Text: In Makos (16a), the text is in most Sefarim, "Ameimar says that the law is that a vow that was taken in public can have Hafarah, (but) if it was based on the mindset of the public it cannot have Hafarah."

According to this text, the implication is that the law indeed is that a vow made in public can still have Hafarah.

According to the added text (found in our Gemara), "(the law is) even according to the opinion etc.," which is not coming to rule anything regarding one who makes a vow in public, the implication is that if a vow based on the public mindset does not have Hafarah, a vow in public does have Hafarah. If it wouldn't have Hafarah, certainly a vow based on the public mindset would not have Hafarah. Why would it have to rule regarding a case of a vow based on the public mindset, as even a public vow does not have Hafarah? The text should have said without implying halachic conclusion (unlike the present text that "the law is") that even according to the opinion that in public there is Hafarah etc.

Implied Question: Earlier, Rav Nachman said that our Mishnah is discussing a case where we make her take a vow in public. We hold like Rav Nachman in monetary issues. Here, our question is the law regarding payment of her Kesuvah (making it a monetary issue). (Note: Why, then, is the halachic conclusion at odds with Rav Nachman's position?)

Answer: The Gemara asks afterwards "It is good according to the opinion etc." It is possible to say that this question is also asked on Rav Nachman. (Note: The Maharsha explains that being that the Mishnah later (45b) implies that the Rabbanan (Tana Kama) does not hold that a vow made in public cannot have Hafarah, even Rav Nachman must explain how the Rabbanan will explain our Mishnah (see Maharsha at length).)

Observation: The fact that Rav Acha made a certain teacher take a vow based on the mindset of the public tells us that he held a vow made in public would have Hafarah.

Rav Yosef, who says in Pesachim (107a) that he will take a vow in public that he will not drink beer, implies that a public vow does not have Hafarah. However, we do not rule this way.

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam says that the vow can be permitted because the public probably would want that, as it is for the purpose of performing a Mitzvah.

Rabeinu Tam adds that "based on the mindset" means that he says "on the mindset of Ploni and Ploni," even if they are not present. However, if someone merely says, "based on the mindset of the public," (without specifying who this public is), he has not done anything.

If he says, "based on the mindset of a single person," even if he specified who he was referring to, a Chacham can permit the vow.

Text: Rabeinu Tam erased from his edition of the Gemara the letter "vav" from the word "v'ha'Eidim."

Explanation: Perhaps this was because this implies that Rabban Gamliel instituted this decree. The Gemara, however, says that Rabban Gamliel said, "They instituted a great decree." This implies that the decree was instituted before Rabban Gamliel.

Implied Question: Now Rava does not want to answer this question by saying "Hefker Beis Din Hefker" -- "whatever Beis Din makes ownerless is indeed ownerless," as he answers later (top 36b). (Note: Why not?)

Answer: This is because he has difficulty with the concept that Hillel seemingly uprooted Shemitah, which is a Torah law.

Implied Question: The Sifri states that the Pasuk, "And what will be with you of your brother's (money) you should leave go," teaches "And what belongs to your brother should not be in your hand." This is the source for the law that if someone lends his friend money based on collateral or gives his (loan) documents to Beis Din, he does not forfeit the loan. (Note: This implies that even without Hillel there is a way to circumvent Shemitah.)

Answer: Even so, he should not have made a decree to teach to do so, as by doing so he essentially nullified the Torah's commandment to forgo payment of loans due to Shemitah.

Opinion: Rashi explains that Rava (in his second answer) also was answering the first question of the Gemara. The teaching of the Sifri is mainly regarding lending money based on collateral. Giving one's loan documents to Beis Din works because of the concept Hefker Beis Din Hefker (and is therefore not really applicable to the Sifri's derivation from the Pasuk). Rather, the Sifri "leaned" the concept of giving loan documents to Beis Din on the teaching regarding loan with collateral.

Explanation: Rashi explains that the resting of land did not apply during the second Beis Hamikdash. This is as the Yerushalmi says in our chapter: How do we know that Shemitah only applies when Yovel applies? The Pasuk says, "v'Zeh Devar ha'Shemitah, Shamot" -- "And this is the concept of Shemitah, leave go" (Devarim 15:2). This teaches that both the leaving go of Yovel and Shemitah etc. (Note: The "leaving go" of Shemitah and Yovel are connected, as evidenced by the two words of "leaving go," in that Shemitah only applies when Yovel applies.)

In the second Beis Hamikdash, being that Yovel did not apply as not all of the land's inhabitants (the Jews of that period) were dwelling in Eretz Yisrael, Shemitah also did not apply according to Torah law.

Implied Question: The Gemara says in Erchin (32b) that one should count Yovalos to make Shemitah holy. (Note: The fiftieth year does not count towards the cycle of Shemitah years. It is therefore essential to count the Yovel years in order to have the right counting of Shemitah. This implies that they were keeping Shemitah.)

