1) THE PROOF THAT AN ORDINARY PERSON MAY NOT BECOME "TAMEI" FOR A RELATIVE WHEN HE MUST BRING THE KORBAN PESACH
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the circumstances under which the offering of the Korban Pesach overrides Tum'as Mes. The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that a Kohen Gadol who is also a Nazir and who must bring his Korban Pesach may not become Tamei for a close relative who dies. He may become Tamei only for a Mes Mitzvah. This implies that an ordinary person also should not become Tamei for a relative in order to bring his Korban Pesach, just as a Kohen Gadol who is a Nazir, who normally is permitted to become Tamei for a relative, may not become Tamei for a relative when he must bring his Korban Pesach.
TOSFOS (DH Harei) has a difficulty with the Gemara's proof. It is possible that a Kohen Gadol who is a Nazir may not become Tamei for a relative when he must bring the Korban Pesach because three factors prevent him from becoming Tamei: he is a Kohen Gadol, he is a Nazir, and the obligation to bring the Korban Pesach. In contrast, only one factor -- the obligation to bring the Korban Pesach -- prevents an ordinary person from becoming Tamei. Perhaps he should become Tamei rather than bring the Korban Pesach. What is the basis of the Gemara's proof from a Kohen Gadol who is a Nazir that an ordinary person may not become Tamei when he must bring the Korban Pesach?
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS writes that because of this question, some Rishonim emend the text of the Beraisa so that the Beraisa is not discussing a Kohen Gadol who is a Nazir, but an ordinary person on his way to slaughter the Korban Pesach (the case which the Gemara seeks to prove). However, Tosfos rejects this approach. Since the rest of the Beraisa discusses a Kohen Gadol and Nazir, it is unreasonable to suggest that the Beraisa interrupts its discussion with a Halachah about an ordinary person.
(b) Tosfos answers that although the Beraisa teaches many cases in which a Kohen Gadol may not become Tamei, in this case the Beraisa changes its wording and implies that even an ordinary person may not become Tamei. When the Beraisa presents the case, it says, "Perhaps he should become Tamei? It says: 'He may not become Tamei' (Bamidbar 6:7)." This is in contrast to all of the other verses cited by the Beraisa, which the Beraisa introduces with the words, "Talmud Lomar" -- "This [verse] is to teach." Tosfos explains that the change of wording to "it is said" implies that the Beraisa understands that the verse is not teaching a unique law of Nazir, but rather a general law which applies to everyone. The verse is teaching that even an ordinary person who is on his way to bring his Korban Pesach should not become Tamei for a relative.
Tosfos in Berachos (19b, DH Amart) also gives this answer, but he asks the obvious question on it. Why does the Beraisa assume that the verse, "Lo Yitama," in the Parshah of Nazir means that even an ordinary person who is on his way to bring his Korban Pesach should not become Tamei for a relative? Tosfos answers that a strong logical argument convinces the Beraisa that this must be true. Since the requirement to become Tamei for a relative is, at most, a Mitzvas Aseh and does not bear the punishment of Kares, it is logical that the Torah requires that one ensure that he can perform a Mitzvas Aseh that does bear the punishment of Kares (i.e., Pesach and Milah). This type of Mitzvas Aseh overrides an ordinary Mitzvas Aseh.
(c) Alternatively, Tosfos in Berachos answers that in this case, the Beraisa does not introduce the person as being a Kohen Gadol, Kohen Hedyot, or Nazir. This omission implies that even an ordinary person, who is neither a Kohen nor a Nazir, may not become Tamei for a relative when he is supposed to bring the Korban Pesach. (The second answer of Tosfos here, and the second answer of Tosfos in Berachos, are explained differently by various Acharonim. See the BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH and CHOK NASAN on Tosfos here, who explain these answers and discuss whether Tosfos in these two places are saying the same answer.) (Y. MONTROSE)
100b----------------------------------------100b
2) THE STATUS OF AN "ONEN" ON THE DAY OF THE DEATH OF HIS RELATIVE
QUESTION: The Beraisa records an argument between Rebbi and the Tana Kama with regard to how long an Onen must refrain from eating Kodshim. The Tana Kama says that an Onen must refrain from eating Kodshim the entire day, while Rebbi says that he must refrain only until his relative is buried.
The Gemara says that the Beraisa must not be referring to the day on which the relative died. One of the Gemara's proofs for this assertion is that Rebbi says that an Onen may eat Kodshim after his relative is buried. If the case refers to the day of death, how can Rebbi say that an Onen may eat Kodshim on that day, after the burial? The verse explicitly states, "v'Acharisah k'Yom Mar" -- "And its end [will be] like a bitter day" (Amos 8:10), which implies that the status of Aninus, on the day of a relative's passing, lasts for an entire day.
The CHAFETZ CHAIM in LIKUTEI HALACHOS (in ZEVACH TODAH) writes that there are many proofs that a person is an Onen mid'Oraisa during the entire day on which his relative died, regardless of whether his relative has been buried. One of these proofs is Aharon's response to Moshe Rabeinu, "v'Achalti Chatas ha'Yom" -- "And if I would have eaten a Chatas today, would it have been good in the eyes of Hash-m?" (Vayikra 10:19). Aharon's questioning remark to Moshe Rabeinu clearly implies that he definitely would not have eaten a Chatas at any time on that day, despite the fact that Nadav and Avihu (his sons) had been buried already. Accordingly, the Likutei Halachos does not understand why Rashi defines the duration of Onen differently. Earlier in Zevachim (15b, DH Kol ha'Zevachim), Rashi defines the duration of Aninus as "the entire time that the Mes is not yet buried." This implies that once the Mes has been buried, even during the first day, Aninus no longer applies.
What is the intent of Rashi here, and how will he respond to the proofs cited by the Likutei Halachos?
(a) The LIKUTEI HALACHOS suggests that Rashi means that even if the deceased is not buried for some time, even for many days, mid'Rabanan the relatives still have the status of Aninus. This indeed is the opinion of the ME'IRI in Pesachim (91b).
The Likutei Halachos has difficulty with this answer. Even in this case, after the deceased is buried, his relative remains an Onen mid'Rabanan for the duration of that day. Accordingly, Rashi's definition of the duration of Aninus (i.e., that it lasts only until the deceased is buried) seems inaccurate both mid'Oraisa and mid'Rabanan.
(b) The MEROMEI SADEH (15b) answers that Rashi maintains that a person whose relative has not been buried for more than one day remains an Onen mid'Oraisa until the relative is buried. Any Avodah which he performs during that time is Pasul. This is unlike the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 2:10) who states that such a person, as mentioned by the Zevach Todah, is an Onen only mid'Rabanan, and his Avodah therefore is valid. (See Meromei Sadeh, and EVEN HA'AZEL to Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 2:9 at length.) (Y. MONTROSE)