The amended statement of the Bnei Eretz Yisrael 'Ben she'Machar be'Nichsei Aviv be'Chayei Aviv, u'Meis, B'no Motzi mi'Yad ha'Lekuchos' ends - 've'Zu Hi she'Kashah be'Dinei Mamonos' (and this is what is difficult in Dinei Mamonos).

We refute the suggestion that this is because the Lekuchos can say to him 'Your father sells, and you take back' - because he can reply that he is claiming in his capacity as the heir of his grandfather, and not of his father.

We know that a grandson inherits from his grandfather - from the Pasuk in Tehilim "Tachas Avosecha Yih'yu Banecha".

So we assume that the statement must have been 'Ben B'chor she'Machar Cheilek Bechorah be'Chayei Aviv u'Meis, B'no Motzi mi'Yad ha'Lekuchos', which matches the concluding phrase better than the previous suggestion - since the Cheilek Bechorah is certainly Ra'uy, and we would think that, seeing as the B'chor died in his father's lifetime, his son cannot claim it from the purchaser.

And it is on this statement that they concluded 've'Zu Hi she'Kashah be'Dinei Mamonos' ('Avuha Mazbin, Ihu Mapik!'). We initially think that we cannot answer like we did earlier (because he is claiming in his capacity as the heir of his grandfather, and not of his father) - since what right does he then have to claim the Cheilek Bechorah, when he is not the B'chor?

We refute this question however on the basis of what we learned in 'Yesh Nochlin', that - the B'chor's children inherit his Cheilek Bechorah from their grandfather, even though their father is no longer alive (like we saw with the daughters of Tzelofchad).

We therefore suggest that the Kashya on Dinei Mamonos refers do the following case 'Hayah Yode'a lo Eidus ad she'Lo Na'aseh Gazlan ve'Na'aseh Gazlan, Hu Eino Me'id al K'sav Yado, Aval Acherim Me'idin'. Even though a witness is normally believed to substantiate his signature on a Sh'tar, we learn that he is not believed where he is suspect - from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Al Tashes Yadcha Im Rasha Lih'yos Eid Chamas".

And we are afraid that - he may have forged the signature on the Sh'tar, or even written the Sh'tar after he became a Gazlan.

This ruling is initially considered to be incomprehensible - because, if we are afraid that perhaps the Gazlan forged the signature on the Sh'tar, what will it help if others recognize his signature?

We refute this Kashya too however - by establishing the case where Beis-Din had already substantiated the Sh'tar before he became a Gazlan (see Hagahos Ashri), in which case there is nothing to worry about (see Tosfos DH 'Kegon').

So we try to establish the case - where the witness became, not a Gazlan, but a son-in-law, where we disqualify him from substantiating his signature, but not others.

We decline to answer like we did in the previous case however (that his signature had already been substantiated in Beis-Din) due to a statement by Rav Yosef bar Minyomi Amar Rav Nachman, who establishes the case - even where Beis-Din had not substantiated the Sh'tar.

And we refute the Kashya 'that if he is not believed (to testify on his signature), how can we believe others' - based on the fact that relatives are not believed due to a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, and not because they are suspected of lying ...

... otherwise, why are Moshe and Aharon (who are certainly not suspected of lying) not believed to testify on their relatives?

So we finally revert to the original text of the statement of the Bnei Eretz Yisrael ('Ben she'Machar be'Nichsei Aviv u'Meis, Beno Motzi mi'Yad ha'Lekuchos'). The problem with that is this - if his father sold the property, how can he claim it from the Lekuchos (as we explained above).

To refute the Kashya that a grandson can inherits his grandfather directly we establish the Pasuk "Tachas Avosecha Yih'yu Banecha" - in the form of a blessing, a prediction that Tzadikim will have children and grandchildren to inherit them (rather than a Halachah).

We query this from our Mishnah however, which discussed the case of 'Nafal ha'Bayis alav ve'Al Aviv, alav ve'Al Morishav ... . Yorshei ha'Av Omrim ... ', due to the assumption that if 'Yorshei ha'Av' refers to his (the son's) sons - 'Morishav' must refer to his brothers ...

