1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A "MUKTZAH" AND A "NE'EVAD"
QUESTIONS: The Mishnah (112a) derives from the words, "v'El Pesach Ohel Mo'ed Lo Hevi'u" (Vayikra 17:4), that any type of animal that is not fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed as a Korban is not subject to the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, offering it outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. The Mishnah then lists various other types of animals, including a Rove'a, Nirva, Muktzah (an animal set aside for Avodah Zarah), and a Ne'evad (an animal worshipped as Avodah Zarah), and says that these animals are also exempt from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, as derived from the words, "Lifnei Mishkan Hash-m," in the same verse. These words teach that any type of animal that is not fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed is not included in the prohibition.
The Gemara asks the obvious question. Why are two sources needed to teach this law? The first phrase in the verse, which excludes from the prohibition any type of animal that cannot be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed, already teaches that Rove'a, Nirva, Muktzah, Ne'evad, and the others listed in the Mishnah are excluded from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz!
The Gemara answers that Rove'a and Nirva cannot be derived from the first phrase in the verse, because they could have been designated as Korbanos before they became a Rove'a and Nirva, and thus they were fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed. Therefore, an additional verse is needed to exclude them. This answer, however, does not apply to an animal that was Muktzah and an animal that was Ne'evad, because such animals could not have been fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed as Korbanos before they became Muktzah and Ne'evad. They must have been used for Avodah Zarah before they were designated as Korbanos, because if they would be designated as Korbanos first, then the status of Muktzah and Ne'evad would not be able to take effect. There is a rule that a person cannot forbid (in this case, by using the item for Avodah Zarah) something that does not belong to him; an animal that has been sanctified as a Korban does not belong to any person, but it belongs to Hekdesh. Why, then, are these types of animals not included in the exemption of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz derived from the first phrase in the verse, "v'El Pesach Ohel Mo'ed"?
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah refers to Kodshim Kalim, and it follows the opinion of Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili. Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili maintains that even after an item has been designated as Kodshim Kalim, it is considered the property of the owner. Therefore, the owner is able to render his animal forbidden as a Muktzah or Ne'evad even after he has designated it as a Korban (and it was fit to be brought into the Ohel Mo'ed). That is why the second verse is necessary to exclude a Muktzah and Ne'evad from the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz.
Based on this Gemara, the LECHEM MISHNEH has difficulty with the ruling of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Isurei Mizbe'ach 4:5). The Rambam rules that an animal that has been sanctified as a Korban cannot become prohibited as a Muktzah, because a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him. However, in the very next Halachah, the Rambam writes that an animal that has been sanctified as a Korban, whether it is one's own animal or the animal of someone else, can become prohibited as a Ne'evad! How can a person cause a Korban to become prohibited as a Ne'evad, if it does not belong to the person? What is the difference between a Muktzah and a Ne'evad?
ANSWER: The MAHARI KURKUS explains that the Rambam's source is the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (54a). The Gemara there quotes Rebbi Yochanan who says that even though one normally cannot prohibit the animal of his friend, he can prohibit it if he performs an act of Avodah Zarah with the animal itself. The Gemara gives as an example one who pours wine between the animal's horns as an offering to the animal, making the animal a Ne'evad. (See RAMBAN there, and see Insights to Avodah Zarah 54:1.) Such an act forbids the animal to be used as a Korban even if the animal belongs to someone else. This is the case that the Rambam is discussing, and this also appears to be the RA'AVAD's understanding of the Rambam.
However, if the Rambam refers to a case in which an action was done to the animal itself, then why does he not discuss such a case with regard to Muktzah as well?
1. The Mahari Kurkus cites a Tosefta in Temurah (4:1) which states the same Halachos that the Rambam records. The Tosefta there presumably understands that both cases, that of Muktzah and that of Ne'evad, refer to the same type of situation. It seems that the very point of the Tosefta is that an animal of Kodshim can never become Muktzah, even if an action is done to it.
