OPINIONS: Rebbi Yehudah exempts a blind person from all of the Mitzvos in the Torah. Does this imply that a blind person may do whatever he pleases and is considered like a Shoteh with regard to the Mitzvos?

(a) REBBI AKIVA EIGER and the TUREI EVEN (Megilah 24a, DH Eino) assert that a blind person is obligated to observe all Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh, even if he is exempt from all Mitzvos Aseh. They prove this from TOSFOS here (DH v'Chen, #2) and in Megilah, who states that a blind person is Chayav mid'Rabanan to observe the Mitzvos, and he therefore may recite blessings for the Mitzvos that he performs. (This is why Rav Yosef was not saddened that he could not recite blessings when he heard that his blindness exempted him from Mitzvos, because he could recite blessings even though he was blind.) They reason as follows. The Gemara in Shabbos (23a) explains that when one performs a Mitzvah d'Rabanan, he recites a blessing with the words, "Asher Kideshanu b'Mitzvosav v'Tzivanu," because of the Mitzvah d'Oraisa of "Lo Sasur," which obligates a person mid'Oraisa to follow the dictates of the Rabanan. If a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh, why should he be able to say "Asher Kideshanu b'Mitzvosav v'Tzivanu" for a Mitzvah d'Rabanan? The requirement to observe the Mitzvos d'Rabanan is based on the Lo Ta'aseh of "Lo Sasur"! It must be that a blind person is obligated to observe "Lo Sasur" and all Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh, and Rebbi Yehudah exempts a blind person only from Mitzvos Aseh.

This is also the opinion of the PRI MEGADIM (Introduction to OC 3:29), who cites additional proof from the fact that Rebbi Yehudah requires a verse to exempt a blind person from Misah and Galus when he kills another Jew. If a blind person would be excluded from the prohibition of killing, he obviously would be exempt from punishment! This is also the opinion of the SHE'EILAS YA'AVETZ (1:75), the CHIDA in MACHZIK BERACHAH (OC 53:5), and the MAHARATZ CHAYOS here.

Tosfos states that the Rabanan obligated a blind person to observe the Mitzvos so that he would not be like a Nochri. This reasoning implies that a blind person, mid'Oraisa, is exempt even from the Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh; otherwise, it could not be said that he would be like a Nochri. However, as the Pri Megadim writes, Tosfos may mean simply that a Jew needs to perform positive actions (Mitzvos Aseh) in order to define him as a Jew, since a lack of action (observing the Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh) does not give him a clear Jewish identity.

(b) The NODA B'YEHUDAH (OC 2:112) argues with the Pri Megadim and writes that according to Rebbi Yehudah, a blind person is exempt even from Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh. The MINCHAS CHINUCH (2:25) points out that this is the opinion of the RID in SEFER HA'MACHRIA (#78), and the ROSH in Kidushin (1:49, depending on the Girsa of the Rosh there). How will the Noda b'Yehudah, Rid, and Rosh refute the proofs of the Acharonim cited above?

Rebbi Akiva Eiger's proof from the fact that a blind person may say "v'Tzivanu" points to another, more basic question: If the blind person is not obligated to observe the Mitzvah of "Lo Sasur," what obligates him to listen to what the Rabanan decree in the first place? This question is similar to the question that the Acharonim ask on the RAMBAN in Sefer ha'Mitzvos (Shoresh Rishon). The Ramban (who disagrees with the Rambam there) writes that "Lo Sasur" does not imply a Mitzvah d'Oraisa to observe every Mitzvah d'Rabanan. According to the Ramban, what does obligate a person to listen to the Rabanan? The Acharonim (see KUNTRESEI SHI'URIM, Bava Metzia 12:6) pose similar questions in other cases: How can the Rabanan obligate a minor to observe the Mitzvos (according to TOSFOS to Berachos 48a, DH Ad; see RASHI there (DH Ad), and RAMBAN (Milchamos) to Berachos 20b), and how can the Rabanan obligate a Nochri to keep certain Mitzvos (see LECHEM MISHNEH, Hilchos Melachim 10:9)?

The KOVETZ SHI'URIM (Divrei Sofrim 1:15-18, and in Kovetz He'oros 16:18) answers that there is a principle that when it is clear what the will of Hash-m is, one is required to act on that will even if it is not written explicitly in the Torah. Since we know that the Rabanan are able to determine the will of Hash-m, we are required to accept what they decree based on what they understand to be the will of Hash-m, even if the Torah does not contain an explicit Mitzvah to follow their decrees. The same applies to a minor. Even though he is not obligated to keep the Mitzvos, he still must listen to the Rabanan since they are able to ascertain what is Hash-m's will. The same may be suggested with regard to a blind person. He is obligated to listen to the Rabanan even if he is not obligated to observe the Mitzvos of the Torah. This is why he may say "v'Tzivanu" in his blessing when he performs a Mitzvah d'Rabanan. (DEVAR YAKOV 87:7)

RAV SHLOMO ZALMAN AUERBACH zt'l (Minchas Shlomo 2:51:1) answers that the Lav of "Lo Sasur" applies to every living person of sound mind, since it is a general statement addressed to the inhabitants of the entire world. Therefore, it applies to a blind person, minor, and a Nochri, even if they are not obligated to observe any of the other Mitzvos of the Torah.

