QUESTION: The Gemara states that two Halachos are learned from the verse, "And Aharon will offer the Par ha'Chatas which is his (Asher Lo), and he will attain atonement for himself and for his household, and he will slaughter the Par ha'Chatas which is his (Asher Lo)" (Vayikra 16:11). The first law derived from the verse is that the Par ha'Chatas which the Kohen Gadol brings on Yom Kippur must be his own, and it cannot be bought with public funds. The second law derived from the verse is that Korbanos may not be brought from Ma'aser, but they must be brought from Chulin. RASHI (DH mi'Shelo v'Lo mi'Shel Tzibur) explains that these two Halachos are derived from the fact that the verse says the words "Asher Lo" twice. Rashi's intention, apparently, is to explain how the Gemara is able to learn two laws from one verse. (It is because the phrase "Asher Lo" is written twice.)
The TUREI EVEN in Chagigah (8a) and other Acharonim question Rashi's explanation. The Gemara in Yoma (51b) and Shevuos (14a) teaches that three Halachos are learned from the three occasions that the verse says "Asher Lo" (two in Vayikra 16:11, and one in Vayikra 16:6). These three Halachos are that the Par ha'Chatas cannot come from public funds, it cannot come from the funds of the Kohanim, and this Halachah is absolute (it is "Me'akev"), such that if the Par ha'Chatas is not brought from the private funds of the Kohen Gadol, it is invalid.
However, there now are too many laws being derived from the verse. While the Gemara here agrees with the Gemara there that one verse is used to exclude bringing the Par ha'Chatas from public funds, there are three more Halachos (that the Par ha'Chatas may not be brought from the funds of the Kohanim, that it is Me'akev, and that it may not come from Ma'aser) that are being learned from only two phrases of "Asher Lo." How can one verse be used to teach more than one Halachah?
(a) The MITZPEH EISAN quotes the NACHALAS AZRIEL who says that the Gemara here must be arguing with the Gemara in Yoma and in Shevuos. While the Gemara here derives from the third "Asher Lo" that Korbanos may not be brought from Ma'aser, the Gemara in Yoma and in Shevuos (which do not mention the Halachah of Ma'aser) derive instead from the third "Asher Lo" that if the Par ha'Chatas does not belong to the Kohen Gadol, it is not a valid Korban even b'Di'eved. The Gemara here maintains that if the Par ha'Chatas does not belong to the Kohen Gadol, it nevertheless is valid b'Di'eved.
The Mitzpeh Eisan is not satisfied with this answer, because it is preferable to refrain from making a new argument between two statements of the Gemara.
(b) The Mitzpeh Eisan prefers to explain that there is a different argument between the Gemara here and the Gemara in Yoma and Shevuos. The Gemara in Yoma (3b) records a dispute about the meaning of the word "Lecha" in the verse, "Aseh Lecha" -- "Make for you" (Bamidbar 10:2), written with regard to the making of the Chatzotzeros. Rebbi Yoshiya says that this verse teaches that the Chatzotzeros must be made from private funds, and not from public funds. Rebbi Yonasan says that the word "Lecha" there means that they may be made from either private or public funds. However, even Rebbi Yonasan agrees that the Par ha'Chatas of Aharon must be bought by Aharon himself. The Mitzpeh Eisan explains that although they agree about the general principle, Rebbi Yoshiya and Rebbi Yonasan differ about how to explain the three phrases of "Asher Lo." Rebbi Yonasan maintains that although it may not come from public funds, one might have thought that it may come from the funds of the Kohanim, who also gain atonement with the Korban of Aharon. This is why another verse of "Asher Lo" is needed -- to exclude the funds of the Kohanim, and another verse of "Asher Lo" is needed to teach that this is an absolute Halachah which is Me'akev the Korban. The Gemara in Yoma and Shevuos follows this opinion of Rebbi Yonasan. The Gemara here, in contrast, follows the opinion of Rebbi Yoshiya, who maintains that whenever the verse uses wording of "Lecha" or "Lo" ("to you" or "to him") one may infer that the subject of the verse is supposed to be brought by the person himself and not from public funds. Rebbi Yoshiya understands from only one verse of "Asher Lo" that the Korban may be brought neither from public funds nor from the Kohanim. This leaves two phrases of "Asher Lo," from which the Gemara learns that this Halachah is Me'akev, and that the Korban may not be brought from Ma'aser. (Y. MONTROSE)
QUESTION: The Gemara asks why the Tana Kama needs the word, "ka'Mishpat" (Vayikra 5:10), to teach the Halachah that an Olas ha'Of is brought only during the day. There is another verse, "b'Yom Tzavoso" (Vayikra 7:38), that teaches that bird offerings may be brought only during the day.
