Question: This is difficult. The case there is different, as we suspect he is lying and the object is not really his! This is apparent from the fact that we do return lost objects to Rabbinical students who recognize their lost objects.

Answer: Our Gemara is referring to slight recognition, whereas when we return an object to a Rabbinical student, it is when he clearly recognizes it is his.

Answer (cont.): All Amoraim in our Gemara did not clearly recognize their objects. Otherwise, why would they ask if they did not have any doubt that it was the correct object?

Question: Don't we allow a woman to remarry based on signs that a body was that of her husband according to Rava who says in Yevamos (120a) that signs are Torah law?

Question (cont.): If witnesses testify that she was promiscuous after she married (her second husband) we kill her, as we rely on the signs to consider her married to her second husband.

Question (cont.): This is even if it becomes clear through witnesses that her first husband was dead when she was promiscuous. We do not say that perhaps her first husband was alive when she married her second husband and that therefore her second Kidushin was invalid.

Answer: In this case we do not rely on signs to kill her and consider her a married woman due to her second husband. Rather, we indeed say that perhaps her first husband was alive and therefore her second Kidushin was invalid.

Answer (cont.): Similarly, if she was married due to the testimony of one witness and she was promiscuous we do not kill her even though we know that her first husband was dead when she was promiscuous. We do not believe one witness for everything (regarding her husband's status of being dead), as we do not allow the brothers to divide his estate due to this witness. (Rava in Yevamos ibid. only said we believe him regarding her ability to remarry.) Additionally, in a case where a woman says that she saw her husband dead, her co-wife is not allowed to remarry (as she is suspected of setting up her co-wife to be in a situation where she remarries when her husband is actually still alive, see Maharam here).

Question: How can a loan document be given back with signs? If witnesses come and say that Ploni, who has this sign on the document and this sign on the document, borrowed from Ploni, we cannot take the money away from the borrower!

Answer: One cannot compare a document that a person is not holding. If he says it is his, we return it. However, money that is being held by its owner cannot be taken away through signs, just as we would not take away an object that is his if witnesses came and said that this object, which has this and this sign, belongs to someone else.

Observation: The Gemara seemingly implies that Rebbi Yehudah also holds of two different levels of prohibition regarding Gid ha'Nasheh, namely the Torah prohibition and the Rabbinic prohibition. According to Rebbi Meir, everything that Rebbi Yehudah forbids (even what he says is Rabbinic) is forbidden according to Torah law.

Observation (cont.): This is as we say later that he took away the part that was forbidden according to Torah law according to Rebbi Meir, while he took away even what was forbidden according to Rabbinic law according to Rebbi Yehudah.

Question: This does not appear to be correct. If so, there are three arguments regarding the Torah law! Rebbi Yehudah argues on the Tana who says that only what is the on Kaf itself is prohibited, as stated later.

Question (cont.): This is illogical. It is understandable that Rebbi Yehudah and his Tana Kama argue regarding the derivation from the Pasuk, "Al Kaf ha'Yarech," as explained by Shmuel. However, what would be the basis of the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah? (The Maharam explains that it must be that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir agree regarding the amount the Torah states is forbidden. Rebbi Meir forbids more than that according to Rabbinic law, while Rebbi Yehudah understands that there is no part that is forbidden other that the part forbidden according to Torah law.)

Question: How do we know that Bar Fiyuli took away what was forbidden according to Rebbi Meir's understanding of the Torah law? Perhaps Rebbi Meir holds that the Torah only forbade the Gid on the Kaf, and therefore there are only two arguments!

Answer: Since Rebbi Meir is stringent that one must dig out all of the Gid, it is not logical that he is lenient in the Torah law more than Rebbi Yehudah. Similarly, Rebbi Yehudah's Tana Kama is certainly not stringent that the Gid must be dug out being that he is lenient in the Torah law (of Gid ha'Nasheh).

Question: Shmuel holds like Rebbi Meir, as he told Bar Fiyuli to reveal (i.e. take out) more. Yet we say later that Shmuel says that according to a certain Sugya the Torah only forbade what was on the Kaf!

Answer: Shmuel says this according to the Tana of the Mishnah who says that if they ate from it and there was not a Kzayis he is liable. The Torah only forbade etc. However, Shmuel does not agree with this opinion.

