1)

(a)We learned in a Beraisa that if a Nochri claimed one's Eved or a Sikrikun took him, the Eved does not go free. The case of Sikrikun is when at a time when the murder of Jews is common, someone threatens a Jew's life, and he gives him his slave so that he should leave him alone.

(b)The Chachamim did not decree in these two cases since he neither sold the Eved nor borrowed money against him, in which case it is a pure Ones.

(c)Another Beraisa rules that if the king claimed one's granary ...

1. ... in lieu of his debt he is obligated to Ma'aser it (from another source).

2. ... although the owner owed him nothing he is Patur.

(d)The criterion for this is whether he benefits from the claim (in which case, it is as if he sold it) or not.

2)

(a)We reconcile the first of the two previous Beraisos, which does not seem to consider an Eved that is claimed against a debt, a sale, with the second Beraisa, which does by switching the criterion of the first Beraisa to the fact that he was an Ones, rather than the fact that it was not a sale.

(b)Rav rules that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri 'Forhang' (someone who takes people's fields by force), the Eved goes free.

(c)We resolve Rav's ruling with the Beraisa that does not obligate the master to set free an Eved claimed by the king for his debt by pointing out that in Rav's case, he should have appeased the Forhang by offering him money and retaining the Eved, something that is not possible when it is the king who is claiming.

(d)There is no proof from Rav's ruling by Forhang (who generally returned the field after thirty days) that he does because Rav is speaking about a Forhang who does not return what he claims.

3)

(a)R. Yirmiyahu asks whether, if a master sells his Eved to a Nochri 'Chutz mi'Melachto', he goes free. The case is where he only sells him to live with a Shifchah, to provide his master with slaves, but not to work.

(b)He also asks from 'Chutz min ha'Mitzvos' and from 'Chutz mi'Shabbasos v'Yamim-Tovim'. Apart from 'le'Ger Toshav Mahu?' he also asks what the Din will be if he sold him to a Kuti or to a Yisrael Mumar.

(c)We resolve the She'eilah of Ger Toshav, by citing a Beraisa which says 'Harei Hu k'Oved-Kochavim'. Regarding a Kuti and Yisrael Mumar, we conclude that according to some, they are considered like a Yisrael (and do not go out to freedom), whereas according to others, they are like an Akum (and they do).

4)

(a)They asked Rebbi Ami whether, if an Eved cast himself upon a band of robbers and the master is unable to retrieve him either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court he is permitted to accept payment for him or not.

(b)When Rebbi Yirmiyahu instructed Rebbi Zerika to look into the matter, the latter quoted a Beraisa, which rules that ...

1. ... if someone sells a house to a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael) he is not permitted to accept payment for it.

2. ... if someone's house is taken by force and he is unable to retrieve it either in a Jewish Beis-Din or in a Nochri court he may.

(c)He is even permitted to take it to a Nochri court to have the deal substantiated because he is merely saving his money from falling into their hands.

(d)We might have thought that this at least, would be forbidden at all costs because it raises the esteem of the Nochrim and their gods (see Rashi at the beginning of Mishpatim).

5)

(a)The Eved (in our current She'eilah) might well be more stringent than the house in the latter case because whereas an Eved is not indispensable, a house is. Consequently, it is unusual to sell it (and Chazal generally waive decrees in unusual cases).

(b)Rebbi Ami however, convinced that he knew the Halachah, sent them a reply that an Eved had exactly the same Din as a house in this regard.

(c)Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi states that that if someone sells his Eved to a Nochri, we penalize him by forcing him to redeem for anything him up to a hundred times his value. We try to prove from Reish Lakish, who said that if someone sells a large animal to a Nochri (which Chazal forbade in Avodah-Zarah), we penalize him by forcing him to buy it back for anything up to ten times its value that Rebbi Yehoshua did not mean literally a hundred times as much.

(d)We reject this proof on the grounds that a slave might have a more stringent ruling that a large animal, because every day, he is prevented from observing Mitzvos (in which case Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi too, meant exactly what he said).

