What does Abaye extrapolate from the Pasuk "Eishes Bincha hi", with regard to one's wife's daughter-in-law?
In the same style as before, Rava refutes the need for such a D'rashah, with two Pirchos. Firstly, if we hold 'Don Minah u'Minah' and assuming that S'kilah is more stringent, we could not learn from "Kalaso", that Kalasah should be Asur and receive S'kilah, because 'Bitah bi'S'reifah, ve'Kalasah bi'S'kilah?' (her mother receives only S'reifah, whereas his mother receives S'kilah)? On what grounds do we refute this Pircha?
What is the second Pircha (based on Imo)?
And what will be the Pircha, assuming that we hold that S'reifah is more stringent?
Abaye extrapolates from the Pasuk "Eishes Bincha hi" - that only one's own daughter-in-law is forbidden, but not the daughter-in-law of one's wife.
In the same style as before, Rava refutes the need for such a D'rashah, with two Pirchos. Firstly, if we hold 'Don Minah u'Minah' and assuming that S'kilah is more stringent, we could not learn from "Kalaso", that Kalasah should be Asur and receive S'kilah, because 'Bitah bi'S'reifah, ve'Kalasah bi'S'kilah?' (her mother receives only S'reifah, whereas his mother receives S'kilah)? We refute thi Pircha however on the grounds that - seeing as that is also the case with regard to his daughter and daughter-in-law and respectively, that would not be a problem.
The second Pircha is that - just as the Torah does not distinguish between his mother and daughter-in-law (both receive S'kilah), so too, should it not distinguish between her mother and daughter-in-law (who should therefore receive S'reifah [which in turn, will not conform to 'Don Minah u'Minah']).
And the same Kashya will apply, assuming that S'reifah is more stringent - since his wife's mother receives S'reifah, so should her daughter-in-law.
If we hold 'Don Minah ve'Uki be'Asra' ('Kalaso bi'S'kilah, Aval Kalasa bi'S'reifah') and assuming that S'kilah is more stringent, Rava asks two Pirchos: The first is that we cannot learn her daughter-in-law from his, since his mother receives (the stricter) S'kilah, whereas hers receives only S'reifah. What is the second Pircha, based on the fact that the Torah differentiates between his daughter and daughter-in-law?
And what will be the Pircha, assuming that S'reifah is more stringent?
If we hold 'Don Minah ve'Uki be'Asra' ('Kalaso bi'S'kilah, Aval Kalasa bi'S'reifah') and assuming that S'kilah is more stringent, Rava asks two Pirchos: The first is that we cannot learn her daughter-in-law from his, since his mother receives (the stricter) S'kilah, whereas her's receives only S'reifah. The second Pircha is that - just as the Torah differentiates between his daughter and daughter-in-law, to give the former S'reifah, and the latter, S'kilah, so too, should we differentiate between her daughter and daughter-in-law, to give the latter S'kilah (which in turn, will not conform to 'Don Minah ve'Uki be'Asra').
And assuming that S'reifah is more stringent - the Pircha will be the same as the latter Pircha that we just asked.
Bearing in mind that the Pasuk of Anusah mentions only granddaughter and not daughter, we ask from where we know that Bito me'Anusaso is forbidden. What does Abaye answer?
How do we refute the Kashya 've'Chi Onshin min ha'Din'?
How does this differ from a paternal and maternal sister, whom we decline to derive from a half-sister, because it would be considered 'Onshin min ha'Din'?
Rava, quoting Rebbi Yitzchak bar Avudimi, learns 'Bito ke'Bas Bito' from "Heinah" "Heinah", "Zimah" "Zimah". What does he mean by that?
Bearing in mind that the Pasuk of Anusah mentions only granddaughter and not daughter, we ask from where we know that Bito me'Anusaso is forbidden. Abaye answers - from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from bas Bito.
We refute the Kashya 've'Chi Onshin min ha'Din' - by referring to it as a 'Giluy Milsa' (a indication) rather than a full-scale 'Kal va'Chomer', due to the fact that a granddaughter incorporates a daughter, in which case it is stronger than a regular 'Kal va'Chomer'.
This differs from a paternal and maternal sister, whom we decline to derive from a half-sister, because it is considered 'Onshin min ha'Din' - inasmuch as, a granddaughter is only forbidden because she is his daughter's daughter (which is not the case by a sister).
