KERISUS 24 (14 Elul) ג€“ This Daf has been dedicated in honor of the Yahrzeit of Yisrael (son of Chazkel and Miryam) Rosenbaum, who passed away on 14 Elul, by his son and daughter and their families.

1)

(a)Rav Sheishes refers to a case where somebody sets aside two Ashamos for Acharayus. What does this mean?

(b)He maintains that Rebbi Meir will concede to the Chachamim that, after the first one has been brought, the second one is subject to the Din of Yir'eh (ad she'Yista'ev ve'Yimacher ve'Yiplu Damav li'Nedavah). Why is that?

1)

(a)Rav Sheishes refers to a case where somebody sets aside two Ashamos for Acharayus - one for his Korban, and the one, in reserve, in case something happens to the first one.

(b)He maintains that Rebbi Meir will concede to the Chachamim that, after the first one has been brought, the second one is subject to the Din of Yir'eh (ad she'Yista'ev ve'Yimacher ve'Yiplu Damav li'Nedavah) - since, unlike the case in our Mishnah, where there is only one animal involved, the owner has indicated his fear that he may not fulfill his duty, in which case, he was certainly Makdish the second Korban unconditionally.

2)

(a)Likewise, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav maintains that the Chachamim will concede to Rebbi Meir that, if the witnesses who obligated him to bring an Asham Taluy become Zom'min, he returns the animal to the flock. Why is that?

(b)Rabah queries Rav Yehudah however, from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Shor ha'Niskal Eino Kein; Im ad she'Lo Niskal, Yeitzei Yir'eh be'Eider'. How do we know that the Tana must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min?

(c)What is now the Kashya on Rav Yehudah? What can we extrapolate from there with regard to Asham Taluy in the Reisha?

(d)How do we refute the Kashya? How else might we establish the case of ...

1. ... Shor ha'Niskal?

2. ... Asham Taluy?

2)

(a)Likewise, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav maintains that the Chachamim will concede to Rebbi Meir that, if the witnesses who obligated him to bring an Asham Taluy become Zom'min, the animal is subject to the Din of Yir'eh ... - because they only ascribe to him fear that he may have sinned there where he confesses to having possibly transgressed, but not where witnesses force it upon him (in which case, knowing that he didn't sin, he is determined at the outset to find witnesses to come and prove them Zom'min).

(b)Rabah queries Rav Yehudah however, from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Shor ha'Niskal Eino Kein; Im ad she'Lo Niskal, Yeitzei Yir'eh be'Eider', where the Tana must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min - because otherwise, it is simply a matter of one set of Eidim against the other, in which case there is no reason to accept the second set and not the first.

(c)In that case - Asham Taluy in the Reisha too, must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min, a Kashya on Rav Yehudah (who holds that the Tana'im do not argue over Asham Taluy in that case).

(d)We refute the Kashya by establishing the case of ...

1. ... Shor ha'Niskal - where, after the witnesses testified that Reuven's ox killed Shimon, the latter turns up alive and well.

2. ... Asham Taluy - where after eating what he personally thought was perhaps Cheilev, he discovers that it was Shuman.

3)

(a)The Machlokes between Rav Yehudah and Rabah is actually an old Machlokes. Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das, the Amora) compares Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy to Eidim Zom'min by Minchas Kena'os of a Sotah. What is the case there?

(b)What does the Beraisa say happens to the Minchah?

(c)What does Rebbi Yochanan say in the case of Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy?

(d)What distinction does Rebbi Yochanan draw between the two, to explain why one goes out to Chulin and the other is Yir'eh ad she'Yista'ev ... ?

3)

(a)The Machlokes between Rav Yehudah and Rabah is actually an old Machlokes between Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das, the Amora) who compares Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy to Eidim Zom'min by Minchas Kena'os of a Sotah - where the witnesses who testified that she secluded herself with a man, became Zom'min after her Minchah was already designated ...

(b)... where the Beraisa rules that - the Minchah goes out to Chulin.

(c)In the case of Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy, Rebbi Yochanan rules - Yir'eh ad she'Yista'ev ... .

