Explanation: This is because it is a common thing that a person lends to someone who owns land. He cannot use up his land, and it is standing before him (to collect in case he defaults on the loan).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that one can use up a potted plant that has a hole. (Note: Why, then, did Chazal allow a Pruzbul to be written based on this potted plant?)

Answer: This is because the Rabbanan did not differentiate between different types of land.

Opinion#1: Even a small amount of land can be used to write a Pruzbul. Rashi explains that this is because one can collect the entire debt from such a piece of land, as was done in the incident of the small field discussed by Abaye (see Kesuvos 91b).

Opinion#2: Rabeinu Shmuel explains because a tiny piece of land is still (possibly) worth all of the debt, as there is no law of Ona'ah when it comes to land.

Question: This is difficult, as we say in Kesvuos (100b) that we cancel the transaction if the value of the sale was more than double its actual worth.

Opinion: The law follows Rebbi Nasan. This is evident from Rava's statement in Pesachim (31a), as his opinion that a creditor only collects in the future (explained there) can only be upheld according to Rebbi Nasan. We know that in arguments between Abaye and Rava, the law follows Rava besides in the six cases of YA'aL K'GaM (each of the capitalized letter stands for a case). (Note: Being that this is not one of those cases, and the law therefore follows Rava, the law also must follow Rebbi Nasan.)

Rabeinu Tam originally held that the law does not follow Rebbi Nasan, but he then retracted his opinion. There is no need to give a lengthy explanation here (on this topic).

Implied Question: It says earlier (18a) that money owed due to rape, a fine, or seduction that was made into a loan, is taken away by Shemitah. The Gemara explains that this is from the time that the person was taken to Beis Din. This is despite the fact that when he was in Beis Din the money could have been collected from his property with a lien, as is apparent in many places. Similarly, when a woman demand her Kesuvah and establishes it as a loan, the loan is taken away by Shemitah even though she could have technically collected the loan from property with a lien. (Note: Why is a case of a loan document with Achrayus different than these cases?)

Answer: It is indeed stronger, as the lien on the property is explicit in the document.

Explanation: He seized it as collateral. The Sifri derives, "And not that of your brother in your hand." (Note: This is the source that loans with collateral are not taken away by Shemitah.)

Explanation: One should not explain that the question is from a case where he lent him money, but the loan was not connected to the yard. This is clear from the fact that it does not say that he gave him a loan and he has collateral in his hand.

Rather, the question is from a case where he lent him money based on his yard and he lives in his yard. Even so, Shemitah takes away the loan, as is apparent from the Gemara in Bava Metzia (67b), where the Gemara says that a loan with collateral, in a place where a loan can be taken away at any time (but during the interim the lender eats the fruit of the field), is indeed taken away by Shemitah.

Question#1: Rebbi Yitzchak's law is only when the collateral is not taken at the time when the loan was given, as stated in Bava Metzia (82a) and Shevuos (44a). Here, it says a case of someone who lends based on collateral, implying that the collateral was given at the time of the loan. This is even implied in the Gemara there (in Bava Metzia), as it asks, "Both are stating a case of lending based on collateral!" There is no reason to differentiate between the terms "one who lends" and "one he lends to."

Question#2: Additionally, in Bava Metzia (48b) and Shevuos (44b) the implication is that even (collateral given) during his lending would prevent the loan from being taken away. Regarding a loan based on collateral which is only worth half of the loan, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says the loan is not taken away. This means that the amount of the loan equal to the value of the collateral is not taken away. Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi holds that the loan is taken away, as he only took the collateral to remind the borrower about the loan.

This is clearly regarding collateral taken during the loan. If it would not be during the loan, than what he would take as collateral would clearly be for the purpose of collection. Even so, if the value of the collateral would equal the loan, the loan would not be taken away.

Answer: It is logical to the Gemara that since a person acquires collateral that is taken at a time other than the loan, the strength of the lien on collateral taken at the time of the loan similarly means that the loan is not taken away. Here, too, we say the Pasuk, "And not that of your brother in your hands," applies.

