1) The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 246:6) rules that one should not teach one's daughter Torah. However, if a woman studies Torah, she does receive reward for doing so. In addition, there is a distinction between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. It is only considered frivolous for one to teach his daughter the Oral Law.

2) Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 47:14) rules that women should say the blessing every morning on learning Torah. The Mishnah Berurah there (in Bi'ur Halachah, paragraph beginning "Nashim") writes that one of the reasons is that they are obligated to learn the Dinim which are relevant to them. This suggests that the limitation on women learning Torah applies more to theoretical areas, but they certainly should know practical Halachah.

3) The Chafetz Chaim also wrote, in his commentary to Maseches Sotah, that the situation nowadays is different. In the time of the Gemara, people possessed a much stronger tradition. Then, it was possible for girls to rely on their family heritage and invest less effort in Torah education. In contrast, nowadays it is a great Mitzvah to teach girls Chumash, Nach, and the Musar of Chazal, such as Pirkei Avos, Menoras ha'Me'or, and similar books.

Kesivah v'Chasimah Tovah,

Dovid Bloom

1) A Jewish woman is certainly not like a Nochri. The proof for this is from Sanhedrin 59a which states that an Akum who occupies himself with Torah is culpable of the capital penalty. This certainly does not apply to a Jewish woman who learns Torah.

2) The Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:13) writes that a woman who learns Torah receives a reward, but less of a reward than a man because she is not commanded. However, neither the Rambam, nor anyone else, compares a woman to a Nochri.

3) Instead, this matter may be compared to the Gemara in Kidushin 31a, where Rav Yosef (who was blind) said that he would make a feast for anyone who told him that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Yehudah who says that a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos, because Rav Yosef mistakenly had thought that somebody who is exempt will receive more reward for an optional Mitzvah. However, when he heard Rebbi Chanina's statement that one receives more reward for a Mitzvah that one is commanded to perform, he changed his mind and said he would make a feast for anyone who told him the Halachah does not follow Rebbi Yehudah. Tosfos there (DH Gadol) writes that if someone is commanded to do a Mitzvah, he suffers more Tza'ar (for which he is rewarded more) because he is worried that he will not fulfil the Mitzvah.

4) Accordingly, Ben Heh-Heh will also agree that women receive less reward for learning Torah, because men suffer more Tza'ar on this matter. They are worried that they will not carry out their duty properly, while women feel more relaxed because they are entitled not to learn if they so want.

5) Rebbi Chanina's statement was a general one about all different sorts of people who are exempt from Mitzvos. Certainly, no one would say that a blind man is like a Nochri, and similarly no one says that a woman is like a Nochri. Rebbi Chanina's argument enables us to understand the relative rewards of men and women.

Kesivah v'Chasimah Tovah,

Dovid Bloom

1) It seems to me that R' Chanina did not derive his principle from the story of Dama but rather he applied his principle to that story. I think we see this from the fact that the Gemara cites the episode of Dama, and then R' Chanina comments on it that, if so, people who are commanded on the Mitzvot will get even more reward than Dama received. The Gemara supports this comment of R' Chanina by citing the rule of R' Chanina himself. It appears from this that the Gemara is citing a well-known rule, or at least a general rule, not merely limited to the story of Dama. In addition it should be pointed out that the words of the Gemara, when it cites R' Chanina's rule, never indicate that he is referring specifically to a Nochri, but rather to any people not commanded on a certain Mitzvah. That is why Rav Yosef applied R' Chanina's rule to blind people, and the Rambam applied it to women learning Torah. It is true that the Gemara Kidushin 31a and Avoda Zara 3a cites R' Chanina in connection with Nochri, but that does not prove that R' Chanina's rule does not possess a wider application too. Therefore I argue that R' Chanina himself was referring to a Jew as well.

2) It is true that the Gemara does not mention how Rav Yosef resolved his dilemma whether or not the Halacha follows R' Yehuda that a blind person is exempt from Mitzvot. However concerning R' Chanina's rule, it seems from the Gemara that Rav Yosef was in no dilemma. As soon as he heard about R' Chanina's rule, he accepted it as being a clear Halacha. Since Rav Yosef did not understand that R' Chanina's rule only applied to a Nochri, but applies to blind people also, the Rambam felt free to widen it further to women learning Torah.

There is a lot more to write but I will close here for the moment

Shavua Tov

Dovid Bloom

1) It seems to me that Rebbi Chanina did not derive his principle from the story of Dama, but rather he applied his principle to that story. I think we see this from the fact that the Gemara cites the episode of Dama, and then Rebbi Chanina comments on it, saying that -- according to that episode -- people who are commanded in the Mitzvos will get even more reward than Dama received. The Gemara supports this comment of Rebbi Chanina by citing the rule of Rebbi Chanina himself. It appears from this that the Gemara is citing a well-known rule, or at least a general rule, not merely limited to the story of Dama. In addition, it should be pointed out that the words of the Gemara, when it cites Rebbi Chanina's rule, never indicate that he is referring specifically to a Nochri, but rather to any people not commanded in a certain Mitzvah. That is why Rav Yosef applied Rebbi Chanina's rule to blind people, and the Rambam applied it to women learning Torah. It is true that the Gemara in Kidushin (31a) and hAvoda Zarah (3a) cites Rebbi Chanina in connection with Nochri, but that does not prove that Rebbi Chanina's rule does not possess a wider application as well. Therefore, I argue that Rebbi Chanina himself was referring to a Jew as well.

2) It is true that the Gemara does not mention how Rav Yosef resolved his dilemma of whether or not the Halachah follows Rebbi Yehudah's opinion that a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos. However, concerning Rebbi Chanina's rule, it seems from the Gemara that Rav Yosef was in no dilemma. As soon as he heard about Rebbi Chanina's rule, he accepted it as being a clear Halachah. Since Rav Yosef did not understand that Rebbi Chanina's rule applies only to a Nochri but applies to blind people also, the Rambam felt free to widen it further to women learning Torah.