Answer: They were keeping Shemitah as Rabbinic law.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this. Our Gemara should have brought the teaching of the Yerushalmi. Even if you will say that our Gemara did depend on the Yerushalmi and or teaching is only because of Shemitas Kesafim, there is still a difficulty from the beginning of Moed Katan (2b). The Gemara there asks, is plowing and planting on Shemitah permitted? To answer, the Gemara quotes the teaching of our Gemara. It is clear that the Gemara should have quoted the teaching of the Yerushalmi (if it held that it was correct).

Answer: Rabeinu Tam understands that the "letting go" of land referred to here and in Moed Katan is not referring to plowing and planting, but rather fields that go back to their owners during Yovel. Yovel is being referred to when the Gemara says "letting go of land" and Shemitah is being referred to when the Gemara says "letting go of money."

Shemitah takes away money (loans), but Yovel does not. This is as explicitly stated in Parshah Re'aih, and is extrapolated from the teaching of "Dvar ha'Shemitah Shamot" (as explained above in (a). It means to say that when you are letting go of ownership of land of Yovel, you also let go of money. This is the intent of the Yerushalmi. (Note: Accordingly, the "letting go" of not working the land on Shemitah is still Torah law, even when Yovel does not apply.)

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam continues that in the times of the second Beis Hamikdash, Yovel did apply. This is evident from the Gemara in Kerisus (11a), which quotes the Pasuk, "And Ashamim, a ram of sheep, for their Asham" (Ezra 10:19). The Gemara says that this teaches us that they all had relations with "Shifchos Charufos," which is a half Kenani and half Jewish maidservant who is engaged to an Eved Ivri. The law of Eved Ivri only applies when Yovel applies, as is stated (at the end of Erchin) in the chapter of, "ha'Makdish Sadeihu" -- "One who is Makdish his field."

It is not logical at all to say that they brought Korbanos Asham because they had relations with Shifchos Charufos during the time of the first Beis Hamikdash. This is despite the fact that we do find in Horiyos (6a) that people in the time of the second Beis Hamikdash brought Korbanos due to Avodah Zarah they had worshipped during the times of Tzidkiyahu.

This possibility does not apply here, as we find that people were suspected of serving Avodah Zarah during the time of Tzidkiyahu (and therefore it is understandable that they would bring Korbanos later during the time of the second Beis Hamikdash). However, we do not find that they were suspected of the sin of being with a Shifchah Charufah (during the first Beis Hamikdash).

Additionally, the law of houses in walled cities applied in the era of the second Beis Hamikdash, as stated in a Mishnah in Erchin (31b) and quoted later in our Gemara (74b) that, "Originally people would hide (when they bought such a house on the last day possible for redemption by the seller) ...they therefore decreed etc." We also say in Erchin (29a) that Batei Arei Chomah only apply when Yovel applies.

Hillel did not establish Pruzbul for his generation, as he was alive during the time of the second Beis Hamikdash. The Gemara in Shabbos (15a) states that Hillel, Shimon, Gamliel, and Shimon (fathers and sons) were the Nesi'im for 100 years during the times of the second Beis Hamikdash. Rather, he established this decree for after the destruction, as they knew that there would come a time when the Beis Hamikdash would be destroyed, as is stated in Nazir (32b).

Implied Question: The Gemara later (36b) asks whether Hillel established Pruzbul for his generation or for later generations. (Note: According to Rabeinu Tam, it is clear that it would only be for later generations!)

Answer#1: It doesn't mean literally for his generation, but rather for the next generation which would be right after the destruction of the second Bayis.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it could be that this question is according to Rava who answers that Hefker Beis Din Hefker (in which case it could also be during the second Bayis).

Implied Question: At the end of Erchin (32b), the Gemara says count Yovalos to sanctify Shemitah. This implies that Yovel, otherwise, did not apply (as if it did, of course they would have counted Yovel).

Answer: This is according to the Gemara's original thought that the Ten Lost Tribes indeed stayed lost in exile, and only two Tribes were actually in the exile to Bavel (from the destruction of the first Bayis). When they came up from exile, not all of its inhabitants were there, preventing keeping Yovel.

However, according to the Gemara's conclusion that we say Yirmiyahu brought the Ten Tribes back and Yoshiyahu was king over them, there certainly was twelve tribes in exile. Even though not all of them returned with Ezra to Eretz Yisrael, enough returned that it is considered that "all of its inhabitants" are present (and therefore Yovel applied in the time of the second Bayis).

Question: However, it is difficult to understand why the Gemara even thought this way originally. There are explicit Pesukim in Ezra stating that representatives of all twelve tribes went with him.

Implied Question: They didn't decree a Rabbinic Yovel as a remembrance to Yovel. (Note: If they did it for Shemitah, why not do it for Yovel?)

Answer: This is because most people would not be able to bear being unable to work their land for two years straight.

