1) COMPARING LEFTOVER BLOOD TO LEFTOVER FLOUR
QUESTION: The Mishnah (8a) states that when the blood of a Chatas ha'Of is sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach (Haza'ah), the Isurim of Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei take effect, and the Isur of Me'ilah is removed.
In the Gemara (8b), Rav Huna in the name of Rav says that a Chatas ha'Of is valid (b'Di'eved) even when Mitzuy is not performed (that is, "Mitzuy is not Me'akev"). He infers this from the Mishnah that says that once Haza'ah is performed, the Isurim of Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei take effect, and Me'ilah is removed.
Rav Ada bar Ahavah in the name of Rav argues and maintains that Mitzuy of a Chatas ha'Of is Me'akev, and he learns that the text of the Mishnah is "Mitzah Damah" instead of "Huzah Damah." Accordingly, Haza'ah is not sufficient to make the laws of Pigul, Nosar, and Tamei apply to the Chatas ha'Of, or to remove the Isur of Me'ilah, because the Korban is only valid once the Mitzuy has been performed.
The Gemara questions the view of Rav Huna from the verse, "And the remaining blood shall be pressed..." (Vayikra 5:9), which implies that pressing the remaining blood is an absolute requirement. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna understands the word "veha'Nish'ar" ("the remaining [blood]") to mean that if there is blood remaining, then Mitzuy ha'Dam must be performed, but it is not Me'akev if there is no blood remaining after the Haza'ah.
The Gemara continues and asks that "veha'Nish'ar" cannot mean that Mitzuy is required only "if" there is blood leftover, because the same wording -- "veha'Noseres" (Vayikra 2:3) -- is used with regard to the leftover flour of a Minchah offering. With regard to the Minchah, however, there must be flour left over to give to the Kohanim, for otherwise the Minchah is invalid as derived from the verse, "mi'Soltah umi'Shamnah" (Vayikra 2:2).
What is the Gemara's question? The Gemara itself says that there is an additional verse which teaches that the leftover flour of a Minchah is Me'akev -- "mi'Soltah umi'Shamnah"! There is no additional verse with regard to the leftover blood of a Chatas ha'Of, and thus perhaps Mitzuy indeed is not Me'akev! Accordingly, the reason why the law of the leftover flour of a Minchah is mandatory is that the verse says both "veha'Noseres" and "mi'Soltah umi'Shamnah." In contrast, the verse regarding Chatas ha'Of says only "veha'Nish'ar." Why does the Gemara question Rav Huna's opinion from the verse regarding the leftover flour of a Minchah?
(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Ha) answers that the words, "Chatas Hi," in the verse discussing the remaining blood of a Chatas ha'Of are considered like the words "mi'Soltah...," and thus the leftover blood is also Me'akev.
(b) Once the Gemara teaches that the word "veha'Noseres" means that something must be left, then we may assume that the similar word written with regard to the Chatas ha'Of, "veha'Nish'ar," also means that there must be blood left.
(c) The Gemara in Menachos (9b) teaches that one of the two verses discussing the Minchah offering is needed to teach a different Halachah (i.e., if some of the remaining flour was lost between the Kemitzah and the Haktarah, the Minchah is Pasul). Accordingly, there is only one verse that discusses the need to leave over flour after the Kemitzah. (See CHOK NASAN.)
2) THE NATURE OF THE PAYMENT OF "ME'ILAH"
QUESTION: Rav maintains that when one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah, the payment of Keren v'Chomesh that he is obligated to pay must be used to buy a Korban Nidvas Tzibur, a public Nedavah offering. The Gemara cites a Beraisa that supports Rav. The Beraisa first says that when one derives benefit from some of the money that was set aside for the purchase of a Chatas, and he found out about his sin only after the Chatas had been purchased and offered, he must take the Keren and Chomesh that he owes for his sin of Me'ilah and throw it into the Yam ha'Melach. Since the Chatas has already been offered, the money that was supposed to be used for the purchase of the animal is considered like money of a Chatas whose owner has already received atonement from a different Korban. In such a case, the original Chatas must die, or the money designated to buy the Chatas must be thrown into the Yam ha'Melach (see Temurah 16a).
The Beraisa continues and says that when one derives benefit from some of the money that was set aside for the purchase of an Asham, and he found out about his sin only after the Asham had been purchased and offered, he must take the Keren and Chomesh that he owes for his sin of Me'ilah and use it to buy a Korban Nedavah.
The Beraisa adds that one who benefits from Kodshei Kodashim (before Zerikah) or from the Eimurim of Kodshim Kalim (after Zerikah) must give the value that he benefited towards the purchase of a Nidvas Tzibur. This is the support from the Beraisa for Rav's ruling.
