1)

(a)Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef Amar Rebbi Yochanan that if someone asks his Sheli'ach to betroth a woman on his behalf, and the Sheli'ach dies, he is forbidden to all women in the world. Why is that?

(b)In that case, we ask, why should anyone subsequently be permitted to marry any woman at all, seeing as she may be the one whom the Sheli'ach betrothed. Why can we not answer, using Rabeinu Tam's ruling, that a woman is believed to say that she is not betrothed?

(c)So what do we answer? What is the underlying reason of the basic ruling?

(d)We just said that mi'd'Oraysa, even the Meshale'ach is permitted because we go after the majority of women? Why do we not apply the principle 'Kol Kavu'a ke'Mechtzah al Mechtzah'?

1)

(a)Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef Amar Rebbi Yochanan: If someone asks his Sheli'ach to betroth a woman on his behalf, and the Sheli'ach dies, he is forbidden to all women in the world - because based on the Chazakah that a Sheli'ach tends to discharge his Shelichus, we have to suspect that any woman that he subsequently marries, may be the mother, the sister or the daughter of the woman to whom he is already betrothed.

(b)In that case, we ask, why should anyone subsequently be permitted to marry any woman at all, seeing as she may be the one whom the Sheli'ach betrothed. The answer that according to Rabeinu Tam, a woman is believed to say that she is not betrothed, is inadequate - because that is fine as regards a Gedolah, but not as regards a Ketanah, who might not know that her father accepted Kidushin on her behalf.

(c)We answer that - strictly speaking, even the man himself is believed, because we go after the majority, and it is only because he acted irresponsibly by appointing a Sheli'ach to betroth for him an unnamed woman, that we punish him by giving the unknown Safek a Din of Kavu'a. Consequently, Chazal restricted this penalty to the man himself, and not to anybody else (Tosfos).

(d)We just said that mi'd'Oraysa, even the Meshale'ach is permitted because we go after the majority of women. The principle 'Kol Kavu'a ke'Mechtzah al Mechtzah' does not apply here - because neither the Isur nor the Heter were ever known (Tosfos).

2)

(a)A Zav, a Zavah and a Yoledes are obligated to bring a pair of birds. What is the difference between a Kan S'tumah and a Kan Mefureshes?

(b)What must the owner do if one of the birds flew away or died?

(c)What would be the Din if it was a Kan Mefureshes and one of them flew away or died (and he did not know which one - Tosfos [DH 'Kan S'tumah] is speaking when he did)?

2)

(a)A Zav, a Zavah and a Yoledes are obligated to bring a pair of birds. What is a Kan S'tumah. A Kan S'tumah is - one where the birds (one of which is to be a Chatas, the other, an Olah) have not yet been designated; a Kan Mefureshes is one where they have.

(b)If one of the birds flew away or died - the owner would have to take a second bird for the remaining one.

(c)If it was a Kan Mefureshes and one of them flew away or died (and he did not know which one - Tosfos [DH 'Kan S'tumah] is speaking when he did) - there is nothing he could do about it.

3)

(a)Resh Lakish asked Rebbi Yochanan how, if the bird flew away, anyone would be permitted to use any birds for a Kan? Why are we not afraid that it came from Reuven's Kan, so how can Shimon use it. What did he answer him?

(b)But did we not learn earlier that Chazal restricted the penalty to the owner for his carelessness, so why do we not go after the majority and permit Shimon to use the bird?

(c)Why, at the end of the day, is a woman more Kavu'a than a bird?

3)

(a)Resh Lakish asked Rebbi Yochanan how, if the bird flew away, anyone would be permitted to use any birds for a Kan? Why are we not afraid that it came from Reuven's Kan, so how can Shimon use it? He answered him - that one cannot compare birds, which fly around (and do not therefore have even a remote likeness to Kavu'a), to women who are stable and remain in one place (giving them, at least mid'Rabanan, a Din of Kavu'a).

(b)We did indeed learn earlier that Chazal restricted the penalty to the owner for his carelessness. Consequently, it is not Shimon we are worried about (as we initially thought), but Re'uven, who may wish to bring another Kan.

(c)At the end of the day, a woman is more Kavu'a than a bird - because, even though the Sheli'ach may well have betrothed her in a public street, she is nevertheless domicile in her hometown, and tends to return home each day.

4)

(a)In which case does Rebbi Yochanan concede that the Meshale'ach is subsequently permitted to get married?

(b)And when does he permit him to marry even a woman who has a sister who may just be the woman that the Sheli'ach betrothed to him? Why is that?