3)

a) This is a difficult question. I posed it to a Gadol as follows: Since Tosfos in Kidushin (31a, DH Gadol) writes that the reason why one who is commanded in a Mitzvah receives more reward is that he suffers more doing that Mitzvah, then why do men receive more reward than women for the Mitzvah of "Peru u'Revu"?

b) The Gadol answered by citing another Gemara in Kidushin (34a): "One cannot learn from rules." In English this could be translated as, "There is an exception to every rule." So even though Tosfos writes that a person who is commanded in a Mitzvah receives greater reward for doing it, there might be exceptions to this rule of Tosfos. The Mitzvah of bearing children may be one of the exceptions.

b) The Gadol cited another Gemara. First, he pointed out that the reward to which Tosfos refers is a reward "b'Dinei Shamayim," a reward "according to the laws of Heaven." If so, we find in Makos (23b) that Rav Yosef asked rhetorically, "Who can go up and tell us what happens in Heaven?!"

The idea is that only Hash-m really knows properly who receives which reward, and no doubt one of the reasons that we do not know how much reward each individual will receive in Shamayim is because it all depends on a each person's motives for doing the Mitzvos, and only Hash-m knows that.

c) To summarize what the Gadol said to me, I think we can explain that every case is subjective; while there may be general guidelines outlined in the Gemara for who gets more reward, in the final analysis each case is judged on its own merits in Shamayim.

d) Having said the above, I am going to suggest my personal approach to this question, which I think may not be so different from that of the Gadol's, but in fact may help us understand a little more of what he said. This is based on the reason given by the Meshech Chochmah in Parshas Noach (Bereshis 9:7) for why women are exempt from the Mitzvah of bearing children. He writes that the Torah cannot command a person to do something that his body is incapable of doing. Since a woman's life is sometimes put in danger during pregnancy and childbirth, the Torah could not make it compulsory for her to bear children. However, on the other hand, in order that the human race should survive, Hash-m put a very powerful force into the nature of a woman that she wants to have children.

e) In light of the above, I suggest that the chief motive of many women who bear children is not in fact to fulfil the Mitzvah of Peru u'Revu, but a more dominant factor is their yearning desire to have children. Therefore, it is likely in many cases that even though the woman might suffer more than the man through childbirth, on the other hand her natural desire for children is usually greater than a man's. Possibly it is more likely that the man is having the children in order to fulfil the Mitzvah.

f) So to summarize how I am suggesting that the Mitzvah of bearing children does not contradict the rule of Tosfos: First, we may say that sometimes it does indeed not fit in with Tosfos' rule, but that does not bother us because there is an exception to every rule, especially as it is only Hash-m who knows properly who really finds the Mitzvah difficult. In additon, a woman possesses a very powerful natural urge to have children and this may often be her main motivation, while the Mitzvah aspect plays a secondary role.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom

3-B) Now to address the Mitzvah of marrying off children:

a) The source for this is the Beraisa in Kidushin 29a which states that the father has a Mitzvah to marry off his son. The Gemara there (30b) cites the verse in Yirmeyahu 29:6, "Take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands." We learn from this that the father not only has a Mitzvah to marry off his son, but he also has a Mitzvah to marry off his daughter. This is stated also by the Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 21:25): "It is a Mitzvah of the Sages that a man should marry off his sons and daughters." According to this, there are two parents at a wedding directly performing this Mitzvah, namely the two fathers.

b) It is true that it does not say that the mother has a Mitzvah of marrying off her children, but I would now like to mention some sources, not necessarily directly connected with children getting married, but relevant to understanding the general role of the wife and mother in these Mitzvos.

The Gemara in Berachos (17a) tells us: "The promise that ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu promised women is greater than what he promised men." The Gemara asks, what is the special Zechus of women? They earn it by sending their children to the Beis Keneses to learn Chumash, and by allowing their husbands to go to the Beis Midrash to learn Mishnah and Gemara, and waiting for them to come home from their studies.

We learn from the Gemara that while women do not have the Mitzvah of learning Torah, they play a very important role in making this Mitzvah possible for their husbands and sons, and this in fact gives them an even greater reward than the men themselves.

c) We find a similar idea in the Ran in Kidushin on the Rif (beginning of 16b in the pages of the Rif), who writes that even though a woman is not commanded to bear children, she does have a Mitzvah because she helps the husband to fulfill his Mitzvah. Again, we learn that the wife has her part in this Mitzvah because it clearly cannot be carried out without her participation. And, of course, this idea is stated in the beginning of the Torah itself, when Hash-m says, "I will make for Adam an Ezer k'Negdo'" (Bereishis 2:18). The wife can help her husband fulfill many Mitzvos, and she can sometimes make a more important contrbution than the husband.

This is proving to be a bigger topic than I thought, and certainly very interesting, and I hope to return to the topic.

3-C) Now to conclude this discussion, which is really the story of your family's life, and a wonderful example of, "Every wise woman builds her home" (Mishlei 14:1)!

In fact, your wife's understanding is reflected perfectly by what the Rema writes (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 246:6): "A woman is not obligated to teach her son, but if she helps her son or husband to occupy himself with Torah she shares the reward with them."

The Shulchan Aruch ha'Rav (Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:14) adds that she receives a great reward for this, because the male members of her family are commanded to learn Torah and are now doing this as a result of her help. If your wife would have learned Torah herself she would have received a reward, but less than that of you or your sons. Because she helped the children to learn, she shares their great reward!

Kesivah v'Chasimah Tovah,

Dovid Bloom