1) BENEFITING FROM "HEKDESH" WORTH LESS THAN A "PERUTAH"
QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses a case in which there was a piece of Chelev of Chulin and a piece of Chelev of Nosar in front of a person, and he ate one after the other. In such a case, he must bring three Korbenos Chatas: two for eating two pieces of Chelev, and one for eating Nosar.
In the Gemara, Rava asked Rav Nachman why the Mishnah does not require him to bring a Korban Asham Vadai as well, because of the Nosar that he ate. As RASHI (DH v'Neisi, according to the SHITAH MEKUBETZES #15) explains, he should be required to bring an Asham Vadai for benefiting in a forbidden way from the meat of Kodshim.
Rav Nachman answered that the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the piece of Nosar is worth less than a Perutah. Since it is worth less than a Perutah, it is not considered to have any value, and thus the person is not considered to have benefited from Hekdesh and does not bring a Korban. Rava objected that it is evident from the earlier part of the Mishnah that the Mishnah is discussing a piece of meat that is worth at least a Perutah. The Mishnah states that when one eats both a piece of Chelev and a piece of Kodesh, he must bring a Korban Asham. Obviously, the piece of Kodesh was worth at least a Perutah, because if it was worth less than a Perutah he would not be obligated to bring an Asham. Rav Nachman replied that in the earlier case of the Mishnah, the piece of Kodesh was not Nosar, and thus it was worth at least a Perutah. In contrast, Nosar is meat that has been left over for a day or more, and thus it has already begun to spoil and is no longer worth a Perutah.
Rava challenged Rav Nachman again from an earlier Mishnah (13b) that discusses a case of one who is obligated to bring an Asham for eating Nosar. It is evident from that Mishnah that Nosar is worth a Perutah. Rav Nachman replied that the earlier Mishnah is discussing a case of "Gasah," where the person ate a large amount of Nosar meat, and the total value of all of the meat was a Perutah (see Rashi, DH b'Gasah). The Mishnah here, in contrast, is referring to one who did not eat so much meat of Nosar, and thus the Nosar was worth less than a Perutah.
Rashi adds that although the meat of Nosar is Asur b'Hana'ah, the Isur of Me'ilah applies to it. Although it may not be offered on the Mizbe'ach, if, b'Di'eved, it was offered, it does not need to be removed.
Why does Rashi add that Nosar that was offered on the Mizbe'ach is not removed?
(a) The CHASAM SOFER (on Kerisus 13b, and as cited by the ACHI'EZER 2:46:6) explains that one who derives benefit from an object of Kodesh that is worth less than a Perutah to the treasury of the Beis ha'Mikdash is not liable for Me'ilah. However, if that object can be offered on the Mizbe'ach, then one is liable for Me'ilah even though it is not worth a Perutah to the treasury. Since the object can be offered as a Korban, it is worth a Perutah to the individual. (The Chasam Sofer adds that there must be at least a k'Zayis, because it is not possible to offer a Korban of less than a k'Zayis. See TOSFOS to Kerisus 6b, DH ha'Mefatem, and Zevachim 109b.) The reason why Rashi writes that, b'Di'eved, Nosar is a valid Korban and may not be removed from the Mizbe'ach if it was placed there is that he seeks to explain why Nosar is considered worth a Perutah and why one who benefits from it is liable for Me'ilah. However, after the Nosar has spoiled as a result of being left over, it is worth a Perutah only when one consumes a large quantity.
(b) The ACHI'EZER explains that the reason why Rashi says that the Nosar is an acceptable Korban, b'Di'eved, is that if it would not be considered an acceptable Korban, then there would be no Me'ilah for a different reason. It would be considered like an animal of Kodshim that died, for which there is no Me'ilah mid'Oraisa (Me'ilah 2a). TOSFOS in Me'ilah (2a, DH Kodshim) writes that since the dead animal of Kodshim must go to waste, it is no longer called "Kodshei Hash-m" to which Me'ilah applies. Similarly, Nosar -- if not for the fact that b'Di'eved it may be offered as a Korban -- would not be considered "Kodshei Hash-m" since it must be left to rot.
