QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yanai who says that Me'ilah applies mid'Oraisa only to Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis and to a Korban Olah, since they are the only types of Kodshim that are exclusively "Kodshei Hash-m" (Vayikra 5:15). They belong exclusively to Hekdesh; no part is consumed or used by anyone other than Hekdesh. Other Korbanos (Chatas, Asham, Kodshim Kalim, etc.) are eaten in part by man (either the Kohanim or the owner) and thus are not considered "Kodshei Hash-m."

Rebbi Yanai's statement here seems to contradict his statement in Chulin (117a). The Mishnah there teaches that the prohibition of Me'ilah applies to the Chelev of a Korban. RASHI there (DH Mo'alin) explains that this is because the Chelev of a Korban is an item of Kodshim that is entirely for Hash-m (as it is burned on the Mizbe'ach), and it is not given to the Kohanim. The Gemara there quotes Rebbi Yanai who explains that the source that Me'ilah applies to Chelev is the verse (Vayikra 4:10) that teaches that just as the Chelev must be removed from the bull offered as a Korban Shelamim, it must be removed from the cow offered by the Kohen Gadol as a Korban Chatas ("Par Kohen Mashi'ach"). This teaches that just as Me'ilah applies to the cow of the Kohen Gadol, it applies to the bull brought as a Korban Shelamim.

RASHI there (DH Mena Hani Mili) explains that Rebbi Yanai is teaching that Me'ilah applies even to the Chelev of Kodshim Kalim, such as Shelamim. Even though Me'ilah does not apply to a live animal of Kodshim Kalim because it is still the property of its owner and not of Hekdesh, after the animal has been slaughtered and the blood has been sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach the Isur Me'ilah does apply.

In Chulin, Rebbi Yanai is saying that Me'ilah applies mid'Oraisa even for Kodshim Kalim (part of which the owner is entitled to keep), while here in Me'ilah he says that Me'ilah does not apply whenever the owner has a share in the Kodshim! How are these two statements of Rebbi Yanai to be reconciled?

(a) TOSFOS here (DH me'Hai Kera) and in Chulin (117a, DH Amar Rebbi Yanai) writes that Rebbi Yanai there is saying that Me'ilah applies mid'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, Me'ilah applies only to Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.

(b) The TIFERES YAKOV in Chulin answers that there are two different sages named Rebbi Yanai. Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is "Rebbi Yanai me'Chavarta" -- Rebbi Yanai from the city of Chavarta.

This is in contrast to the explanation of both RASHI (DH Amar Rebbi Yanai) and TOSFOS here (DH Mechavarta), who explain that the word is not "me'Chavarta" ("from the city of Chavarta") but rather it is "Mechavarta," which means "it is clearly correct." Rebbi Yanai is saying that it is clear that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.

The Tiferes Yakov adds that the Rebbi Yanai mentioned in Me'ilah is not the same Rebbi Yanai quoted in Temurah (32b) as saying, "There is no Me'ilah stated explicitly in the Torah other than Me'ilah of the Korban Olah" (see Tosfos here, DH Mechavarta). Rebbi Yanai in Temurah agrees that Me'ilah does apply to other types of Kodshim; he merely says that those forms of Me'ilah are not written in the Torah explicitly, but rather they are derived from Derashos. According to Rebbi Yanai in Temurah, Me'ilah does apply to Kodshim Kalim, while according to Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah, Me'ilah does not apply to Kodshim Kalim but only to Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah. (See also Insights to Chulin 117:1.) (D. BLOOM)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Ula in the name of Rebbi Yochanan who says that Kodshim she'Mesu (sanctified animals that died) no longer are subject to the Isur d'Oraisa of Me'ilah. The Gemara proves that Ula is referring to Kodshei Mizbe'ach (animals consecrated as Korbanos to be offered on the Mizbe'ach), because it is not logical to say that he is referring to Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis (animals consecrated for their value to be used for the upkeep of the Beis ha'Mikdash), because even after such animals die the Isur d'Oraisa of Me'ilah should apply to the carcass. A dead animal that was consecrated as Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis is no different from any other object, even a garbage heap, whose value was consecrated for Bedek ha'Bayis, to which the Isur of Me'ilah applies.

TOSFOS (DH v'Afilu) asks in the name of RABEINU CHAIM HA'KOHEN that there seems to be a significant difference between a garbage heap that was consecrated for Bedek ha'Bayis and a carcass of a dead animal. The garbage heap can be redeemed, and the proceeds received will have Kedushah. In contrast, a dead animal of Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis cannot be redeemed, because in order to redeem an animal the Torah requires that it be stood up in the presence of the Kohen and evaluated ("Ha'amadah v'Ha'arachah"; Vayikra 27:11-12), which is not possible to do with a carcass. Why, then, does the Gemara compare a carcass to a garbage heap?

