Observation: When he said "I exempt you totally, even if he will not give to me", obviously he cannot return [to demand payment];

If not, regarding every pardon, he could ask whether or not it requires a Kinyan!

Observation: Also when he said "I exempt you totally if the moneychanger will pay me", obviously he can return [to demand payment], since the moneychanger does not want to pay him!

Explanation: Here, the case is, the worker said Stam that he will rely on the moneychanger;

He asks whether or not we say that he relied on him with intent that he will pay. Or, perhaps he exempts him even if [the moneychanger] will not give to him.

Question: Obviously, he does not totally exempt him, rather, only if he will give to him, for the moneychanger can retract even [if he accepted] b'Ma'amad Sheloshtan (in the presence of all three. If Reuven tells Shimon in front of Levi 'you have money of mine. Give it to Levi', Levi acquires it);

This is because the employer does not have in [the moneychanger's hand] a deposit or loan. Since [the moneychanger] can retract, presumably [the worker] does not totally exempt [the employer], for we do not discuss fools!

Answer: Really, we can say that he totally exempted him, and the moneychanger becomes obligated due to the law of an Arev (guarantor);

When he relies on the moneychanger, it is as if he said "rely on me, and totally exempt the employer."

Observation: We could have asked whether or not the moneychanger can retract, for these questions depend on each other.

Inference: Now it is proven that pardon does not require a Kinyan. You are forced to say that we discuss without a Kinyan, for a Kinyan applies only when he explicitly totally exempts him;

Even if he did not explicitly totally exempt him, since he was Makneh to him, surely it seems that he was Makneh to him in order to exempt him. If not, why was a Kinyan needed?!

When he explicitly exempts him, obviously he cannot return [to demand payment], like I explained. He did not ask about this!

Conclusion: Rather, surely we discuss without a Kinyan.

Disclaimer: We could say that here we discuss when he said to him explicitly "I exempt you if he will give to me, and if not, I will return to you [for payment];

They argue about when the moneychanger did not retract, if the worker can return to the employer [for payment].

Inference: Also according to this explanation, it is proven somewhat that pardon does not require a Kinyan, since Rav Sheshes said "he cannot return." This shows that he exempts him as long as the moneychanger wants to pay;

We discuss without a Kinyan, for with a Kinyan, even Rabah agrees.

Retraction: Or, we can say that this argument has no connection at all to pardon. All agree that the worker can return to the employer [for payment];

They argue only about Bal Talin when he immediately returns to the employer on the first day [for payment];

According to Rav Sheshes, he cannot return to him to make [the employer] liable for Bal Talin, since at one time he was uprooted from him, when he stood by the moneychanger. He does not return to the Isur Bal Talin;

Rabah holds that since he returns within the time, it is like initially.

Explanation: Rabah infers from our Mishnah, which teaches "if Hamchehu (he transferred responsibility for payment) to a moneychanger, he does not transgress for it";

Inference: Only as long as [the worker] relies on the moneychanger, but if he retracts, he returns to the Isur;

If he did not return to the Isur, it should have taught "he cannot transgress for it"!

Implied question: Why is this unlike what was taught "after the time, he does not transgress for it"? It did not teach "he cannot [transgress for it]"!

Answer: There, we cannot err.

Explanation (cont.): Rav Sheshes rejects this. [It means that] he is not relevant to transgressing for it, even if he will return [to demand payment from the employer].

Reference: The Yerushalmi in Shevuos, regarding a grocer on his ledger (both the grocer and workers) swear and collect from the employer, it says this is only when he did not stand the workers by the grocer;

However, if he stood them by [the grocer], the employer is not obligated to the workers at all!

The Rif explains that the Yerushalmi is according to Rav Sheshes, and it holds like him;

However, in any case we hold like Rabah, and we establish that they do not argue about Bal Talin, rather, whether or not the employer must pay the workers.

Support #1: It connotes like this in Kidushin (16a) that pardon does not require a Kinyan, regarding an Eved Ivri. It says "why does he need a document [of freedom]? Let [the master] say in front of two [witnesses] 'go!'"

