Gemara: If you will say that there is a Yad for Tzedakah.

Explanation: Since there is a Hekesh, even though [Tzedakah] is not written explicitly, a Hekesh is never only half-way!

Implied question: Why wasn't the Gemara unsure about whether or not there is a Yad for Shevu'ah?

Answer: There is an explicit Hekesh "Ki Yidor Neder Oh Hishava Shevu'ah."

Support (Mishnah - 9a): "K'Nidrei Resha'im" - he vowed Nezirus, Korban or Shevu'ah.

Inference: There is a Yad for Shevu'ah.

Gemara: If there a Yad for a privy?

Consequence: That it should be forbidden to recite Shma in it [even before it is used].

Gemara: He asked one question amidst another.

Explanation: If you will say that designation for a Beis ha'Kisei takes effect, is there a Yad, or is there not a Yad?

Ruling: Regarding Kidushin, we are stringent to say that there is a Yad, since the question was not resolved. This is a Torah Safek, so we are stringent.

Ruling: The Rashba says that also regarding Pe'ah and Tzedakah, we are stringent, because these were not resolved.

Support: Also the Ramban in his Halachos says that the question about Tzedakah was not resolved explicitly;

The Sugya [connotes that] there is a Yad for Tzedakah. Also, we hold that we are stringent about every Teiku about Isur.

Explanation: [The Ramban] said that the Sugya [connotes that] there is a Yad for Tzedakah, because we say "if you will say that there is a Yad for Tzedakah..."

We can say so according to the Rambam, who rules in every place like "if you will say that..."

Question #1: [The Ramban] said that we are stringent about every Teiku about Isur. It seems that the Rashba agreed. This is astounding!

An explicit Sugya in Chulin (134a) says that Safek Mamon Aniyim is like any other Safek Mamon, and we are lenient for the defendant;

We ask there against the Mishnah of one who converted, and he had a slaughtered cow (he must give Matanos (the foreleg, jaw and stomach) to a Kohen only if it was slaughtered after he converted)... the Mishnah says that this is Safek Mamon, and he is exempt. This implies that we are lenient about a Safek;

Citation (134a) Contradiction (Mishnah): If grain was found in an ant hole in a place that was not yet harvested [what is on top must be left for the poor. R. Meir says that all must be left for the poor, for Safek Leket is Leket. Tosfos there (DH u'Rminhu) says that even what is on top is a Safek, and we ask even from the first Tana.]

We needed to answer that the cow's Chazakah was to be exempt from Matanos, and the grain's Chazakah was to be obligated [to leave Leket from it].

Inference: It is obligated due to Chezkas Chiyuv. If not, we would exempt the Safek.

Summation of question: If Safek Mamon Aniyim is Safek Isur (like the Ramban and Rashba say about Tzedakah and Pe'ah), why did we answer like this? (Even without Chezkas Chiyuv, we are stringent!)

Question #2: Also there, Abaye asked from a dough that has Chezkas Petur. A Mishnah teaches that if a Nochri converted, and it is a Safek [whether his dough was kneaded before he converted], it is obligated [in Chalah];

[Rava] answered that we are stringent about a Safek Isur, and lenient about Safek Mamon.

If Safek Mamon Aniyim is called Safek Isur, we could have given this answer itself to the question against the Mishnah from ant holes!

Question #3: A Mishnah in Yoma (8b) says that Chachamim obligated bakers to separate [from Demai, i.e. Safek Tevel] only the amount of Terumas Ma'aser and Chalah;

Citation (8b) Question: Granted, [they are exempt from Terumah Gedolah, for a Beraisa teaches... [they are exempt from] Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Oni, for ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah;

Explanation: It is not Safek of Isur, rather, of Mamon, and for [Safek] Mamon, ha'Motzi mi'Chavero Alav ha'Re'ayah.

Citation (cont.): However, we should separate Ma'aser Sheni, and take it up and eat it in Yerushalayim!

Summation of question: If Safek [Mamon] Aniyim is Safek Isur, just like he asked from Ma'aser Sheni, he should have asked from Ma'aser Oni!

Answer: Rather, surely Safek Mamon Aniyim is not called Safek Isur. Rather, it is Safek Mamon, and we are lenient. Therefore, [the Ramban's and Rashba's] words are not clear.

Ruling: Regarding Hefker, there is no Safek. It is Safek Mamon, and we are lenient, and there is no Yad.

Also regarding a privy, even if you will say that designation helps for it, it helps only mid'Rabanan. This is a Safek d'Rabanan, so we are lenient.

Mishnah: 'I am Menudeh to you' - R. Akiva was Chocheh to be stringent about this.

Explanation #1: 'Chocheh' is like a person who is unsure, and scratches himself, for he cannot clarify it.

Explanation #2: 'Chocheh' it is an expression of Chech (palate). I.e. he gave reasons to his palate to be stringent about this.

Gemara: R. Akiva agrees about lashes, that he is not lashed

Explanation: For he is stringent amidst a Safek. The matter was not clear to him.

