We just learned that 'K'ni ka'Chamor' does not acquire. 'K'ni At va'Chamor' acquires according to Rav Sheishes, but not according to Rav Hamnuna. According to Rav Nachman - it acquires half.

Rav Hamnuna applies the logic of 'K'ni ka'Chamor', to 'K'ni At va'Chamor'. The reason of ...

... Rav Sheishes' is that - knowing that a donkey cannot acquire, when one says 'K'ni At va'Chamor' he obviously intends the person to acquire whatever he can.

... Rav Nachman is that - he intends each one independently to acquire half.

Rav Sheishes proves his opinion from a Beraisa concerning Terumah. One is normally obligated to separate - one fiftieth.

The significance of the extra ke'Beitzah (see Rabeinu Gershom) that Rebbi Yossi obligates the owner to add when Ma'asering Kishos (cucumbers) is - based on the fact that the middle of the cucumber is bitter, and due to the possibility that the particular cucumber that one is separating is more bitter than the other ones in the batch, he needs to separate a little extra from the outside of another cucumber to cover the deficiency.

The problem if he didn't do that, would be that - he would be separating from what is bitter to exempt what is sweet.

Rav Sheishes attempts to prove from here - that just like the sweet part of the cucumber is considered Ma'aser, even though the bitter part is not (despite the fact that he declared them Terumah simultaneously), so too, does 'K'ni At va'Chamor' acquire half.

We refute Rav Sheishes' proof however, from a statement of Rebbi Ila'i, who learns from the Pasuk in Korach "ve'Lo Sis'u alav Chet, ba'Harimchem es Chelbo mimenu" that - since the bitter part of the cucumber is edible, one is Yotzei even if one separate from it on to the sweet part ...

... because otherwise - what sin would he have perpetrated, when all he has to do is to take Ma'aser again from the good part.

This dispenses with Rav Sheishes' proof - inasmuch as we cannot therefore compare 'K'ni At va'Chamor' to it, since there, the Kinyan on the donkey is not valid at all.

Rav Ivya posed a Kashya from the Mishnah in Kidushin, which discusses a man who betrothed five women, two of whom were sisters, with a basket of figs - of Sh'mitah that belonged to the women themselves.

One of the women received the Kidushin (on behalf of all the women), and the Chachamim ruled - that the sisters are not betrothed.

Based on the Tana's ruling that specifically the sisters are not betrothed, Rav Mordechai quoting Rav Ivya, asked Rav Ashi from this Mishnah - on those who argue with Rav Sheishes, seeing as we can extrapolate from it that the women who are not sisters are betrothed (even though the sisters are not.

Rav Ashi already knew about Rav Ivya's Kashya however (even though he had not heard it from him) - through the medium of a dream.

Rav Ashi answered the Kashya by quoting Abaye, who establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin - where the man specifically stipulated that the Kidushin would take effect only on those women who were legally fit to be betrothed to him.

We rule like Rav Nachman that ...

... 'K'ni At va'Chamor' ... Kanah Mechtzah, and that ...

... 'ha'Mezakeh le'Ubar - le'che'she'Teiled Kanah'.

In the case of someone who said to his wife 'Nechasai lach ve'li'Venayich', Rav Yosef rules - that she receives half (and the sons half).

He learns this from a ruling of Rebbi, who, based on the Pasuk in Emor (in connection with the Lechem ha'Panim) "ve'Haysah le'Aharon u'le'Vanav" - that Aharon takes half, and the other Kohanim, half.

According to Rebbi, the Kohen Gadol therefore takes ...

... one Chalah of the Sh'tei ha'Lechem on Shavu'os, and ...

... five of the Lechem ha'Panim each Shabbos (as the Gemara explains in Yoma).

Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's proof however, on the grounds that - a wife is different than that of Aharon ha'Kohen - inasmuch as, unlike him, she is not an heir (and should consider herself lucky to receive one portion like the sons).

We query Abaye however, from a number of cases that actually occurred, where the husband said to his wife 'Nechasai lach ve'li'Venayich', and where Shmuel ruled in Neherda'a and Rebbi Yochanan in Teverya that - the wife should receive half the deceased man's property (like Rav Yosef).

And in similar vein, we query Abaye from Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef, who related how, when the king ordered the Avuli - millionaires, and the Isterugi - ministers, to make his crown, they had to share equally in the expenses.

If not for Rebbi's ruling, we might have otherwise thought that - the Avuli, who were more wealthy than the Isterugi, should shoulder most of the expenses.