Proof: Shmuel similarly said in Kesuvos (96a) that if a widow find a lost object, she is able to keep it. This follows the opinion of the people of Yehudah, as is apparent in the Gemara (ibid.). However, earlier in Kesuvos (54a) we clearly see that Shmuel rules like the people of Galil in this case. (It must be that in the first case he was saying his statement according to the opinion of the people of Yehudah, but did not hold it was halachically correct.)

Observation: Regarding digging out the Gid ha'Nasheh, the Mishnah rules like Rebbi Meir. Regarding a person being believed that it was done, the Mishnah rules like Rebbi Yehudah quoted earlier (89b) as the Mishnah says, "And the Chachamim (Rebbi Yehudah) say he is believed."

Explanation: Later (102b), we also similarly say that if he ate a kosher bird when it was alive, he is liable for even a small amount (i.e. if he ate a very small bird). If it was dead, he is liable if he ate a Kzayis. If he ate a non kosher bird, whether it was alive or dead, he is liable for even a small amount. This is because Aiver Min ha'Chai and a non kosher bird are considered a Beryah (a whole entity, for which one is liable even if he eats less than the regular amount required to be liable).

Question: Why is it that Aiver Min ha'Chai, an unkosher bird, Gid ha'Nasheh, and Sheretz are considered more of an entity than a kosher Neveilah of a bird that one is only liable for if he eats a Kzayis, and it is not considered a Beryah? Similarly, we see that the Rabbanan do not consider individual grains to be considered a Beryah regarding the prohibition of Tevel, as stated in Makos (17a). (Why?)

Answer: Regarding the former group, when the Torah stated that one should not eat the Gid or one should not eat a non kosher bird, and similarly regarding Aiver Min ha'Chai, it is as if it explicitly stated that this is whether it is big or small. They are all called a Gid or a bird as long as they are whole.

Answer (cont.): However, Neveilah can also mean a piece of Neveilah, and the same applies to Tevel. If the Pasuk would say, "Do not eat wheat of Tevel" it would also be considered a Beryah.

Proof: This is similarly implied in Shevuos (21b) as the Gemara states, "Where do we find that someone who eats even a small amount is liable?" The Gemara counters, "Is this untrue? Someone who explicitly states that he swears he will not a small amount is liable for that small amount!" The Gemara answers, explicitly stating this makes it tantamount to a Beryah. This implies that the reasoning of Beryah is that it is as if the Torah stated that you should not eat it whether it is big or small.

Question: In Makos (13a) the Gemara asks, "How much must be eaten from the Tevel in order for one to be liable? Rebbi Shimon says, even a small amount. The Chachamim say, A Kzayis. Rebbi Shimon asked the Chachamim, don't you agree that if a person eats a small ant he is liable? They said to him, this is because it is a Beryah. He replied, a kernel of wheat is also a Beryah."

Question (cont.): The Gemara concludes that Rebbi Shimon holds that one even receives lashes on a small amount of Tevel flour. He was just asking his question according to the opinion of the Rabbanan, that they should at least admit to him that one kernel of wheat should make one liable. The Rabbanan understand that an entity that was/is alive is considered a Beryah, not a kernel of wheat.

Question (cont.): This is difficult. Gid ha'Nasheh and Aiver Min ha'Chai are considered a Beryah. This implies that it is not dependent on them being alive. Even if a kernel of wheat was alive it would not be considered a Beryah, as we have explained that it is unlike a case where someone explicitly swears (not to eat a small amount of something). The verse states not to eat Tevel, and does not state, "Do not eat a kernel of Tevel wheat."

Answer: It appears that the Rabbanan are answering Rebbi Shimon according to his opinion. They are saying that according to us, even if a kernel of wheat would be alive we would not consider it a Beryah. This is because it is unlike someone who specifies that even a small amount should be prohibited as we explained above (D2).

Answer (cont.): However, according to you that you do consider a kernel of wheat a Beryah, you must not agree that specifying is important. Even so, you should admit that it is unlike an ant, as an ant was/is alive.

Question: Where do we find a similar case where a reply is given, but the ones giving the reply do not hold that (this reply is in fact correct that) it is dependent on being alive?

Answer: One can find a similar case in Zevachim (77a). The Beraisa there states a case where limbs of unblemished animals became mixed with limbs of blemished animals (in the Beis Hamikdash). Rebbi Eliezer says they should be offered, and that he looks at the limbs of the unblemished animals as if they are wood. The Chachamim say they should not be offered.