RASHI (DH mib'Yom) explains that the verse of "b'Yom Tzavoso" refers to all forms of Korbanos.
Rashi here seems to contradict his words earlier. Rashi (21b, DH Rebbi Yishmael) explains that according to the Tana Kama, the verse, "Zos ha'Torah" (Vayikra 7:37), which immediately precedes the verse of "b'Yom Tzavoso," refers to animal offerings alone and not to bird offerings! How are the words of Rashi to be reconciled? (TOSFOS to 21b, DH Mah Chatas)
ANSWER: Perhaps Rashi understands that the verse of "Zos ha'Torah" has two connotations. The first is the simple meaning of the verse, a concluding statement for all of the laws of the different types of Korbanos. The second is the Hekesh; the verse compares all of the different types of Korbanos to each other. Rashi learns that the simple meaning of the verse applies even to bird offerings. Therefore, the words "b'Yom Tzavoso" written in the following verse also refer to all offerings -- even birds. In contrast, the Derashah of the verse (that is, the Hekesh that compares all Korbanos to each other) refers only to the Korbanos that are mentioned explicitly in the verse, and not to bird offerings. (M. KORNFELD)


QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that Torim (turtledoves) and Bnei Yonah (pigeons) are valid Korbanos at opposite ages. A Tor must be brought when it is older, and a Ben Yonah when it is younger. The Gemara explains that Bnei Yonah become unfit for Korbanos once their feathers begin turning yellow, while Torim are valid only when their feathers begin turning gold. The Gemara says that both a Tor and a Ben Yonah is Pasul when its fathers turn yellow (a Ben Yonah because it is too old, and a Tor because it is too young).
Rebbi Zeira asks what the Halachah is in a case in which a person pledges to bring a Korban Olah from either Torim or Bnei Yonah, and he brings one of each bird when it starts to turn yellow. Has the person fulfilled his pledge or not? The answer depends on why birds are Pasul when they begin to turn yellow. Perhaps they are Pasul because at the stage at which they begin to turn yellow, it is not known whether they are young or old, and out of doubt one cannot bring them as a Korban. If this is the reason why they are Pasul, then the person does fulfill his pledge to bring a Korban Olah when he brings one of each type of bird when it starts to turn yellow. The two birds are either both young or both old, and thus he has brought either a valid Tor or a valid Ben Yonah. However, perhaps the reason why birds that have turned yellow may not be offered is that birds at this stage are considered like a different creature entirely, which is neither a Tor nor a Ben Yonah. According to this reason, the person does not fulfill his pledge to bring a Korban Olah, since neither of the birds that he brings is a valid Korban when it is yellow.
TOSFOS (DH v'Hevi) asks that the first part of this question seems strange. The Gemara entertains the possibility that one fulfills his pledge by bringing two birds, one Tor and one Ben Yonah, which are both beginning to show signs of yellow, since one of these birds definitely is valid. How, though, is one permitted to bring both birds? If one bird is definitely valid, then the other bird is definitely invalid, since it is either too old or too young! A person is not allowed to bring two Korbanos into the Beis ha'Mikdash when one of them is definitely Pasul.
(a) TOSFOS answers that it is obvious that, in practice, a person is not permitted to bring a Korban that is Pasul. The question involves a case in which a Kohen already offered the two birds, even though he was not supposed to do so.
(b) Alternatively, Tosfos answers that the Gemara may even refer to a case in which one is permitted l'Chatchilah to bring both birds. The person's pledge was to "bring" a Korban Olah to the Beis ha'Mikdash. Once he brings both of the birds to the Kohen, he has fulfilled his obligation, since one of the birds is valid, and he has "brought" them to the Beis ha'Mikdash. (The Kohen, of course, does not offer them in the Beis ha'Mikdash, since one of them is certainly Pasul.) This also seems to be the case according to the opinion of RASHI later (139a, DH d'Michsar Hakravah), who states that when a person makes a pledge and says that a certain Korban is "upon me" ("Alai") to bring, his pledge means that he must bring the Korban to the Azarah, and not that he actually must offer the Korban.
