QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses a case in which a poor person pledges to give to Hekdesh the Erech of a rich person. The Rabanan (Tana Kama) maintain that the amount that he must give is assessed according to his own means, as a poor person. Rebbi argues with the Rabanan and maintains that just as a poor person who pledges to give the Korbanos of a rich Metzora must give the Korbanos of a rich person, a poor person who pledges to give the Erech of a rich person is assessed according to the means of the rich person.

However, in the end of the Mishnah, Rebbi says that the case of one who pledges to bring Korbanos for a Metzora is not comparable to a person who pledges to give an Erech. In the case of Korbanos, the poor person is pledging to give the Korbanos that the other person was already obligated to bring. It is obvious that in such a case the poor person must give the Korbanos that the Metzora was already obligated to bring. In contrast, when a poor person pledges to give the Erech of a rich person, he gives as a poor person, since there was no pre-existing obligation to give anything.

This ruling of Rebbi seems to be the same as the ruling of the Rabanan, with which Rebbi himself argues in the first part of the Mishnah. How are these two statements of Rebbi to be reconciled?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (second DH Heseg) explains that Rebbi and the Rabanan argue about the Halachah in the case of a wealthy person who said, "Erki Alai" -- "My value is upon me [to give to Hekdesh]," and a poor person -- upon hearing the wealthy man make this pledge -- said that he obligates himself to give whatever the first person said. According to the Rabanan, the poor person is assessed "b'Heseg Yad," according to his ability to pay. Rebbi, however, maintains that in such a case the poor person must pay the same amount as the wealthy person. In that case, the wealthy person indeed was obligated already (even before the poor person made his pledge) to give his value to Hekdesh.

QUESTION: The Mishnah here seems to contradict the ruling of Rav Ada bar Ahavah. Rav Ada bar Ahavah (7b) rules that in a case in which a person who had five Sela'im said, "Erki Alai," and said a second time, "Erki Alai," and then he gave four Sela'im for his second pledge and one Sela for his first, he fulfills both of his pledges. His logic is that since all of his money was Meshubad to pay for the first pledge (indeed, he should have paid it first), it was as if he had no money for the second pledge, and thus he is judged with the law of Heseg Yad for the second pledge (and he is obligated to give just one Sela). When he paid four Sela'im for his second pledge, he fulfilled his obligation (b'Di'eved), and thus when he gave his last Sela for the first pledge, it suffices (for he has no more money and is assessed like a poor person, b'Heseg Yad, for the first pledge).

Why does the law of Heseg Yad allow this person, in the case of Rav Ada bar Ahavah, to fulfill his obligation of his first pledge with one Sela, based on the fact that now he has only one Sela? At the time that he made his pledge, he had five Sela'im, and thus he should be assessed as a rich man!

(a) TOSFOS (Erchin 7b, DH b'Idna) answers that Heseg Yad depends on a person's wealth at the time the Kohen assesses him. If a person was rich when he made a pledge of an Erech and was assessed to have the wherewithal to pay the full amount, he must pay the full amount even if he later becomes poor. In Rav Ada bar Ahavah's case, the person who made the pledge was not assessed for the first Erech until he had only one Sela left.

(b) The LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Erchin 3:1) and SEFAS EMES answer that Rav Ada bar Ahavah is discussing a person who had only five Sela'im in the first place, and thus he automatically was in the category of a poor person who must be assessed by the Kohen. Accordingly, he never had the status of a rich man; rather, he was merely "richer" than he is now.

The Mishnah, in contrast, is discussing the case of a truly rich man who later becomes poor. Since, at the time of his pledge, he did not qualify to be assessed by the Kohen at all, he pays as a rich man even when he becomes poor.

OPINIONS: The Mishnah teaches that if a person was poor when he pledged to give his Erech to Hekdesh and he later became rich, or if he was rich at the time of his pledge and later became poor, he must give the Erech of a rich person to Hekdesh (and he is not assessed as a poor person in either case, and the law of Heseg Yad does not apply to him). The Mishnah adds that with regard to Korbanos (of a Metzora) this is not the case, but rather "even if his father died, leaving him tens of thousands [of Sela'im]... Hekdesh is not entitled to that money at all."

What does the Mishnah mean by this last statement? Obviously, if the man became rich before he brought his Korban, he must bring his Korban Metzora as a rich man!

(a) RASHI and TOSFOS (18a, DH Lo Tzericha) explain that this statement of the Mishnah does not refer to the case of Korbanos, but rather it refers to the earlier statement that discusses Erchin. The Mishnah is teaching that even if a poor person's father was dying at the time of his son's assessment, and the son was about to inherit a large estate, he still is considered a poor person. He may fulfill his pledge with the law of "Heseg Yad" and give whatever he can afford at the present moment.

(b) TOSFOS (17b, DH Aval) and RABEINU GERSHOM offer another explanation. The statement of the Mishnah indeed refers to Korbanos. The Mishnah is discussing a case in which a poor person who was a Metzora designated an inexpensive Korban (as only a poor person is permitted to bring). Even if his father was dying at the time that the poor son designated his Korban, and shortly after the son designated his Korban the father died and left him a large estate, Hekdesh does not benefit from that money. The son still may bring the Korban that a poor person is entitled to bring.