1)
When Rava Amar Rav Nachman says 'Shechiv-M'ra sha'Amar Halva'asi li'Peloni, Halva'aso li'Peloni', what kind of loan is he referring to?
What is the problem with this statement, coming from Rava Amar Rav Nachman?
1)
When Rava Amar Rav Nachman says 'Shechiv-M'ra sha'Amar Halva'asi li'Peloni, Halva'aso li'Peloni', he is referring to - a Milveh-al-Peh (an oral loan).
The problem with this statement, coming from Rava Amar Rav Nachman is that - he himself just concluded that whatever does not acquire by a Bari, does not acquire by a Shechiv-M'ra either, and 'Halva'asi li'Peloni' does not acquire by a Bari.
2)
Rav Papa answers 'Ho'il ve'Yoresh Yorshah'. What does he mean by that?
Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ika disagrees. To answer the Kashya, he cites Rav Huna Amar Rav. What does Rav Huna Amar Rav say about 'Manah li be'Yadcha, Teneihu li'Peloni'?
How does this answer the Kashya?
Which other exception to the above rule stems from the Din of 'Halva'asi li'Peloni'?
2)
Rav Papa answers 'Ho'il ve'Yoresh Yorshah, by which he means that - seeing as the heirs of a Shechiv-M'ra inherit his oral loans, Chazal incorporated them in the concession, too.
Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ika disagrees. To answer the Kashya, he cites Rav Huna Amar Rav, who says that - 'Manah li be'Yadcha, Teneihu li'Peloni' acquires without a Kinyan, provided all three parties are present, as we learned earlier.
And since there is a Heter to transfer a loan by a Matnas Bari, they permitted it by a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra even when the recipient is not present.
This concession also enables the Shechiv-M'ra to give away coins, which cannot otherwise be transferred even with a Kinyan Chalipin.
3)
We ask what the Din will be if someone gives a date-palm to Reuven and the fruit to Shimon. Why can this She'eilah not pertain to a Matnas Bari?
Assuming then, that the She'eilah concerns a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra, why do we ask it specifically here?
The She'eilah is based on the difference between a total Matnas Shechiv-M'ra and a partial one. Besides the fact that the latter requires a Kinyan, what is the difference between the two?
What then, is the She'eilah?
3)
We ask what the Din will be if someone gives a date-palm to Reuven and the fruit to Shimon. This She'eilah cannot pertain to a Matnas Bari - because then it would belong in Perek ha'Mocher es ha'Sefinah, and not here.
Assuming then, that the She'eilah concerns a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra, we ask it specifically here - because it refers to our Mishnah 'Shiyer Karka Kol she'Hu, Matanaso Matanah'.
The She'eilah is based on the difference between a total Matnas Shechiv-M'ra and a partial one. Besides the fact that the latter requires a Kinyan, the difference between the two is - whether, in the event that the Shechiv-M'ra recovers, he can retract (a total Matnas Shechiv-M'ra), or not (a partial one).
The She'eilah then is - whether, when the Shechiv-M'ra gives Reuven the tree, he means to retain the branches for himself, in which case the initial gift is a partial Matnas Shechiv-M'ra, from the which he will not be able to retract, or whether he gives him the entire tree, branches and all, in which case, it is a total one, from which he will.
4)
What do we then ask, assuming that the previous case is not considered a Shiyur and that the gift of the palm-tree is effective?
Why might this case be different than the previous one?
On what grounds do we refute the above text of the second She'eilah?
So what is the alternative text of the second She'eilah (see Maharam)?
What is then the She'eilah?
4)
Assuming that the previous case is not considered a Shiyur and that the gift of the palm-tree is effective, we ask what the Din will be if the Shechiv-M'ra simply precluded the fruit from the sale. Maybe that will be considered a Shiyur ...
... because when it comes to oneself, one tends to be more generous (as we learned in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis'), in which case, the Shechiv-M'ra may well retain the branches for the fruit.
We refute the above text of the second She'eilah - because it does not conform to the Gemara's alternative version (which follows), which refers to a 'Yitur Lashon' (an excessive Lashon), as we shall now see).
The alternative text of the second She'eilah is - 'Chutz mi'Peirosav', which is superfluous (seeing as he only gave Reuven the tree to begin with, and not the fruit).
