QUESTION: The Mishnah (83b) says that all Menachos may be brought from either grain of Eretz Yisrael or of Chutz la'Aretz, and from either Chadash or Yashan grain, except for the Korban ha'Omer and the Shtei ha'Lechem which must be brought only from grain of Eretz Yisrael and from Chadash. The Gemara infers from the Mishnah that if the Korban ha'Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem are brought from Yashan, then they are Pasul. The Gemara says that the Mishnah disagrees with the Tana of a Beraisa who states that if the Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem are brought from Yashan, they are valid, even though the Mitzvah to bring them from Chadash was not fulfilled.

The Gemara (83b-84a) continues and says that the Mishnah and Beraisa disagree only about Chadash. They agree that the Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem must be brought exclusively from Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara notes that Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah in another Beraisa expresses a different view and says that one may bring the Omer from outside Eretz Yisrael. According to this opinion, when the verse says about the Omer, "When you come to the land" (Vayikra 23:10), it does not mean that the Omer may be brought only from grain of Eretz Yisrael, but that the obligation to bring the Korban ha'Omer did not take effect until the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara continues and says that Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the prohibition of Chadash applies in Chutz la'Aretz is mid'Oraisa (see Insights to Menachos 68:2). The verse, "From your dwelling places" (Vayikra 23:14), teaches that one may bring the Omer from any place where Jews live. This is logical as well: since the Torah prohibits Chadash from Chutz la'Aretz, it follows that one may bring the Korban ha'Omer from grain of Chutz la'Aretz.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Temidim u'Musafim 7:5) writes, "One may bring the Minchah of the Omer only from Eretz Yisrael." Similarly, he writes (ibid. 8:2) that the Shtei ha'Lechem may be brought only from Eretz Yisrael and from Chadash. However, he also writes (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros 10:2) that one who eats Chadash produced before the Korban ha'Omer is offered receives lashes mid'Oraisa, whether he eats Chadash from Eretz Yisrael or from Chutz la'Aretz.

These rulings seem to contradict the Gemara here that states that since Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Chadash is forbidden mid'Oraisa outside of Eretz Yisrael, it follows that one may bring the Korban ha'Omer from produce of Chutz la'Aretz. Why does the Rambam rule that even though Chadash in Chutz la'Aretz is forbidden mid'Oraisa, one may not bring the Korban ha'Omer from produce of Chutz la'Aretz?

(a) The LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Temidin u'Musafim 7:5) answers that the reason why the Rambam maintains that the Korban ha'Omer may not be brought from Chutz la'Aretz is that he learns that the verse, "When you come to the land," teaches that one may bring the Omer only from produce of Eretz Yisrael.

REBBI AKIVA EIGER explains that according to the Lechem Mishneh, even though the Gemara appears to make the two issues dependent on each other (if the Omer may be brought from Chutz la'Aretz, then Chadash is mid'Oraisa in Chutz la'Aretz, and if Chadash is not mid'Oraisa in Chutz la'Aretz, then the Omer may not be brought from Chutz la'Aretz), the Rambam maintains that they are related only in part: if Chadash is not mid'Oraisa in Chutz la'Aretz, then the Omer certainly may not be brought from grain of Chutz la'Aretz. The converse relationship is not true; it is possible that even though the prohibition of Chadash is mid'Oraisa outside Eretz Yisrael, the Omer may not be brought from there because of the verse, "When you come to the land."

(b) REBBI AKIVA EIGER (Chidushim, end of 84a) offers a different solution. He cites the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (13a) which explains the verse, "Your reaping" (Vayikra 23:10), said in connection with the Omer, to mean that only "your reaping" is valid for the Omer, but not what is reaped by a Nochri. Similarly, produce of Chutz la'Aretz should not be valid for the Omer, because the Gemara in Kidushin (39a) says that the phrase, "your field" (Vayikra 19:19), excludes a field outside of Eretz Yisrael.

Rashi (DH veha'Kesiv) writes that "your field" indicates the field which is uniquely designated for you, in contrast to land in Chutz la'Aretz which was not given to you. Therefore, only Eretz Yisrael is considered, "your reaping" and "your field."

Rebbi Akiva Eiger proves from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (13a) that Chadash is forbidden even in Chutz la'Aretz, even though it maintains that the grain of Chutz la'Aretz is not valid for the Omer. This shows that the law of the Omer and the law of Chadash outside of Eretz Yisrael do not depend on each other.

Consequently, the Rambam maintains that the law does not follow the view of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah. Therefore, while Chadash does apply in Chutz la'Aretz, the Omer may not be brought from Chutz la'Aretz. (D. BLOOM)

QUESTIONS: The Gemara cites one Beraisa which states that fruit that grows on a roof, in a ruin, in a pot, or in a ship may be brought as Bikurim. However, another Beraisa states that in all of these cases one brings the fruit to the Beis ha'Mikdash but does not recite the Parshah of Bikurim ("Mevi v'Eino Korei"). The Gemara reconciles the two Beraisos, according to the view of Reish Lakish (who maintains that one brings Bikurim from fruits that grow in the mountains). The Gemara explains that the first Beraisa refers to fruit that grew on the roof of a cave, in which case one brings Bikurim and recites the Parshah of Bikurim, since the roof of a cave is similar to land (see RABEINU GERSHOM). The second Beraisa refers to fruit that grew on the roof of a house, in which case one brings Bikurim but does not recite the Parshah of Bikurim. Similarly, in the case of fruits of a ruin, the first Beraisa refers to fruit grown in a ruin where the land was worked. Since the farmer took the trouble to work the field, the fruits are considered "from your land." In the case of the second Beraisa, the field of the ruin was not worked, and thus one brings Bikurim but does not recite the Parshah of Bikurim.