(d)... because it comes to atone (in which case, the owner declares it Hekdesh without reservations; whereas the Minchas Sotah only comes to clarify the sin.

4)

(a)What does Rebbi K'ruspedai Amar Rebbi Yochanan say about someone who takes home a Shor ha'Niskal whose witnesses became Zom'min?

(b)Rava confined this ruling to where the witnesses claimed that the owner's ox was raped, but not where they claimed that he was the one to have raped it. Why is that?

(c)What does Rabah bar Isi Amar Resh Lakish say about the property of the people living in an Ir ha'Nidachas, in a case where the witnesses became Zom'min?

(d)Seeing as this includes the property of those who know that they did not sin, how will we reconcile Rava's previous statement with Rabah bar Isi's ruling by Ir ha'Nidachas?

4)

(a)Rebbi K'ruspedai Amar Rebbi Yochanan rules that someone who takes home a Shor ha'Niskal whose witnesses became Zom'min - may keep it.

(b)Rava confined this ruling to where the witnesses claimed that the owner's ox was raped, but not where they claimed that he was the one to have raped it - because in the latter case, where he knows that he didn't do it, he is determined to go and look for witnesses to render the first ones Zom'min.

(c)Rabah bar Isi Amar Resh Lakish rules that, in a case where the witnesses of an Ir ha'Nidachas became Zom'min - the property of the people living there becomes Hefker.

(d)Even though this includes the property of those who know that they did not sin, Rava will reconcile his previous statement with this ruling by explaining that - Ir ha'Nidachas is different, inasmuch as, even though the Tzadikim in it know that they did not sin, they do not know that everybody else didn't (in which case even they declare their animals Hefker).

5)

(a)What does Resh Lakish say about a gift that Reuven gives Shimon and that, after having accepted it, Shimon declares 'I Efshi bah' ('I don't want it')?

(b)We query this from a statement by Rabah bar Eivu Amar Rav Sheishes (or Rabah bar Avuhah), who discusses a case where Reuven gives Shimon a Sh'tar Matanah and Shimon refuses it. What sort of Sh'tar Matanah is he referring to?

(c)What does Rav Sheishes rule, assuming Shimon says ...

1. ... 'Matanah Zu Tivatel ... Mevuteles' or 'I Efshi bah'?

2. ... 'Beteilah hi' or 'Einah Matanah'?

(d)What is the reason for ...

1. ... the first ruling

2. ... the second ruling? On what grounds is he believed?

5)

(a)Resh Lakish rules that if Reuven gives Shimon a Matanah and, after having accepted it, Shimon declares 'I Efshi bah' ('I don't want it') - it is Hefker and whoever wants can take it.

(b)We query this from a statement by Rabah bar Eivu Amar Rav Sheishes (or Rabah bar Avuhah), who discusses a case where Reuven gives Shimon a Sh'tar Matanah - of Karka, which Shimon then rejects.

(c)Assuming Shimon says ...

1. ... 'Matanah Zu Tivatel ... Mevuteles' or 'I Efshi bah' - Rav Sheishes rules 'Lo Amar K'lum'.

2. ... 'Beteilah hi' or 'Einah Matanah' he rules that - his words stand (Devarav Kayamin).

(d)The reason for ...

1. ... the first ruling is that - each of these terms implies the future, as if he now wishes to negate the gift, which having already accepted it, he cannot do.

2. ... the second ruling is - because those terms imply the past (meaning that he claims that he did not accept the Sh'tar as a gift [and regarding monetary issues, a person is believed on himself like a hundred witnesses]).

6)

(a)Why does Resh Lakish have no problem with the first ruling? What is the difference between Rav Sheishes' first case and that of Resh Lakish?

(b)What is then the Kashya on Resh Lakish from the second ruling? How do we initially interpret Devarav Kayamin?

(c)What do we reply? What does Devarav Kayamin really mean?

(d)How else might we have answered the Kashya on Resh Lakish?

