Version #1: According to the version in Kesuvos (94a) that Rav holds like R. Meir, who say that Edei Chasimah Karsei (the witnesses who sign a document empower it), and therefore they divide....

Even if there are Edei Mesirah (witnesses who saw the document given, and they testify) that one of them received his document earlier, since from the signatures it is not evident who is first, [therefore they divide].

Proof: This is clear from Gitin 24b. A Mishnah says that if one wrote a Get to divorce his older wife, he may not use it to divorce his younger wife [who has the same name];

The Gemara infers that he may use it to divorce his older wife. We establish it to be with Edei Mesirah, and it is like R. Elazar [who says that Edei Mesirah Karsei]

However, according to R. Meir, he cannot divorce [with it], even if there are Edei Mesirah, since it is not evident from the signatures [whom he divorces].

We discuss a gift or sale acquired through a document. However, if he acquires through money, Chazakah or Chalipin, and the document is a mere proof, Rav agrees that we apply Shuda;

[Then], it need not be recognized amidst the Edei Chasimah, since [the document] is only a proof.

Explanation: According to that version, we do not ask here [against] Rav Nachman, who said Kol d'Alim Gavar, from Rav. There, it is proper to say that it is of both of them, since they were signed on one day. Rather, we ask from Shmuel [who said Shuda].

Observation: According to R. Tam, who says that Shuda is whatever the judge wants to do, this is fine. Also here, when one says "it was of my fathers", Shuda of judges applies.

Question: However, according to the Rashbam, that Shuda is to the one that it seems to the judge that [the owner] loved more, this is difficult. When this says "it was of my fathers" [and also the other says so], Shuda does not apply!

Answer: With difficulty, we can say that the judges give to the one who seems to be more truthful.

Version #2: Also, according to the version in Kesuvos (94a) that establishes the argument of Rav and Shmuel according to R. Elazar, and Rav holds that division is better, this is fine that we ask even from Rav.

Also, that version is primary, like is clear there from the Beraisa.

Explanation: This is like R. Elazar, who says that Edei Mesirah Karsei. According to R. Meir, he would not say Shuda [since both acquired it equally].

Assertion: It says in Kesuvos (94a) that if one wrote to one person, and gave [a document also] to another, the [first] one to whom he did Mesirah (handed over the document) acquired, even though the other document was written first;

It seems that this is only if they were written on one day. Therefore, the first Mesirah acquired, since it is not evident from the other document that it was [written] first;

However, if they were written on different days, the one to whom it was written first acquired, since it is evident from the signature that it was [written] first. Even though he did Mesirah to the other first, he (the former) acquired;

Later, when he was Moser also to this one, he acquired from the time it was signed.

Source: Abaye taught in Bava Metzi'a (13a) that witnesses, through (at the time of) their signatures, acquire for him (the one who will receive the document, on condition that he receives it later).

Support #1: This resolves Shmuel, who holds here like R. Elazar, and in Bava Metzi'a the Gemara takes pains to establish Shmuel like Abaye.

Support #2: In Sanhedrin (28b), regarding the gift [document] on which two Gisim (husbands of two sisters) signed, it connotes that Abaye holds like R. Elazar;

[Abaye] asked against Rav Yosef, who said "go acquire (the document should be given over) with Edei Mesirah, like R. Elazar." Abaye asked that R. Elazar agrees about a document that is an inherent forgery (the signatures are invalid), that it is Pasul;

It is difficult to say that [Abaye] says according to Rav Yosef (it is Pasul), but he (Abaye) disagrees.

Explanation #1 (R. Tam): The judge gives to whom he wants.

Explanation #2 (Rashbam): They assess the giver's intent.

Rebuttal #1: In Gitin (14b), regarding "bring this money to Ploni" [and Ploni died, and the giver died, one opinion says that] the Shali'ach does what he wants, and there this is called Shuda.

Rebuttal #2: In Kidushin (74a), it says that a judge is believed to say "I vindicated this one, and obligated this one." When is this? It is when the litigants stand in front of him. If they are not standing in front of him, he is not believed.

We ask "let him return and judge them again!", and answer that he ruled based on Shuda.