The Achi'ezer explains that Rashi is concerned with why this case differs from the case in Pesachim (29a, cited by Tosfos to 13b, DH v'Asham), in which one who eats Chametz of Hekdesh on Pesach is not liable for Me'ilah because the Chametz which is Asur b'Hana'ah during Pesach, is not worth anything. Why is one liable for Me'ilah for eating Nosar, if Nosar is also Asur b'Hana'ah and, consequently, not worth a Perutah? To answer this question, Rashi says that it is necessary for an object to be worth a Perutah in order for Me'ilah to apply to it only when the Isur Hana'ah is due to an external factor other than the fact that it is Kodshim (such as in the case of Chametz on Pesach, which is Asur b'Hana'ah due to the Isur of Chametz, and not merely due to the Isur of Kodesh). However, when the Isur Hana'ah of an object is due only to the fact that it is Kodesh (such as Nosar), the Isur of Me'ilah applies even when it is not worth a Perutah, in the same way that the Isur of Me'ilah applies to all Kodshim even though they are Asur b'Hana'ah and thus not worth a Perutah. (This differs from the Chasam Sofer's explanation that Nosar is worth a Perutah because, b'Di'eved, it is a valid Korban.) (D. BLOOM)
2) OFFSPRING OF "KODSHIM" BECOME "KADOSH" AT BIRTH
QUESTION: The Gemara explains that one is Chayav for Me'ilah when he eats Chelev of Kodshim, according to the opinion that "Veladei Kodshim b'Havayasam Hem Kedoshim" -- the offspring of an animal that is Kadosh becomes Kodesh at birth and not while it is a fetus. This is because both Isurim -- the Isur to eat Chelev and the Isur to eat Kodshim -- take effect b'Vas Achas, at the same moment (at the moment of birth).
Why does the Gemara say that one is Chayav for Me'ilah when he eats Chelev of Kodshim only according to the opinion that "Veladei Kodshim b'Havayasam Hem Kedoshim"? According to the other opinion (that the offspring of an animal that is Kadosh becomes Kadosh in the womb), the law of Me'ilah certainly applies to the Chelev of the offspring, since the prohibition of Chelev begins only afterwards, at birth, while the prohibition of Me'ilah begins even earlier! (SEFAS EMES; ARUCH LA'NER)
Moreover, why is the verse, "Kol Chelev la'Hashem" (Vayikra 3:16), needed to teach that Me'ilah applies to the Chelev of such offspring? Why would one have thought that it does not apply? Even though the Halachah is "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur," the prohibition of Me'ilah certainly does not take effect after the prohibition of Chelev takes effect; there is no pre-existing Isur that should prevent Me'ilah from taking effect! (SEFAS EMES)
ANSWER: The Gemara in Chulin (101b) raises the possibility that two Isurim cannot take effect on the same object even when they come about simultaneously (b'Vas Achas). Hence, the verse is teaching that in such a case, where the two Isurim occur simultaneously (at birth), both Isurim take effect because they are "b'Vas Achas." (M. KORNFELD)
3) A KORBAN THAT TURNED OUT TO BE UNNECESSARY
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that according to Rebbi Meir, when one designated an animal as a Korban Asham Taluy and then, before the animal was slaughtered, discovered that he in fact did not commit the transgression in question, the animal has no Kedushah and may return to graze with the other animals in the flock. The Chachamim argue and maintain that the animal remains Kadosh, and therefore it must be left to graze until it develops a blemish. It is then sold and the proceeds used to buy a Korban Nedavah.
The Gemara explains the dispute between Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim. According to Rebbi Meir, when the person sanctified the animal as an Asham Taluy, he did not have in mind that it should be Kadosh if it turns out that he is not required to bring a Korban. As the KEHILOS YAKOV (#11) explains, it is considered as though the person stipulated that he intends to make the animal Kadosh only if he in fact later needs it to be a Korban. (The Kehilos Yakov compares this case to the case in the Mishnah in Nazir (24a), in which a woman vowed to become a Nazir and separated an animal for her Korban, and then her husband annulled her vow. If the animal belonged to the husband, then it has no Kedushah. The Gemara explains that this is because the husband gave her the animal only for the purpose of her needs. When it becomes apparent that she does not need the animal (because her husband annulled her vow), it also becomes apparent that his present to her was not valid, and consequently the Kedushah that she placed on the animal is removed.)