6)

(a)Resh Lakish has no problem with the first ruling - in that whereas his 'I Efshi bah' implies Hefker (since Shimon has already received the actual Metaltelin), that of Rav Sheishes (where all he has is the Sh'tar) implies rejection of the gift.

(b)The Kashya on Resh Lakish from the second ruling is that - we initially interpret Devarav Kayamin to mean that the property reverts to Reuven.

(c)And we answer that Devarav Kayamin really means that - it remains Hefker (like Resh Lakish).

(d)Alternatively, we might have answered that - seeing as Shimon claims that he did not accept the gift, he obviously did not declare it Hefker, in which case there is no reason for the property not to revert to Reuven (as we will answer shortly).

24b----------------------------------------24b

7)

(a)What does the Beraisa say about a case where one partner (in a field) says to the other partner 'Din u'Devarim Ein li al Sadeh Zu', 'Ein Li Eisek bah' or 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu'?

(b)To what do we compare 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu'? How does that pose a Kashya on Resh Lakish?

(c)What do we answer? What makes that case different?

7)

(a)In a case where one partner (in a field) says to the other partner 'Din u'Devarim Ein li al Sadeh Zu', 'Ein Li Eisek bah' or 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu', the Beraisa rules - Lo Amar K'lum.

(b)We compare 'Yadi Mesulekes Heimenu' to - 'I Efshi bah', a Kashya on Resh Lakish, who holds Devarav Kayamin.

(c)And we answer that this case is different - inasmuch as the Tana is referring to where he said all three expressions in one (not or, but and), in which case he is withdrawing, not from the property, but from Din u'Devarim (from the negotiations with whoever claims ownership of the property).

8)

(a)We query Resh Lakish from another Beraisa, which discusses a case where Reuven, who is a Sh'chiv-Mera (a man on his death-bed) writes a Sh'tar in which he donates all his property, including Avadim, to Shimon, who is a Kohen, and where Shimon declares 'I Efshi bahen'. The Tana Kama permits the Avadim to eat Terumah. What does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(b)What is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's reasoning?

(c)What problem does the Tana Kama pose on Resh Lakish?

(d)We answer that the Tana Kama holds 'ha'Mafkir Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus'. What else does he hold that will explain why the Eved is permitted to eat Terumah?

8)

(a)We query Resh Lakish from another Beraisa, which discusses a case where Reuven, who is a Sh'chiv-Mera (on his death-bed) writes a Sh'tar in which he donates all his property, including Avadim, to Shimon, who is a Kohen and where Shimon declares 'I Efshi bahen'. The Tana Kama permits the Avadim to eat Terumah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that - the moment Shimon declared 'I Efshi bahen', Reuven's heirs acquired them (and they are therefore forbidden to eat Terumah).

(b)Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's reasoning is - based on the fact that Shimon did not accept the gift in the first place, in which case, it remains Reuven's (in which case there is no contradiction to Resh Lakish, as we explained a little earlier).

(c)The problem that the Tana Kama poses on Resh Lakish however,is that - seeing as Shimon has acquired the Avadim, why are they not Hefker, when he declares 'I Efshi bahen' (like Resh Lakish holds), in which case, they ought not be permitted to eat Terumah.

(d)We answer that the Tana Kama holds a. ha'Mafkir Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus - b. that he requires a Get Shichrur and c. an Eved who has not yet received his Get Shichrur, is permitted to eat Terumah.

9)

(a)We cited Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah, who permits bringing the Asham Taluy even after the owner discovers that he did not sin, because even if it does not atone for this sin, it will atone for another one. How do we reconcile this with the Mishnah later, where Rebbi Eliezer permits bringing a voluntary Asham Taluy, even if the owner did not sin at all?

(b)How does Rebbi Elazar reconcile the ruling in our Mishnah 'Im mi'she'Nishchat Noda lo, Yishafech ha'Dam, ve'ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' with the case of Asham Vaday (in the Seifa), where the Tana rules 'mi'she'Nishchat, harei Zeh Yikaver'? What does 'Tavra' mean?

