1)

(a)Rav Sheishes refers to a case where somebody sets aside two Ashamos for Acharayus - one for his Korban, and the one, in reserve, in case something happens to the first one.

(b)He maintains that Rebbi Meir will concede to the Chachamim that, after the first one has been brought, the second one is subject to the Din of Yir'eh (ad she'Yista'ev ve'Yimacher ve'Yiplu Damav li'Nedavah) - since, unlike the case in our Mishnah, where there is only one animal involved, the owner has indicated his fear that he may not fulfill his duty, in which case, he was certainly Makdish the second Korban unconditionally.

2)

(a)Likewise, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav maintains that the Chachamim will concede to Rebbi Meir that, if the witnesses who obligated him to bring an Asham Taluy become Zom'min, the animal is subject to the Din of Yir'eh ... - because they only ascribe to him fear that he may have sinned there where he confesses to having possibly transgressed, but not where witnesses force it upon him (in which case, knowing that he didn't sin, he is determined at the outset to find witnesses to come and prove them Zom'min).

(b)Rabah queries Rav Yehudah however, from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Shor ha'Niskal Eino Kein; Im ad she'Lo Niskal, Yeitzei Yir'eh be'Eider', where the Tana must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min - because otherwise, it is simply a matter of one set of Eidim against the other, in which case there is no reason to accept the second set and not the first.

(c)In that case - Asham Taluy in the Reisha too, must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min, a Kashya on Rav Yehudah (who holds that the Tana'im do not argue over Asham Taluy in that case).

(d)We refute the Kashya by establishing the case of ...

1. ... Shor ha'Niskal - where, after the witnesses testified that Reuven's ox killed Shimon, the latter turns up alive and well.

2. ... Asham Taluy - where after eating what he personally thought was perhaps Cheilev, he discovers that it was Shuman.

3)

(a)The Machlokes between Rav Yehudah and Rabah is actually an old Machlokes between Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das, the Amora) who compares Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy to Eidim Zom'min by Minchas Kena'os of a Sotah - where the witnesses who testified that she secluded herself with a man, became Zom'min after her Minchah was already designated ...

(b)... where the Beraisa rules that - the Minchah goes out to Chulin.

(c)In the case of Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy, Rebbi Yochanan rules - Yir'eh ad she'Yista'ev ... .

(d)... because it comes to atone (in which case, the owner declares it Hekdesh without reservations; whereas the Minchas Sotah only comes to clarify the sin.

4)

(a)Rebbi K'ruspedai Amar Rebbi Yochanan rules that someone who takes home a Shor ha'Niskal whose witnesses became Zom'min - may keep it.

(b)Rava confined this ruling to where the witnesses claimed that the owner's ox was raped, but not where they claimed that he was the one to have raped it - because in the latter case, where he knows that he didn't do it, he is determined to go and look for witnesses to render the first ones Zom'min.

(c)Rabah bar Isi Amar Resh Lakish rules that, in a case where the witnesses of an Ir ha'Nidachas became Zom'min - the property of the people living there becomes Hefker.

(d)Even though this includes the property of those who know that they did not sin, Rava will reconcile his previous statement with this ruling by explaining that - Ir ha'Nidachas is different, inasmuch as, even though the Tzadikim in it know that they did not sin, they do not know that everybody else didn't (in which case even they declare their animals Hefker).

5)

(a)Resh Lakish rules that if Reuven gives Shimon a Matanah and, after having accepted it, Shimon declares 'I Efshi bah' ('I don't want it') - it is Hefker and whoever wants can take it.

(b)We query this from a statement by Rabah bar Eivu Amar Rav Sheishes (or Rabah bar Avuhah), who discusses a case where Reuven gives Shimon a Sh'tar Matanah - of Karka, which Shimon then rejects.

(c)Assuming Shimon says ...

1. ... 'Matanah Zu Tivatel ... Mevuteles' or 'I Efshi bah' - Rav Sheishes rules 'Lo Amar K'lum'.

2. ... 'Beteilah hi' or 'Einah Matanah' he rules that - his words stand (Devarav Kayamin).

(d)The reason for ...

1. ... the first ruling is that - each of these terms implies the future, as if he now wishes to negate the gift, which having already accepted it, he cannot do.

2. ... the second ruling is - because those terms imply the past (meaning that he claims that he did not accept the Sh'tar as a gift [and regarding monetary issues, a person is believed on himself like a hundred witnesses]).

6)

(a)Resh Lakish has no problem with the first ruling - in that whereas his 'I Efshi bah' implies Hefker (since Shimon has already received the actual Metaltelin), that of Rav Sheishes (where all he has is the Sh'tar) implies rejection of the gift.

(b)The Kashya on Resh Lakish from the second ruling is that - we initially interpret Devarav Kayamin to mean that the property reverts to Reuven.

