1)
(a)We suggest that accepting the testimony of one witness to permit a woman to remarry is a S'vara. Why is it obvious that a piece of fat which is Safek Chelev, Safek Shuman becomes permitted if someone testifies that it is indeed Shuman?
(b)On what grounds do we reject the comparison between the two cases? Why should the woman nevertheless remain forbidden?
(c)What will be the Din if one witness testifies that a piece of fat that we know to be Chelev, is Shuman?
(d)And on what grounds do we reject the comparison of our case to that case too?
1)
(a)We suggest that accepting the testimony of one witness to permit a woman to remarry is a Sevara. It is obvious that a piece of fat which is Safek Chelev, Safek Shuman becomes permitted if someone testifies that it is indeed Shuman - because otherwise, nobody would ever be permitted to eat by his friend.
(b)We reject the comparison between the two cases however - on the grounds that in the case of Safek Chelev ... , no Isur was ever established, whereas in our case, the woman has a Chazakah of being married.
(c)If one witness testifies that a piece of fat that we know to be Chelev, is Shuman - he is not believed.
(d)And we reject the comparison of our case to that case too - because whereas there, even two witnesses would not be believed, in our case, they certainly would (so perhaps one witness will be believed too).
2)
(a)So we try to compare our case to Tevel, Hekdesh and Konamos. Why is a person believed to say that his Tevel has been rectified?
(b)Why might he not be believed if he testifies that someone else's Tevel has been rectified?
(c)Why will he be believed if he says that his Hekdesh which was ...
1. ... Kedushas Damim is now Chulin?
2. ... Kedushas ha'Guf (Mizbe'ach) is now Chulin?
(d)Why can we not resolve our She'eilah from the case of Reuven who testifies that Shimon's animal that was Kedushas ha'Guf is now Chulin, due to the fact that the owner had the Hekdesh nullified?
2)
(a)So we try and compare our case to Tevel, Hekdesh and Konamos. A person is believed to say that his Tevel has been rectified - because it lies within his control to rectify it.
(b)He might not be believed however, if he testifies that someone else's Tevel has been rectified - because that does not lie within his control to rectify.
(c)If he claims that his Hekdesh which was ...
1. ... Kedushas Damim is now Chulin - he is believed, because he is able to redeem it.
2. ... Kedushas ha'Guf (Mizbe'ach) is now Chulin - he is believed because he is able to have the Neder of Hekdesh revoked.
(d)We cannot resolve our She'eilah from the case of Reuven who testifies that Shimon's animal that was Kedushas ha'Guf is now Chulin, due to the fact that the owner had the Hekdesh nullified - because that is no different than the She'eilah we are currently asking (and if we don't know that, we don't know this either).
3)
(a)What are Konamos?
(b)What is the meaning of ...
1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos'?
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos'?
(c)Would the owner be believed to say that the object was no longer forbidden, were we to hold ...
1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos?
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos'?
(d)Assuming that we hold 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos', would he be believed to say that someone else's object is no longer forbidden?
3)
(a)Konamos are - a form of Neder where a person renders something forbidden by declaring 'Konam Alai Davar Zeh k'Hekdesh'.
(b)
1. 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos' - means that Konamos not only cause the object to become forbidden, but also render it Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, which is subject to the Dinim of Me'ilah.
2. 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos' - means that Konamos are not subject to Me'ilah, because the object becomes forbidden, but not Hekdesh.
(c)The owner would be believed to say that the object was no longer forbidden, were we to hold ...
1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah b'Konamos - because it lies within his power to redeem it.
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos' - because it lies within his power to have the Neder revoked.
(d)Assuming that we hold 'Ein Me'ilah b'Konamos' - we do not know whether he is believed to say that someone else's object is no longer forbidden, any more than we know whether one witness is (intrinsically) believed to testify that someone ate Chelev.
4)
(a)Then how does Rebbi Zeira explain the fact that all the above Mishnahs accept the testimony of one witness, in spite of the fact that it does not lie in one's power to rectify matters, and it is a Davar she'be'Ervah (a matter concerning marriage)?
(b)And on what basis do Chazal take such a lenient view with regard to Eishes Ish?
(c)Do the Chachamim have the power to override Torah law in this manner (see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch' and Tosfos Yeshanim DH 'Mishum')?
4)
(a)Rebbi Zeira explains that all the above Mishnahs accept the testimony of one witness, in spite of the fact that it does not lie in one's power to rectify matters, and it is a Davar she'be'Ervah (a matter concerning marriage) - because of the Chazakah that, due to the stringencies that the woman will come up against at the end, she will not dare to get married before she has made extensive inquiries and fully ascertained that her husband is indeed dead.
(b)Chazal took such a lenient view with regard to Eishes Ish - in order to prevent the woman from becoming an Agunah.