Perhaps, we therefore suggest, he means to retain the branches as well, even if, in the first She'eilah, he gave Shimon the fruit together with the branches.
148b----------------------------------------148b
5)
Rebbi Aba told Rav Ashi that he had learned the above distinction in connection with a statement of Resh Lakish (in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis'). What did Resh Lakish say there about someone who sells a house on condition that the Diyuta ha'Elyonah (the attic) still belongs to him?
What She'eilah did they ask there about a Bari who sells a house or a room (in a Chatzer) to Reuven and the Diyuta to Shimon?
What did they then ask, assuming that, in the previous She'eilah, it is not considered a Shiyur?
5)
Rebbi Aba told Rav Ashi that he had learned the above distinction in connection with a statement of Resh Lakish, who said (in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis') that if someone sells a house on condition that the Diyuta ha'Elyonah (the attic) still belongs to him - the Diyuta still belongs to him.
And they asked there whether, if a Bari sells a house or a room (in a Chatzer) to Reuven and the Diyuta to Shimon - whether he leaves Reuven a space in the Chatzer to allow him to affix ledges to the Diyuta that protrudes into the Chatzer or not.
Assuming that, in the previous She'eilah, it is not considered a Shiyur they asked - what the Din will be if the owner said 'Chutz mi'Diyuta ... , whether there, he will retain the right to affix a ledge to the Diyuta that protrudes into the Chatzer or not.
6)
Rava Amar Rav Nachman resolved the She'eilah by quoting Rav Z'vid. What did Rav Z'vid rule in such a case?
What makes this case different than the previous one?
6)
Rava Amar Rav Nachman resolved the She'eilah by quoting Rav Z'vid, who ruled in such a case that - the owner's stipulation allows him to affix ledges to the Diyuta that protrude into the Chatzer.
What makes this case different than the previous one is the fact that - even if he had not stipulated that the Diyuta belonged to him, it would have belonged to him anyway. Consequently, the stipulation is superfluous, and permits him to retain additional rights in the actual Chatzer.
7)
What does Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman say about a Shechiv-M'ra who distributes all his property to a number of people?
How will the Din differ in a case where he changed his mind? What does this mean?
How do we know that he changed his mind and was not just working out to whom to give his estate?
7)
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman states that if a Shechiv-M'ra distributes all his property to a number of people - it has the Din of a regular Matnas Shechiv-M'ra, which acquires after death, but allows him to retract as long as he is alive.
If however, he changed his mind - (meaning that he initially meant to give away only part of his estate to the first beneficiary, and then changed his mind and decided to give away more to the second beneficiary, and then to the third, and so on, then the Din is the same in the event that he dies, but only allows him to retract from the last one should he survive.
We know that he changed his mind and was not just working out to whom to give his estate - because people tend to make their list first before beginning to distribute.
8)
On what grounds does Rav Yosef bar Minyomi Amar Rav Nachman rule that a Shechiv-M'ra who distributes all his property (field by field) and then recovers, cannot retract?
How do we then establish our Mishnah, which states 'Lo Shiyer Karka Kol she'Hu, Ein Matanaso Kayemes'?
What second answer does Mar bar Rav Ashi give to explain our Mishnah?
8)
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman rules that a Shechiv-M'ra who distributes all his property (field by field) and then recovers, cannot retract - because we suspect that he may own more property in another country (in which case, it is a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra be'Miktzas, from which one cannot retract).
We therefore establish our Mishnah, which states 'Lo Shiyer Karka Kol she'Hu, Ein Matanaso Kayemes' - where he specifically stated that he is giving 'all his property' to so-and-so (incorporating all his property wherever it is).
Mar bar Rav Ashi answers that - the Tana is speaking specifically when we know for sure that he does not own any more property, other than what he is specifically giving away.
9)
We ask whether 'Chazarah be'Miktzas Havya Chazarah' or not. Practically speaking, what does 'Chazarah be'Miktzas Havya Chazarah' mean?
We try to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa 'Kulan le'Rishon, u'Miktzasan le'Sheini, Sheini Kanah, Rishon Lo Kanah'. How do we initially establish the Beraisa, to resolve it?
Why does the proof fall away, once we establish the Beraisa where he recovered?