The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 14:5) has difficulty with this answer. The Gemara in a number of places (see beginning of Zevachim) often discusses the Halachah in a case in which a person brings a Korban, which the Kohen slaughters with intention that it is a different Korban. Although, in the case of most Korbanos, the Korban remains valid, it is valid only as the type of Korban that the Kohen had in mind, and it does not fulfill the owner's obligation (and the owner must bring a new Korban to fulfill his obligation). According to the proposition of Tosfos -- that one merely needs to bring his Korban to the Azarah in order to fulfill his pledge, why should the Korban that was slaughtered with the wrong intention not fulfill his pledge?
1. RAV YOSEF SHALOM ELYASHIV shlit'a (cited in HE'OROS B'MASECHES CHULIN) suggests that Tosfos is discussing a case in which the person specifically stated in his Neder that it is incumbent upon him to bring a Korban to the Gizbar (treasurer) or to the Kohen. In such a case, he indeed fulfills his obligation by bringing the birds to the Gizbar or to the Kohen, since that was the extent of his obligation.
However, Rav Elyashiv is not entirely satisfied with this answer. One problem with it is that the words of Tosfos do not seem to be saying this. If this indeed is the intention of Tosfos, then Tosfos should state so explicitly. Another problem is that Rashi in Me'ilah (19a, DH Ad she'Yatza) says that even when a person must bring a Korban Asham or Chatas, he is no longer responsible for the Korban once he brings it to the Azarah. This implies that one discharges his obligation for all Korbanos by bringing them to the Azarah, and not merely when he specifically limited his obligation (in the case of Neder).
2. Rav Elyashiv therefore suggests an alternative answer. He explains that there are two parts to every obligation to bring a Korban. The first part is an obligation to fulfill the Neder by bringing a Korban, or to fulfill one's obligation to attain atonement by bringing a Korban. The second part is an obligation to fulfill a monetary obligation to give to Hekdesh what one owes to Hekdesh. This second part, the monetary obligation, is fulfilled once the person brings to Hekdesh (to the Beis ha'Mikdash) whatever he owes (i.e. the animal).
This second part of the obligation is evident from the Gemara in Kidushin (13b), which states that when a person accepted upon himself to bring a Korban and then he died before he fulfilled his pledge, his heirs are obligated to bring the Korban in his place (according to the opinion that maintains "Shibuda d'Oraisa"). From there it is evident that when a person accepts upon himself to bring a Korban, he has a monetary obligation to bring the Korban even if it no longer can atone for his sins.
Tosfos and Rashi agree that until a person's Korban is offered on the Mizbe'ach, he does not fulfill his obligation to bring a Korban and he does not attain atonement for himself by just giving it to the Kohen. Nevertheless, by bringing the Korban to the Kohen, one does fulfill his monetary obligation to Hekdesh. (Therefore, when one brought his Korban to the Kohen and then died before it was offered on the Mizbe'ach, his heirs do not need to bring a Korban for him, because he has fulfilled his monetary obligation by bringing the Korban to the Kohen.) (See AVI EZRI, Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 14:5.) (Y. MONTROSE)
3. The TZELACH suggests another answer. The Gemara in Nedarim (35b) discusses the question of whether the Kohanim who offer the Korbanos for the people in the Beis ha'Mikdash are considered their agents (Sheluchim) or are considered the agents of Hash-m. The Tzelach explains that Tosfos, in his second answer, accepts the opinion that the Kohanim are the agents of Hash-m. Consequently, once a person gives his Korban to a Kohen, he has discharged his responsibility to bring a Korban. The Kohen who accepts the Korban to offer it in the Beis ha'Mikdash is accepting the Korban on behalf of Hash-m. (In contrast, if the Kohanim are agents of the people, then the owner of the Korban is responsible to ensure that the Kohen, his Shali'ach, offers it on the Mizbe'ach, and he cannot discharge his obligation by merely giving the Korban to a Kohen.) (See also EVEN HA'AZEL, Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:2:2.) (Z. Wainstein)