According to the Rashbam, still he could return and assess the giver's intent!

Support (for Explanation #1 - Citation - Yerushalmi): To whomever Beis Din wants to decide [in his favor], they decide.

Question: If so, he will give to whomever will pay wages to him!

Answer: Any judge who takes wages is not a judge.

Explanation (R. Chananel): We have a tradition that we say Shuda only regarding land.

Rebuttal (Ri): Regarding "bring this money to Ploni", regarding [Shuda of] the Shali'ach, we bring this in Gitin (14b).

Explanation (R. Chananel): Only an expert judge may do Shuda, for Rav Sheshes was a great Chacham, and Rav Nachman said to him "you are not a judge [to rule through Shuda]" regarding [the gift of] the mother of Rami bar Chama and Rav Ukva bar Chama, in Kesuvos (94b).

Note: Hagahos Be'eros ha'Mayim puts this second law of R. Chananel before the Ri's rebuttal, for the episode of the Shali'ach refutes both laws. I disagree. Several Rishonim, including Tosfos Kesuvos 94a DH Imei, cite R. Chananel's two laws, and refute [only] the first from that episode. The Rosh defends R. Chananel. R. Chananel discussed Shuda of judges. Shuda of a Shali'ach is different.

Suggestion: We can prove from here that the Halachah follows Sumchus, since we ask from his opinion!

Rejection: [Chachamim] argue with him only regarding following Chezkas Mamon, and establishing it in the Chazakah of its original owner. If not for this, they agree that we divide.

Suggestion: Below (63a), regarding one who says "give a portion to Ploni from my property", we bring Sumchus' opinion;

The Rashbam explained that [he receives a quarter] because he is unsure whether "portion" is Mashehu, or half. When there is a Safek about money, we divide. This connotes that the Halachah follows Sumchus!

Rejection: The reason is not due to Safek, like the Rashbam explained. Rather, it is because "portion" is a quarter.

Pesak: The Halachah does not follow Sumchus, even though in several places the Stam Tana is like him.

Source #1: Shmuel holds like Rabanan, like we say in Bava Kama (46a), that Shmuel said "this is Sumchus' opinion, but Chachamim say, [ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah] is a great general rule in monetary laws."

Inference: [Shmuel said] "this [is Sumchus' opinion]", but [Shmuel] does not hold like him.

Implied question: It is proven below (105a) that sometimes [an Amora says] "this [is the opinion of Ploni]", and he holds like him!

Answer: Stam (if there is no indication otherwise, when an Amora says) "this [is the opinion of Ploni]", he does not hold like him!

Source #2: Also, we say there (Bava Kama 46a) "alternatively, this is a great general rule in monetary laws" applies to one who sold an ox to his friend, and it was found to be a gorer...

Inference: "This is a great general rule" applies even to one who sold an ox to his friend, we say ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah, and all the more so in the argument of Sumchus and Rabanan Shmuel holds that ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah.

Source #3: In Bava Metzi'a (102b), it says that Shmuel was unsure if we follow the first words [that a person said] or his last words;

Our Mishnah (102b) discusses one who rented a bathhouse in Tzipori for 12 gold coins for the year, a gold Dinar per month (and it became a leap year);

The case came in front of R. Shimon ben Gamliel and R. Yosi, and they said that they divide the added month.

Shmuel establishes this when he came in the middle of the month, but if he came at the beginning of the month, the owner gets all of it (if the renter wants to use it, he must pay for the entire month). If he came at the end of the month, the renter gets all of it

Inference: He holds like Rabanan, who follow Chazakah. According to Sumchus, in every case they divide!

Source #4: Also Rav Nachman holds like Rabanan. He said there that land is in the Chazakah of its owner, even if he came at the end of the month, the owner gets all of it, and even if he reversed [the order of which he said first];

You are forced to say that this is because he holds like Rabanan. He establishes our Mishnah there like Sumchus, so we cannot challenge him from our Mishnah. We hold like Rav Nachman in monetary laws.