The Halachah that one must throw into the Yam ha'Melach the money that he owes for using money designated for a Korban Chatas seems to contradict a principle taught by TOSFOS in Kesuvos (30b, DH Zar). Tosfos there says that "the Keren and Chomesh that one must pay for benefiting from Hekdesh is not in order to gain atonement, but it is a monetary debt that one owes in return for stealing money from Hekdesh." Since the payment one owes for transgressing Me'ilah is like returning, or compensating for, an object that one stole, it does not seem logical that the money should be thrown into the sea. Discarding the money does not accomplish the purpose of compensating the victim for his loss! Why, then, does Tosfos say that the payment of Keren and Chomesh for Me'ilah is merely a monetary debt, similar to the requirement to repay money that one stole?
ANSWER: The KEHILOS YAKOV in Pesachim (#20, DH Amnam) answers that the reason why one must return the value that he misappropriated from Hekdesh is neither for the sake of atonement nor for the sake of returning what he stole. Rather, it is because there is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, "v'Heishiv Es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal" (Vayikra 5:23). This Mitzvah is not merely intended to compensate the victim of the theft, because the Gemara in Bava Kama (96b) teaches that one who stole Chametz must return it even after Pesach, even though it is now worthless to the victim of the theft (Chametz that was in the possession of a Jew during Pesach is forbidden). Even though the owner can derive no benefit from the Chametz, the thief still must return it in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of "v'Heishiv."
Similarly, one who derived benefit from Hekdesh now has a Mitzvah to return the value to Hekdesh. However, since a Chatas must be left to die if its owner already attained atonement from a different animal, the money designated to buy the Chatas also must be discarded by being thrown into the Yam ha'Melach. Therefore, one who derived benefit from the money designated to buy the Chatas does not have a Mitzvah to return the value to Hekdesh, but rather to throw it into the sea.
The Kehilos Yakov adds that when Tosfos in Kesuvos says that the payment of Me'ilah is to return money stolen from Hekdesh, Tosfos means that it is a monetary obligation, and not an obligation of Kaparah, atonement. Nevertheless, the obligation is due to the Mitzvah of "v'Heishiv" and is not merely to compensate the owner's loss. (D. BLOOM)
3) "ME'ILAH" OF "KORBENOS HA'MIZBE'ACH" AND "KORBENOS TZIBUR"
QUESTION: The Beraisa states that when one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah with "Korbenos Mizbe'ach," the Me'ilah payment of Keren v'Chomesh that he pays is used to buy a public Korban ("la'Mizbe'ach"). When a person benefits from "Korbenos Tzibur," his Me'ilah payment is used for "Nidvas Tzibur," a public Korban Nedavah.
What is the difference between the two payments? A "Nidvas Tzibur" is the same as a public Korban! (See TOSFOS DH ha'Neheneh, and GILYON in RASHI to Kerisus 22a, DH Mevi Me'ilah.) Why does the Beraisa list these two payments separately and use two different expressions to describe them?
(a) According to RASHI, there indeed is no difference between the two payments. Rashi (DH l'Nidvas Tzibur) explains that the Me'ilah payment for a Korban Tzibur is placed in the Shofaros (collection boxes), the money of which is for Kayitz ha'Mizbe'ach. Perhaps Korbenos Tzibur are listed separately simply because their Me'ilah payment is clearly an appropriate penalty; since the person sinned with a public Korban, he must bring a public Korban in exchange.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Me'ilah 3:10) writes, "If a person benefited from Kodshim... he must give what he benefited as a Nedavah. If he benefited from Kodshim of the Tzibur, his Me'ilah payment goes to the Lishkah." (The Rambam does not have the same text as we have, that the money is given to "Nidvas Tzibur"; rather, his Girsa reads that the money is given to the "Tzibur.") The KESEF MISHNEH quotes the ROSH who explains that this means that the Keren v'Chomesh of Me'ilah with Korbenos Tzibur is used for Bedek ha'Bayis (upkeep of the Beis ha'Mikdash), like the yearly Shekalim collection that is kept in the Lishkah.
The CHAFETZ CHAYIM in ZEVACH TODAH questions the Kesef Mishneh's explanation of the Rambam. It not logical that the Keren v'Chomesh payment for Me'ilah with a Korban Tzibur should be used for Bedek ha'Bayis, while the payment for Me'ilah with a private Korban must be used specifically for the Mizbe'ach, for Nidvas Tzibur! He therefore explains that the Rambam means that the Me'ilah payment for a private Korban is used for public Korbanos of Kayitz ha'Mizbe'ach (Nidvas Tzibur), while the Me'ilah payment for a Korban Tzibur is used to purchase the Korbenos Chovah -- the obligatory Korbanos of a Tzibur, such as the Temidim and Musafim. (He adds that Rashi, too, may be referring to the Shofaros of Tiklin Chadetin, which were used to purchase Korbenos Chovah of the Tzibur.)