Tosfos answers that perhaps Ula follows the opinion of Rebbi Shimon (Temurah 32b) who says that an animal of Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis does not require Ha'amadah v'Ha'arachah in order to be redeemed. Alternatively, perhaps Ula is discussing a case in which the owners did Ha'amadah v'Ha'arachah while the animal was alive, but it died before they were able to redeem it.

Tosfos implies that an object of Hekdesh that cannot be redeemed has no Isur of Me'ilah. Since it cannot be redeemed, it has no value to Hekdesh, and thus when one benefits from it he is not misappropriating anything of value from Hekdesh.

This assumption of Tosfos, however, seems to be contradicted by the Gemara later (19b). The Mishnah there quotes the Tana Kama who states that the Isur of Me'ilah applies successively (that is, a second person is liable for transgressing Me'ilah when he benefits from an object of Hekdesh even after another person already benefited from the same object and transgressed Me'ilah) only in the case of an animal that is sanctified and fit to be offered as a Korban, and in the case of the sanctified vessels that are used for the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rebbi adds that the Isur of Me'ilah applies successively to "anything that cannot be redeemed." What is the difference between Rebbi and the Tana Kama? Rav Papa explains that the difference exists in a case in which an animal fit to be offered as a Korban developed a blemish that disqualified it. If the animal was slaughtered before it was redeemed, Rebbi rules that the carcass must be buried. The Tana Kama maintains that it still may be redeemed. RASHI there (DH veha'Tanya) writes that according to Rebbi, the dead animal cannot be redeemed because an animal fit to be offered as a Korban requires Ha'amadah v'Ha'arachah in order to be redeemed (this is the view of the Rabanan in Temurah 32b, according to Rebbi Yochanan; see Chart to Temurah 32b). According to Rebbi, since the animal cannot be redeemed, it retains its Isur d'Oraisa of Me'ilah, even if one already transgressed Me'ilah with it.

It is clear from the Gemara there that something that cannot be redeemed still has an Isur of Me'ilah. What, then, is the intent of Tosfos when he says that something that cannot be redeemed does not have an Isur of Me'ilah since it is worth nothing to Hekdesh?

ANSWER: The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Me'ilah 5:10, end of DH Hineh) explains that the Me'ilah that the Gemara later (19b) discusses is Me'ilah d'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, something that cannot be redeemed no longer is subject to the Isur of Me'ilah. This is similar to Ula's ruling that Kodshim that died no longer have an Isur d'Oraisa of Me'ilah, but they do have an Isur d'Rabanan of Me'ilah. (D. BLOOM)

OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that five parts of a Korban Olah and six parts of a Korban Todah combine to make the minimum Shi'ur. The meat, fat (Chelev), flour, wine, and oil of a Korban Olah combine, with the addition of the Lachmei Todah for a Korban Todah.

With regard to what law do these parts of a Korban combine?

(a) RASHI (DH Chamishah) explains that they combine to make a minimum Shi'ur (a k'Zayis) for liability for Pigul, Nosar, Tamei, Me'ilah, and Ma'aleh ba'Chutz (offering the Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash).

(b) TOSFOS (Zevachim 109a, DH Olah) asks a number of questions on Rashi's explanation that the Mishnah is referring to the minimum Shi'ur for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz.

1. The Isur of offering Korbanos outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash does not apply to the Lachmei Todah, which are eaten and not burned.

2. How can Chelev and wine offered on a Mizbe'ach together outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash combine to make a Shi'ur for liability for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz? There are two entirely different Shi'urim for the Isur of offering Chelev outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash and for the Isur of offering wine outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. For Chelev, one is Chayav for offering a k'Zayis, while for wine, one is Chayav for offering three Lugin!

3. The Beraisa cited by the Gemara earlier (14b) and the Mishnah in Zevachim (109a) mention only that the meat and fats of a Korban Olah combine to obligate a person for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, implying that the flour, wine, and oil do not combine. How can Rashi say that the Olah's flour, wine, and oil combine for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, and that any parts of the Todah combine for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, when the Beraisa says that only the meat and fats of an Olah combine?

TOSFOS concludes, therefore, that the Mishnah refers to combining the various parts of the Olah and Todah only with regard to the Isurim of eating Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei.