Explanation: Rav Yehudah is referring to the Mishnah later (83b) which says, "(Kisuy ha'Dam) applies to a Koy because it is a doubt, but one does not slaughter it on Yom Tov. If he does etc."

Explanation (cont.): He is not referring to the Koy which Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan are arguing about, as explained by Rashi.

Question: Why not check the Simanim of the horns? (See Nidah 51b.)

Answer: It is possible that they could not check the horns well enough to see if they were sharp and wound up well enough.

Explanation: Rav Nachman and the Tana Kama of the Beraisa hold that it is definitely an undomesticated animal which is slaughtered on Yom Tov, after which one does Kisuy ha'Dam. This argues on our Mishnah (83b).

Implied Question: However, one cannot say that they hold it is a domesticated animal. (Why not?)

Answer: If this would be so, the Tana Kama would have the same opinion as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Explanation: Rav Acha holds that a Tao is an undomesticated animal, as is the opinion of Rebbi Yosi later that a Shor ha'Bor is a type of undomesticated animal.

Explanation (cont.): If he holds like the Rabbanan who say it is a type of domesticated animal, even if it is a Tao it would be able to be brought on the Mizbe'ach.

Explanation: This implies that if it would not be listed as an undomesticated animal it would be considered domesticated according to everyone, being that it is called a "Shor" - "ox."

Question: This is somewhat difficult, as the "Ail ha'Bor" is classified as undomesticated as I explained earlier, even though it is called an "Ayil" - "ram."

Explanation: One might have thought (without the Mishnah stating it is permitted) that the second animal is forbidden due to the prohibition quoted later (115a), "Lo Sochal Kol Toei'vah" - "do not eat anything that is an abomination."

Observation: This is unlike the opinion of Rebbi Yitzchak who says in Makos (23a) that if one who is liable to receive Kares receives lashes, he is now exempt from receiving Kares.

Implied Question: The Mishnah could have listed more cases, such as one animal that is Chulin/Kodshim outside the Mikdash with an animal that is Kodshim/Chulin inside the Mikdash (i.e. first Chulin second Kodshim or first Kodshim second Chulin). It also could have listed Chulin/Kodshim inside and then outside, as well as Kodshim/Chulin inside and outside.

Answer: If there is a novelty in all of the cases that were stated in the Mishnah, one can explain that these cases were not said because there is nothing novel about them. If there is no novelty in each case stated in the Mishnah, one must say that the Tana left out certain cases.

Question: Later (85a), the Gemara explains that Rebbi Shimon's derives his law from the Pasuk, "Slaughter an animal and prepare it." The Gemara asks, let us derive this from Shechutei Chutz! The Gemara answers that it is understandable to derive Chulin from Chulin, as opposed to deriving Chulin from Kodshim. If so, being that we are discussing Kodshim here, why don't we prefer to derive Kodshim from Kodshim?

Answer: Being that the main Pasuk regarding Oso v'Es Beno is regarding Chulin, as indicated by the word "ox" separating Kodshim from Oso v'Es Beno, it must be that the slaughtering regarding Oso v'Es Beno is a proper slaughtering being that we derive Chulin from Chulin.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that not only will he not receive lashes for the slaughtering of the second animal if Oso v'Es Beno applies to Kodshim, as the second animal is not "old enough" to be brought (being that its mother/child was slaughtered it needs to be one day older to be brought). Even if Oso v'Es Beno did not apply to Kodshim the slaughtering of the first animal is not deemed appropriate, as the slaughtering does not permit it without the blood being sprinkled. Why, then, should the second animal be considered invalid? It is "old enough" (as there is no prohibition of Oso v'Es Beno). Accordingly, (if the Mishnah was according to Rebbi Shimon) why would it say that if one slaughters the second animal he receives lashes?

Explanation #1 (cont.): Due to this reasoning, Rashi erased the texts later that stated that there is no lashes for Oso v'Es Beno animals of Kodshim being that the warning given to the person is doubtful (as he might not slaughter the second animal). Why would the reason need to be because of a doubtful warning? It should be because the slaughtering is not appropriate because the animal is not "old enough."

Question #1: This does not seem correct, being that the Pasuk forbade Oso v'Es Beno regarding Kodshim, as is apparent from the letter Vav indicating that it also applies to Kodshim (78a). This means that the Torah states it should be punished with lashes, even though it is not an appropriate slaughtering and it is not "old enough." This is because there is no other reason it is invalid, for example like Shechutei Chutz, which would make one liable to be punished for that reason even according to Rebbi Shimon (who says Oso v'Es Beno would not apply). This is despite the fact that it indeed is generally considered an inappropriate slaughtering.

Question #2: Additionally, the Mishnah explicitly states in Zevachim (112b) that one transgresses a negative prohibition if he offers Kodshim that is Oso v'Es Beno or Mechusar Zeman being that he considers it slaughtering. This causes one to transgress the prohibition of "do not slaughter them." (The Maharsha and others ask that this does not seem to be the prohibition that Rebbi Shimon says one transgresses in this case.)

Explanation #2: It therefore appears that it is only apparent from the first animal that the slaughtering of Kodshim is not deemed an appropriate slaughtering, and it is therefore as if he killed the first animal instead of slaughtering it (Oso v'Es Beno specifically requires slaughtering), causing the second animal to be totally valid.

Implied Question: One cannot ask a question on the opinion of Rebbi Oshiya and even Rav Hamnuna later from the Mishnah in Zevachim (ibid.) that implies Rebbi Shimon says Oso v'Es Beno applies to Kodshim. (Why doesn't this Mishnah contradict their positions?)

Answer: One can answer that the case in Zevachim is where the first animal was Chulin and the second animal was Kodshim. Accordingly, the first animals slaughtering was appropriate.

Explanation: Even if the second animal was slaughtered after the sprinkling of the blood of the first animal, the first slaughtering is considered inappropriate, being that at the time of the slaughtering it was not appropriate.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Rebbi Shimon generally holds that whatever is about to be sprinkled is considered as if it is already sprinkled. (Why, then, is the first animal's slaughtering considered inappropriate?)

Answer #1: This rule only applies after the blood was accepted in the Kli Shares, as stated in Pesachim (13b).

Answer #2: Additionally, being that through slaughtering alone the meat would not be permitted to be eaten were it not for the fact that it is about to be sprinkled, it is not deemed an appropriate slaughtering.

Question: The Gemara in Bava Kama (76a) implies that slaughtering of Kodshim is an appropriate slaughtering, even if the blood is spilled.

Question (cont.): The Mishnah there stated that Rebbi Shimon says one is liable to pay four or five times the amount (for stealing and then slaughtering) an ox or sheep of Kodshim that the owner was obligated to replace. The Gemara (ibid.) asks, isn't the slaughtering considered inappropriate? Rav Dimi says the case is where he slaughtered animals without a blemish in the name of their owner in the Beis Hamikdash, as the principle went back to the owner when the blood was spilled.

Question (cont.): The Gemara asks, does slaughtering permit the animal? Sprinkling permits it! The Gemara answers, what is about to be sprinkled is considered as if it is sprinkled. This is why it is considered an appropriate sprinkling. Rebbi Oshiya himself holds in Menachos (102a) that according to Rebbi Shimon, whatever is going to be sprinkled is considered as if it is already sprinkled regarding Nosar.

Answer: Rebbi Oshiya only says the blood is considered as if it is sprinkled in order to consider Nosar food that cannot be fed to others (as discussed in Menachos ibid.). However, he does not consider it a proper slaughtering because it is as if it is sprinkled.

Answer (cont.): Rebbi Oshiya would answer the question of the Gemara in Bava Kama (76a) with Reish Lakish's answer (76b) that the case is where a person slaughtered animals with a blemish outside the Beis Hamikdash. The reason it is not considered slaughtering Kodshim outside the Beis Hamikdash is because it is supposed to be redeemed, and what is going to be redeemed is as if it is was already redeemed.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that he does not hold that whatever is going to be sprinkled is considered sprinkled. (Why, then, do we assume he holds that whatever is supposed to be redeemed is considered redeemed?)

Answer: This is because sprinkling is dependent on slaughtering, and slaughtering requires sprinkling. However, redeeming is not dependent on slaughtering, as one can redeem before slaughtering.

Observation: Our Gemara's conclusion is that the slaughtering of Kodshim is considered an appropriate slaughtering because it is considered sprinkled.

