1)

(a)Rebbi establishes the Pasuk in Ki Setzei "Lo Sasgir Eved El Adonav" by someone who buys a slave with the express intention of setting him free. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak establishes the case when, at the time of purchase, he stipulated that the slave will acquire himself retroactively from the current moment.

(b)The Tana cannot be speaking when he actually set him free, and now wants to enslave him again because then the Torah would not refer to him as 'Eved'.

(c)The Tana Kama in the Beraisa holds (like the Tana of our Mishnah) 'Harei At Mekudeshes li l'Achar she'Esgayer, l'Achar she'Tisgayri ... ', Einah Mekudeshes'. Rebbi Meir says 'Mekudeshes'.

(d)We have proved from these two Beraisos that both Rebbi and Rebbi Meir hold 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam'.

2)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar agrees with the Tana Kama. Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi agrees in principle with Rebbi Meir, only he maintains that the Rabanan invalidated the Kidushin in the cases of 'le'Achar she'Yamus Ba'alech, l'Achar she'Tamus Achosech', because it will result in her sister or her husband's jealousy.

(b)Abaye did not add Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi to his list of those who hold 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' because he is synonymous with Rebbi, who already appears in the list.

3)

(a)Rebbi Akiva rules that if a woman declares a Neder forbidding on her husband whatever she produces (despite the fact that she is Meshubad to produce for him a certain amount of work per week) the husband needs to annul the Neder in case, he says, she produces in excess of her obligation (and her Neder will take effect on that excess).

(b)To refute the suggestion that (bearing in mind that her work is not yet in the world), Rebbi Akiva too, holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua establishes that Rebbi Akiva speaks when the woman said 'Yikadshu Yadai l'Oseihen' (and her hands are in the world).

4)

(a)Our Mishnah validates the Kidushin in a case where a man stipulated that he would speak on her behalf to the governor, or that he would work for her for a day on condition that he fulfils his condition.

(b)Reish Lakish establishes our Mishnah when he gave her a Perutah for the Kidushin, which is necessary because the Tana holds 'Yeshnah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah v'Ad Sof' (the wages of an employee become payable as he works), in which case the money that he is owed when he finishes his work will have become a loan, and we will apply the principle 'ha'Mekadesh b'Milveh, Einah Mekudeshes'.

(c)The Tana of the Beraisa invalidates the Kidushin of a man who betroths a woman with the benefit that a woman derives when he helps her mount a donkey or settle in a boat but validates that of a man who betroths a woman with the benefit that she derives when he helps her.

(d)We know that the Tana there cannot be speaking when the man gave her a Perutah over and above the assistance that he afforded her because the Tana says 'bi'S'char she'Hirkavtich ... ' (and not 'Al-Menas').

5)

(a)A second Beraisa rules that if a woman says to a man 'If you keep me company, or laugh to me or dance before me, I will become betrothed to you' we assess the value of what he did, and if it is a Shaveh Perutah, she is Mekudeshas. Here too, the Tana cannot be speaking when he gave her a Perutah because he speaks of assessing what the man did.

(b)To vindicate his interpretation of our Mishnah, Reish Lakish explains that the Beraisa holds 'Einah li'Sechirus Ela li'be'Sof' (the wages of an employee only become payable when he finishes his work), in which case the money is not a loan.

(c)Rava explains that Reish Lakish infers his interpretation of our Mishnah from the Lashon 'Harei At Mekudeshes Li Al-Menas she'Adaber Alayich l'Shilton'. Otherwise, the Tana should have said ' bi'Schar she'Adaber ... ' (like the Lashon used by the Beraisa).

6)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if a man betroths a woman 'Al-Menas she'Yirtzeh Aba' ...

1. ... as long as his father remains alive the Kidushin is valid, provided the father gives his consent.

2. ... in the event that the man himself dies we teach the father to say that he does not give his consent to the Kidushin ...

(b)... to exempt his daughter-in-law from having to perform Yibum.

(c)The problem with establishing the Mishnah when the father ...

1. ... actually gives his consent is from the middle case 'Mes ha'Av, Harei Zu Mekudeshes'. Seeing as he failed to gave his consent, on what basis will the Kidushin become valid with his death?

2. ... remains silent from the Seifa ''Mes ha'Ben, Melamdin Es ha'Av Lomar she'Eino Rotzeh'. Seeing as his silence construes consent , how can he now revoke it?

7)

(a)We finally establish 'Al-Menas she'Yirtzeh Aba' with regard to the Metzia and the Seifa of the Mishnah ('Mes ha'Ben ... ') to mean on condition that his father does not object.

(b)Whereas the equivalent case in the Reisha speaks where the father is silent.

(c)'Ratzah ha'Av' cannot have the same connotations in the Reisha as it does in the Seifa because the fact that the father has the right to object any time in his lifetime renders the statement meaningless.

(d)This is how Rebbi Yanai explains the Mishnah. We might also have explained that the Reisha and the Seifa comprise a Machlokes Tana'im, whether 'Al-Menas she'Yirtzeh Aba' denotes that he remains silent (the Tana of the Reisha), or that he does not object (the Metzia and the Seifa).

