1) WRONGFUL THOUGHTS THAT ARE NOT CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE
OPINIONS: The Gemara (9b) records a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a person who -- while slaughtering a Korban Chatas -- has in mind to perform the Zerikah later with intent that it should be a different type of Korban. Rebbi Yochanan says that the Chatas is Pasul, because the thought that one has in mind during one Avodah about a different Avodah is able to invalidate a Korban. Reish Lakish disagrees and maintains that a thought about a different Avodah cannot invalidate the Korban. Similarly, they argue (10a) about whether or not slaughtering a Korban with intent that the Zerikah will be done in the name of Avodah Zarah forbids the animal from benefit. Rebbi Yochanan says that one may not benefit from the animal, while Reish Lakish says that one may benefit from the animal.
What exactly is the case in which Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue? Must the person slaughtering the animal have intent that he will do the Zerikah himself in a wrongful manner, or do these arguments apply even when he intends to have someone else do the Zerikah in a wrongful manner?
(a) The RASHBA in TORAS HA'BAYIS (Hilchos Shechitah 1:1) discusses the opinion in Chulin (39b) that rules that Jewish butchers may slaughter animals of Nochrim in return for the meat and skin, even though it is apparent that the Nochrim will sprinkle the blood of the animals for Avodah Zarah. The Rashba points out that the Jewish butchers may not have in mind that their slaughtering is being done in order to enable the Nochri to sprinkle the blood, because such an intent would prohibit the meat and skin from benefit, as stated by Rebbi Yochanan here in Zevachim. If the argument between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish applies in a case in which the person who slaughtered the animal (with intent to do the Zerikah for the sake of Avodah Zarah) is the one who also performs the Zerikah, then even Reish Lakish should agree that the meat is forbidden, because the person who slaughters the animal is considered a Mumar whose Shechitah is forbidden! The Gemara, therefore, must be referring to a person who slaughters with intent that a Nochri will perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, and nevertheless Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the animal is forbidden. Even though the Rashba is unsure about the proof from the Gemara here, he says that this is the correct conclusion.
(b) The RE'AH in BEDEK HA'BAYIS writes that he does not understand the Rashba's words at all. It is obvious from context that the Gemara is discussing only a case of a person who will do the Zerikah himself. Moreover, the Rashba's proof is not clear. The Rashba says that Reish Lakish would agree that the animal is forbidden in a case in which the person who slaughtered the animal planned to perform the Zerikah himself. This is problematic, because Reish Lakish maintains that until the Zerikah is actually performed for Avodah Zarah, the animal is permitted like any other animal! The Re'ah also asserts that even if the person slaughtering the Korban arranged beforehand that someone else would perform the Zerikah for Avodah Zarah, it is not clear that appointing a Shali'ach for such a thing is effective.
The ME'IRI in Sanhedrin (60b) understands the case like the Re'ah. He explains that the case involving Avodah Zarah refers to a case in which the person had in mind during Shechitah "that he would sprinkle the blood... to Avodah Zarah." He adds that this also applies to having intention to delay the Zerikah beyond the proper time -- "as long as the Kohen doing the Avodah has in mind to sprinkle the blood the next day after the correct time, it is Pigul." It is apparent that the Me'iri maintains that only one who intends to do the Zerikah, during the Shechitah, can nullify the Korban through this thought. This is why the case of a Korban being nullified in such a way can apply only to a Kohen (as the Me'iri writes) -- for a Yisrael is not able to do the Zerikah!
(c) It seems that RABEINU GERSHOM in Chulin (39a) has a third opinion. He states that the case involving a thought during Shechitah about the Zerikah is referring to a Kohen's thought, but he does not mention (as the Me'iri does) that the case of Avodah Zarah is referring to a case in which the slaughterer intends to perform the Zerikah himself.
The SHA'AR MORDECHAI writes that Rabeinu Gershom's opinion may be understood based on a different statement of Rabeinu Gershom. The Gemara in Menachos (5b) teaches that a number of conditions must be met in order for a wrongful thought to invalidate a Korban. One of these conditions is that the thought must be done by "one who is fit to perform the Avodah." What does this mean? The SHITAH MEKUBETZES in Menachos quotes Rabeinu Gershom as saying that if a Yisrael slaughters the Korban with a wrongful thought in mind, his thought does not invalidate the Korban. This seems to contradict the Mishnah later in Zevachim (31b) which explicitly states that a Yisrael can invalidate a Korban with his thoughts during Shechitah! (The wording of the Shitah Mekubetzes in the margin of our text is indeed amended to read, "a Yisrael who performed the Kabalah or Zerikah," an emendation apparently made because of this question.)
The Sha'ar Mordechai answers that it must be that Rabeinu Gershom means that a Yisrael cannot invalidate a Korban by having in mind that a different Yisrael will do the Zerikah. This is why he states in Chulin that the case there is discussing a Kohen. In most cases, the slaughterer will also be the one intending to do the Zerikah. When he explains the normal case, Rabeinu Gershom says that only a Kohen could make the Korban unfit, not a Yisrael. This does not imply that he rules like the Me'iri or the Re'ah regarding slaughtering for Avodah Zarah, for in that case he might rule like the Rashba that the slaughtering could be done with intent that someone else will do the Zerikah. (Y. MONTROSE)
10b----------------------------------------10b
2) AN ATONEMENT WHICH IS "PASUL"
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer who maintains that just as a Chatas slaughtered with intent to be brought as a different Korban is Pasul, an Asham slaughtered with such intent is also Pasul. Rebbi Eliezer attempts to demonstrate how these two Korbanos are comparable, such that an Asham should have the same Halachah as a Chatas in this regard. At one point, the Gemara asks that a Chatas differs significantly from an Asham in the Halachah that if the blood of a Chatas is brought into the Heichal, then the Korban becomes Pasul, while an Asham, in contrast, does not become Pasul if its blood is brought into the Heichal.
