KERISUS 18 (8 Elul) - Dedicated in memory of Esther Miryam bas Harav Chaim Zev and her husband Harav Refael Yisrael ben Harav Moshe (Snow), whose Yahrzeits are 7 Elul and 8 Elul respectively. Sponsored by their son and daughter in law, Moshe and Rivka Snow.

QUESTION: Rav Nachman explains that one is Chayav to bring an Asham Taluy only when there were two pieces of food in front of him, one of Isur and one of Heter, and he ate one but is not sure if he ate the Isur or the Heter. In order to be Chayav, there must have been a definite piece of Isur in front of him. This is called "Ikva Isura," an established prohibition in front of the person, since one of the two pieces of food is certainly Asur. When there is only one piece in front of him, and his doubt is whether that piece was a piece of Isur or Heter, he is not Chayav to bring an Asham Taluy for eating it.
How are we to understand the second case in the Mishnah (end of 17a) according to Rav Nachman? The Mishnah says that one is Chayav to bring an Asham Taluy if he is in doubt about whether he ate a piece of Isur, or if he is in doubt about whether he ate a k'Zayis of Isur. If the doubt is whether the Isur contained a Shi'ur of a k'Zayis or not, then how can the person be Chayav to bring an Asham Taluy, according to Rav Nachman? This is not a case of "Ikva Isura," because there was no definite Isur in front of him!
(a) TOSFOS (17b, DH mid'Seifa) answers this question by explaining that the second case in the Mishnah refers to the same questionable piece as in the first case where there were two pieces in front of him, which both have a Shi'ur of a k'Zayis. The doubt is not only whether one ate the piece of Isur, but whether one ate at least a k'Zayis from that Isur. Accordingly, it certainly is a case of "Ikva Isura."
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 8:2) writes that the second case refers to one who knows that he ate a piece of Isur, but he does not know if the whole piece of Isur was a k'Zayis or not. Why is this considered "Ikva Isura"?
The MIRKEVES HA'MISHNEH explains that the Rambam follows his own view expressed elsewhere. The Rambam (Hilchos Shevisas Asor 2:3) rules that a Chatzi Shi'ur, a partial Shi'ur of Isur, is forbidden mid'Oraisa. Accordingly, a Chatzi Shi'ur indeed is considered "Ikva Isura"! (See also MAHARI KURKUS.)
It is also possible that even if a Chatzi Shi'ur is not forbidden mid'Oraisa, it is "Chazi l'Itzterufi" -- it is fit to join another partial Shi'ur to make a full Shi'ur of Isur, and this suffices to make it considered "Ikva Isura." (M. KORNFELD, Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
QUESTION: One of the cases in the Mishnah (17b) in which one is obligated to bring an Asham Taluy is a case in which one performed Melachah, but he does not know whether it was Shabbos when he performed the Melachah or whether it was a weekday.
According to the opinion that one is obligated to bring an Asham Taluy only when there was "Ikva Isura," a definite piece of Isur in front of him (see previous Insight), why is one Chayav in this case of the Mishnah? There is no definite Isur in this case, since, if it was a weekday when the person performed the Melachah, no Isur at all was in front of him.
(a) TOSFOS (17b, DH mid'Seifa) explains that the Mishnah refers to one who did Melachah during Bein ha'Shemashos at the end of Shabbos, between Shabbos and Motza'i Shabbos. Since Shabbos was already here the entire day, it is considered as though the Isur was established in front of him.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 8:2) and the RAN (cited by the KEHILOS YAKOV, Kerisus #9) do not mention that this case involves a doubt that occurred at Bein ha'Shemashos at the end of Shabbos, implying that they understand that the Chiyuv applies even when one is in doubt at the beginning of Shabbos. Why, then, is this case considered a case of "Ikva Isura"?
The KEHILOS YAKOV answers as follows. The time period called Bein ha'Shemashos is a specific period that occurs every day at the same time. If Bein ha'Shemashos in truth is daytime, then that moment of Bein ha'Shemashos is always daytime, every day. Similarly, if Bein ha'Shemashos is considered nighttime, then that moment is always nighttime, every day. Accordingly, when a person did Melachah during Bein ha'Shemashos on Erev Shabbos and did Melachah at the same moment on Motza'i Shabbos, he must bring a Chatas, because one of those moments definitely is Shabbos. In the case of the Mishnah here, when one who does Melachah during one of those moments (at the onset of Shabbos, or at the conclusion of Shabbos), he is faced with the doubt of whether it is Shabbos at the moment of this Bein ha'Shemashos, or whether it is Shabbos at the moment of the other Bein ha'Shemashos. Since one of the periods of Bein ha'Shemashos definitely is Shabbos, and he is in doubt which one it is, it is considered to be "Ikva Isura." (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)


OPINIONS: The Gemara records two versions of Rava bar Chanan's challenge to Abaye's assertion that Safek Yedi'os are Mechalek for Chata'os, and Abaye's defense for his position, which Rava bar Chanan refutes (see next Insight). In the first version, Abaye cites proof that Safek Yedi'os are Mechalek for Chata'os from a Beraisa that teaches that whatever is Mechalek to obligate one to bring multiple Chata'os for multiple Vadai transgressions is also Mechalek to obligate one to bring multiple Ashamos in a case of multiple Safek transgressions.
Rava bar Chanan refutes this proof from the case of one who ate a k'Zayis of Chelev before Yom Kippur and a k'Zayis after Yom Kippur, who brings only one Chatas.