(e)Reish Lakish learns from Rebbi Yanai that it is preferable to establish two sections of a Mishnah in two different ways according to one Tana, rather than explaining them uniformly but according to two different Tana'im.

8)

(a)In order to avoid the whole problem Rav Yosef bar Ami establishes the entire Mishnah when the man said 'Al-Menas she'Yirtzeh Aba mi'Ka'an v'ad Sheloshim Yom'.

(b)He now explains ...

1. ... the Reisha when the father either failed to protest within thirty days (Mekudeshes), or he did indeed protest (Einah Mekudeshes).

2. ... the middle case when the father died during the thirty days, without having protested.

3. ... the Seifa when the son died during the thirty days, before the father managed to protest.

9)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if a father forgot to whom he betrothed his daughter, and ...

1. ... a man claims to be the Chasan he is believed.

2. ... two men claim that they are the ones both are obligated to give her a Get.

(b)They are permitted to reach an agreement between them that one of them gives her a Get, and the other one marries her.

(c)Rav maintains that in the Reisha of our Mishnah. the sole claimant is ...

1. ... is believed to give a Get on the grounds that 'Ein Adam Chotei v'Lo Lo' (a person will not cause others to sin if he gets nothing out of it), but he is ...

2. ... not believed to marry her because we suspect that his Yetzer ha'Ra got the better of him.

(d)The reason that ...

1. ... Rav Asi disagrees with Rav, believing the sole claimant even if he wants to marry her is because he would not to dare make such a claim if it were not true, in case the father recognizes that he is not the one and confronts him.

2. ... we rule like Rav Asi in this case is because he has a Beraisa that supports him.

10)

(a)Rav Asi concedes to Rav that the man is not believed if it was the woman who claims that she became betrothed to a man, but cannot remember to whom (as we shall see shortly).

(b)Rav reconciles his opinion with the Seifa of the Mishnah, where the Tana believes one of the two men even with regard to marrying her because there where there is another person, the one who sticks to his guns, will be afraid to do so (if it is not true), because of the fear that the father might recognize that the second man is really the man who betrothed his daughter.

(c)The Beraisa that we cite in support of Rav Asi rules that ...

1. ... in a case where, after the sole claimant marries her, a second claimant turns up and claims that he is the one who betrothed her his claim is ignored, because the first claimant married her b'Heter.

2. ... if it is the woman who betrothed herself and forgot to whom then the man who claims that he is the one, he is not believed because in such a case, the man, knowing that the woman will support any man who claims to have married her, is willing to try his luck.

11)

(a)We know that the father is believed to say that his daughter is betrothed from the Pasuk in Ki Setzei (in connection with Motzi Shem Ra) "Es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh".

(b)According to Rav Asi, the father is even believed to the extent that, should his daughter subsequently commit adultery, Beis-Din will sentence the adulterer and her to stoning for adultery (even though there are no other witnesses). Rav maintains that the Torah only believes him with regard to forbidding her to marry anybody else, but no more.

(c)Rav Asi concedes to Rav that they are not stoned to death if it was the woman who claimed that she was betrothed but forgot to whom.

12)

(a)What seems strange about Rav Asi's opinion regarding the two above rulings is that if, there where the father says that he betrothed her, and where we do not take him too seriously (inasmuch as we believe whoever claims that she is betrothed to him), yet we stone on the basis of his testimony; there where it is the woman herself who claims that she is betrothed, and whom we take more seriously (inasmuch as we do not believe whoever claims that she is betrothed to him), we should certainly stone on the basis of her testimony.

(b)To answer the apparent paradox, Rav Asi himself explains that the reason that we believe the father to the point of stoning via his testimony, but not the daughter, is because the Torah grants this credibility to the father alone, but not to the daughter.

(c)Despite the fact that the woman is not believed with regard to the Chiyuv Misah, she is nevertheless believed with regard to the fact that she is betrothed because of the principle 'Shavyah Anafshah Chatichah d'Isura' (When someone claims that something is forbidden to him, it becomes forbidden to him because of a Neder).

(d)Rav Chisda, who does not differentiate between the father and the daughter, follows his own reasoning elsewhere, where he says that a father who testifies that his son is nine years old, and his daughter three (the respective ages when their Bi'ah is first considered Bi'ah) is believed with regard to bringing a Korban, should a relative commit incest with either of them b'Shogeg.

13)

(a)The Beraisa supports Rav Chisda. The two areas in which a man who testifies that his son is thirteen or his daughter twelve is ...

1. ... believed, besides validating their Nedarim and regular Hekdesh are those of Charamim (a type of Hekdesh) and Erchin.

2. ... not believed are Malkus and (other) punishments.

(b)The Beraisa speaks even if they have already produced Simanei Gadlus (see also Tosfos DH 'Bnei').

(c)Simanim that appear before one reaches the age of Gadlus are considered to be warts and no more.