6)

(a)Others reverse the two Halachos. According to them one is obligated to pay up to ten times for selling an Eved, and a hundred times for a large animal.

(b)After again asking whether Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi meant literally ten times as much, and attempting to prove that he did not from Reish Lakish, we try to reject the proof on the grounds that he has to pay less for the Eved, because when he redeems him, he goes free, whereas the animal returns to him. We reject this Sevara however, on the grounds that that would account for eleven times more than its value (instead of the Eved's ten); but a hundred!

(c)We conclude however, that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, like Reish Lakish, meant literally ten times as much as his value, and the reason that Chazal were so much more lenient by an Eved than by a large animal is because it is unusual to sell an Eved to a Nochri, and whatever is unusual, Chazal tended to treat more leniently (as we just explained).

(d)Rebbi Yirmiyahu asked Rebbi Asi whether, if someone sold his Eved and died, the penalty extends to his sons. We cannot learn from the case of ...

1. ... a Kohen who chipped the ear of a Bechor, where they penalized his children, forbidding them to slaughter it just like he was because there he contravened a Lav d'Oraisa ("Kol Mum Lo Yiheyeh Bo" Emor), whereas here, he only contravened an Isur d'Rabanan.

2. ... someone who performed work on Chol ha'Mo'ed that will cause a loss if it is not performed, if he could have been performed it before Yom Tov or afterwards, where they did not penalized his children, and his children are permitted to benefit from that work because there, he did not actually perform an Isur, whereas here, he did.

7)

(a)The basis of Rebbi Yirmiyah's current She'eilah (whether the penalty for selling one's slave extends to the master's children or not) is whether Chazal penalized the person (and not his children), or the object with which the sin was performed (irrespective of whether it is owned by the sinner himself or by his sons).

(b)The Mishnah permits a field from which the thorns were removed in the Shemitah year to be sown in the following year. They did not penalize the owner because there is nothing wrong with removing thorns in the Shemitah-year.

(c)The Tana does however forbid sowing in the following year, a field that one fertilized either manually or by placing animals there to manure it in the Shemitah.

(d)

1. Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina says that if someone did so and then died, Chazal did not penalize his sons after him (which also resolves our She'eilah regarding selling his Eved to a Nochri).

2. Abaye therefore rules that if someone renders Tamei his friend's Taharos and then dies Chazal did not penalize his sons after him, because, seeing as the damage is not discernible, the obligation to pay is only a Kenas mid'Rabanan, and as we just learned, the Rabanan punished the sinner and not the article.

8)

(a)The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that if someone sells his Eved to Chutz la'Aretz, the Eved goes free and he requires a Get Shichrur from the purchaser.

(b)Raban Shimon ben Gamliel draws a distinction between 'Ploni Antuchi' (someone who was born in Antuchya [a town in Syria], but who does not live there), and 'Antuchi she'be'Antuchya' (someone who was both born there and who resides there too).

(c)He rules that, if the master sold him ...

1. ... 'li'Ploni Antuchi' he does not go free.

2. ... 'le'Antuchi she'be'Antuchya' he goes free, because it is clear that the purchaser intended to take him back with him to Anti'och.

(d)The Tana of another Beraisa nevertheless writes 'Machartihu l'Antuchi, Yeitzei' because he speaks when the Antuchi does not own a house in Eretz Yisrael, but is only renting there (in which case, he clearly intends to return, with the Eved, to Anti'och), whereas the previous Beraisa speaks when he owns a house in Eretz Yisrael.

9)

(a)The Tana of the latter Beraisa concedes that 'le'Antuchi' does not go free if he adds 'le'Antuchi ha'Sharuy b'Lud', in which case, he clearly did not intend the purchaser to take the Eved to Anti'och.

(b)Rebbi Yirmiyahu asked whether, if a ben Bavel who married a woman in Eretz Yisrael who brought Avadim and Shefachos into the marriage, and who, we assume, intends to return to Bavel they go free or not.

