QUESTION: The Mishnah states that the laws of Heter Nedarim, the annulment of oaths, "hover in the air with nothing to support them," which means that there is no explicit verse in the Torah for the laws of Heter Nedarim. Rather, the laws were transmitted to the Chachamim from Har Sinai through Torah she'Ba'al Peh.

The Gemara cites a Beraisa (which disagrees with the Mishnah) in which a number of Tana'im give various sources for the laws of Heter Nedarim. Rava rejects all of these sources for various reasons.

One of these sources (that of Rebbi Yitzchak) is the verse, "Kol Nediv Libo" (Shemos 35:5). The verse implies that one's oath is binding only when one still has in his heart the desire to fulfill it. If he no longer desires to fulfill his oath, he may have a Chacham annul it for him. Rava rejects this source because perhaps the verse is needed to teach a different law. Perhaps "Kol Nediv Libo" is needed to teach that the law does not follow the view of Shmuel who maintains that one must verbalize a Neder aloud in order for it to take effect, and it does not suffice merely to think the Neder in one's heart. "Kol Nediv Libo" teaches that a Neder is valid even when one merely thinks it in his heart and does not verbalize it.

RASHI (DH Gamar b'Libo) explains that when Shmuel says that one must verbalize his intention in order for it to take effect, he refers to taking upon oneself a "Shevu'ah, Neder, or Hekdesh."

Why does Rashi explain that Shmuel's ruling refers to Hekdesh, and that one's intention in his heart to sanctify something to Hekdesh is not binding until he verbalizes his intention? The Gemara in Shevuos (26b) explicitly states that even Shmuel agrees that with regard to oaths of Hekdesh, a person's thoughts are enough to obligate him. Why does Rashi write that Shmuel's statement (that one's thoughts are not binding) also applies to Hekdesh? (SI'ACH YITZCHAK)

ANSWER: The Gemara in Shevuos derives that an oath of Hekdesh is binding even when not verbalized from the verse cited here, "Kol Nediv Libo" (as Tosfos points out). Rashi means to say that if not for the verse of "Kol Nediv Libo," Shmuel's ruling would have applied to Hekdesh as well. Now that the verse says "Kol Nediv Libo," it teaches that the thoughts in one's heart suffice to make one obligated, at least with regard to Hekdesh, even according to Shmuel. Rashi is not explaining what Shmuel actually rules, but rather what Shmuel would have ruled had there been no verse. (M. Kornfeld)

OPINIONS: A fundamental argument concerning the liability for performing Melachah on Shabbos involves a "Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah," a "Melachah that is not needed for itself." Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon disagree about whether one is Chayav for performing such a Melachah "that is not needed for itself." Rebbi Yehudah says that one is Chayav, and Rebbi Shimon says that one is Patur. What exactly is the definition of a Melachah "that is not needed for itself"?

(a) TOSFOS (10b, DH Meleches; see also TOSFOS to Shabbos 94a, DH Rebbi Shimon Poter) writes in the name of RASHI that a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah refers to any Melachah that one does in order to prevent something else from happening, or in order to rectify something that was already done wrong. For example, a person who carries a dead body out of a house is interested in correcting an uncomfortable situation (the dead body's presence in his house); he would have preferred that the dead body not be brought into his house in the first place.

Tosfos refutes this explanation. When a curtain has a wormhole and one tears some more above and below the hole in order to mend it neatly, he is Chayav (this is the classic example of "Meleches Kore'a Al Menas Litfor," Shabbos 75a). Similarly, one who destroys a building in order to build another structure in its place is Chayav (for "Soser Al Menas Livnos"). Tosfos asks that according to Rashi, the one who tears the curtain or destroys the building should be exempt, because he tore the curtain only to fix the damage done by the worm, and he destroyed the building only to make room for another. He would have preferred that the wormhole or building not have been there in the first place.

(b) TOSFOS (ibid.) defines a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah as any Melachah performed for a different purpose for which the same Melachah was performed in the Mishkan.

(c) The RAMBAN (Shabbos 94b) and BA'AL HA'ME'OR (Shabbos 106a) write that a Melachah must be performed for the purpose for which that activity is normally performed. A Melachah done for a purpose other than its normal objective is a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah. For example, digging a pit in order to use the dirt is a Melachah that is not needed for itself because, normally, the purpose of digging is not to use the dirt but rather to make a pit. The dirt is merely a secondary outcome of the primary purpose of the Melachah. Similarly, a Melachah performed in order to prevent damage from occurring, such as the capture of a snake, is considered a Melachah that is not needed for itself because the normal objective of capturing is to use the animal and not to prevent it from causing harm. The same reasoning applies to carrying an object to Reshus ha'Rabim in order to keep one's body from becoming soiled (as in the case of the Kis of the Zav in Shabbos 11b).

