem, he is forced to establish Kedei Rish'aso [which is written regarding Edim Zomemim] for Misah and lashes, since Kedei Rish'aso does not apply to lashes and money;

Therefore, he holds that in every case Lokeh u'Meshalem. From where would he exclude that Ein Lokeh u'Meshalem?!

Explanation: He explains according to R. Meir. Rabah himself does not hold like this.

Explanation: If he was Mechalel Shabbos, after Shabbos they testify about him and kill him;

However, regarding a tunnel (a thief tunneling into a house), even though he is Chayav Misah while in the tunnel, once he leaves, he cannot be killed. This is unlike "Im Yihyeh Ason" (the source for Kam Lei bid'Rabah Minei. If he killed, he can be killed whenever witnesses testify about him.)

Question #1: The primary source for Kam Lei bid'Rabah Minei is written regarding murder, which requires warning (to kill the murderer))!

Question #2: Shabbos and a tunnel were both taught! A Mishnah in Bava Kama (34b) says that if one burned a stack on Shabbos he is exempt, because he is Chayav Misah;

Also a tunnel was taught in Sanhedrin (72a). If one was tunneling into a house and broke a barrel, if he has no blood (he may be killed, for we assume that he will try to kill the owner if the owner tries to stop him), he is exempt!

Answer: It seems that here we show why it was needed to teach both, that for a fine he is killed and pays;

It means that the Isur [of Shabbos] is stringent, and one might have thought that only here he is Chayav a fine with Misah,

Support: We make a Tzerichusa (show the need for both) like this below (37a) regarding Lo Yihyeh Ason and "Kedei Rish'aso". Because it is stringent, we say that we would do two punishments to him.

Question: According to what I explained, that Ravina explains according to R. Meir, why does he say "but Shabbos, which requires warning, I would not say that Mes u'Meshalem"?

R. Meir's primary teaching was taught above regarding Shabbos!

Answer: Rabah teaches that Kam Lei bid'Rabah Minei applies even though at the time he is Chayav Misah, the money is still intact;

We should not have said Kam Lei bid'Rabah Minei, like Rabah himself said in Sanhedrin (72a) "presumably, Rav's law (that a thief tunneling into a house who broke Kelim is exempt) is only when he broke them, and they are not intact. However, if he took them, and they are intact, no (Rav would agree that he is liable);

Even so, since he slaughtered afterwards (i.e. it is no longer intact), he is exempt for the theft.

Regarding this that he is exempt for the theft, even though at the time it was intact, he makes a Tzerichusa.

Distinction: However, if it was lost or stolen, it seems to the Ri that they are liable, since they benefit and use it.

Support: It says so in Bava Metzi'a (81a. If a craftsman told the owner 'bring money, and take your object', since he still benefits from the object (it helps him to collect his wage, he is a Shomer Sachar.)

Explanation: We do not say that he is liable for Ones from the time he borrowed it.

Question: If so, also in the Seifa, when they slaughtered it, why do they pay when their father left them property with Acharayus (i.e. land)? The father was not obligated!

Answer: There, the father was negligent. He should have told his children that it is not his. Therefore, in his lifetime he was negligent, and he was obligated from that time, and there was a lien on his property.