(c)If we hold (with regard to Nichsei Tzon Barzel) ...

1. ... that, in the event of divorce, 'ha'Din Imah' (she is entitled to take back the articles that she brought in) Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be that the Avadim might nevertheless be considered her husband's, since they are Meshubad to him.

2. ... that 'ha'Din Imo' (her husband is entitled to give her money and retain the articles) Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah will be that the Avadim might nevertheless be considered the wife's, since the husband does not acquire the body of the Eved.

(d)The outcome of the She'eilah is 'Teiku'.

10)

(a)Rebbi Avahu quoted Rebbi Yochanan that if an Eved follows his master to Syria, and the master then sells him there, he goes free. Rebbi Chiya quotes a Beraisa which says 'Ibad Es Zechuso' meaning that, by leaving Eretz Yisrael of his own accord, the Eved loses his right to go free should his master sell him there.

(b)We reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa by establishing his case when the master intended to return to Eretz Yisrael, in which case, the Eved expected to return with him, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he intended to remain in Chutz la'Aretz.

(c)We cite another Beraisa which makes this very distinction. The problem with the initial text 'Yotzei ha'Eved Achar Rabo l'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor Kofin Oso ... ' is that the Mishnah in Kesuvos teaches us that the members of a person's household are not obligated to follow him to Chutz la'Aretz.

(d)Consequently, the correct text is 'Yatza ha'Eved Achar Rabo l'Surya, Im Da'as Rabo Lachzor Kofin Oso ... '.

11)

(a)Rav Anan heard two things from Shmuel. One of them is the same Halachah as stated by Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan. The other follows a statement by Rav that if someone sells a field in the Yovel year, the sale is valid, but it reverts to the seller immediately. Shmuel argues with Rav. He holds 'Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar' because, if a field that has been sold returns to the owner in the Yovel year, it stands to reason that a field that has not been sold cannot be sold then.

(b)Rav Anan says about the two statements of Shmuel that by one of them, the sale is valid and the money is returned to the owner immediately, and by the other, the money remains where it is, only he could not recall which was which.

(c)What Rav Anan could not remember, Rav Yosef extrapolated from a Beraisa. The Tana says that an Eved whose master sold him to Chutz la'Aretz goes free, and requires a Shtar Shichrur from his second master.

(d)Rav Yosef extrapolates from the fact that the second master is obligated to give him a Get Shichrur, that the sale is valid (and the money remains where it is) in which case it must be in the case of someone who sells a field in the Yovel that Shmuel holds that it is invalid.

12)

(a)Rav Anan did not extrapolate from the Beraisa like Rav Yosef because he had not seen the Beraisa.

(b)Neither did he extrapolate from Shmuel himself, who said in the case of 'ha'Mocher Sadeihu bi'Shenas ha'Yovel' Einah Mechurah Kol Ikar', that the sale is invalid (implying that the money returns to the buyer) because that does not preclude the possibility of the money remaining in the hand of the seller.

(c)The precedent we have for saying that, according to Shmuel, the transaction is Batel, yet the seller retains the money is a case where someone marries his sister, where Shmuel holds that the Kidushin is Batel, yet the money is considered a gift and the woman retains it.

(d)According to Rav she must return the money.

13)

(a)In the previous case (of the Eved), we ask why the Chachamim chose to punish the buyer, rather than the seller. Initially, we cite the principle 'Lav Achb'ra Ganav, Ela Chora Ganav meaning that even though it is the seller who sins (like a mouse who steals one's food), if not for the purchaser (who offers to purchase his goods), the seller would not be able to sin (just like the hole in the Mashal, which enables the mouse to steal).

(b)We reject this answer however, on the grounds that the opposite is true; if not for the mouse, there would be no hole, and similarly, if people did not offer to sell their property, there would be no purchasers (in other words, the ultimate culprits are the mouse and the seller).

(c)And the reason that we penalize the purchaser and not the seller is because Chazal decided to punish the one who is currently holding the Isur.