(c)We learned in our Mishnah that if a man declared Nezirus and that he would shave another Nazir, and his friend said 'va'Ani ve'Alai Legale'ach Nazir, that, if they are smart, they should shave each other ... . What problem does this present with what we just learned?

(d)How do we amend Rebbi Yochanan's reason (for permitting the Meshale'ach to marry the woman who had a married sister at the time when he appointed the Sheli'ach)?

4)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan concedes - that the Meshale'ach is subsequently permitted to marry a woman who has no daughter or granddaughter, mother, grandmother or sister (who may have been the woman whom the Sheli'ach betrothed to him).

(b)And he permits him to marry even a woman who has a sister (who may just be the woman that the Sheli'ach betrothed to him) - provided she was married at the time that the Sheli'ach was appointed (or so we initially think), because when a man appoints a Sheli'ach, he has in mind only the object or the person that is currently available. Consequently, even if the Sheli'ach had betrothed him to that woman, the Kidushin would not have been valid (so her sister is permitted to him).

(c)We learned in our Mishnah that if a man declared Nezirus and that he would shave another Nazir, and his friend said 'va'Ani, ve'Alai Legale'ach Nazir, if they are smart, they should shave each other ... . According to the principle that we just laid down (that a person has in mind only what and whoever is available at the moment of his declaration), seeing as when the first man declared his Neder, the second man had not yet said anything (and who was therefore not available), how can we permit the first man to shave the second one?

(d)So we amend Rebbi Yochanan's reason for permitting the Meshale'ach to marry the woman who had a married sister at the time when he appointed the Sheli'ach to read (not because a person has in mind only what is [technically] available but) - because Halachically, a person can only appoint a Sheli'ach to do what is permitted to him at that moment (which precludes betrothing a woman who is married at that moment).

5)

(a)How do we then justify appointing a Sheli'ach to separate Chalah from flour before it has been kneaded with water to become a dough, since he himself would not be able to separate Chalah from it now?

(b)On what grounds is he able to do this?

(c)Then why do we not permit it purely on the basis of 'be'Yado'?

5)

(a)We justify appointing a Sheli'ach to separate Chalah from flour before it has been kneaded with water to become a dough (despite the fact that he himself would not be able to separate Chalah from it now) - because if he wanted, he could bring a dough that is Chayav Chalah, and separate from it Chalah with the stipulation that it covers the flour for when it will become dough.

(b)He is able to do this - on the grounds that even the flour is 'be'Yado' (he could make it into dough, if he chose to).

(c)Nevertheless, we do not permit it purely on the basis of 'be'Yado' - because it is 'Mechusar Ma'aseh' (it is lacking an act, because the flour has yet to be made into a dough).

12b----------------------------------------12b

6)

(a)According to Rebbi Yonasan in a Beraisa, if someone asks his agent to annul all the Nedarim that his wife declares up to the time that he returns from a trip, the agent may do so, on the basis of 'Shelucho shel Adam Kamoso'. What does Rebbi Yashiyah say?

(b)What does another Beraisa say about a husband upholding (himself) all the Nedarim that his wife declares up to the time that he returns from a trip?

(c)As for annulling those Nedarim, Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Harei Hein Mufarin'. What do the Chachamim say?

(d)What problem does this now create with Rebbi Yochanan's principle (that whatever one cannot do oneself, one cannot appoint a Sheli'ach to perform)?

6)

(a)According to Rebbi Yonasan in a Beraisa, if someone asks his agent to annul all the Nedarim that his wife declares up to the time that he returns from a trip, the agent may do so, on the basis of 'Shelucho shel Adam Kamoso' - Rebbi Yashiyah learns from "Iyshah Yekimenu, ve'Iyshah Yeferenu" that in this instance, Sh'lichus is ineffective.

(b)Another Beraisa says that if a husband (himself) upholds all the Nedarim that his wife declares up to the time that he returns from a trip 'Lo Amar K'lum'.

(c)As for annulling them, Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Harei Hein Mufarin' - whereas the Chachamim there too, 'Lo Amar K'lum'.

(d)This creates a problem with Rebbi Yochanan's principle (that whatever one cannot do oneself, one cannot appoint a Sheli'ach to perform) - because seeing as according to the Chachamim, a husband is unable to annul his wife's Nedarim in advance, how could Rebbi Yonasan and Rebbi Yashiyah (if not for the D'rashah of "Iyshah Yeferenu" permit him to appoint a Sheli'ach to do so?

7)

(a)How do we resolve the above problem?