With regard to the Pri Megadim's proof from the verse that exempts a blind person who murders from a Chiyuv Misah and Galus, the MISHNAS CHACHAMIM (#2) and the MINCHAS CHINUCH (2:25) write that a blind Jew cannot be obligated in fewer Mitzvos than a Nochri. Therefore, a blind person is obligated to observe the prohibition of Retzichah even if he is exempt from Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh. (The IMREI HA'TZVI proves this from Lemech (Bereishis 4:23-24) who was held responsible for killing his son even though he was blind.)

(c) HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l (in Kuntresei Shi'urim) disagrees with the position of the Minchas Chinuch that a blind person is obligated at least in the Mitzvos of Bnei Noach. He points out that the RAMBAM in Perush ha'Mishnayos (Chulin, beginning of chapter seven) writes that the obligation of all Jews to perform Mitzvos is not due to what Hash-m told Noach or Avraham Avinu. Rather, the general obligation to perform the Mitzvos comes from Hash-m's command at Har Sinai to perform them. Hence, a blind Jew cannot be bound by the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach, whose obligation stems from Hash-m's commandments to Noach long before Har Sinai.

According to Rav Gustman's position, the Pri Megadim's proof remains difficult; why is a verse necessary to exempt a blind person from punishment for murder? Some suggest a simple answer to this question. In truth, the verse that exempts a blind person is not necessary. Once Rebbi Yehudah found a verse to exempt a blind person from all of the Mitzvos, he no longer needed to derive the exemption from this verse. It was only before Rebbi Yehudah concluded that a blind person is exempt from all Mitzvos that he needed this verse to exempt a blind person from Misah or Galus. This is similar to the position of TOSFOS here (DH v'Chen, as cited in Insights to 86b). (SHEYAREI KORBAN, Makos 2:5, DH b'Lo)

The MAHARSHAM (OC 53:14) has a different approach. He proves from the Yerushalmi that even though one verse exempts a blind person from Mitzvos, another verse is necessary to exempt him from Galus. He suggests that it is only after we know that a blind person is exempt from punishment that we can derive -- from the verse which compares Mitzvos to Mishpatim -- that a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos.

A third approach may be that a verse indeed is needed to exempt a blind person from Misah and Galus even if it is already known that he is exempt from Mitzvos. This is because it is possible for a person to incur a punishment for murder even when he is not obligated in the Mitzvos of the Torah. Rav Gustman zt'l quotes the SHITAH MEKUBETZES in the name of MAHARI KOHEN TZEDEK to support his opinion that a blind person is exempt from all of the Mitzvos. Mahari Kohen Tzedek quotes RABEINU TAM's comment on the principle that a person who observes the Mitzvos because he is commanded to observe them ("Metzuveh v'Oseh") is greater than one who observes the Mitzvos when he is not commanded to observe them ("Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh"). Rabeinu Tam states that this principle applies only with regard to Mitzvos that a person would have had to observe even had they not been written in the Torah (such as the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach). The Gemara says that Rav Yosef was saddened to find out that a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos because he would not receive the reward of a "Metzuveh v'Oseh." According to Rabeinu Tam, Rav Yosef was exempt even from the Mitzvos of Bnei Noach. (See Kuntresei Shi'urim there, and IGROS MOSHE YD 1:6, cited by the Yosef Da'as here, who discuss what Mahari Kohen Tzedek means.)

It seems that Mahari Kohen Tzedek quotes Rabeinu Tam's position in order to answer the question discussed by the Ge'onim in the Shitah Mekubetzes there, and by Tosfos in Kidushin (31a): Why is a person who observes Mitzvos that he is commanded to observe greater than one who observes Mitzvos voluntarily? Rav Yosef's original assumption -- that a person who observes Mitzvos voluntarily is greater -- seems more logical, since doing the Mitzvah even when one is not commanded is considered Midas Chasidus (see RASHBA). To answer this question, Mahari Kohen Tzedek cites the Gemara earlier (38a) which teaches that when the Nochrim failed to observe their seven Mitzvos, Hash-m repealed those Mitzvos so that even when a Nochri observes them he does not receive reward like one who is "Metzuveh v'Oseh" but only like one who is "Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh." The Gemara clearly says that although a Nochri must observe the seven Mitzvos nowadays, nevertheless his reward is like that of a person who is "Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh." How can that be? It must be that even had Hash-m not commanded Noach to observe these seven Mitzvos, Noach and his children would have had a moral obligation to observe them based on logical considerations. However, when one performs a Mitzvah for that reason, he receives less reward than one who was told by Hash-m to observe the Mitzvah, since the latter fulfills both the mandate of Hash-m and the moral obligation.