Source #5: We explicitly rule like him in Bava Metzi'a (110a) regarding the document on which was written [that the lender was entitled to eat the Peros of the land] Stam "years";

Implied question: We hold like R. Shimon ben Gamliel [whenever he appears] in our Mishnah [with only three exceptions, and this is not one of them. Regarding the bathhouse rented for 12 Dinarim, he holds like Sumchus!]

Answer: That refers to Stam. Here that Rav Nachman disagrees, we do not [hold like R. Shimon ben Gamliel].

Explanation: Even without their claims, Beis Din has a Safek to whom the child belongs, whether it was born before he sold or after he sold;

Similarly, when an ox gored a [pregnant] cow and its fetus was found at its side, [even] without their claims, Beis Din has a Safek about the episode, whether it gave birth before the goring or after the goring.

Similarly, if an ox was chasing an ox, and [the latter] was damaged, we are unsure whether it was damaged through the [chasing] ox, or if it was hurt on a rock.

Similarly, in every place that Rabanan and Sumchus argue [even without their claims, Beis Din has a Safek].

However, here that one says "it was my fathers'" [and the other claims similarly], the Safek comes due to their claims. We say Kol d'Alim Gavar.

Explanation: Even if they (the two who initially claimed it) wrote a Harsha'ah (power of attorney) to each other [we do not take it from the third party]. Since they are Resha'im, we do not deal with their claim. (Kovetz Shi'urim asks that only one of them is a Rasha. Ketzos ha'Choshen (49:8) explains that when even one of them is a Rasha, Chachamim did not enact Harsha'ah.)

Explanation #1: [Therefore] we do not take it from him. We discuss when this one says "it was my fathers'", and not when one stole from [one of] five people. In the latter case, why wouldn't we take it from him?!

Rav Ashi argues with Neharde'ei, and holds that R. Chiya does not come to be lenient, rather, to be stringent;

[He teaches that] one Hashavah (return) does not suffice, just like [it does not suffice] for other Gazlanim, until he pays to everyone, like R. Akiva in Bava Kama (103b). He discusses one who stole from [one of] five people.

Explanation #2 (Rashbam): He discusses a grocer who sold with an improper measure. He does not know from whom he stole. Therefore, he cannot return it.

Implied question: He can do communal needs, like we say in Beitzah (29a)!

Answer: This is not a proper Hashavah.

Question: We should believe him through a Migo, that if he wanted, he could have said that he rented the land to him for Peros!

Answer #1: This is a Migo against witnesses, for Anan Sahadei that since he helped load Peros on the Machazik, he admits that the Peros are his (of the Machazik. Nesivos ha'Mishpat - this is when witnesses saw him load. Rav Zevid said that the original owner is believed when there are no witnesses who saw this.)

Answer #2: [The original owner] does not want to claim that he rented the land to him for Peros, for he wants the land and the Peros.

Suggestion: Rav Ashi holds that he is always believed to say "I rented the land to you for Peros."

Rejection #1: If so, it is difficult for Rav Ashi, why do Rabanan require three years from day to day?!

[Rav Ashi] cannot say like Rava said above (29a) that until three years, one is careful with his document, but not after three years, for he must always be careful, lest [the seller] say "I rented the land to you for Peros"!

Rejection #2: If so, how can he say 'if you will not say so, that he should have protested, rather, you will say that he did not need to protest, for his Chazakah is not a Chazakah, since [the original owner] can say "I rented the land to him for Peros"', and he brings a proof from Mashkanta of Sura? (Land is given for collateral. The lender deducts a fixed amount from the loan for eating the Peros. After some years, this pays the entire loan, and the land reverts to Ploni (the borrower) for free.)

What is the proof? Just the contrary, according to Rav Ashi there is no loss, for he can say "I rented the land to you for Peros"!

Explanation (Rashba): Rav Ashi does not come to teach that he is believed after three years if he says "I rented the land to you for Peros";

Rather, he asks how we can fix this from the beginning, so he cannot say after three years "it is mine" when he rented it to him for Peros!

He holds that a protest helps only when he says "Ploni is a robber. He eats [the Peros of] my field through theft", and when he rented the land to him for Peros, he cannot protest like this. Also Rashi explained like this.

Support: Now, it is a proper proof from Mashkanta of Sura, that protest helps in such a case.