Citation (16a - Rava): This teaches that a master bodily owns an Eved Ivri, and if a master pardoned the remaining value of his labor [that the slave must pay to redeem himself], it is not pardoned.

Inference: If he did not bodily own him, he could pardon.

Assertion: We discuss without a Kinyan, for with a Kinyan, a document would not be needed. Even an Eved Kena'ani acquires himself through Chalipin, like is proven in Gitin (39b)!

It says there that a man took his hat and threw it [to his Shifchah] and said "acquire this, and acquire yourself";

It says that this did not do anything, because it is the Kelim of the Makneh. However, if it were the Kelim of the Koneh, she would have acquired herself through Chalipin!

Support #2: In Kesuvos (104a) it says that [if a widow did not mention her Kesuvah] after 25 years, she lost her Kesuvah, because presumably she pardoned it;

This is even though she did not do any Kinyan, for through a Kinyan she immediately loses her Kesuvah!

Suggestion: We can bring a proof also from above (71b) "put on the ground and be exempt", and in Gitin (78b) "throw to me and be exempt"!

Rejection: We can say that there we discuss with a Kinyan.

Implied question: Bahag explained in Sanhedrin (6a) regarding "compromise requires a Kinyan" that both of them need a Kinyan - the one who pardons must be Makneh to pay him half!

Answer: Compromise is different, because it is like mistaken pardon. If he knew that he would merit in Din, he would not pardon! Therefore, it requires a Kinyan, which is stronger."

Support: Also for this reason, there is an opinion that requires three [judges for compromise], and two do not suffice, because it is like mistaken pardon;

All the more so, if we will not explain like Bahag, rather, they do the Kinyan before they hear [the compromise], we fulfill the opinion of those who say that without a Kinyan, they can retract when they hear the compromise. Then, it is not difficult at all.

Explanation: There is a way in which he transgresses, e.g. when there is no Shevach in the Kli, e.g. one who delivers letters, or he was hired to stomp [on a Kli].

However, Rav Sheshes properly holds that Uman Koneh bi'Shevach Kli, like is proven in Bava Kama (99a);

It says there "let us say that Rav Sheshes argues with R. Ami, who says that Uman Koneh bi'Shevach Kli!" Rav Ashi bar Chama said [to reject this] that Rav Sheshes discusses one who delivers letters;

Those who asked Rav Sheshes did not mention Uman Koneh bi'Shevach Kli in their question. Rather, they asked Stam whether or not a Kablan transgresses Bal Talin;

The Gemara said "Uman Koneh...", for according to the simple meaning, the question depends on this.

Support: This is why it says "let us say that this supports him", for the Gemara thought that one depends on the other, and Rav Sheshes, who answered that he transgresses, holds that Ein Uman Koneh.

Reference: In Shevuos (45b) it explains that this is only when he hired him in front of witnesses, but if he hired him not in front of witnesses, because he could say "I never hired you", he can say "I hired you, and I paid you your wage."

Question: Why is he believed through a Migo? The Gemara explains that the reason why a worker swears and collects is because the employer is distracted with his workers, and we consider him as if he said "I do not know";

Source: The Gemara asked "if so, we should give to [the worker] without a Shevu'ah!" (because it is as if the employer is unsure).

If so (we consider the employer to be unsure), how does Migo help? If one said "I do not know", no Migo will help, and he would be liable, for it is as if he said "you lent to me, and I do not know whether I paid you." He is liable, like the Mishnah in Bava Kama (118a)!

Strengthening of question: In Yevamos (114b) it connotes that Migo does not help in such a case, for it says that a woman is not believed to say "my husband died in war", because she says based on estimation (she saw him severely wounded, and assumes that he cannot live), and does not know clearly that he died;

A Migo does not help her, that if she wanted, she could have said "he died on his bed (normally, not in war)!

Implied question: In Gitin (36a) we say that they made a great enactment to specify people's names in Gitin (and we did not ask "this implies that there were small enactments")!