Question: What is the case? If this decree was accepted by most of Klal Yisrael, even if the Beis Din is bigger than the Beis Din that made the original decree, it cannot retract the decree. This is as stated in Avodah Zarah (36a) regarding the eighteen things (decrees), that even if Eliyahu and his Beis Din were to retract them we do not listen to him. If it was not accepted by most of Klal Yisrael, even a lesser authority than the first Beis Din can retract it. This is as is also stated in Avodah Zara (ibid.) regarding oil of Nochrim. The Gemara there says that Rebbi Yehudah Ha'Nasi (not Rebbi, but rather his descendant) and his Beis Din gathered and annulled this decree, as it was not accepted by most of Klal Yisrael.

Answer: The Gemara says there that our Rabbanim relied on the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok who said that we cannot make a decree on the public unless most people could uphold it. This implies that there were two factors. They had the ability to annul the decree because it was not widely accepted, and people could not uphold it. However, here it either was accepted but they had difficulty upholding it, or they did not have difficulty upholding it but it was not widely accepted.

Question#1: The Yerushalmi in the beginning of Shabbos does not imply that this is correct. It says that Rebbi Yehudah asked, didn't we learn that a Beis Din cannot annul the words of a fellow Beis Din unless the second Beis Din is greater than the first in wisdom and numbers? (Note: There is much discussion among the Rishonim in regards to the definition of wisdom and numbers.) Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi and his Beis Din permitted what Daniel and his group forbade (oil of Nochrim, in seeming violation of this principle)!

Rather Rebbi Yochanan is according to his opinion. He says in the name of Rebbi Elazar bar Tzadok that he has a tradition that any decree that Beis Din decree on the public, but which most of the public does not accept, is not considered a decree. They checked, and found that regarding the decree about oil of Nochrim most of the public had not accepted the decree. This implies that this is sufficient reason (even if it is not technically difficult to uphold).

Question#2: Additionally, in the beginning of Megilah (2a) the Gemara asks, if the Anshei Kneses ha'Gedolah instituted that Purim should be on the fourteenth and fifteenth of Adar, would the Rabbanan come and change a decree made by the Anshei Kneses ha'Gedolah? Doesn't the Mishnah say, "A Beis Din etc.?" In that case, it seems that these days had been accepted and people could abide by them!

Answer: Only the eighteen decrees could not even be annulled by a greater Beis Din, as is stated by the Yerushalmi, because these decrees were made by putting their lives on the line. This is as stated there, that the students of Shamai killed some of the students of Hillel. Any great decree can be overturned, besides these eighteen decrees. Where the decree did not spread, like the case of oil of Nochrim, even though they sacrificed their life to ensure it was enacted, even a lesser Beis Din could permit the decree.

Implied Question: The Gemara says (in Avodah Zarah ibid.) that our Rabbis relied on the fact that we do not make a decree on the public (unless most of them can uphold the decree). (Note: Why would it say this if the important thing is that its observance had not spread.)

Answer: It only quoted this reason in order that one shouldn't say that because the earlier sages gathered to say it is forbidden, why did he gather together a Beis Din to permit it? On the contrary, he should have gathered to strengthen the prohibition, as we find in many places that the earlier sages made a decree that was not accepted, and then the later sages made a decree that was accepted. This is evident in the Gemara in Shabbos (14b) and Chulin (6a). The Gemara therefore says why he did not want to gather the Beis Din to forbid this, as he saw that most people could not uphold the decree.

Observation: Some things were not originally decreed to be forbidden amongst all of Bnei Yisrael but only in one place, such as the Gemara in Chulin (110a) where Rav went to Tetlofush and said that he found a valley and fenced it in. The Gemara relates that he forbade "Kechal" -- "utters." Similarly, there were cases in Shabbos (139a) about which the Bnei Baskar asked him regarding the Halachah, and he was stringent because they were not immersed in Torah. In a case where a sage forbids something to the people in that place, one must be a greater sage than the one who was originally asked to permit these things for them.

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam wrote a Pruzbul, because he said that one only requires an important Beis Din of his times (not a Beis Din as knowledgeable as the sages of the Gemara). We find also later (37a) that the Rabbanan of Rav Ashi's study house would give their loan documents to (a Beis Din comprised of) each other.

Observation: The Mishnah in Shevi'is (10:5) states that a Pruzbul that is dated early is valid. One that is dated late is invalid. The Yerushalmi explains that this is because a Pruzbul does not help for loans that he made after writing the Pruzbul. It only helps for loans made before the date stated in the Pruzbul. This is why a Pruzbul dated late is invalid. The person benefits improperly, as all of the loans he made from the actual date of the Pruzbul to the date stated in the Pruzbul are now "covered" by the Pruzbul.

Implied Question: It is supposed to say things in a nice manner. (Note: Why, then, does Rava have grounds to make this derivation?)

Answer: Even so, it could have said, "left" (instead of "give).