QUESTION: In the Beraisa, the Tana Kama and Rebbi Eliezer b'Rebbi Tzadok disagree about one who stokes coals on Shabbos, whereby he extinguishes the upper coals by moving the lower coals on top of them, and he kindles the lower coals by moving them to the top. According to the Tana Kama, when a person stokes coals he is Chayav to bring one Korban Chatas. According to Rebbi Eliezer b'Rebbi Tzadok, he is Chayav to bring two Chata'os.

Rava explains that their argument applies in a case in which one intended to kindle the lower coals first, before extinguishing the upper coals, and he ended up doing both acts in one stoking. According to Rebbi Eliezer b'Rebbi Tzadok, he is Chayav for two transgressions, because in practice he did what he intended to do, even though he did not do it in the order in which he intended.

According to the Tana Kama, he is Chayav for only one transgression, because he did not do the actions in the order in which he intended, and thus his act is considered Mis'asek.

This is difficult to understand. If a change from his intended order renders his act Mis'asek according to the Tana Kama, then he should not be Chayav for even one transgression!

RASHI explains that according to the Tana Kama, he is not Chayav for extinguishing "because perhaps he extinguished first" (and his intention was not to extinguish until afterwards). However, this does not exempt him completely, because even though he did not end up kindling first, he did not postpone the kindling until last, for he did both acts at the same time (that is, he did not completely fail to do the actions the way he had intended). Thus, he is Chayav to bring one Korban Chatas.

Rashi's explanation is difficult to understand for several reasons.

(a) Rashi writes that "perhaps he extinguished first," which implies that there is a possibility that he did not kindle until the end. However, Rashi afterwards writes that even though he failed to do the kindling first, nevertheless he did not do it after the extinguishing!

(b) Not only do the words of Rashi contradict each other, but the ruling of the Tana Kama itself is contradictory. The Tana Kama exempts a person from one Chatas (out of two) because he might have extinguished first. How, then, can the Tana Kama obligate him to bring even one Chatas? If he extinguished first, then that means he did not kindle first, and since his intention was to kindle first, there was a change in the order he intended even with regard to the kindling, and thus he should not be Chayav for even one Chatas.

(a) Rashi's words, "Perhaps he extinguished first," mean that it is impossible to clarify what he did first. When he intended to kindle the coals first, his intention was to kindle only in such a way that it would be clear that his kindling was done first, and he certainly failed to do this. Nevertheless, he did not alter his act so severely as to do the kindling in such a way that it was clear that it was done last. This is what Rashi means when he writes that certainly "he did not delay the kindling [until after the extinguishing]" -- that is, he did not do it in such a way that it is clear and obvious that it was done after the extinguishing (for, had he done it after the extinguishing, he would not be Chayav even one Chatas). (Rashi's basis for this explanation is the text of the Gemara earlier on 19a.)

(b) The reason why the Tana Kama requires him to bring one Chatas is that it is assumed that a person's concern is not to perform one action last, but rather his intention is to perform one action first, and merely as a result the second action is done last (that is, he does not want to do that action last; he merely does not want to do it first, because he wants to do the other action first).

Therefore, the person who stoked the coals on Shabbos intended specifically that his action of kindling the lower coals be done first (in a manner that was clear and obvious, as explained above), and he intended that his action of extinguishing the upper coals specifically not be done first (that is, he did not want that action to be clearly first, as explained above). He wanted his act of kindling to precede his act of extinguishing, and, as a natural result, his act of extinguishing would not be done first. Nevertheless, he did not necessarily care that his act of extinguishing be done last (in a manner that was clear that he was doing it last). Therefore, when he failed to perform one action before the other in a clear and obvious manner, he nonetheless fulfilled his intention with regard to the act of extinguishing (because he did not extinguish first), but he did not fulfill his intention with regard to the kindling (because he did not kindle first). (M. KORNFELD, based on SHITAH MEKUBETZES #10)

QUESTION: The Beraisa discusses the status of human blood (20b) and milk (22a) with regard to whether one may eat or drink them. Why does the Beraisa here refer to a person as "Mehalchei Shtayim" -- "those who walk on two [legs]," instead of simply calling him a person ("Adam")? (TOSFOS YOM TOV to Bikurim 2:7)

(a) The TOSFOS YOM TOV (Bikurim 2:7) answers that the term "Adam" sometimes refers only to a Jew. Hence, had the Gemara used the term "Adam" one might have thought that these laws apply only to the blood and milk of a Jew. The Beraisa uses the term "Mehalchei Shtayim" to make it clear that it is referring to all people. (The RISHON L'TZIYON asks that TOSFOS in a number of places points out that when the term "ha'Adam" (with the prefix "Ha") is used, it includes all humans, both Jews and others; hence, the Beraisa should have simply used the term "ha'Adam.")

(b) The TIFERES YISRAEL quotes RAV YAKOV EMDEN, who explains that the term "Mehalchei Shtayim" was used in order to include in this category the "Adnei ha'Sadeh" (a creature referred to in Kil'ayim 8:5) which also walks on two legs like man, and which, according to some, is Metamei b'Ohel like man (see Insights to Bechoros 8:1).

(c) The BEIS DAVID explains that since the Gemara here discusses animals in the same context as it discusses man, it felt that it would be degrading to use the term "Adam," as if to say that "Adam" is just another species of animal. In order to avoid referring to "Adam" when relating solely to the animalistic, non-reasoning qualities of man, it uses the term "Mehalchei Shtayim."