Also in Bava Kama (103b), [we say that] they made a great enactment [if one stole and swore to deny it], if the expense [of returning the theft to the owner] exceeds the principal (he leaves the money with Beis Din, and may bring his Asham), and we did not ask!

Answer: [We asked here,] because [Rav Yehudah] said "[great enactments] were taught here", this implies "and not elsewhere."

Implied question: Why is this in the plural? (He discusses only the enactment that a worker swears and collects!)

Answer: He refers to all those who swear and collect in Shevuos (44b) - a worker, a victim of theft, a victim of damage, one whose opponent is suspected to swear falsely, and a grocer on his ledger (he claims that he paid the workers, and the workers deny this).

Explanation: He calls them fixed enactments, because they uprooted the Shevu'ah from its place, and fixed it on his opponent, that he swears and collects. (Mid'Oraisa, always the defendant swears to avoid paying);

The Gemara did not need to explain the reason for all of them, only the reason for a worker.

Question: The first Tana discusses even Kofer ha'Kol (when he totally denies), since R. Yehudah argues with him and says that a worker swears only if he is Modeh b'Miktzas;

When he is Kofer ha'Kol, is the employer obligated a Shevu'ah mid'Oraisa?! Why does it say that Rabanan took the Shevu'ah from the Ba'al ha'Bayis, even when he is Kofer ha'Kol?

Answer: Regarding Modeh b'Miktzas it says that Rabanan took the Shevu'ah from the Ba'al ha'Bayis;

And even when he is Kofer ha'Kol, it is more appropriate to obligate the Ba'al ha'Bayis [to swear], for it is upon him to pay, for if he partially admits, he swears;

Because it was proper [for the Shevu'ah] to be on the Ba'al ha'Bayis, it says that they took it from her.

Explanation: He is considered like [one who says] "I do not know", even if he totally denies, like the Mishnah (Bava Kama 118a) "you lent to me, and I do not know whether I paid you";

He does not distinguish between whether he has many workers, or not.

Question: What was the question? Does he always forget?! Sometimes the employer says the truth. Therefore, they did not want to enact that [the worker] collects without a Shevu'ah;

Strengthening of question: If it is considered that he always forgets, why does R. Yehudah exempt Kofer ha'Kol?

Rather, surely it is a mere concern lest he forgot. Therefore, R. Yehudah exempts Kofer ha'Kol, for there is no Torah Shevu'ah on the employer;

We do not consider the employer like one who says "I do not know", for it is common that he knows well;

However, when he partially admits, they were concerned lest he forgot, because he is distracted with his workers, and he will swear falsely, because he thinks that he paid;

Similarly, according to Rabanan we should not establish him like one who Vadai forgot!

Answer: It seems to the Gemara that we establish him like one who Vadai forgot and says "I do not know", since he is liable for Kofer ha'Kol;

If it were a mere concern, why does the worker receive, even through a Shevu'ah, since we can say that the employer knows well that he paid? Rather, surely he is considered like one who says "I do not know."

We answer that [the Shevu'ah] is to appease the employer, for he thinks that he surely paid.

Distinction: However, when one said "you lent to me, and I do not know whether I paid you", [the lender] need not swear, since [the borrower] does not know whether he paid.

Explanation: We should enact that he pay only in front of witnesses. If he pays without witnesses, he caused his own loss, and we will not need to appease him [through a Shevu'ah];

As much as we can enact that he not need to swear without need, we should enact.

Support: We asked "we should enact that he pay him before [he works]!", i.e. we should enact that if [the worker] does not take his wage from the beginning, he loses, rather than enact a Shevu'ah without need.

Question: [When they argue about] the wage, this is like "I do not know whether you lent to me." He is exempt according to Rav Nachman and R. Yochanan, who say that if one said "you owe to me 100", and the other says "I do not know", he is exempt!

Answer: Here that he partially admits, we should obligate him, for this is like "I know about 50 (that I you), but I do not know about the other 50 [that you claim]."