Proof: This is similar to the conclusion of the Gemara in Bava Kama (76b) that concludes that Oso v'Es Beno applies to Kodshim, but there is no punishment of lashes because the warning is doubtful. Perhaps he will not sprinkle the blood, causing it to be an inappropriate slaughtering.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that in Bava Kama (ibid.) we say that it is an appropriate slaughtering even if the blood spilled being that what is supposed to be sprinkled is considered as if it is already sprinkled.

Answer: In our Gemara the animal is considered not old enough, and it is therefore inappropriate to sprinkle the blood being that it is forbidden to sprinkle the blood. It therefore cannot be considered as if it is sprinkled.

Proof #1: We indeed say in Kerisus (24b) that Rebbi Shimon only says that it is considered as if it is sprinkled when it is going to be sprinkled.

Proof #2: In Menachos (102b) we say that it is understandable (that a red heifer is considered redeemed before it is redeemed) as it is a Mitzvah to redeem the red heifer, meaning it is a Mitzvah in a case where a nicer red heifer is available. This is why it is considered redeemed. However, is it a Mitzvah to redeem Menachos?!

Question: Why doesn't the Gemara asks a similar question on Rebbi Oshiya as it asks on Rav Hamnuna later?

Answer: Rebbi Oshiya only said that the Mishnah regarding Kodshim being slaughtered in the Beis Hamikdash is unlike Rebbi Shimon. The Gemara asks, why should the second person receive lashes and his Korban be deemed invalid?

Answer (cont.): However, Rebbi Oshiya possibly only deduces from the fact that the Mishnah says he receives lashes. He therefore asks why he should receive lashes, being that it is a doubtful warning, as stated in the conclusion of the Gemara.

Answer (cont.): This is why the Gemara only asks its question according to Rav Hamnuna who clearly said that Oso v'Es Beno does not apply to Kodshim because the slaughtering of Kodshim is deemed an inappropriate slaughtering.

Text: Rabeinu Chananel does not have the text, "and it is invalid." Rather, he only has the text, "Why should he receive lashes?" Due to the aspect of a doubtful warning, the Gemara continues to deduce until it reaches its conclusion.

Question: Why don't we say that receiving lashes is not because of the prohibition of not slaughtering Oso v'Es Beno, but rather because of the prohibition against slaughtering an animal not old enough to be a Korban? This is the prohibition, "Do not do so etc." that Rebbi Shimon says in Zevachim (114b) mandates that one be punished with lashes.

Answer: The entire Mishnah that says that the second person receives lashes only deals with the prohibition against Oso v'Es Beno.

Question: This is difficult. How can he receive lashes? Isn't this is a Lav she'bic'Chlalos which is not punished by lashes? This is similar to the prohibition, "It should not be eaten for it is holy" (regarding Nosar). We derive from that Pasuk that it is a prohibition against eating anything that is Kodesh and invalid. The Gemara in Pesachim (24a) calls this a Lav she'bich'Chlalos.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this is not similar to the positive commandment of "Send" which is at the beginning of the Mitzvah. However, this positive commandment must be after the negative commandment, as the negative commandment is within the first seven days (of the animal's life), and the positive commandment is afterwards. This indicates that Rashi is explaining that it is like a regular Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei.

Question: This is difficult, as this is unlike (the classic examples of a Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei such as) Nosar and stealing where after one transgresses a negative prohibition he can fix it by doing a positive commandment. We do not find a Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei that is in this form!

Answer: However, we do find a positive commandment structured in this fashion in Yoma (36b). Rebbi Yirmiyah says that there is an argument in the Gemara there regarding whether after the Lav against Neveilah there is a positive commandment, "You should give it to the Ger by your gates and he will eat it."

Question: However, this is not a proof. Firstly, Abaye argues on him and says that according to everyone Neveilah is a regular Lav.

Question: Even according to Rebbi Yirmiyah that there is an opinion that Neveilah is a Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei, this is only because the Asei is said immediately after the Lav. However, the Asei of "From the eighth day etc." is not said immediately after the Lav, "it will not be wanted."

Explanation #2: It appears that Rebbi Zeira means that one should leave the prohibition of not being old enough aside, as the Torah detached it from the prohibition of "it will not be wanted" causing it not to be included in the other invalid offerings that are included in "it will not be wanted."