QUESTION: Rebbi Akiva maintains that the milk of both a woman and an animal are Machshir for Tum'ah, even though nobody planned to drink them. The Chachamim maintain that the milk of a woman is Machshir without intent, but the milk of an animal is Machshir only when one intends to drink it.

The Chachamim prove that liquids from an animal are less able to be Machshir from the fact that the blood of an animal cannot be Machshir (except for Dam Shechitah), while the blood of a person is Machshir. Rebbi Akiva rejoins that no proof can be adduced from blood, because milk -- even animal milk -- has a greater ability to be Machshir than blood. He proves this from the Halachah that when one milks an animal for a curative purpose (Refu'ah), the milk is Tamei, but if one lets out blood from an animal for the same purpose, the blood is Tahor.

Rashi and the Rishonim explain that Rebbi Akiva means to say that milk of an animal is Machshir while blood of an animal is not. Why, then, does Rebbi Akiva need to mention that milk "that is drawn out for Refu'ah" is Machshir? Animal milk in general is Machshir, while animal blood is not. What difference does it make whether or not it was drawn for the sake of Refu'ah?

(a) TOSFOS (DH Machmir) says that, indeed, Rebbi Akiva does not need to mention that the milk was drawn for Refu'ah. Any milk will be Machshir for Tum'ah.

(b) The TOSFOS YOM TOV (cited by the Bach #1) explains that the Gemara here apparently supports the opinion of the RASH (end of Machshirin, and as recorded by the VILNA GA'ON in his comments to Mishnayos Machshirin 6:5 (in the end of the Vilna Shas)) who writes that when a person specifically intends to drink (or otherwise use) animal's blood, the blood is Machshir. Accordingly, Rebbi Akiva needs to mention that animal's milk is capable of being Machshir when the animal is not milked in order to use its milk but rather in order to make the animal comfortable, while blood of an animal that was not earmarked for drinking (such as blood that was let from an animal to improve its health) is not Machshir. Both blood and milk are Machshir if they were set aside for drinking.

(It is not clear why, according to the Rash, milk will be Machshir even when it was taken from the animal to relieve its pain.)

(c) Others suggest that Rebbi Akiva mentions milk that is extracted for curative purposes in order to emphasize his point. Even such milk can be Machshir, even though milk is normally not used for such a purpose. In contrast, animal blood is not Machshir even when it is let in order to be used for curative purposes, even though blood is normally used only for such a purpose. (CHAZON NACHUM, see also MISHNAH ACHARONAH.)

QUESTION: The Beraisa says that one may squeeze the juice out of prunes, quinces and crab-apples, but not out of pomegranates, because the people of the house of Menashya ben Menachem squeeze pomegranates for the use of their juice. The Gemara wonders how the conduct of just a few individuals can establish for everyone that pomegranates are normally squeezed for their juice? Rav Chisda explains that when a person intends to use the pomegranate juice, he lends significance to the juice and thus he is Chayav.

According to Rav Chisda's answer, one should also be prohibited from squeezing out the juice of prunes and the other fruits mentioned in the Beraisa! Moreover, how does Rav Chisda's answer explain how the family of Menashya ben Menachem was able to establish a prohibition against squeezing pomegranates?

(a) RASHI and TOSFOS (DH Hachi Garsinan) explain that Rav Chisda understands the Beraisa differently from the way it was originally understood. The Beraisa refers to squeezing fruits not for their juices, but in order to sweeten the fruits. The types of fruits that are never squeezed for their juices may be crushed in order to sweeten them on Shabbos. The Rabanan were not concerned that if one is allowed to squeeze the fruit to sweeten it, he might come to squeeze it for its juice, since nobody normally squeezes it for its juice. Pomegranates, however, may not be squeezed to sweeten the fruit. Since there are a few individuals who squeeze it for its juice, the Rabanan were afraid that if would be permitted to squeeze the pomegranate in order to sweeten it, one might squeeze it for its juice as well.

(b) The RITVA questions Rashi's explanation. According to Rashi, the Gemara should have specified that the Beraisa refers to squeezing the fruits in order to sweeten them.

The Ritva therefore explains that the Beraisa indeed is discussing squeezing fruits for their juice. However, since nobody normally squeezes prunes, quinces, and crab-apples for their juices, even if one does so, we rule that his intention cannot give those juices significance. Rather, the rule of "Batlah Da'ato Etzel Kol Adam" applies. In contrast, with regard to squeezing pomegranates, since there are at least some individuals who do squeeze pomegranates for their juice, Rav Chisda asserts that anyone who does so gives significance to the juice of the pomegranate. Therefore, squeezing them for their juice on Shabbos is forbidden.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that one is permitted to milk a goat's milk directly into food on Shabbos. This act is not considered to be the Melachah of Mefarek, because milk is considered Ochel (food) when it is in the goat (since it is part of the goat which can be eaten), and it remains Ochel when it mixes with the food and becomes part of the food. The Melachah of Mefarek applies only to taking an item that was initially Ochel and making it a Mashkeh (liquid).

Why is one permitted to use goat's milk on Shabbos? Even though there is no problem of Mefarek, it should be prohibited because of another reason -- the milk is Nolad (an item that came into being on Shabbos, which is Muktzah)! A goat is Muktzah on Shabbos because it cannot be slaughtered. Its milk should also be Muktzah as well, since its state has changed on Shabbos!

(a) TOSFOS (DH Cholev) in the name of RABEINU TAM says that, indeed, the milk is not permitted on Shabbos because it is Nolad. The Gemara refers to milking a goat on Yom Tov, when the goat is not Muktzah because it may be slaughtered (if it was designated for consumption before Yom Tov).

(b) The RITVA says that the ruling that the milk of a goat is permitted is only in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, who permits Nolad.

(c) The RITVA suggests another answer. Even Rebbi Yehudah would permit this type of Nolad. Before Shabbos, the person intended to milk the goat on Shabbos. An object which a person expects to arrive on Shabbos is not forbidden as Nolad. (See Tosfos 44a, DH sheb'Ner, who discusses whether such a stipulation works according to Rebbi Yehudah. See also Insights to Beitzah 2:5, in the name of the Ba'al ha'Me'or.)

(d) The RAN in Beitzah (2a) explains that the milk is not considered Nolad and is not Muktzah. Even though the goat was Muktzah, the milk that comes from it is not considered to be a new object just because it went from being forbidden (because the goat cannot be slaughtered on Shabbos) to being permitted. Only its Halachic status changed, and not its physical status; a change in Halachic status does not make an item Nolad. Since the milk was physically in existence when Shabbos entered, it is not Nolad. (See Insights, ibid.)