(b)If Rebbi Yashiyah holds like Rebbi Eliezer, why does the husband bother to appoint a Sheli'ach to annul the Nedarim that his wife is going to declare? Why does he not just do it himself before leaving the house?

(c)Then why does he not annul the Nedarim that she is going to declare ...

1. ... from now on, immediately?

2. ... after his departure, immediately?

7)

(a)We resolve the above problem - by establishing both Rebbi Yonasan (see Tosfos DH 'Ta'ama') and Rebbi Yonasan like Rebbi Eliezer (who permits the husband to annul his wife's Nedarim in advance).

(b)Nevertheless, the husband bothers to appoint a Sheli'ach to annul the Nedarim that his wife is going to declare rather than do it himself before leaving the house - because he is afraid that he may be busy at that stage and forget to do it.

(c)Neither does he want to annul the Nedarim that she is going to declare ...

1. ... from now on, immediately - because he may not wish to incorporate all the Nedarim that she declares before he leaves in the Hafarah (Tosfos).

2. ... after his departure, immediately - because this might involve poor relations with wife on account of it up to the time that he leaves (Tosfos).

8)

(a)'Harei Alai Legale'ach Chatzi Nazir, ve'Shama Chaveiro ve'Amar 'va'Ani ... .', Rebbi Meir holds that each one of them must shave a whole Nazir (and bring all his Korbanos). What do the Chachamim say?

(b)What does Rava say regarding a case where the Noder said ...

1. ... 'Chatzi Korbanos Nazir Alai'?

2. ... 'Korbenos Chatzi Nazir Alai'?

(c)What is the reason for the latter Din?

(d)What is the reason of ...

1. ... Rebbi Meir (in our Mishnah)?

2. ... the Chachamim?

8)

(a)'Harei Alai Legale'ach Chatzi Nazir, ve'Shama Chaveiro ve'Amar 'va'Ani ... .', Rebbi Meir holds that each one of them must shave a whole Nazir (and bring all his Korbanos) - The Chachamim say that they can shave half a Nazir and bring half his Korbanos.

(b)According to Rava, regarding a case where the Noder said ...

1. ... 'Chatzi Korbanos Nazir Alai' - everyone agrees that they can shave and bring the Korbanos of half a Nazir.

2. ... 'Korbenos Chatzi Nazir Alai' - everyone agrees that they must shave and bring the Korbanos of a complete Nazir.

(c)The reason for the latter Din is - because there is no such thing as half a Nazir.

(d)The reason of ...

1. ... Rebbi Meir (in our Mishnah) is - because having declared 'Harei Alai Legale'ach', he is obligated to shave a complete Nazir, which he cannot subsequently rescind by changing it to a half Nazir (because Rebbi Meir holds 'Tafus Lashon Rishon'.

2. ... the Chachamim is - because it is 'a Neder with its opening', seeing as he explained immediately what he meant (in the same breath as he said 'Harei Alai Legale'ach', he added 'Chatzi Nazir').

9)

(a)If someone declares that he will be a Nazir if he has a son and his wife then gives birth to a son, he is a Nazir. Is he a Nazir if she gave birth to ...

1. ... a daughter?

2. ... a Tumtum or Androginos?

(b)According to the Tana Kama (Rebbi Yehudah), he is not a Nazir if his wife has a still-born son who may have been a ninth month baby. What does Rebbi Shimon say he should do?

(c)Should she give birth to another son later, according to the Tana Kama (Rebbi Yehudah), he is then a Nazir. What does Rebbi Shimon say?

(d)What is the basis of their Machlokes?

9)

(a)If someone declares that he will be a Nazir if he has a son and his wife then gives birth to a son, he is a Nazir. He is not a Nazir if she gives birth to ...

1. ... a daughter ...

2. ... a Tumtum or an Androginos.

(b)According to the Tana Kama, he is not a Nazir if his wife has a stillborn son who may have been a ninth month baby - Rebbi Shimon says he should declare that if his son was a ninth month baby, then he is a Nazir anyway, and if not, then he now undertakes a Nezirus Nedavah.

(c)Should she give birth to another baby later, according to the Tana Kama (Rebbi Yehudah), he is then a Nazir - Rebbi Shimon says that he must again make a declaration. He must declare that if his first son was a ninth month baby, then his first Nezirus was obligatory and he now undertakes a Nezirus Nedavah; whereas if he was not, then his first Nezirus was a Nedavah, and he is now obligated to fulfill his Neder.

(d)The basis of their Machlokes is - whether a person involves himself in a Safek (Rebbi Shimon) or not (Rebbi Yehudah).