Inference: We learn that Yados were included also for lashes. If not, why does it say that R. Akiva agrees? This is obvious (if one is never lashed for Yados)!

Explanation: He is forbidden and he is lashed.

Limitation: This is only if he said she'Ani Ochel Lecha, like Shmuel said above (4b) regarding "I am separated or distanced from you." In every case, he is forbidden only if he said she'Ani Ochel Lecha;

The same applies to Nedina, which is an expression of distancing.

Explanation: Even if he said she'Ani Ochel Lecha, there is no Isur, for this is not an expression of a vow, rather, of Niduy (excommunication).

Support: In the episode of the man who said "Meshamisna from the property [of R. Yirmeyah's son]", we say that he argues with Rav Chisda [who says that R. Akiva forbids this], even though "from the property" is Mochi'ach as if he said she'Ani Ochel Lecha.

Explanation: He said also she'Ani Ochel Lecha. The word "Menudeh" has both connotations (separation and Niduy);

R. Akiva holds that it is an expression of Niduy. I.e. also it is an expression of distancing and separation, like Mufrashni, Meruchakni;

This is like the Targum of "veha'Davah v'Nidasah", which is "veli'Dsovsah b'Richukah". Therefore, he is forbidden.

Rabanan hold that it is an expression of Niduy. People use it only for Niduy.

Gemara: This implies that he holds...

Explanation: They argue about Meshamisna. He holds that R. Akiva's reason is because since he made himself like a Menudeh, he comes to forbid Hana'ah, for people separate from a Meshumas and a Menudeh.

Ruling: We do not hold like R. Akiva, for [Rav Chisda says below] that no one is concerned for his opinion.

Also, [normally] the Halachah follows R. Akiva against his colleague, but not against his colleagues.

Consequence: Therefore, [if one said] Nedina Mimecha she'Ani Ochel Lecha, he is forbidden and [if he eats] he is lashed. If he said Nedina Minach alone, he is permitted;

Also if one said Menudeh Ani Lecha she'Ani Ochel Lecha, he is permitted, and we need not teach Meshamisna Minach she'Ani Ochel Lecha (all the more so, he is permitted).

Support: The Ramban ruled like this in his Halachos. What the Rambam wrote in Perek 8 of Hilchos Nedarim is not clear.

Citation (Yerushalmi): R. Akiva was hesitant about this to be stringent, to forbid all his property, like it says "all his property will be Cherem, and he will be separated..."

Citation (cont.): How do Rabanan explain this? This is a stringency of someone excommunicated by Beis Din.

Opinion #1: Presumably, the Yerushalmi has no relevance at all to our Gemara. The Yerushalmi's reason is, because he made himself like a Menudeh, he is forbidden.

In our Gemara, it is due to distancing, and not due to Niduy.

Proof: If you would not say so, how do we say that all permit "Meshamisna from you"? Rather, surely it is like we said.

Opinion #2: However, Rav Baruch bar Shmuel wrote in his Perush that from here we explicitly hear that if Beis Din was Menadeh someone, one may not benefit from his property;

However, if a commoner was Menadeh someone, [his property] is permitted. This is the episode of the one who said "Meshamisna from his property", and Rav Chisda permitted him.

Rebuttal: This is wrong. We hold in Mo'ed Katan (15b) that a Menudeh may teach, and we teach to him. He may be hired, and we may be hired [to work] for him.

Inference: His property is not forbidden (he pays his workers).

Conclusion: Rather, surely Cherem of the Great Beis Din (Sanhedrin) is different, for it is stronger. Cherem of a regular Beis Din does not forbid his property.

Explanation #1: Since they excommunicated him in front of him, it is a stronger Niduy, and it is uprooted only in front of him.

Support: This is like it says in Gitin (33b) 'any matter done amidst 10, 10 are needed to undo it.'

Rejection (and Explanation #2): This is wrong. Rather, the reason is due to suspicion;

If they would permit him not in front of him, sometimes they permit him and the Menudeh does not know, and when people do not observe laws of Niduy regarding him, he will come to suspect them.

However, if they excommunicated him not in front of him, there is no suspicion, for even he reasons that perhaps they permitted him not in front of him, just like they excommunicated him not in front of him.

Source: This is like we say below (65a) that one who is Mudar Hana'ah from his friend (i.e. he vowed) in front of him, we permit him only in front of him;

The Yerushalmi explains that the reason is due to suspicion.

Consequence #1: Based on this, as long as they informed him [that they permitted him], so there is no suspicion, we permit him [even] not in front of him;

Consequence #2: In any case that they permitted him (even not in front of him), even if they did not inform him, he is permitted b'Di'avad.

Gemara: If one hears Hash-m's Name said in vain, he must excommunicate him.

Reference: In Temurah (3b), we learn the warning not to mention Hash-m's name in vain from "Es Hash-m Elokecha Sira" (Devarim 10:20).