Answer (cont.): Rebbi Eliezer himself does not hold of this reason (that they are looked at as wood). Regarding an animal that had relations with a person, Rebbi Eliezer agrees it should not be offered. He does not say, "I look at them as if they are wood."

Answer: Rather, the main reason is as explained by the Gemara, "There is a blemish in them they will not appease" implies that if they are mixed with unblemished limbs they will appease. Rebbi Eliezer's answer is according to the Rabbanan's position, as stated there.

Implied Question: However, this answer is more understandable in the Gemara there (77a), as Gemara says this answer from a Beraisa. Who is forcing the Gemara in Makos (17a) to say that the Rabbanan are answering Rebbi Shimon according to his own opinion? There is no Mishnah or Beraisa indicating that this is the case!

Question: Rebbi Shimon considers wheat a Beryah. According to him, how can Terumah be nullified with one hundred (Chulin) and one (Terumah) parts? We say later (100a) that a Beryah is not nullified regarding a Gid ha'Nasheh!

Answer: You might say that the reason there is because when something is a Beryah it is born prohibited, such as Gid ha'Nasheh, Sheratzim, Aiver Min ha'Chai, and non kosher birds. However, Terumah (i.e. grain when harvested) is permitted until it is gathered together (and it then becomes obligated in Terumos and Ma'aseros, which is why it is a Beryah that can be nullified).

Question: This would mean that Orlah and Kilai ha'Kerem should not be able to be nullified (as they grew prohibited, yet we know they can)! [See Tosfos in Zevachim 72a, DH "vLivtelu."]

Question: Regarding an ant and other Sheratzim, the Pasuk uses the term "eat" implying one is even liable if they are very small. Indeed, the Mishnah in Makos (13a) says one is liable for eating even a small amount (i.e. an ant), and Rebbi Yehudah does not argue! (Why does he argue here?)

Answer: Eating there is necessary to teach that one is liable for one Kzayis even though an ant or Sheretz is comprised of four or five Kzaysim. However, here we say that Rebbi Yehudah derives this from, "that is on the Kaf." The Gemara in Meilah (16b) also states that if someone ate Sheratzim he receives lashes if he eats a Kzayis, as it says "eat" regarding Sheratzim.

Question: We say in Makos (16b) that if someone ground up nine ants and had another one that was alive and altogether they added up to a Kzayis, he receives six sets of lashes. Five of these are due to the single whole ant that is a Sheretz, and one due to Neveilah.

Question (cont.): Why does there have to be one whole live ant that is a Beryah? Even without it six sets of lashes are warranted. Since there is a Kzayis he should receive five sets of lashes due to the prohibition of Sheretz which is a prohibition of "eating" as I explained, and one due to Neveilah!

Answer: Certainly he receives lashes due to the prohibition against eating Sheratzim because he ate a Kzayis of a Sheretz. However, there is a prohibition against eating Sheratzim that is not stated as a prohibition against "eating" like "Al Tishaktzu" - "don't do a disgusting thing" (Vayikra 11:43). One only receives lashes for transgressing this prohibition if he eats a live Sheretz such as a Beryah.

Question: Even so, why does it have to be alive? Even if it is dead it is considered a Beryah, as stated later (102b) that whether an unkosher animal is alive or dead one is liable for even a small amount.

Answer: In this case, alive does not mean to exclude dead, but rather it means "whole" and excludes ground up. This is as we say regarding vessels that when they are broken they are "dead."

Question: We say later (102b) that one must eat a Kzayis of Aiver Min ha'Chai, as it says, "eat" regarding Aiver Min ha'Chai. Perhaps "eat" regarding Aiver Min ha'Chai teaches that one is liable if he eats a Kzayis, even though the limb itself has four or five Kzaysim in it?

Answer: He is not liable until he eats an entire limb, meaning the meat, sinews, and bones.

Proof: This is apparent from the fact that we do not find later (103b) that Reish Lakish, who holds that a person who separates the two halves of an Aiver Min ha'Chai in his mouth and swallows one after the other is exempt, practically says one is liable for Aiver Min ha'Chai unless it is a small bone on the Kaf ha'Yarech (which has a little meat, sinew, and bone that add up to a Kzayis).

Answer: The reason for this Halachah is that the Pasuk says, "Don't eat the soul with the flesh." We derive from here (102b) that Aiver Min ha'Chai is forbidden. The implication is that he is only liable if he eats an entire limb.

Implied Question: The term "its prohibition" does not fit well, as we only forbid the part on the Kaf. (How can we say the entire Kaf is forbidden?)

Opinion: Rabeinu Gershom writes that the text is, "It is drawn throughout the thigh."

Answer: One can answer that the text, "its prohibition" means that the prohibited sinew goes through the entire thigh.

Explanation: We do not measure this based on the Gid alone, as the "peel" (i.e. small amount) around the Gid should also help the Gid prohibit, as from the time that it was salted the "peel" next to it is prohibited.

Observation: According to the explanation of Rabeinu Efrayim that we only say that the piece itself (that was not originally forbidden but absorbed prohibited matter) becomes Neveilah in a case of mixture of milk and meat, this is understandable.

Explanation: This (Mishnah) seems to imply that the sauce and other pieces do not help to take away the taste of the Gid (text of this sentence of Tosfos based on the Maharsha). Rather, the taste is determined by the thigh itself. This is implied due to the fact that the Mishnah did not say, "If there is in them and their sauce a taste etc."

Opinion #1: This is understandable according to Rashi. He explains later (108b) regarding a drop of milk etc. that the Gemara says that this is only if he shook it and covered it. However, if he did not shake it and cover it, the piece itself becomes Neveilah etc.

Opinion #1 (cont.): Rashi explains that when he shakes the pot, he makes the drop of milk go all around the pot. Accordingly, everything in the pot helps to nullify the drop of milk. Similarly, when he covers the pot the boiling goes from the bottom up and causes the milk to go all around the pot.

Opinion #1 (cont.): This implies that even if the piece that the drop of milk fell upon is partially in sauce, if he did not shake the pot and cover it, the sauce and other pieces would not help to nullify the milk. The case in our Gemara is where he did not shake or cover it (which is why the Mishnah does not say that the sauce or other pieces help nullify the taste).

Opinion #2: The Ri understands that when the piece that the prohibited item fell on is partially in sauce, we do not require shaking and covering.

Opinion #2 (cont.): The case in the Gemara later is when the piece is totally out of the sauce, in which case the milk only spreads out if it was shaken and covered.

Implied Question: The Gemara there (108b) could have said that this is only when the piece is partially in sauce. (Why didn't it say this if it is a significant difference?)

Answer: Rather, it wanted to say a clear difference such as when he shook it and covered it. In such a case, the sauce will always cover the pieces, even if the entire piece was originally outside of the sauce.

Explanation: When our Mishnah says, "If it gives a taste" it means that the meat plus the sauce was not sixty times more than the Gid, and therefore did not nullify the taste of the Gid.

Question: What is the novelty of Shmuel's statement? It is obvious that the law cannot include a case where it was roasted, as if so why should the Mishnah say it was cooked? It was forbidden from the time it was salted, as salting is akin to the boiling of roasting as stated later. Without salting one cannot cook, as the meat does not release the blood until it is well salted.

Answer: The novelty of Shmuel's statement is that we do not say that the case of cooking in the Mishnah is roasting, as sometimes we find that roasting is called cooking.

Proof #1: This is as the Pasuk states, "And they cooked the Pesach" (Divrei Hayamim 2, 35:13). (We know that the Pesach must be roasted, so obviously cooking here means roasting.)

Proof #2: Similarly, the Mishnah states later (109b) that one should tear the heart and take out its blood. If he did not do so, he should do so after it is cooked. The Gemara in Pesachim (74b) tries to deduce from this Mishnah the concept, "like it absorbs so it emits." The Mishnah must mean that it was roasted, not cooked. If it would have been cooked, the entire heart would be forbidden if the mouth of the trachea would not be outside of the pot.

Explanation: This does not mean until he actually gets to the Gid, as he must leave a (thin) layer close to the Gid (all around it). He must even leave an amount one can take off, as stated in Pesachim (75b) that if some of the juices of the Korban Pesach drip onto the earthenware and then go back on the Korban Pesach, he should take away the entire area (a layer the thickness of a finger, see Bartenura and Yachin on the Mishnah in Pesachim 7:2, due to this area of the Pesach being called "Tzli Cheres" and not "Tzli Aish") and it is not enough to take away a small layer.

Explanation (cont.): This is (true) unless we differentiate that perhaps juices (of the Pesach) penetrate deeper into the meat than the flavor of the Gid.