2. The KIRYAS SEFER suggests that there is a difference between Muktzah and Ne'evad. An animal that is Muktzah has no action done to it to designate it for Avodah Zarah until it reaches the idolatrous priests who are going to sacrifice it. An animal that is Ne'evad, on the other hand, usually does have an action done to it to worship it as Avodah Zarah before it reaches the idolaters (see Lechem Mishneh, who proves that the Rambam maintains that this is the typical case of Ne'evad). Therefore, the Rambam rules that in the case of a Ne'evad, one can make the animal prohibited even though it does not belong to him, since one does some action of idolatry to the animal. (Y. MONTROSE)
114b----------------------------------------114b
3) EXCLUDING A "CHATAS" SLAUGHTERED "SHE'LO LISHMAH" FROM THE PROHIBITION OF "SHECHUTEI CHUTZ"
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one who is "Mechusar Zeman" who offers his Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is not liable for Shechutei Chutz, since his Korban is not fit to be offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash while he is a Mechusar Zeman. The Gemara here quotes Rebbi Chilkiyah bar Tovi who says that the exemption of a Mechusar Zeman from the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz applies only when he offers his Korban with proper intent (Lishmah). When a Mechusar Zeman offers his Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash with improper intent, such as with intent that it should be a different Korban (she'Lo Lishmah), he is liable for the prohibition of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz. This is because a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is a valid Korban, although it does not fulfill the owner's obligation to bring a Korban. Since the Korban that the Mechusar Zeman slaughters she'Lo Lishmah could be offered in the Beis ha'Mikdash, he transgresses the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz when he offers it outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
RASHI (DH Rebbi Chilkiyah) explains that Rebbi Chilkiyah's distinction applies only to a Korban Asham, but not to a Korban Chatas. A Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah, with intent that it is a different Korban, is Pasul, as the Gemara teaches in the beginning of Zevachim (2a). One violates the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz only when he offers a Korban which could have been brought on the Mizbe'ach in the Beis ha'Mikdash. A Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah cannot be offered on the Mizbe'ach, and thus Rebbi Chilkiyah cannot be referring to a Chatas, but only to an Asham of a Mechusar Zeman.
The YAD BINYAMIN is perplexed by the words of Rashi. The Mishnah earlier (84a) states that any Korban that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" is subject to the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz. (See TOSFOS to 68b, DH Amar Rav, and Insights there for different opinions regarding what exactly constitutes "Pesulo b'Kodesh." Generally, "Pesulo b'Kodesh" refers to a Korban that became Pasul due to a problem that arose during the Avodah of the Korban, and not due to a pre-existing Pesul.) Hence, a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah should also be included in the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz! Moreover, the Beraisa there (84a) explicitly includes a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah in its list of Korbanos that are subject to the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz. Why, then, does Rashi say that this Chatas is not subject to the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz?
ANSWER: The YAD BINYAMIN answers this question based on a principle mentioned by TOSFOS earlier (59b, DH Ad she'Lo Nivneh). Tosfos explains that when the Mishnah says that things which are "Pesulo b'Kodesh" are included in the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz, it means that performing actions which are part of the Korban's function of attaining atonement for its owner are subject to the prohibition of Shechutei Chutz. The logic behind this is that something that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" is not removed from the Mizbe'ach if it is inadvertently placed there ("Im Alu Lo Yerdu"), since it retains some Kedushah of a proper Korban. This logic, however, applies only to Avodos that are linked to the atonement of the Korban, such as Zerikah and Ha'ala'ah, since these actions are done on the Mizbe'ach. In contrast, Shechitah is not an act done for atonement or done with the Mizbe'ach in any way. Accordingly, one is liable for doing an Avodah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash with an offering that is "Pesulo b'Kodesh" when he does any Avodah besides Shechitah. When the Beraisa (84a) states explicitly that a Chatas slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is subject to the Isur of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, it means that one transgresses the Isur only when he does Zerikah and Ha'ala'ah, but not when he does Shechitah, outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
This is why Rashi says that Rebbi Chilkiyah cannot be referring to a Korban Chatas. Rebbi Chilkiyah is discussing one who transgresses the Isur of Shechutei Chutz by slaughtering a Korban with intent that it is a different Korban. The Korbanos of a Mechusar Zeman are "Pesulo b'Kodesh," and thus the slaughtering of such a Chatas outside the Beis ha'Mikdash would not make one liable for Shechutei Chutz. (Y. MONTROSE)