(c)What distinction does Rabah draw between Asham Vaday and Asham Taluy, that will explain the discrepancy?

9)

(a)We cited Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah, who permits bringing the Asham Taluy even after the owner discovers that he did not sin, because even if it does not atone for this sin, it will atone for another one. We reconcile this with the Mishnah later, where Rebbi Eliezer permits bringing a voluntary Asham Taluy, even if the owner did not sin at all - by establishing our Mishnah like Amru lo of the next Mishnah, who require a Safek Chet, as we will learn there.

(b)To reconcile the ruling in our Mishnah 'Im mi'she'Nishchat Noda Lo, Yishafech ha'Dam, ve'ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' with the case of Asham Vaday (in the Seifa), where the Tana rules 'mi'she'Nishchat, Harei Zeh Yikaver' - Rebbi Elazar states Tavra (This is a contradiction), and the one who learned this one did not learn that one'.

(c)Rabah draws a distinction between Asham Vaday - which the sinner only sanctifies on the understanding that he is Chayav, and Asham Taluy, which, out of fear that he may have sinned, he declares Hekdesh unconditionally (and Hekdesh that became Pasul must be burned).

10)

(a)So we query (not Asham Taluy, but) Asham Vaday from Asham Vaday in the Seifa: 'Nizrak ha'Dam, ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah'. What is the problem with that?

(b)Once again, Rebbi Elazar answers 'Tavra, Mi she'Shanah Zu Lo Shanah Zu'. How does Rav Ashi explain the latter ruling (despite the fact that it is really Chulin)?

(c)Our Mishnah rules that if one discovers that he sinned only after the blood of the Asham Taluy has been sprinkled, the Kohanim may eat the Basar. How does Rava explain this, in light of the Pasuk (in connection with Asham Taluy) "ve'hu Lo Yada"?

10)

(a)So we query Asham Vaday (not from Asham Taluy, but) from Asham Vaday. The Mishnah states 'Nizrak ha'Dam, ha'Basar Yeitei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' - whereas regarding the previous stage, we just ruled Yikaver.

(b)Once again, Rebbi Elazar answers 'Tavra, Mi she'Shanah Zu Lo Shanah Zu'. Rav Ashi explains that, even though in the latter case, it is really Chulin - the Chachamim decreed that it should be burned, since it resembles a Pasul Korban.

(c)Our Mishnah rules that if one discovers that he sinned only after the blood of the Asham Taluy has been sprinkled, the Kohanim may eat the Basar. Rava explains that granted, the Pasuk writes (in connection with Asham Taluy) "ve'Hu Lo Yada" (and he did know) - but it also adds "ve'Nislach lo", implying that the criterion for that knowledge is at the time that the atonement takes place (the Zerikas ha'Dam).

11)

(a)What problem do now we have with Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah, who rules that if he discovers that he sinned when the blood is already in the cup, then ... the Kohanim may eat the Basar?

(b)Rava answers by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Shimon. What does Rebbi Shimon say?

(c)What problem do we have with this answer? Why is Rebbi Shimon's ruling not applicable here?

(d)What principle concerning K'lei Shareis, do the B'nei Eretz Yisrael therefore ascribe to Rebbi Yossi, that will avoid the problem?

11)

(a)The problem with Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah, who rules that if he discovers that he sinned when the blood is already in the cup, then ... the Kohanim may eat the Basar is that - since he discovered that he sinned before the Z'rikas ha'Dam, the Korban ought to be Pasul (as we just explained)?

(b)Rava answers by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Shimon, who holds - Kol ha'Omed Lizarek, ke'Zaruk Dami (rendering the blood that is in the cup as if it had already been sprinkled).

(c)The problem with this answer is that - bearing in mind that the blood of this Asham Taluy is not due to be sprinkled, Rebbi Shimon's principle is not applicable here.

(d)To avoid the problem, the B'nei Eretz Yisrael therefore ascribe to Rebbi Yossi the principle - that K'lei Shareis sanctify even Pasul things, rendering them fit to bring on the Mizbe'ach Lechatchilah.

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