This is the intent of the Gemara here as well when it says that a person who is "Metzuveh v'Oseh" is greater. The Gemara refers only to Mitzvos which logic would have compelled one to observe (not merely as Midas Chasidus), even had the Torah not specifically commanded them. (Perhaps for the other Mitzvos, one who is not obligated would receive a greater reward.)

According to this approach, even according to the Kuntresei Shi'urim's position that the commandments which Hash-m gave to Noach or Avraham do not apply to Jews after the giving of the Torah, a blind person nevertheless would be bound to fulfill the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach out of a moral obligation. A moral obligation and a Mitzvah are equally binding. The only difference between a moral obligation and a Mitzvah is the amount of reward received. This logic may also be the source for the Rambam's ruling that we do not perform the Mitzvos because of what Hash-m told Noach and Avraham. The Rambam may have learned this from the Gemara (38a) which teaches that the Mitzvos of Bnei Noach no longer apply and their obligation is based solely on moral considerations.

The Gemara in Kidushin (31a) seems to contradict this approach. The Gemara there says that a "Metzuveh v'Oseh" is greater with regard to the Mitzvah of Kibud Av v'Em. However, a Ben Noach has no obligation of Kibud Av v'Em based on moral considerations. In fact, the Gemara in Nazir (61a) says clearly that a Nochri is not obligated to honor his father. Furthermore, the Gemara in Kidushin which discusses the righteous acts of Dama ben Nesinah states that if a Nochri who is not "Metzuveh v'Oseh" receives such reward for honoring his father, all the more so will a Jew receive great reward for performing the Mitzvah.

However, these two statements of the Gemara may be understood differently. It is obvious that a person would have been morally obligated to honor his parents had the Torah not specified that he must honor them, as the Rambam writes (Shemoneh Perakim, chapter six). This moral obligation should obligate a Nochri to observe the Mitzvah of Kibud Av v'Em. The Gemara in Nazir means only that a Nochri cannot be sure about the identity of his father, and therefore he cannot be obligated to honor his father. In the Gemara in Kidushin, Dama ben Nesinah honored his father nonetheless, because he assumed that the man who raised him was his father. Although the Gemara calls him "Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh," it refers merely to the aforementioned Gemara in Bava Kama (38a) which asserts that a Nochri is rewarded for observing his Mitzvos only like a person who is "Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh."

Further support for this approach is the Halachah that a Nochri who converts must respect his parents so that people not say that he performed more Mitzvos before his conversion (RAMBAM, Hilchos Melachim 5:11; see OR SAME'ACH there). This implies that a Nochri is obligated to respect his parents before he converts. (See also SEFER HA'ESHKOL, Hilchos Milah #39.)

Accordingly, when the Gemara here says that a blind person is "Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh," it means that he is obligated to observe the Mitzvos only because of moral considerations, and not because they are written in the Torah. (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: Rav Yosef initially thought that if a blind person is exempt from Mitzvos and nevertheless performs them, he receives a greater reward than one who is commanded to observe the Mitzvos. This assumption is based on the concept that if a person performs more Mitzvos than he is required to perform, he acts with "Midas Chasidus."

How is this concept reconciled with the Halachah of one who sits in a Sukah in the rain? A person is exempt from sitting in a Sukah when it is raining (OC 639:7), and one who sits in the Sukah when it is raining is called a "Hedyot," a fool. Similarly, the Yerushalmi (Shabbos 1:2) says that "one who is exempt from a Mitzvah and performs it nonetheless is called a 'Hedyot.'" (ME'IRI)

A similar discrepancy arises with regard to the Mitzvah of Sukah itself. Although a person is not obligated to drink water in a Sukah, it is considered a "Midas Chasidus" to do so (OC 639:2). This Halachah also seems to contradict the Yerushalmi that calls a person a "Hedyot" for performing a Mitzvah when he is not required to do so. (BIKUREI YAKOV, cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH end of OC 639. See Insights to Sukah 28:1.)

(a) The ME'IRI, cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes, answers that a person is considered a "Hedyot" only when the action that he does has no positive effect on his growth as a Jew. The act of eating in a Sukah with the discomfort caused by the rain cannot be said to cause any positive character development or convey a particular lesson in Avodas Hash-m. No one is obligated to eat in a Sukah when it is raining because nothing is gained from the act. In contrast, in the case of a blind person who is exempt from Mitzvos, there obviously are positive benefits that the blind person gains when he performs the Mitzvos. A blind person gains these benefits by performing the Mitzvos even though he is exempt from them.