Rava, quoting Rebbi Yitzchak bar Avudimi, learns - 'Bito ke'Bas Bito' from "Heinah" "Heinah", written by the Azharah, and the punishments from "Zimah" "Zimah" (as we learned earlier).
What does Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin learn from the word "Ish" (in the Pasuk in Emor ... "u'bas Ish Kohen ki Seichel li'Zenos ... ba'Eish Tisaref")?
What punishment is due to a man who commits adultery with a bas Kohen who is married?
Based on Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin's D'rashah, what does Abaye therefore learn from "es Avihah hi Mechaleles"?
Once again, Rava argues that no D'rashah is needed for this Halachah. Why not? Why can he not be Patur, as if she was a Penuyah?
Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin learns from the word "Ish" (in the Pasuk ... "u'bas Ish Kohen ki Seichel li'Zenos ... ba'Eish Tisaref") - the Azharah for Bito me'Anusaso.
A man who commits adultery with a bas Kohen who is married receives - Chenek.
Based on Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin's D'rashah, Abaye therefore learns from "es Avihah hi Mechaleles" that - someone who commits adultery with Bito me'Anusaso - receives the same punishment as his daughter (S'reifah).
Once again, Rava argues that no D'rashah is needed for this Halachah - because there is neither any reason to give him Chenek, nor to absolve him as if she was a regular Penuyah (seeing as he committed incest). Consequently, the only possibility is to apply the general principle that both parties receive the same punishment.
From where do Abaye and Rava (who learn Bito me'Anusaso from a 'Kal va'Chomer' and from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' respectively), learn the Azharah?
Tani Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin learns it from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Al Techalel es Bitcha le'Haznosah". How do we reconcile this with the Beraisa, which uses this Pasuk (from the use of the word "le'Haznosah") to preclude any Isur for a Kohen to marry off his daughter to a Levi or a Yisrael?
Why might we have thought that the Torah forbids a Kohen to marry off his daughter to a Levi or a Yisrael
According to Rebbi Mani, what do Abaye and Rava then learn from "Al Techalel es Bitcha ... "?
What is the source of this ruling?
Abaye and Rava (who learn Bito me'Anusaso from a 'Kal va'Chomer' and from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' respectively) - learn the Azharah from the same source as the punishment.
Tani Avuhah de'Rebbi Avin learns it from the Pasuk "Al Techalel es Bitcha le'Haznosah". We reconcile this with the Beraisa, which uses this Pasuk (from the use of the word "le'Haznosah") to preclude any Isur for a Kohen to marry off his daughter to a Levi or a Yisrael - by making a dual D'rashah from the two 'Lameds' in the word "Techalel" (which could just as well have been written "Tachel" [with one 'Lamed']).
We might have thought that the Torah forbids a Kohen to marry off his daughter to a Levi or a Yisrael - since she becomes disqualified from eating Terumah (as long as she is married to him), which might have been considered a 'Chilul'.
According to Rebbi Mani, Abaye and Rava learn from "Al Techalel es Bitcha ... " - that a man should not 'desecrate' his young daughter by marrying her off to an old man (thereby encouraging her to commit adultery with younger men) ...
... like the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa.
In the Beraisa that we just cited, what does Rebbi Akiva say?
Rav Kahana quoting Rebbi Akiva states 'Ein l'cha Ani be'Yisrael Ela Rasha Arum, ve'ha'Mashhe Bito Bogeres'. What problem do we have with this dual statement?
So how does Abaye amend it?
What does poverty have to do with this?
In the Beraisa that we just cited, Rebbi Akiva says - 'Zeh ha'Mashhe Bito Bogeres' (that the Pasuk refers to someone who does not marry off his daughter before she becomes a Bogeres).
Rav Kahana quoting Rebbi Akiva states 'Ein l'cha Ani be'Yisrael Ela Rasha Arum, ve'ha'Mashhe Bito Bogeres'. The problem with this dual statement is that - 'Rasha Arum' incorporates 'Mashhe Bito Bogeres'?
So Abaye amends it to read - 'Eizehu Rasha Arum, Zeh ha'Mashhe es Bito Bogeres'.
The connection with poverty is that - the father's delay is probably due to the fact that he is short of money, and is trying to save himself having to purchase a maidservant (at the expense of his unfortunate daughter).
Rav Kahana quoting Rebbi Akiva also says 'Hevei Zahir min ha'Yo'atzech l'fi Darko'. What does he mean by that?