We reject this Kashya on Abaye however, on the grounds that - in the case there, the crown was already under construction, and the Avuli were paying the bulk of the costs, when the king ordered them both to foot the bill. It is therefore obvious that he now meant them to share the costs equally.

Rebbi Zeira queries Rav Yosef from a Beraisa, which rules that if someone undertakes to bring a Korban Minchah comprising a hundred Isaron, but in two vessels - he brings sixty Isaron in one vessel and forty in the other.

He will also be Yotzei Bedieved - by bringing fifty Isaron in one, and fifty in the other.

The Kashya on Rav Yosef is - why there too, the donor should not bring fifty in each vessel (half in each vessel) Lechatchilah?

And we answer that even Rav Yosef will concede there, that it is more correct to bring sixty in one vessel and forty in the other - because the donor obviously meant to bring a large Korban, and the maximum amount of flour that is mixable in one vessel is sixty Isaron (an Isaron = a tenth of an Eifah, each tenth comprising seven and a fifth egg-volumes).

The fact that we rule like Rav Yosef is unusual inasmuch as - we always rule like Rabah against Rav Yosef.

This is one of three cases throughout Shas where we do so ('Sadeh, Inyan and Mechtzah'), all of them in Bava Basra (See Tosfos, above 114b DH 've'Hilch'sa').

With regard to the case where a man sends his children pieces of material from cloaks, Rebbi Ami rules - that the sons take whatever is fit to be worn by men, and the daughters, whatever is fit to be worn by women.

If there are unmarried daughters, married daughters and daughters-in-law, then we assess the father's order of priorities as - 1. unmarried daughters; 2. daughters-in-law; 3. married daughters.

The Yerushalmi rules that if someone with sons and daughters, donates something to his children ('le'Banav') ...

... during his lifetime - he means to include his daughters.

... at the time of his death - he means to include only his sons.

The She'eilah in the case of a man on his death-bed who had a son and daughters, who said 'Nechasai le'Banai' was - whether a person will refer to his son as 'Banai' (plural) or not (in which case, he must have meant to incorporate his daughter).

Abaye attempts to resolve the She'eilah from the Pasuk in Vay'chi "u'Venei Dan Chushim" - which uses the plural term in spite of the fact that Dan had only one son.

Rava refutes this proof however, from a Beraisa, where Tana de'bei Chizkiyah interprets that Pasuk to mean that - the sons (descendants) of Dan were many, like clusters of canes ('ke'Chushim').

Rava therefore resolves the She'eilah in exactly the same way - but from the Pasuk in Pinchas "u'Venei Palu Eli'av", and Rav Yosef from the Pasuk in Divrei Hayamim "u'Venei Eisan Azaryah".

The She'eilah in the case of the man who had a son and a grandson, and who said 'Nechasai le'Banai' is - whether a person tends to refer to his grandchildren as his children (explaining why the man used the plural term), or not.

Assuming that one does not, he used the plural - because, as we just concluded, people do tend to refer to one son as 'Banai'.

Rav Chaviva rules that one does tend to refer to a grandchild as one's child; Mar bar Rav Ashi maintains that one does not. The Beraisa - precludes one's grandchildren from someone who is Mudar Hana'ah from his sons ...

... a proof for Mar bar Rav Ashi.

One's grandchildren are however, considered like one's children - with regard to the Mitzvah of 'P'ru u'Revu', which one has fulfilled if one dies, leaving behind only grandchildren.

Our Mishnah discusses a case where a man dies, leaving grown-up sons and small ones, and the grown-up sons improve the estate, in which case their younger brothers share in the profits. If however - the older brothers stipulate in front of witnesses or in Beis-Din that they are ready to divide the property, in order to work on improving their own portion, then they alone take the profits (from the section that they improved).

Their stipulation will be effective - if, after they made it, Beis-Din are lax in apportioning the estate.

Rav Chaviva b'rei de'Rav Yosef b'rei de'Rava qualifies the Reisha of our Mishnah - - confining it to where the older brothers improve the estate with money taken out of the kitty. In the event that they spend their own money or work on it themselves without taking money from the kitty, then they alone take the profit, even without having stipulated.

Rebbi Chanina rules that in the case in our Mishnah, but where their father left them a pit with a cover (Udyani) which was meant to be hired out, which is what the older brothers subsequently did - they all share the profit.

This is a Kashya on Rava - since the older brothers need to stand by the pit to guard its water against theft, in which case, they alone ought to take the profits.

We answer that Udyani is different - inasmuch as on the one hand, it doesn't cost them anything, and on the other, guarding the pit is so easy that the younger brothers could just as well have participated.