This may be Rashi's opinion as well, in contrast to Tosfos' understanding of Rashi (in (a) above). According to this approach, tearing a garment to repair a wormhole is considered a genuine Melachah; the person who tears the garment is presently interested in having the garment torn apart (the primary effect of the Melachah) and not in a secondary outcome of the tearing. Similarly, one who demolishes a building in order to build a new one in its place is interested in the removal of the building, and that is the primary outcome of the Melachah. (See also Insights to Shabbos 93:3.)

QUESTION: The Mishnah (10a) states that the laws of Me'ilos are "like mountains suspended from a hair, with many Halachos but [based on] very few verses." The Gemara asks that all of the Halachos of Me'ilah are written clearly in the Torah. To what Halachah does the Mishnah refer when it says that the laws of Me'ilah are "like mountains suspended from a hair"?

Rava answers that the Mishnah refers to a case of Me'ilah which is not written in the Torah: a Ba'al ha'Bayis appoints a Shali'ach to take and spend money which -- unbeknown to them -- is Hekdesh, and then the Ba'al ha'Bayis realizes that the money he sent was Hekdesh while the Shali'ach remains unaware of it and spends the money. In such a case, the Shali'ach is liable for Me'ilah and not the Ba'al ha'Bayis. The Gemara says that this law is "suspended by a hair" because there is no strong logical basis to say that the helpless Shali'ach is liable (since he had no way of knowing that the money he was appointed to spend is money of Hekdesh).

Rav Ashi rejects Rava's answer and says that this case is not a law "suspended by a hair," because every case of Me'ilah involves unknowingly spending money of Hekdesh.

The Gemara concludes that Rava's case indeed is the Mishnah's law of Me'ilah "suspended by a hair." This case is not comparable to a normal case of Me'ilah, because a Shali'ach differs from a person who accidentally spends his own money of Hekdesh. A Shali'ach has absolutely no way of knowing that the money is Hekdesh. In contrast, one who spends his own money of Hekdesh knew at one point (such as at the moment at which he consecrated the money) that the money was Hekdesh; he merely forgot that it was Hekdesh at the time that he spent it.

RASHI explains why the Shali'ach is liable when the Ba'al ha'Bayis remembered that the money is Hekdesh. Since the owner remembered that the money is Hekdesh, we assume beyond a doubt ("Anan Sahadei") that he does not want the person to be his Shali'ach anymore and he rescinds the Shelichus in his heart. Since the person is no longer his Shali'ach, the sender cannot be liable.

Why does Rashi give this reason for why the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt? A person is liable for Me'ilah only when he spends Hekdesh money accidentally. If he knows that the money is Hekdesh when he spends it, he is not liable to bring a Korban Me'ilah (although he transgresses a Torah prohibition). Accordingly, Rashi should have explained that the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt because he remembered that the money is Hekdesh. Since he remembered, he cannot be liable for Me'ilah because he spent the money knowingly (and not accidentally). In fact, Rashi himself gives this explanation in Kidushin (50a, DH Shali'ach Ma'al) and Me'ilah (21a, DH ha'Chenvani, DH u'Reminhu). Why does Rashi here give a different reason for why the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt and the Shali'ach is liable?

(a) The Acharonim explain that Rashi here gives a different explanation from the one he gives in Kidushin and Me'ilah because this explanation has an advantage over the other.

REBBI AKIVA EIGER (Pesachim 29a) and the KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN (348:4) point out that TOSFOS in Kidushin (42b, DH Amai) suggests that although the normal rule is "Ein Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" -- "a Shali'ach cannot be appointed to commit an Aveirah" (such that the Shali'ach's act of Aveirah is attributed to the sender and not to the Shali'ach), this rule applies only when the Shali'ach is aware that he is doing an Aveirah. If he does not know that he is doing an Aveirah, then "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" -- the Aveirah is attributed to the person who sent the Shali'ach.