What does Rav Yehudah Amar Rav mean when he applies the Pasuk "Lema'an S'fos ha'Ravah es ha'Tzemei'ah" to someone who marries off his young daughter to an old man?
What other similar case does he add to that?
Rav Kahana quoting Rebbi Akiva also says 'Hevei Zahir min ha'Yo'atzech l'fi Darko' by which he means that - one should beware of people whose 'good' advice is intended for their own benefit, rather than for the person who consults them.
When Rav Yehudah Amar Rav applies the Pasuk "Lema'an S'fos ha'Ravah es ha'Tzemei'ah" to someone who marries off his young daughter to an old man, he means that - by so doing, he joins someone who is satiated (and who does not want intimacy), with someone who is thirsty (for it), a recipe for disaster.
Similarly, he cites the reverse case - of someone who takes a wife who is of age (who is thirsty for intimacy) for his son who is a Katan (who is not yet interested).
Rav Yehudah Amar Rav concludes his list with someone who returns a lost article to a Nochri. How does that fit the description "Lema'an S'fos ha'Ravah es ha'Tzemei'ah"?
What is the reason for this? What could be wrong with returning a lost article to a Nochri?
Rav Yehudah Amar Rav concludes his list with someone who returns a lost article to a Nochri, which also fits the description "Lema'an S'fos ha'Ravah es ha'Tzemei'ah" - inasmuch as a Yisrael is thirsty for Mitzvos, whereas a Nochri is satiated (and not too keen to perform them).
The reason for this is - because by returning lost articles to all and sundry, one demonstrates that one is not returning them because it is a Mitzvah, but out of personal motivation. (Note that this does obviously not apply to a case that involves Kidush Hash-m).
Discussing the Pasuk in Iyov "ve'Yada'at ki Sh'lom Ohalech u'Fakadta Navech ve'Lo Secheta", the Beraisa includes someone who loves his wife like himself, and honors her more than himself. What does he mean by the latter phrase?
The Tana adds two more cases to his list, one of them is someone who guides his sons and daughters along the right path. What is the other?
How do we reconcile this with Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, who spoke negatively about someone who marries off his son when he is a Katan?
Discussing the Pasuk in Iyov "ve'Yada'at ki Sh'lom Ohalech u'Fakadta Navech ve'Lo Secheta", the Beraisa includes someone who loves his wife like himself, and honors her more than himself - by which he means that he buys her ornaments.
The Tana adds two more cases to his list; one of them is someone who guides his sons and daughters along the right path, the other - someone who marries them off whilst they are still Ketanin.
We reconcile this with Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, who spoke negatively about someone who marries off his son when he is a Katan - by differentiating between a Katan who is still very small and one who is on the verge of becoming a Gadol.
Commenting on the Pasuk in Yeshayah, the Tana describes "P'ros la'Ra'ev Lachmecha", as lending a Sela to a poor man in need, and incorporates in "u'mi'Besarcha al Tis'alem", bringing close one's relatives. On what basis does the Tana also include someone who loves (is kind to) his neighbors?
What third case does the Tana add to this list?
What reward does the Pasuk promise all of these?
Commenting on the Pasuk in Yeshayah, the Tana describes "P'ros la'Ra'ev Lachmecha", as lending a Sela to a poor man in need, and incorporates in "u'mi'Besarcha al Tis'alem", bringing close one's relatives. The Tana also includes someone who loves (is kind to) his neighbors - on the basis of the Pasuk in Mishlei "Tov Shachein Karov me'Ach Rachok".
The third case the Tana adds to this list is - someone who marries his niece (his sister's daughter).
The reward that the Pasuk promises all of these is - "Az Tikra va'Hashem Ya'aneh".
Commenting on the Pasuk in Kedoshim (regarding Ishah ve'Imah) "ba'Eish Yisrefu oso ve'Es'hen", Rebbi Yishmael Darshens 'Oso ve'es Achas Meihen'. What does he mean by that? How does he translate 'Meihen'?
Rebbi Akiva says 'Oso ve'es Sh'teihen'. What is the problem with this?
What does Abaye mean when he explains 'Mashma'os Dorshin Ika Benayhu'? How is it possible for either woman to be Chayav Misah, according to Rebbi Akiva?
Why does Abaye then describe the Machlokes as 'Mashma'os Dorshin' (which implies that they do not argue le'Halachah)?