Gemara: If he did not excommunicate him, he himself will be excommunicated.

Explanation: He is not automatically excommunicated. Rather, it means that he is proper to be excommunicated.

Source: The one who mentioned Hash-m's name l'Vatalah, he needs [someone to excommunicate him; it is not automatic]. How can the one who heard and was silent be worse?! Rather, it is like we said.

Explanation: He gives the reason for what we said "if he did not excommunicate him, he himself will be excommunicated", for its punishment is serious, for poverty is found there.

Source #1: It says "wherever I cause My name to be mentioned, I will come to you and bless you";

Since mentioning His name for a Mitzvah brings Berachah and wealth, mention [of His name] in vain causes poverty.

Source #2: It is written regarding [a house in which there is] Shevu'as Sheker "v'Chilaso v'Es Etzav v'Es Avanav", and in Temurah (3b) we compare vain mention of Hash-m's name to a false oath.

Explanation: They did not really die, like we say below (64b). They were still alive, for whenever it says "quarreling" or "standing", it refers to Dasan v'Aviram, and they were in Korach's rebellion (after Moshe returned to Mitzrayim);

Rather, because they became poor, [Hash-m] said that they died, even though they did not really die, like we say below that four are considered like a Mes - an Oni, a blind person, a Metzora and one who has no children. Here, surely due to poverty He said [that they died].

We cannot say that they became blind, for in Korach's rebellion it says "will you gouge out the eyes of those men?!"

We cannot say that they became Metzora'im, for it says "amidst Kol Yisrael." (A Metzora must be outside the camp);

We cannot say that they were healed at Matan Torah, for we say that [everyone who was healed] returned to his blemish when they made the Egel. (Most Meforshim explain that this refers to the last matter the Ran addressed, i.e. Tzara'as. Logically, this potential answer applies even more to becoming blind, which has no natural cure. Regarding Tzara'as, perhaps it went away at a different time between Yetzi'as Mitzrayim and Korach's rebellion, or returned after the ha'Egel and went away afterwards! - PF)

We cannot say that [Hash-m said that they died] because they had no children, for if so, how did Hash-m say due to this "return to Mitzrayim"?!

Because they had no children, is this a reason why the kingdom would not heed them, to slander Moshe to Pharoah?!

Conclusion: Rather, surely because they lost their property, their words would not be heeded.

Inference: These are equal.

Question (Tosfos): Why does it say specifically that one who hears another mention Hash-m's name [in vain] must excommunicate him? We say in the Yerushalmi that anyone who does improperly, one must excommunicate him!

Strengthening of question: This is proven from many places. We say in Kidushin (39a) [Rav Anan and Rav Chanan] saw a man planting [wheat and barley] between vines. [Rav Anan] said "master, excommunicate him!"...

In Mo'ed Katan (17a) we say that Rebbi's Shifchah saw a man hit his adult son. She said "that man is excommunicated!"

Answer (Tosfos): Indeed, [one must excommunicate anyone who does improperly]. However, only regarding [vain] mention of Hash-m's name, we say that if he did not excommunicate him, he himself will be excommunicated, because its punishment is severe, like I wrote.

Question (Tosfos): In Mo'ed Katan (16a), Shmuel taught that the Shofar [to excommunicate] forbids, and the Shofar permits [even immediately]...

Citation (16a): This refers only to monetary matters, but for Afkerusa (showing contempt for Torah or Chachamim, it permits only), after he was in Niduy for 30 days!

Answer #1 (Tosfos): Here is different, for this Niduy is only to scare him, so he will not mention Hash-m's name in vain again;

This is not like Afkerusa. Therefore, here we do not require any delay between Niduy and Hafarah.

Answer #2: However, I saw that the Rif rejected the [teaching] in Mo'ed Katan due to our Gemara, like he wrote in his Halachos in Mo'ed Katan. Also the Rambam holds like this in Hilchos Talmud Torah (7:13).

Explanation #1 (Rashba): This is only if he was not obligated to be excommunicated, like the case of Mar Zutra. It was a mere Midas Chasidus to excommunicate himself, for the honor of the Talmid [who deserved Niduy];

However, when he excommunicates himself for a matter for which he needed to be excommunicated, he cannot permit himself.

Question: If so, why did the Gemara ask "this is obvious!" before it said that we discuss a case like Mar Zutra? Just the contrary, it should have asked why [he may permit himself]!

Answer #1 (and Explanation #2): Therefore, they [who asked about this] said that in any case that he excommunicated himself, he can permit himself. The Rambam holds like this in Hilchos Talmud Torah 7:11).

Answer #2: I saw some Meforshim who wrote that the text does not say "this is obvious!", rather, "he permits himself, like the case..."

For one who has this text, the Rashba's opinion is correct and logical.

Explanation: This was lest his household need to distance from him.

Inference: When one is excommunicated, even his household must conduct [laws of Niduy] with him. (This Dibur continues on the next Daf.)