This Halachah regarding a Chatas is derived from the verse, "Any Chatas whose blood is brought into the Ohel Mo'ed to make atonement in the sanctuary (l'Chaper ba'Kodesh) may not be eaten; it must be burned in fire" (Vayikra 6:23). The Torah, however, does not specify the exact case to which this law applies. To what exactly does this verse refer?
ANSWERS:
(a) RASHI (DH she'Im, and in his commentary to Vayikra 6:23) explains that the verse is discussing a Chatas "Chitzonah" (an "outer" Chatas) which is not supposed to be taken into the Heichal.
The RAMBAN in Vayikra (ibid.) explains that according to Rashi, when the verse says that the Korban is "l'Chaper ba'Kodesh" -- "to make atonement in the sanctuary," it cannot mean that the purpose of the Chatas is to attain atonement for the owner by being brought into the Kodesh (the Heichal) -- because, to the contrary, entering the Heichal makes the Korban Pasul! The verse must be teaching that if a Kohen brought some of the blood of the Chatas into the Heichal with the intent to perform a Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis (an "inner" Chatas), then the Korban is Pasul and the animal must be burned. Consequently, the Ramban suggests that perhaps the Korban is Pasul only when its blood was brought into the Heichal for the purpose of atonement. If the blood was not brought in for that purpose, then the Korban remains fit. (According to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon (82a), who says that the Chatas is Pasul only if an actual Zerikah was performed in the Heichal, the Zerikah must have been done with the intent of performing a Zerikah for a Chatas Penimis, which was supposed to be done in the Heichal.)
The MINCHAS CHINUCH (#139) proves the Ramban's point that in order to be considered Pasul, the intent of the Zerikah must be that of a Chatas Penimis and not that of a Chatas Chitzonah. Later in the Gemara (83a), Rebbi Eliezer learns a Gezeirah Shavah ("l'Chaper") from this verse (6:23) to a verse later (16:17) that discusses the Se'irim ha'Nisrafim offered on Yom Kippur. The Gezeirah Shavah teaches that the verse here of "l'Chaper" is related in some way to a Chatas Penimis. It must be that the word "l'Chaper," which is written regarding the case of a Chatas Chitzonah that is invalidated, also refers to a Kohen who has intention to do the Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis.
(b) It is questionable whether Rashi agrees with the Ramban that the thought only invalidates the Korban when the thought is to perform a Zerikah of a Chatas Penimis, and not that of a Chatas Chitzonah. In explaining Rebbi Yehudah's opinion later (36a), Rashi (DH Hichnis) says that as long as the blood was sprinkled on the inner Mizbe'ach the Korban is Pasul. (Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is similar to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who says that one must actually do the Zerikah to make it Pasul, and not just bring the blood inside with intent to do the Zerikah.) The law is that a full Zerikah for a Chatas Penimis includes being sprinkled on the Paroches seven times and on the Mizbe'ach four times, without any allowance for error. If Rashi agrees with the Ramban, then why does he mention only that the blood was placed on the inner Mizbe'ach without mentioning the amount of times, and without mentioning the sprinkling on the Paroches? Apparently, Rashi maintains that the Korban becomes invalidated even if it was not brought into the Heichal for the purpose of performing the Avodah of a Chatas Penimis.
The Minchas Chinuch, however, rejects this proof, suggesting that it is possible that Rashi did not want to get involved with this aspect of the Zerikah and thus did not detail the steps of Zerikah necessary to make the Korban Pasul, but he indeed may agree with the Ramban.
The SHA'AR MORDECHAI suggests that the RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:16), who says merely that the blood was "brought inside in order to atone in the inner area," indeed rules that the Korban becomes Pasul with intent to perform a regular Zerikah of a Chatas Chitzonah.
(c) The ME'IRI in Pesachim (83a) writes that the verse is discussing a Chatas Penimis. It is teaching that one is forbidden to eat a Chatas Penimis once the Zerikah is done, since the Korban is supposed to be burned (as a normal Chatas is burned). Accordingly, the verse is saying that once the blood is brought for Zerikah in order to atone, the prohibition against eating the Korban takes effect. (See also the MOSHAV ZEKENIM and the Ramban (end of his commentary to Vayikra 6:23), who say that this is the straightforward explanation of the verse, and the explanation of Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili.)
The Me'iri adds that even though in some places the Gemara teaches that a Chatas Chitzonah becomes Pasul if its blood is brought into the Heichal, it is possible that both laws are learned from the verse. Alternatively, he suggests that the source for the Halachah that bringing the blood of a Chatas Chitzonah into the Heichal makes it Pasul is a different verse which says, "Behold, the blood was not brought to the Kodesh inside" (Vayikra 10:18). When Moshe Rabeinu rebuked the Kohanim for not eating the Chatas, he said, "Since the blood was not yet brought inside, why are you not eating the Korban?" This teaches that if the blood was brought into the Heichal, then it would be forbidden to eat the meat of the Korban. (Y. MONTROSE)