Similarly, drinking water in the Sukah may be considered a positive act. As the BIKUREI YAKOV explains, the Torah does not go so far as to obligate a person to drink water in the Sukah. However, it is commendable to do so since it is a type of activity which one does in his home. Since it is a commendable act, it is considered a "Midas Chasidus." In contrast, one does not eat in a room in his home in which the rain enters, and thus eating in a Sukah as it rains is no act of "Midas Chasidus." Moreover, the Gemara considers rain during Sukos a Heavenly sign that Hash-m is not pleased with our performance of the Mitzvos. Therefore, it is understandable that one should not eat in a Sukah while it is raining, since the rain is a Heavenly sign that Hash-m does not want one to eat in the Sukah at the moment. (See also VILNA GA'ON, Mishnayos Berachos 1:3).

(b) A person is not called a "Hedyot" if he performs an act that has a "Shem Mitzvah." If the act itself is considered a Mitzvah but an exemption from that act is currently in effect, one is not called a Hedyot for performing it. When rain is falling in the Sukah, eating in the Sukah is not considered an act of a Mitzvah at all. Since a person normally does not live in a house into which rain enters, eating in the rain does not fit the description of the Mitzvah of Sukah, which is "k'Ein Taduru" (i.e. one must live in the Sukah in the manner in which he lives in his own home). On the contrary, by eating in the Sukah in the rain, one gives the appearance of adding to the Torah. However, when the act can be described as a Mitzvah, then even a person who is exempt from that Mitzvah may perform the Mitzvah as "Midas Chasidus." (This is similar to the first answer.) (RAMBAN, Kidushin 31a)

OPINIONS: The Gemara asks whether a father receives payments of Nezek that are paid to his daughter who is a Ketanah, a minor. Does the father receive these payments like all of the "Shevach Ne'urim" since the wound caused her value to decrease, or is Nezek different from Shevach Ne'urim which the father receives only because he may give her to a Mukeh Shechin in marriage (in return for payment), whereas he is not entitled to her Nezek payments since he does not have the right to wound his daughter?

Rav and Reish Lakish rule that the father does not receive his daughter's Nezek. Rebbi Yochanan rules that the father does receive his daughter's Nezek.

In general, the father receives Shevach Ne'urim not only from his daughter who is a Ketanah, but also from his daughter who is a Na'arah. According to Rebbi Yochanan, does the father of a Na'arah also receive the Nezek payments of his daughter? (PNEI YEHOSHUA; the SHITAH MEKUBETZES quotes this question in the name of RABEINU MOSHE of SARAKOSTA.)

(a) RASHI (beginning of 88a) writes that Rebbi Yochanan gives the Nezek to the father because it is within his right to sell her. This implies that he receives payments only for a Ketanah, whom he may sell as an Amah Ivriyah, but he cannot sell a Na'arah as an Amah Ivriyah. This is also inferred from the fact that the Gemara asks only what the Halachah is with regard to damages done to a Ketanah, and it does not mention a Na'arah.

(b) However, the PNEI YEHOSHUA points out that TOSFOS (87b, DH Amar Lei) explains that the Gemara discusses specifically the Nezek to the daughter's value when her father gives her over as a wife (which would apply to a Na'arah as well). The Gemara says that the father receives the Shevach Ne'urim since it is in his hands to give his daughter to a Mukeh Shechin. This applies both when she is a Ketanah and when she is a Na'arah. If the Gemara would refer only to a Ketanah, it would say simply that he receives the Shevach Ne'urim because he can sell her. (See RASHI, DH Shevach Ne'urim.)

This may also be the intent of Rashi later (88a). Rashi's statement that the father can sell his daughter may refer to his ability to give her over as a wife in exchange for money, rather than his ability to sell her as an Amah Ivriyah. (See Insights to Kesuvos 46:2.)

If, however, the Gemara's discussion applies to a Na'arah as well, why does the Gemara question only who receives the Nezek of a Ketanah? The CHIDUSHEI RABEINU MEIR SIMCHAH suggests that perhaps there are two payments for wounding a man's daughter: one for her depreciation as an Amah Ivriyah (which is given only to the father of a Ketanah), and one for her depreciation as a wife (which is given to the father of a Na'arah as well). The Gemara refers to the former payment, and that is why it mentions only a Ketanah.

Alternatively, the Gemara indeed may be referring to both a Ketanah and a Na'arah. However, the Gemara addresses the specific case of a Ketanah in order to emphasize that according to Rav, not only does the father of a Na'arah not receive payments for damages done to his daughter, but even the father of a Ketanah does not receive the payments (since he is not permitted to hit her). Since Rav's ruling is less intuitive with regard to a Ketanah, the Gemara chooses to discuss a Ketanah in order to teach this ruling.