Question: We should establish that the one [Dinar] that he agrees [that he contracted to pay], he already paid it, so now he totally denies!

Answer #1: He prefers to answer that people remember the wage. This answers also for Rav Huna and Rav Yehudah [who obligate when one said "you owe to me 100", and the other says "I do not know"].

Answer #2: Even according to Rav Nachman and R. Yochanan, he prefers to answer like this, in order to establish it in every case, even if he did not pay the one [Dinar] that he agrees to.

Answer #3: The simple meaning connotes that he did not pay, similar to R. Yehudah's case. (He says that a worker swears and collects only if he is Modeh b'Miktzas.)

Explanation: [The worker, who claims two,] ha'Motzi me'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah. If he cannot bring a proof, the employer swears, and the worker loses;

Without a Shevu'ah, [the employer] cannot be exempt, since he partially admits.

Support: It explicitly explains like this in Shevuos (46a).

Question: Here it teaches ha'Motzi me'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah, and in Bava Basra (45b) a Beraisa says that also regarding [an argument about] the wage, he swears and collects!

Answer: In Shevuos the Gemara asks this, and answers that the Beraisa in Bava Basra is R. Yehudah.

Implied question: Why can't we answer here that the reason why the worker cannot swear and collect is because we discuss when [the employer has a Migo, for] he hired him not in front of witnesses?

If there are witnesses, we should see what the witnesses say, how much he stipulated!

The Gemara asks like this in Bava Basra (45b) regarding the law of a craftsman (who claims that he bought or received a slave or Kli).

Answer #1: You are forced to say that we discuss when there are witnesses, similar to the Reisha, which teaches that a worker swears and collects in his time. Rav and Shmuel establish this when [the employer] hired him in front of witnesses, like we say there explicitly in Shevuos (45b);

Likewise the Seifa discusses when he hired him with witnesses and they did not hear the wages, or they heard and forgot.

Implied question: In Bava Basra, Rava asked Abaye, who said that if he did not see [his item with the craftsman], even if there are witnesses, a craftsman has a Chazakah, and if he saw, even if there are no witnesses, [a craftsman] has no Chazakah...

[Rava asked] from one who gave his Talis to a craftsman, and [the craftsman] says "you contracted to give two to me", and the owner says "I contracted to give to you only one", as long as the Talis is with the craftsman, the owner must bring a proof;

If there are witnesses, let us see what they say! Rather, there are no witnesses, and even though he saw it, the craftsman is believed. (Why can't we say that he gave it in front of witnesses, and they did not hear the wages, or they heard and forgot?)

Answer: There, we cannot say that there are witnesses, and they forgot or did not hear the wages, for if so, it is difficult even for him (Rava), since he holds that we discuss in every case, even if he saw;

If he discusses also when there are witnesses, why is the craftsman believed? When there are witnesses and he saw, all agree that he has no Chazakah, like our Mishnah teaches!

Rava, who said there "rather, there are no witnesses" says so only so it will not be difficult for him why he wanted to establish it even when he saw.

Implied question: Abaye answered "no, there are no witnesses, and he did not see it." He could have established it when there are witnesses, and he did not see it, e.g. they did not hear the wages!

Answer: Rather, because Rava established it when there are no witnesses, also he established it like this.

Answer #2: If [here] the owner were believed due to a Migo [e.g. he hired him not in front of witnesses], why does it discuss when they argue about the wage, and it abandoned saying that they argue about payment - this one says "I gave", and this one says "you did not give", like the Mishnah in Shevuos (44b)?

Answer #3: Even if we discuss when he hired him not in front of witnesses, he is not believed through a Migo, since he partially admits;

He could not be brazen and deny and say "I never hired you", like every Modeh b'Miktzas, who is not believed through a Migo, that if he wanted, he could have totally denied.

Answer #4 (Ri): Surely, when there are witnesses, normally they know and remember the wage, like it says in Bava Basra. The entire Beraisa discusses when there are no witnesses;

The Reisha, which says that he swears and collects, means that he brings a proof that he hired him, and then he swears and collects.