(c)And we answer that Devarav Kayamin really means that - it remains Hefker (like Resh Lakish).

(d)Alternatively, we might have answered that - seeing as Shimon claims that he did not accept the gift, he obviously did not declare it Hefker, in which case there is no reason for the property not to revert to Reuven (as we will answer shortly).

7)

(a)In a case where one partner (in a field) says to the other partner 'Din u'Devarim Ein li al Sadeh Zu', 'Ein Li Eisek bah' or 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu', the Beraisa rules - Lo Amar K'lum.

(b)We compare 'Yadi Mesulekes Heimenu' to - 'I Efshi bah', a Kashya on Resh Lakish, who holds Devarav Kayamin.

(c)And we answer that this case is different - inasmuch as the Tana is referring to where he said all three expressions in one (not or, but and), in which case he is withdrawing, not from the property, but from Din u'Devarim (from the negotiations with whoever claims ownership of the property).

8)

(a)We query Resh Lakish from another Beraisa, which discusses a case where Reuven, who is a Sh'chiv-Mera (on his death-bed) writes a Sh'tar in which he donates all his property, including Avadim, to Shimon, who is a Kohen and where Shimon declares 'I Efshi bahen'. The Tana Kama permits the Avadim to eat Terumah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that - the moment Shimon declared 'I Efshi bahen', Reuven's heirs acquired them (and they are therefore forbidden to eat Terumah).

(b)Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's reasoning is - based on the fact that Shimon did not accept the gift in the first place, in which case, it remains Reuven's (in which case there is no contradiction to Resh Lakish, as we explained a little earlier).

(c)The problem that the Tana Kama poses on Resh Lakish however,is that - seeing as Shimon has acquired the Avadim, why are they not Hefker, when he declares 'I Efshi bahen' (like Resh Lakish holds), in which case, they ought not be permitted to eat Terumah.

(d)We answer that the Tana Kama holds a. ha'Mafkir Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus - b. that he requires a Get Shichrur and c. an Eved who has not yet received his Get Shichrur, is permitted to eat Terumah.

9)

(a)We cited Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah, who permits bringing the Asham Taluy even after the owner discovers that he did not sin, because even if it does not atone for this sin, it will atone for another one. We reconcile this with the Mishnah later, where Rebbi Eliezer permits bringing a voluntary Asham Taluy, even if the owner did not sin at all - by establishing our Mishnah like Amru lo of the next Mishnah, who require a Safek Chet, as we will learn there.

(b)To reconcile the ruling in our Mishnah 'Im mi'she'Nishchat Noda Lo, Yishafech ha'Dam, ve'ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' with the case of Asham Vaday (in the Seifa), where the Tana rules 'mi'she'Nishchat, Harei Zeh Yikaver' - Rebbi Elazar states Tavra (This is a contradiction), and the one who learned this one did not learn that one'.

(c)Rabah draws a distinction between Asham Vaday - which the sinner only sanctifies on the understanding that he is Chayav, and Asham Taluy, which, out of fear that he may have sinned, he declares Hekdesh unconditionally (and Hekdesh that became Pasul must be burned).

10)

(a)So we query Asham Vaday (not from Asham Taluy, but) from Asham Vaday. The Mishnah states 'Nizrak ha'Dam, ha'Basar Yeitei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' - whereas regarding the previous stage, we just ruled Yikaver.

(b)Once again, Rebbi Elazar answers 'Tavra, Mi she'Shanah Zu Lo Shanah Zu'. Rav Ashi explains that, even though in the latter case, it is really Chulin - the Chachamim decreed that it should be burned, since it resembles a Pasul Korban.

(c)Our Mishnah rules that if one discovers that he sinned only after the blood of the Asham Taluy has been sprinkled, the Kohanim may eat the Basar. Rava explains that granted, the Pasuk writes (in connection with Asham Taluy) "ve'Hu Lo Yada" (and he did know) - but it also adds "ve'Nislach lo", implying that the criterion for that knowledge is at the time that the atonement takes place (the Zerikas ha'Dam).

11)

(a)The problem with Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah, who rules that if he discovers that he sinned when the blood is already in the cup, then ... the Kohanim may eat the Basar is that - since he discovered that he sinned before the Z'rikas ha'Dam, the Korban ought to be Pasul (as we just explained)?

(b)Rava answers by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Shimon, who holds - Kol ha'Omed Lizarek, ke'Zaruk Dami (rendering the blood that is in the cup as if it had already been sprinkled).

(c)The problem with this answer is that - bearing in mind that the blood of this Asham Taluy is not due to be sprinkled, Rebbi Shimon's principle is not applicable here.

(d)To avoid the problem, the B'nei Eretz Yisrael therefore ascribe to Rebbi Yossi the principle - that K'lei Shareis sanctify even Pasul things, rendering them fit to bring on the Mizbe'ach Lechatchilah.