According to Rava, both Tana'im agree that Eim Chamoso is not mentioned in this Pasuk. Then what is the basis of their Machlokes? With regard to whom are they arguing?
Commenting on the Pasuk "ba'Eish Yisrefu oso ve'Es'hen", Rebbi Yishmael says 'Oso ve'es Achas Meihen', by which he means that - besides himself, only one of the two women mentioned there ("Ishah u'Bitah") is Chayav S'reifah. This is because he interprets 'Meihen' as a derivative of the ancient Greek word 'Hina', which means 'one'.
Rebbi Akiva says 'Oso ve'es Sh'teihen'. The problem with this is - why the woman he married first, who after all, is his legal wife, should be Chayav.
Abaye therefore explains 'Mashma'os Dorshin Ika Benaihu', by which he means that - the Tana'im do indeed argue over the meaning of "Es'hen", as we explained. Rebbi Yishmael learns as we explained, whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, the two women with whom he committed incest were his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law's mother (both of whom are forbidden on account of incest).
Abaye nevertheless describes the Machlokes as 'Mashma'os Dorshin' (which implies that they do not argue le'Halachah) - because in fact, they do not argue le'Halachah, since Rebbi Yishmael obligates Eim Chamoso from another source.
According to Rava, both Tana'im agree that Eim Chamoso is not mentioned in this Pasuk, and the basis of their Machlokes is - whether one is still Chayav on Chamoso after the death of one's wife (Rebbi Yishmael, who explains "Es'hen" to mean that his wife is no longer alive when he 'marries' her mother), or not (Rebbi Akiva, who interprets "Es'hen" to mean that they are both alive, because if his wife had died, his mother-in-law would not be Chayav S'reifah, though she would still be forbidden).
Our Mishnah now discusses Sayaf. Which two cases receive Sayaf?
What does the Tana say about Reuven who ...
... murders Shimon with a stone or with metal?
... incites a dog or a snake against Shimon, if Shimon is subsequently attacked and injured or killed by them?
And what will be the Din if Reuven actually picks up a snake and holds it against Shimon's skin, and the snake then bites him, according to...
... Rebbi Yehudah? ...
... the Chachamim?
Our Mishnah now discusses Sayaf - which is the death sentence meted out to - a murderer and the inhabitants of an Ir ha'Nidachas.
The Tana rules that if Reuven ...
... murders Shimon with a stone or with metal - he is Chayav.
... incites a dog or a snake against him, and he (Shimon) is subsequently attacked and injured or killed by them - he (Reuven) is Patur (because it is only G'rama [an indirect cause]).
If Reuven actually picks up a snake and holds it against Shimon's skin, and the snake then bites him ...
... according to Rebbi Yehudah - he is Chayav.
... according to the Chachamim - he is Patur.
What reason does Shmuel, as well as Rebbi in a Beraisa, give, to explain the Torah's omission of the word "Yad" (in Mas'ei in the Parshah of murderers) by metal, like it does regarding stone and wood?
How do we qualify this Chumra? In which case will a Shi'ur be required by metal like in the case of other materials?
What distinction does our Mishnah draw between a case where Reuven drowns Shimon by holding his head under water where he is unable to raise it, on the one hand, and pushing him into the water, if he could have got out, on the other?
What is the Chidush ...
... in the former case?
... in the latter case?
What does Shmuel learn from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "O be'Eivah"? Which case does it come to include in the Chiyuv of murder?
Shmuel, as well as Rebbi in a Beraisa, ascribes the Torah's omission of the word "Yad" (in Mas'ei in the Parshah of murderers) by metal, like it does regarding stone and wood - to the fact that metal is lethal, irrespective of its size, in which case, it does need to fill the hand, like a stone does.
We qualify this Chumra however - confining it to a case where the murderer kills by piercing (like with a sword); but in a case where he strikes him with a piece of metal, it requires a Shi'ur just like other materials.
Our Mishnah rules that if Reuven drowns Shimon by holding his head under water (and he is unable to raise it) - he is Chayav; whereas if he pushes him into the water (and he could have got out), he is Patur ...
... even though ...
... in the former case - he did not push him in, and ...
... in the laytter case, even though he did.
Shmuel learns from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "O be'Eivah" that - Metzamtzem (someone who prevents a drowning man from raising his head out of the water) is Chayav (even though he did not kill him, but only prevented him from emerging).