... a Kashya on what we just concluded - since it proves that a grandson does inherit directly from his grandfather (in which case "Tachas Avosecha Yih'yu Banecha" is a Halachah, and not a B'rachah [because otherwise, even if the son died first, there would be no reason for his creditors not to claim the property from his sons[).

We reject this Kashya however, by explaining 'Yorshei ha'Av' to mean his (the son's) brothers, in which case, 'Morishav' means his father's brothers.

They asked Rav Sheishes - whether a son inherits his mother in the grave, to pass on her property to his paternal brothers.

Rav Sheishes resolved the She'eilah from a Beraisa, which states that if a father was taken captive and his son died in his hometown or vice-versa - 'Yorshei ha'Av ve'Yorshei ha'Ben Yachloku'.

The problem with this Beraisa the way it stands is that - if neither the father nor the son had children, then the father's heirs inherit the property, whereas if the son had children, then they will inherit both the father and the son.

We therefore amend the Beraisa to read - 'Av she'Nashvah u'Meis ben Bito bi'Medinah; u'Ben she'Nashvah, u'Meis Avi Imo bi'Medinah', Yorshei ha'Av ve'Yorshei he'Ben Yachloku'.

The Safek is - whether the father (of the deceased daughter) died first or her son.

If the father died first, then - the son's heirs (his paternal brothers) will inherit the property; whereas if the son died first, then - the father's heirs (his brothers) will inherit it.

The basis of the Beraisa's ruling is - the principle 'Mamon ha'Mutal be'Safek, Cholkin'.

Rav Sheishes now proves from there that - a son does not inherit his mother to pass on his grandfather's property to his paternal brothers, because if he did, then, either way, it would be they who would inherit the property, and there is no reason as to why the father's brothers should receive half.

Rav Acha bar Minyomi substantiates Rav Sheishes ruling from our Mishnah 'Nafal ha'Bayis alav v'Al Imo, Eilu ve'Eilu Modim she'Yachloku' in exactly the same way - because if a son would inherit his mother in the grave to pass on the property to his paternal brothers, then, even if the son died first, his paternal heirs ought to inherit all the property, and should not have to share it with their grandmothers heirs.

The source for this ruling is the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Seivah" "Seivah" (which is synonymous with "Hasavah" "Hasavah") from a husband who inherits his wife, but not in the grave.

This 'Gezeirah-Shavah' is strange however - in that 'in the grave' has different connotations in the two cases. It means that a husband does not inherit property that falls to his wife when she is already in the grave, but that a son does not inherit his deceased mother's property when he is in the grave.

Reuven, who had sold Shimon all the fields that he had purchased from Bei bar Sisin, refused to give Shimon one particular field, even though it was also called 'de'bei bar Sisin' because - although it was called 'de'bei bar Sisin', that was not because he had purchased it from bei bar Sisin.

Rav Nachman placed that field in the possession of Shimon. Rava disagreed with Rav Nachman however, on the basis of the principle - 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero alav ha'Re'ayah', in which case, the field ought to remain with the original owner.

Both Rava and Rav Nachman appear to have switched their opinions from another case where Reuven claimed that he had purchased a house from Shimon and had lived there for three years; whereas Shimon claimed - that he had been living in the outer-section of the house all the time.

Rav Nachman placed the disputed property in the domain of the original owner whereas Rava placed it in the domain of the purchaser ...

... whereas in the current case, they reverse their rulings).

We resolve the apparent discrepancy ...

... in Rava, by drawing a distinction between the first case - where it was the purchaser who currently owned the property, whereas in the second case - the property was still under the jurisdiction of the original owner.

... in Rav Nachman, by going after the purchaser in the case of bei bar Sisin - since the field is called 'bei bar Sisin', just as the seller specified, but after the seller in the first case - because the Chazakah is not better than the Sh'tar that he ought to have produced, and which he would have had to substantiate, had the seller demanded it (there too, Shimon had to substantiate his claim, seeing as Reuven queried it).

In spite of having learned this Sugya in Chezkas ha'Batim, it is repeated here - because it is similar to our current Mishnayos, which discuss cases of 'Nechasim be'Chezkasan.