Tosfos himself questions this approach. If the Shali'ach's act of Aveirah is attributed to the sender when the Shali'ach does not know that he is committing an Aveirah, why is a special verse necessary to teach that, in the laws of Me'ilah, "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah"? The very essence of the sin of Me'ilah is that it is done unknowingly, b'Shogeg; in every case of sending a Shali'ach to do an Aveirah (and not just Me'ilah), when the Shali'ach does the Aveirah unknowingly the sender is liable and not the Shali'ach! Why, then, is a special verse necessary to teach that the Shali'ach is not liable in the case of Me'ilah?

Tosfos answers that the verse indeed is not necessary for a case in which the Shali'ach does not know that the money is Hekdesh. Rather, the verse is necessary for a case in which the Shali'ach knows that the money is Hekdesh but the sender does not. The verse teaches that in such a case, the sender is liable for Me'ilah.

Rebbi Akiva Eiger and the Ketzos ha'Choshen point out that according to the approach of Tosfos, the reasoning of Rashi in Kidushin and Me'ilah cannot apply to the Gemara here. Rashi in Kidushin and Me'ilah writes that if the Ba'al ha'Bayis remembers that the money is Hekdesh and the Shali'ach does not, the Ba'al ha'Bayis cannot be liable for Me'ilah because his act of Me'ilah would be with his knowledge (b'Mezid) and not accidental (b'Shogeg). This explains why the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt.

Why, though, should the Shali'ach be liable? If the Shali'ach's act of Me'ilah can be attributed to the sender ("Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah") -- who is not liable for Me'ilah because his act is considered b'Mezid, then the Shali'ach should also not be liable because his Aveirah was done on behalf of, and is attributed to, the Ba'al ha'Bayis.

Rashi in Kidushin (DH Shali'ach Ma'al) explains that since the Ba'al ha'Bayis is not liable for Me'ilah, the verse that teaches "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" for Me'ilah does not apply in this case. The verse applies that principle to Me'ilah only when, as a result of the Shali'ach's transgression, the Ba'al ha'Bayis will be liable to bring a Korban Me'ilah. Here, the Ba'al ha'Bayis will not be liable for Me'ilah even if the Shelichus remains valid and the Aveirah is attributed to him. Since the application of "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" will not make the Ba'al ha'Bayis liable, the rule of "Ein Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" takes effect and the Shali'ach bears sole responsibility for the Aveirah.

This is true, however, only if the rule "Ein Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" applies in most cases in which a Shali'ach unknowingly does an Aveirah as part of his Shelichus, and the verse is needed to teach that "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" in the case of Me'ilah. According to Tosfos, however, no special verse is necessary to teach that "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" in the case of Me'ilah, because in every case of Shelichus the rule is "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" when the Shali'ach was unaware of the Aveirah. The Shali'ach in this case should be exempt because "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah." (The Aveirah is attributed to the Ba'al ha'Bayis, but since he remembered that the money is Hekdesh his Aveirah is considered b'Mezid, and thus he is not liable to bring a Korban Me'ilah.) It must be that the reason why the Shali'ach is liable is because of a different reason; it is not because the Aveirah of the Ba'al ha'Bayis is considered b'Mezid, but because the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus altogether (as Rashi here writes), and the Shali'ach was no longer acting on behalf of the Ba'al ha'Bayis.

In summary, the Ketzos ha'Choshen and Rebbi Akiva Eiger propose that the advantage of Rashi's explanation here is that it explains the Gemara even according to the opinion that "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" whenever the Shali'ach does not know about the Aveirah. Even that opinion agrees that in this case the Shali'ach is liable for Me'ilah because the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus. (In Kidushin and Me'ilah, Rashi apparently sides with the dissenting opinion which maintains that "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" does not apply when the Shali'ach is not aware of the Aveirah in cases other than Me'ilah. This is why Rashi there does not find it necessary to give the same explanation as he gives here.)

According to this explanation, the purpose of saying that the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus is to explain why the Shali'ach is liable. The Ba'al ha'Bayis would be exempt regardless of whether or not he annulled the Shelichus, because his act is considered b'Mezid. However, Rashi here clearly writes that the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt (and not that the Shali'ach is liable) because he annulled the Shelichus. Rashi's words imply that the purpose of saying that the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus is to explain why the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt, which contradicts this explanation.