Observation: However, we do not find anywhere that when there is a prohibited item that is part of a mixture that involves roasting that it suffices to take off a thin layer. We only find that a thin layer suffices regarding roasting in the case in Pesachim (76a) regarding hot going into cold. Shmuel says one should take a thin layer off (where a hot roasted item goes onto a cold item) because although the cold item on the bottom is stronger (i.e. the entire mixture is deemed to be cold and therefore no significant absorption is deemed to take place), before the hot item cools off it absorbs slightly.

Observation (cont.): It is possible that a very hot roasting causes more absorption.

Implied Question: Later (112a), Rav says that a roasted pigeon that fell into a pot of (milky) dip needs to have a small layer taken off. (This seems to show that it is common to require that a small layer should be taken off of roasted items!)

Answer: The case (ibid.) is even when the pigeon is cold. Since the pigeon is very soft, it absorbs (even without heat).

Implied Question: The Halachah is that a person can put meat and cheese in the same cloth and not worry, as long as they do not touch each other. The Gemara says (107b), if they touch each other what happens? They are both cold (and cold does not absorb)! The Gemara answers, even if they will not require taking a small layer off, they will still require rinsing. (This implies that if the roasted meat was hot, it would only require the taking of a small layer!)

Answer: This is not because it is enough to take a small layer off of hot roasted meat (when it is mixed with something that causes it to be prohibited). Rather, the Gemara means that even if a small layer should not be required as it is in a case of hot going into cold (the exceptional case quoted earlier in b), it should still require rinsing.

Implied Question: Similarly, the Gemara earlier (8b) says that according to the opinion that the area where the slaughtering is done is boiling, one must take a small layer off of the slaughtering area (if a knife of idolatry is used). (This shows a small layer is taken off by roasting!)

Answer: The case there is different, as the amount of fat on the knife is miniscule.

Proof: This is as the Mishnah states in Pesachim (75b) that if they rubbed oil of Terumah onto the Korban Pesach, if they are a group of Kohanim they can eat it. If they are a group of non Kohanim, they should take off a small layer if it is roasted. The Gemara explains that this is even according to the opinion that the bottom is stronger (in this case the entire mixture should be deemed to be like the roasted meat on the bottom, and therefore one would think that significant absorption takes place that would require more than a small layer), as rubbing oil only causes a small absorption.

Explanation: This is referring to a place (the ear) that is far away from the forbidden fat.

Explanation (cont.): This is not necessarily because the head of the goat is facing downwards when it is roasted on a spit in the oven. This is indeed the normal way it is roasted, however, as stated in Pesachim (74a) that the spit is put through its mouth until it reaches the bottom of the animal, and the thick end of the spit is turned downwards in order that it should not fall, causing the fat to pool by the head (making it obvious that the ear should be forbidden when it is roasted in this fashion).

Explanation (cont.): Rather, even if the head was raised it is forbidden, as the forbidden fat boils upwards.

Proof: This is also evident from the fact that a cold item mixing into a hot item is forbidden according to the opinion that the bottom item is stronger, and we do not say that taking off a small layer is sufficient.

Implied Question: There is a custom when people salt a lot of meat and they put it in barrels regarding a piece of meat that is half in the brine and half outside of the brine. They cut off the meat in the brine, and throw it away as it is forbidden. They keep the meat outside the brine, and do not say that the blood is considered to travel upwards causing the entire piece to be forbidden, as we state regarding forbidden fat. (What is the difference between this case and the case of forbidden fat?)

Answer: It is possible to answer that it is not normal for blood to boil upwards. On the contrary, we say that blood spreads out when it falls on meat and does not become absorbed while it is moving. It certainly does not boil upwards!

Implied Question: Even if there is permitted fat in the meat that is in the brine we do not say that it becomes Neveilah due to the blood, and that it therefore forbids what is outside of the brine because the fat boils upwards. (Why not?)

Answer #1: This is as Rabeinu Efrayim explained that we only say a previously permitted piece of meat becomes forbidden like Neveilah when it is mixed (i.e. cooked) with milk.

Answer #2: Even without this first answer, since the forbidden item cannot go outside the brine it is permitted. We only say a previously permitted piece of meat becomes forbidden like Neveilah and that it forbids the other pieces of meat when the forbidden item spreads into the entire piece, similar to a drop of milk (spreading throughout a piece of meat).