This is also how we must explain the Gemara in Pesachim (31b). The Gemara there quotes Rebbi Yitzchak regarding a Jew who lent money to a Nochri based on the Nochri's Chametz (as collateral). The lien on the Chametz is strong enough, even when the collateral was taken at the time of the loan, to make the Jew transgress the prohibition of Bal Yeira'eh (not to see Chametz in your possession on Pesach). This is because if he would have taken it at a time other than the time of the loan, he would acquire it totally. (Note: Similarly, if it is at the time of the loan, it is strong enough for him to transgress Bal Yeira'eh.)

Even someone who takes an item to watch from a Nochri transgress Bal Yeira'eh if he accepts responsibility for the item.

A Nochri who lent money to a Jew based on the Jew's Chametz as collateral would acquire the Chametz, and in that way the Jew would not be liable (for Bal Yeira'eh) even if the collateral was taken at the time of the loan, assuming the Nochri actually acquires it. (Note: This is discussed in Pesachim (31b).) This is because the lien is strong enough that the Chametz is not considered found in the hand of the Jew. This is as we derive from the Pasuk, "It should not be found," meaning that one only transgresses this prohibition if the Chametz is accessible to him. This excludes if the Jew set aside a house for the Nochri's Chametz, even if the Jew took responsibility for it, as stated in Pesachim (6a). (Note: The Maharsha explains Tosfos' train of thought. In Pesachim (6a), the Nochri's Chametz does not present a problem of Bal Yeira'eh as the Jew designated a house for the Nochri as his place to keep his Chametz. Certainly, then, if the Nochri in his house has the Jew's Chametz as collateral, the Jew does not transgress Bal Yeira'eh.)

Observation: However, in Kidushin (8b) the Gemara says that someone who is Mekadesh a woman with the collateral given to him by others has effected a valid Kidushin. The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yitzchak (to prove its point, as he says that a creditor acquires collateral). The Gemara there must be talking about collateral that was taken at a time other than the time of the loan.

In Bava Metzia (82a), the Gemara implies that Rebbi Yitzchak's law would not mean that the creditor is liable for the loss of the collateral due to forced circumstances. He is only considered a person watching for pay (i.e. he is holding it to ensure he gets back the money he lent) who in not liable in such a case. This indicates that it is not totally his (as otherwise he would also be liable for forced circumstances). If so, why should he be considered as watching for pay, if not for the fact that he benefits from the fact that he can acquire a woman or land with this object or effect a Kinyan Chalifin? It therefore seems that collateral taken during a loan cannot be used to be Mekadesh a woman. (Note: The Pnei Yehoshua quotes the Shach as explaining that collateral taken during a loan does not make someone a person watching for pay, as it is looked upon as if the lender is giving benefit to the borrower. Without the collateral, the loan would not occur. However, when collateral is taken after the loan is already done, it is clear that this is to the detriment of the borrower and the benefit of the lender. In such a case, the benefit of the lender is that he can be Mekadesh a woman etc.)

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam says that for this reason he is believed even without having to take an oath.

Explanation: He should not go to his second master as he was redeemed in order to be free. (Note: This text is in our Gemara.)

It could also have said that he should not go to his second master as it was still before Yiush.

Question: When he is redeemed to be a slave, why doesn't he have to be a slave for the second master for this very reason?

Answer: This is not good enough reason to steal a slave from someone and give him to someone else. This reason only applies when he redeems him for the Mitzvah of turning him free.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that this is referring to the first master, and Rabeinu Tam has this in his version of the text.

If when he redeemed him to be a slave we would say that he should be a slave for his second master, a slave would throw himself at the soldiers (who would take him and sell him as a slave) in order to gain the fact that any lost objects or presents would now be his. The second master only acquires him for work, not for these things. Additionally, there are times when he simply hates his first master for a long time, and would therefore decide to take himself away from his servitude (in this manner, if we would say that he goes to the second master).

Opinion#2: However, we can say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only argues on the Tana Kama in a case where he redeemed him in order to set him free. This is because he would not throw himself at the soldiers for a small gain. (Note: See Tosfos Ha'Rosh at length for different opinions regarding the meaning of this phrase (DH) in our Gemara.)

Implied Question: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is unsure of the position of the Rabbanan. (Note: If so, why not say they argue before Yiush?)

Answer: Rava does not think it is logical to say that they argue before Yiush. (Note: The Maharsha explains that Rava does not think it is logical that the Rabbanan would argue on Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's position that just as it is a Mitzvah to redeem free people, it is a Mitzvah to redeem servants.)