The Chachamim, in contrast, maintain that "Libo Nokfo" -- a person's heart troubles him. As RASHI (DH she'Libo) explains, a person is afraid of the transgression that he might have committed. At the time that he designated an animal as an Asham Taluy, he was unsure about whether or not he had done an Aveirah, but he resolved that whether or not he had actually done the Aveirah, he wants the animal to be Kadosh.
The Gemara earlier discusses a case similar to that of the Mishnah here. The Gemara (18a) cites a Beraisa that discusses a case in which a person slaughtered an Asham Taluy outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rebbi Meir maintains that he is Chayav for transgressing Shechutei Chutz, slaughtering Kodshim outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Chachamim maintain that he is exempt. TOSFOS there (DH ha'Shochet) points out that the Beraisa there is discussing a case in which he had not yet discovered that he did not sin, and therefore the animal is still Kadosh according to Rebbi Meir. In addition, Tosfos (18a, DH v'Chachamim) writes that the Chachamim who exempt him for Shechutei Chutz are not the same Chachamim who argue with Rebbi Meir in the Mishnah here. According to the Chachamim here, one who slaughters an Asham Taluy outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash will certainly be Chayav for Shechutei Chutz, because the Asham Taluy never loses its Kedushah, even when the person finds out that he did not sin. Rather, the Chachamim in the Beraisa there agree with Rebbi Meir that when a person finds out that he did not sin his Asham Taluy loses its Kedushah, and they are even more lenient than Rebbi Meir and maintain that one is not Chayav for slaughtering an Asham Taluy outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash even before he finds out that he did not sin.
There seems to be a contradiction in the way that the RAMBAM understands the two Sugyos. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:10) writes that when one slaughters an Asham Taluy outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, he is not Chayav for Shechutei Chutz. This is the opinion of the Chachamim (on 18a). Elsewhere, however, the Rambam (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 4:19) rules that if one designated an animal to be an Asham Taluy and then, before it was slaughtered, he found out that he did not sin, the animal retains its Kedushah because a person is concerned about his transgressions and he separated the animal due to a doubt about whether he sinned, with intent that it be Kadosh regardless of whether or not he actually sinned. The Rambam here is ruling like the Chachamim in the Mishnah here.
How, though, can the Rambam rule like the opinions of both of the Chachamim? If the Asham Taluy retains its Kedushah even after he discovers that he did not sin, then how can one be exempt for slaughtering an Asham Taluy outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash?
ANSWER: The LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:10) answers that the Rambam apparently disagrees with Tosfos and maintains that even the Chachamim here -- who maintain that a person wants the animal to be Kadosh as an Asham Taluy in any event -- agree that one who slaughters the animal outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is not Chayav. Since he would not have sanctified the animal had he had no doubt about having sinned, the Kedushah of the animal is not considered complete, and one is not Chayav for Shechutei Chutz for an animal with such Kedushah.
The MIRKEVES HA'MISHNEH elaborates on this answer. Even according to the Chachamim here, the person decided to make the animal Kadosh only because of a doubt, and therefore it is not considered an "established Isur" as the Rambam writes. The Mirkeves ha'Mishneh explains that the verse, "And he does not bring it to the entrance of the Ohel Mo'ed, to offer an offering to Hash-m" (Vayikra 17:4), teaches that one is Chayav for Shechutei Chutz only when he slaughters an animal that is fit to be offered inside the Beis ha'Mikdash (see Zevachim 115a). The Asham Taluy in the case of the Mishnah here, however, is not fit to be offered as a Korban, because if the person discovers before the Shechitah that he did not sin, then the animal must graze until it gets a blemish, and if he discovers after the Shechitah that he did not sin, then the blood cannot be cast on the Mizbe'ach but must be poured down the Amah, and the flesh cannot be burned on the Mizbe'ach but must be burned at the Beis ha'Sereifah. Therefore, the Asham Taluy is not considered entirely fit to be sacrificed, and one who slaughters it outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is exempt. The logic of the Chachamim that the person wants it to be Kadosh in any event suffices only to establish that it must graze until it develops a blemish; it does not make it fit for sacrificing. Therefore, one who slaughters it outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is not Chayav. (D. BLOOM)