(c)The Chazakah that a woman will make a double check before getting married renders their ruling d'Oraisa (see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch' and Tosfos Yeshanim 'Mishum') - in which case, they are not in fact, overruling Torah law, but endorsing it. (Nevertheless, they would have issued a decree forbidding her to do so, were it not for the concern that she might then become an Agunah).
5)
(a)How did the people of Eretz Yisrael react when they heard of Rav's ruling that if the woman remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, and the husband returned, then she may remain with her second husband?
(b)How do we justify Rav's statement?
(c)How do we establish Rav, in order to differentiate between one witness (in which case she must leave the second marriage) and two (when she may remain)?
(d)We learn the phenomenon of not recognizing a close acquaintance from Yosef. How does Rav Chisda explain the fact that, although Yosef recognized his brothers, they did not recognize him?
5)
(a)When the people of Eretz Yisrael heard of Rav's ruling (that if the woman remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, and the husband returned, then she may remain with her second husband) - they laughed (because they considered it ridiculous).
(b)We justify Rav's statement however - by establishing it in a case when they did not recognize him upon his return (and claimed that he was someone else).
(c)In order to differentiate between one witness (in which case she must leave the second marriage) and two (when she may remain) - we establish Rav when two witnesses testify that they remained with him from the moment that he left until his return. Consequently, they are believed against one witness who says that he died, but not against two (under the circumstances that we are about to describe).
(d)We learn the phenomenon of not recognizing a close acquaintance from Yosef. Rav Chisda explains that, although Yosef recognized his brothers, they did not recognize him - because whereas they already had beards when they last him, his full-length beard only grew whilst he was in Egypt.
88b----------------------------------------88b
6)
(a)What is the penalty for living with a Safek Eishes Ish?
(b)Then how can Rav permit the woman who after all, is a Safek Eishes Ish, to remain with the second man?
(c)Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi in a Beraisa, rules that if two witnesses testify that a woman's husband died or that he divorced her, and two other witnesses testify that he did not, then, even after the woman subsequently marries one of the first pair, she is forbidden to remain with him. What do the Rabanan say?
(d)Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi concedes that if they were already married, she may remain with him. What then, is Rav's Chidush, according to ...
1. ... the first Lashon?
2. ... the second Lashon?
6)
(a)The penalty for living with a Safek Eishes Ish - is an Asham (Taluy).
(b)Rav permits the woman (despite the fact that she is a Safek Eishes Ish), to remain with the second man - provided she claims to be sure that her husband died and she also married one of the witnesses who testified that he had (see Tosfos Yeshanim DH 'le'Echad').
(c)Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi in a Beraisa, rules that if two witnesses testify that a woman's husband died or that he divorced her, and two other witnesses testify that he did not, then, even after the woman subsequently marries one of the first pair, she is forbidden to remain with him. The Rabanan say - that he may.
(d)Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi concedes that if they were already married, she may remain with him. Rav's Chidush, according to ...
1. ... the first Lashon is - that even if she married him only after the testimony of the witnesses, she is permitted to remain (contrary to the opinion of Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi).
2. ... the second Lashon - that only if she was already married to him before they testified, may she remain (like Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi).
7)
(a)Rava queries Rav from a Beraisa. What does the Tana there learn from the Pasuk in Emor "v'Kidashto"? What is the case?
(b)Why must the Tana be referring to a case of Safek (as above) where she married one of her witnesses?
(c)What does 'Dafno' mean?
(d)Initially, in order to reconcile this Beraisa with Rav, we differentiate between ordinary Arayos and Isurei Kehunah, where the Torah is more stringent. Alternatively, how do we interpret 'Dafno' differently, in order to avoid differentiating between them?
(e)In the third answer, we establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi. What does he say? How does this reconcile Rav with the Beraisa?
7)
(a)Rava queries Rav from a Beraisa. The Tana there learns from the Pasuk "v'Kidashto" - that if a Kohen refuses to adhere to the laws of Tum'ah or of forbidden marriages (of Kehunah e.g. a Kohen Hedyot marries a Gerushah or a Kohen Gadol an Almanah, and refuses to divorce her), Beis-Din must force him (physically, if need be) to do so.
(b)The Tana must be referring to a case of Safek (as above) where she married one of her witnesses - because otherwise, what is the Chidush, seeing as Beis Din are always obligated to prevent people from sinning (even by force, where necessary)?!
(c)'Dafno' means - that they force him physically to comply.
(d)Initially, in order to reconcile this Beraisa with Rav, we differentiate between ordinary Arayos (Rav) and Isurei Kehunah (the Beraisa), where the Torah is more stringent. Alternatively, we interpret 'Dafno' to mean - that Beis-Din make efforts to force him at the outset not to marry the Safek (by bringing two witnesses to counter the first pair).
(e)In the third answer, we establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yosi - who forbids the woman to remain with the man if she married him after the witnesses testified (whereas Rav holds like the Chachamim, like the first of the two explanations that we just cited).