(b) Perhaps Rashi's intention is as follows. Although the Ba'al ha'Bayis knows that the money is Hekdesh at the time the act of Me'ilah is committed, he still should be liable for Me'ilah if he does not annul the Shelichus because at the time that he appointed the Shali'ach he did not remember that the money was Hekdesh. Once he appoints the Shali'ach, the Shali'ach takes over for him in his place, and the act is no longer in the hands of the Ba'al ha'Bayis. When the act is done, it is considered as though the act is done according to the conditions that were present at the time of the appointment of the Shali'ach. (This is consistent with the words of the OR SAME'ACH in Hilchos Gerushin 2:15, who points out that this is the opinion of Rashi in the case of a husband who appointed a Shali'ach to give a Get to his wife, and then the husband died. Rashi implies that since the husband was alive and well at the time he appointed the Shali'ach, what happens to the husband afterwards is irrelevant. The Shali'ach's act would have been binding and the Get would have been valid upon delivery, if not for the fact that the husband's death already ended the marriage.)

For this reason, Rashi explains that the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus. Once the Shelichus is annulled, the Shali'ach no longer acts on behalf of the Ba'al ha'Bayis. (M. Kornfeld; see also SHI'UREI HA'GA'ON RAV SHMUEL ROZOVSKY to Kidushin 50a.)

Additional support for Rashi's explanation here may be inferred from the Gemara itself. The Gemara implies that the reason why the Ba'al ha'Bayis is exempt is because he annulled the Shelichus and not because he acted b'Mezid. The Gemara asks that the law that the Shali'ach is liable is not a law "suspended by a hair." Rather, it is has a logical basis and is no different from any other case of Me'ilah in which a person inadvertently spends money of Hekdesh.

If the Mishnah's case refers to when the Shelichus was not annulled and the Shali'ach was still acting on behalf of the Ba'al ha'Bayis, the Gemara would have no question. In such a case, the only reason why the Shali'ach would be liable is because the Ba'al ha'Bayis acted b'Mezid, and thus "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" would not apply (since it would not make the Ba'al ha'Bayis liable to bring a Korban, as he acted b'Mezid). The fact that the Shali'ach would be liable in such a case indeed is very different from a normal case of Me'ilah. Normally the rule of "Yesh Shali'ach l'Devar Aveirah" would exempt the Shali'ach. Consequently, to attribute the Aveirah to the Shali'ach and say that the Shali'ach is liable for Me'ilah merely because the Ba'al ha'Bayis is not liable is a novel law. It is indeed a law that can be described as "mountains suspended by a hair" because, as the Gemara says, "the Shali'ach is a poor, helpless person; what did he do?" -- that is, why should the Shali'ach be liable just because the Ba'al ha'Bayis cannot be liable? If the Ba'al ha'Bayis had not remembered that the money was Hekdesh, then the Shali'ach would have been exempt. Now that the Ba'al ha'Bayis remembers that the money is Hekdesh, why should that affect the Shali'ach? It is not a logical reason for why the Shali'ach is now liable. This novel law certainly qualifies as "mountains suspended by a hair" (as Rashi himself explicitly writes in Me'ilah 21a).

Why, then, does the Gemara (in the name of Rav Ashi) reject this logic and say that this case is the same as every other case of Me'ilah with Hekdesh? It must be that the Gemara understands that the reason why the Shali'ach is liable is not because the Ba'al ha'Bayis acted b'Mezid, but because the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus when he remembered that the money was Hekdesh. Since the Shali'ach is no longer a Shali'ach, he is like any other person who commits Me'ilah inadvertently, and thus the Gemara asks that this is not a case of "mountains suspended by a hair."

Why does Rashi in Kidushin and Me'ilah give a different explanation for why the Shali'ach is liable? This is a difficult point, but perhaps an answer may be suggested as follows.

Apparently, Rashi understands that Rava -- who suggests that this is the case of "mountains suspended by a hair" -- does not accept Rav Ashi's reasoning that the Shali'ach must be liable because the Ba'al ha'Bayis annulled the Shelichus. Rather, Rava understands that the reason the Shali'ach is liable is because the Ba'al ha'Bayis acted b'Mezid, and thus it is a Chidush that the Shali'ach is liable (as mentioned above).

(Perhaps the reason why Rashi understands that this is Rava's intention is that according to Rav Ashi's reasoning, if the Ba'al ha'Bayis explicitly states that he does not want to annul the Shelichus even after he remembers that the money is Hekdesh, the Shali'ach should not be liable. However, no Mishnah or Beraisa mentions any exception to the rule; the Mishnah implies that in all cases the Shali'ach is liable.) (M. Kornfeld)