And we try to prove that the Tana is speaks where he recovered, from the Seifa 'Miktzasan le'Rishon, ve'Kulan le'Sheini, Rishon Kanah, Sheini Lo Kanah'. How do we prove it from there?
9)
We ask whether or not 'Chazarah be'Miktzas Havya Chazarah', which in practical terms means that - if the Shechiv-M'ra gives all his property to Reuven, and then gives half to Shimon, the other half automatically reverts to him.
We try to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa 'Kulan le'Rishon, u'Miktzasan le'Sheini, Sheini Kanah, Rishon Lo Kanah', by initially establishing it - where he died, a proof that he retracted from the gift to Reuven completely (otherwise, there is no reason why Reuven should not acquire the half that the Shechiv-M'ra did not give to Shimon).
Once we establish the Beraisa where he recovered however, the proof falls away - because then, the Tana is simply saying that he can retract from his gift to Reuven (which was a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra be'Kulah), but not from his gift to Shimon, which (having retracted from the gift to Reuven, turns out to be a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra be'Miktzasah).
And we try to prove that the Tana speaks where he recovered, from the Seifa 'Miktzasan le'Rishon, ve'Kulan le'Sheini, Rishon Kanah, Sheini Lo Kanah' - because had he died, why is Shimon not Koneh?
10)
Rav Yeimar however, queries Rav Ashi's proof (that the Tana might even hold 'Chazarah be'Miktzas Lo Havya Chazarah', and the Tana is speaking where the Shechiv-M'ra recovered). How does he prove that even if he does, he must still hold ' ... Havya Chazarah'?
What is the Halachah with regard to Chazarah be'Miktzas?
The Reisha of the Beraisa therefore rules 'Sheini Kanah, Rishon Lo Kanah' irrespective of whether the Shechiv-M'ra recovered or not. Why must the Seifa ('Rishon Kanah, Sheini Lo Kanah') be speaking specifically where he recovered?
10)
Rav Yeimar however, queries Rav Ashi's proof (that the Tana might even hold 'Chazarah be'Miktzas Lo Havya Chazarah', and the Tana is speaking where the Shechiv-M'ra recovered). He proves that even if he does, he must still hold ' ... Havya Chazarah' - because if he held ' ... Lo Havya Chazarah', neither of them ought to acquire the property, seeing as the Shechiv-M'ra distributed all his property to two people ('Mechalek Nechasav'), as we learned above.
The Halachah regarding 'Chazarah be'Miktzas' is - 'Havya Chazarah be'Kulah'.
The Reisha of the Beraisa therefore rules 'Sheini Kanah, Rishon Lo Kanah', irrespective of whether the Shechiv-M'ra recovered or not. The Seifa ('Rishon Kanah, Sheini Lo Kanah') on the other hand, must be speaking specifically where he recovered, - because if he died, both would acquire the Matanah (as Rav Yosef bar Minyumi Amar Rav Nachman explained earlier).
11)
We ask what the Din will be with regard to a Shechiv-M'ra who declares all his property Hekdesh and then recovers. What is the She'eilah? Why might Hekdesh be different than Hedyot in this regard?
We then ask what the Din will be in a case where he declares his property Hefker. Why might Hefker be different than Hedyot?
Why might both Hekdesh and Hefker nevertheless be no different than Hedyot?
What do we then ask about a Shechiv-M'ra who distributed his estate to the poor? What is the She'eilah?
What is the outcome of these She'eilos?
11)
We ask what the Din will be with regard to a Shechiv-M'ra who declares all his property Hekdesh and then recovers. We suggest that Hekdesh might be different than Hedyot in this regard - because a person tends to be Makdish generously (with no intention of retracting).
We then ask what the Din will be in a case where he declares his property Hefker - whether there too, unlike Hedyot - he clearly does so with a full heart, either because of the element of Tzedakah (seeing as it is available to the poor as well as to the rich, or because a person who declares property Hefker removes it from his mind, without any thoughts of retrieving it afterwards.
On the other hand, both Hekdesh and Hefker might nevertheless be no different than Hedyot - because one always tends to give precedence to one's own interests over and above those of others.
We then ask about a Shechiv-M'ra who distributed his estate to the poor, whether (assuming that by Hekdesh, he may not retract whereas by Hefker, he may) we compare this case to Hekdesh or to Hefker.
The outcome of these She'eilos is - 'Teiku'.