In the case of a potted plant, the first Beraisa refers to a case in which there is a hole in the pot. One brings Bikurim and recites the Parshah of Bikurim, because the hole causes the fruit to have the status of being connected to the land. The second Beraisa refers to a case of a pot that has no hole, in which case one does not recite the Parshah of Bikurim.

Finally, in the case of fruit that grew on a ship, the first Beraisa refers to a ship made of earthenware, in which case one brings Bikurim and recites the Parshah of Bikurim. RASHI explains that the earthenware ship is considered like land. In contrast, the second Beraisa refers to fruit that grew on a wooden ship, in which case one brings the Bikurim without reciting the Parshah of Bikurim.

TOSFOS (DH Kan) cites Rashi in Gitin (7b, DH Afar) who writes that in order for the obligation to recite the Parshah of Bikurim to apply to fruit grown in an earthenware ship, the ship does not need to have a hole in it, provided that the ship is resting on the ground. Tosfos in Gitin (7b, DH Asis) writes that Rashi derives this from the fact that the Gemara here reconciles the contradiction between the Beraisos in the case of a potted plant by distinguishing between a pot that has a hole and one that does not, and the Gemara makes no such distinction in the case of a ship. This suggests that earthenware does not need a hole in order for the fruit grown in it to be obligated in Bikurim.

The reason for this is that since earthenware is similar to the earth, as long as the vessel is placed on the ground it has the status of land, even though it has no hole.

Tosfos cites RABEINU TAM who questions Rashi's opinion.

1. The Gemara in Gitin (21b) says that if a husband writes a Get on a perforated earthenware pot ("Atzitz Nakuv"), the Get is valid. Since he can lift the pot from the ground and hand it to his wife, the Get is not considered as though it is written on something that is attached the ground (which is not a valid Get). The fact that the Gemara there mentions that the earthenware pot is perforated implies that a non-perforated pot is not considered part of the ground.

2. The Gemara in Shabbos (95b) lists five different sizes of holes in earthenware vessels which have different Halachic ramifications. One of the sizes mentioned is a hole large enough for a small root of a plant to exit. When the hole is this size, the seeds inside the pot are considered attached to the ground and cannot become Muchshar for Tum'ah. This shows that an earthenware vessel is considered connected to the ground only when it has a hole. This contradicts Rashi's opinion that an earthenware vessel is considered part of the land even when it has no hole.

ANSWER: The CHAZON ISH (Orlah 1:16:1, DH Ayin) distinguishes between a tree planted in an earthenware pot and seeds sown in such a pot. He cites the Mishnah in Orlah (1:2) that teaches that a tree planted in a ship is subject to the laws of Orlah. The Yerushalmi in Orlah (4a) quotes Rebbi Yitzchak bar Chakula in the name of Chizkiyah that a plant in a pot that has no hole is subject to the laws of Orlah. Rebbi Yosi explains that the reason is that the roots have the ability to seep through the pot and receive nourishment from the soil, even though there is no hole in the pot. Therefore, the tree is considered as though it is planted in the ground, and it is subject to the laws of Orlah.

Rebbi Yonah says that Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yitzchak refer only to tree roots. The roots of all other forms of vegetation are not strong enough to penetrate the vessel and emerge.

The RASH in Chalah (2:2) also makes this distinction between trees and seeds. Similarly, the Rash in Orlah (1:2) explains that the tree planted in a ship is subject to the laws of Orlah even when there is no hole. The Rash concludes that according to the Gemara here, the earthenware pot without a hole is considered part of the land only when a tree is planted inside, but not when it contains seeds of other plants.

Accordingly, the Chazon Ish explains that when the Gemara here distinguishes between a wooden ship and an earthenware ship, its distinction applies only when a tree planted is there. In contrast, the Gemara in Gitin and in Shabbos, from which Rabeinu Tam questions Rashi's explanation, refer only to seeds. In those cases, Rashi agrees that the earthenware vessel is considered like land only when it contains a hole. (A wooden vessel always requires a hole to be considered like land, both for trees and seeds.)

The Chazon Ish concludes that the Rash agrees with Rashi's opinion. Moreover, when the Rash in Chalah cites the Yerushalmi that says that an earthenware pot in which a tree is planted is considered attached to the ground even when there is no hole, his specific intent is to answer the questions on Rashi which Rabeinu Tam here asks.

(However, the Chazon Ish writes that this answer suffices only to justify Rashi's position in Menachos. Rashi's comments in Gitin (7b) remain problematic, because the Gemara there is discussing seeds, and yet Rashi writes that an earthenware pot does not require a hole.) (D. BLOOM)