8)
(a)Rav Ashi offers a new slant to the Sugya by reinterpreting Rav's statement 'Lo Setzei'. How does he now explain it?
(b)But did he not already teach us that, when he ruled like the Tana of our Mishnah who said 'Nises she'Lo bi'Reshus, Muteres Lachzor Lo'?
8)
(a)Rav Ashi offers a new slant to the Sugya by reinterpreting Rav's statement 'Lo Setzei', meaning - that she does not leave her original Heter (to go back to her first husband).
(b)Rav Ashi already taught us that, when he ruled like the Tana of our Mishnah who said 'Nises she'Lo bi'Reshus, Muteres Lachzor Lo'. In fact - he made only one of the two statements; and it is we who deduced the second one from the first one.
9)
(a)According to Shmuel, when our Mishnah rules 'Teiztei', that is only as long as she does not contradict the witness, but if she does, she may remain with her second husband. How do we know that the Tana is talking about one witness, and not two?
(b)Why is a second witness not believed to contradict the testimony of the first witness who said that her husband died? What principle did Ula teach in this regard?
(c)So, according to Shmuel, we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa. What does Rebbi Nechemyah say? How does this explain our Mishnah (see Hagahos ha'Gra)?
(d)According to the second Lashon, Rebbi Nechemyah speaks when the first witness was a woman. In which point does the second Lashon disagree with the first?
9)
(a)According to Shmuel, when our Mishnah rules 'Tetzei', that is only as long as she does not contradict the witness; if she does, she may remain with her second husband. The Tana can only be talking about one witness, and not two - because how can anybody contradict two witnesses?
(b)A second witness is not believed to contradict the testimony of the first witness who said that her husband died because, as Ula said - whenever the Torah believes one witness, it is considered as if two witnesses had testified, in which case, he cannot possibly be believed to counter his testimony.
(c)So, according to Shmuel, we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa - who says that, whenever the Torah believes one witness, then we follow the majority of opinions (even if it is two women [say] against one man). Consequently, our Mishnah speaks when the two witnesses were Pesulei Edus (e.g. women). Consequently, if the woman remains silent, then there are two witnesses against one, and she must leave her second husband; whereas, if she contradicts them, then her opinion will combine with that of the first witness, and she may remain married to him (Rambam, not like Rashi).
(d)According to the second Lashon - Rebbi Nechemyah only follows the majority opinion when the first witness is a woman (a Pesul Edus) - but when it is a man (who is a Kasher witness), then no amount of Pesulei Edus can possibly counter his testimony.
10)
(a)It is obvious that the return of the woman's husband automatically invalidates the second marriage. What reason does Rav Huna give to explain why our Mishnah requires a Get from the second man?
(b)How do we initially explain the Seifa, which permits the woman to return to her husband if the second man only betrothed (but did not marry) her? Why are we not worried there too, that people might say that a betrothed woman does not require a Get?
(c)How can the Tana permit a man to take back his wife, once she has been betrothed to somebody else? Like whom must he hold?
(d)On what grounds do we refute the current interpretation of the Seifa (that she does indeed require a Get)? Perhaps a Get mid'Rabanan of this nature will not invalidate a woman from the Kehunah?
10)
(a)It is obvious that the return of the woman's husband automatically invalidates the second marriage. Rav Huna therefore explains that our Mishnah requires a Get from the second man - because we are afraid that otherwise, people may think that the first husband divorced her and the second one married her, and we are now sending out a married woman without a Get.
(b)Initially, we establish that the Seifa, which permits the woman to return to her husband if the second man only betrothed (but did not marry) her - speaks when the second man actually gave her a Get.
(c)This Tana, who permits a man to take back his wife, once she has been betrothed to somebody else - holds like Rebbi Yosi ben Kipar, in whose opinion only a woman who married after her divorce, is forbidden to return to her first husband, but not one who was only betrothed.
(d)We refute the current interpretation of the Seifa (that she does indeed require a Get) - because of the Seifa, which states 'Af-al-Pi she'Nasan Lah Acharon Get, Lo Paslah min ha'Kehunah, in which case the Get cannot have been necessary, because if it had, she would have been Pasul (due to the ruling 'Afilu Re'ach ha'Get Posel').
11)
(a)So how do we finally explain the Seifa? Why do we permit the betrothed woman to return to her husband without a Get from the second man?
(b)Then why does she require a Get in the Reisha, seeing as there no logical reason to differentiate between marriage and betrothal in this matter?
11)
(a)So we finally explain that the Seifa permits the betrothed woman to return to her husband without a Get from the second man - because we assume that people will know that the betrothal was erroneous.
(b)We do not say this in the Reisha however - where she transgressed the Isur of Eishes Ish (by actually living with the second man). Consequently, we penalize her by accepting the possibility that people will not know ... , requiring her to accept a Get and become forbidden to her husband.