What is Rava bar Chanan's proof against Abaye from the case of Yom Kippur?
(a) RASHI (DH b'Makom Asham Taluy) understands that Yom Kippur is considered a Safek Yedi'ah. From the fact that Yom Kippur is not Mechalek between the two Vadai transgressions (to make him Chayav to bring two Chata'os), we learn that a Safek Yedi'ah is not Mechalek.
How, though, do we know that Yom Kippur is considered a Safek Yedi'ah? On what does Rava bar Chanan base this assumption?
The ARUCH LA'NER explains, according to Rashi, that the assumption that Yom Kippur is a Safek Yedi'ah is based on the fact that when one commits a Safek transgression and Yom Kippur comes and passes, he does not need to bring an Asham Taluy, since Yom Kippur takes the place of an Asham Taluy. If Yom Kippur would not be like a Safek Yedi'ah, then how could it provide atonement like an Asham Taluy? In order for an Asham Taluy to provide atonement, there must be a Safek Yedi'ah! It must be that Yom Kippur is like a Safek Yedi'ah, and the fact that it is not Mechalek for Chata'os proves that a Safek Yedi'ah is not Mechalek for Chata'os.
(b) TOSFOS (DH Ela me'Atah) disagrees with Rashi's explanation, because perhaps Yom Kippur atones in its own unique way, and it does not atone in the same way that the bringing of an Asham Taluy atones. Accordingly, Yom Kippur can provide atonement even if it is not considered a Safek Yedi'ah.
Tosfos therefore understands that Rava bar Chanan is refuting the proof that Abaye cites from the Beraisa that says whatever is Mechalek for Chata'os is also Mechalek for Ashamos. Abaye attempts to prove from the Beraisa that a Safek Yedi'ah is Mechalek for Chata'os, just as it is Mechalek for Ashamos. Rava bar Chanan refutes Abaye's proof and shows that one cannot prove from the Beraisa that a Safek Yedi'ah is Mechalek for Chata'os. In a case in which one committed a Safek Aveirah before Yom Kippur and a Safek Aveirah after Yom Kippur, and then he found out about both Safek Aveiros, he brings one Asham Taluy. His actual Korban, together with the day of Yom Kippur itself which atones for his Safek Aveirah like an Asham Taluy, are considered like two Ashamos. If he discovers later that he definitely sinned (Vadai Yedi'ah) both times, then he will be obligated to bring only one Chatas. We see from this case that although one is Chayav to bring Ashamos, one is not Chayav to bring two Chata'os, and thus the rule of the Beraisa is not to be understood in the way Abaye interprets it. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
4) "TARDA"
QUESTION: The Gemara records two versions of Rava bar Chanan's challenge to Abaye's assertion that Safek Yedi'os are Mechalek for Chata'os, and Abaye's defense for his position, to which Rava bar Chanan responds, "Tarda!" and refutes Abaye's defense. RASHI in Zevachim (25b) writes that the word "Tarda" means a "Shoteh Bahul," a baffled fool. Rashi here writes that another interpretation is "lazy one." The ARUCH (Erech Tarir) has a different Girsa, according to which the word is "Terura" and means a fool from whose mouth saliva ("Ror") constantly drips.
What does the Gemara mean when it says that Rava bar Chanan referred to Abaye in such a way? Certainly the holy Amora'im would not insult each other. How is this remark to be understood? (See also Insights to Zevachim 25:2.)
(a) The CHAVOS YA'IR (#152) explains that it was customary that when a Torah teacher noticed his student being lazy in his thinking, he would sometimes call him a derogatory name as a form of rebuke in order to ensure that the student would no longer be lazy in his thinking. Rebbi was the paragon of humility (see Sotah 49b), and yet Rebbi responded to a question posed by his student, Levi, that "it seems to me that he has no brain in his head." Rebbi said this because he saw that Levi needed to be rebuked for not fulfilling his potential in Torah study.
Similarly, in the Gemara here (and in other places where the term "Tarda" is used), the Amora who made this remark was talking to a younger Amora. The younger Amora did not mind receiving this instruction from his senior colleague.
Similarly, in our Gemara (and in other places where the term "Tarda" is used), we find that the Amora who made this remark was talking to a younger Amora. (See SEDER HA'DOROS, "Rabah bar Chanan bar Aba" (p. 335).)
The Chavos Ya'ir, in an earlier responsum (#65), adds that the word "Tarda" is an example of an expression which people in general do not consider offensive. (See Insights to Bava Kama 65a.)
The SEFER L'RE'ACHA KAMOCHA (vol. 3, Kuntrus ha'Bi'urim, ch. 6) adds that it is common that when two good friends are learning together, they use an interchange of words that would not be appropriate for strangers. Such an instance is recorded in Bava Metzia (83b), where the Gemara relates that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Karcha sent a message to Rebbi Eliezer ben Shimon addressing him as "Chametz ben Yayin" -- "vinegar, the son of wine." Rebbi Eliezer ben Shimon was not offended. However, when a common launderer said the same thing to him, he deemed it inappropriate and considered it grounds for punishment.
(b) The Mashgi'ach of the Mirrer Yeshiva, RAV YERUCHAM LEVOVITZ zt'l, writes in DA'AS CHOCHMAH U'MUSAR (2:10) that everything that the holy Amora'im did they did with the utmost purity and holiness. We, who do not live on such a lofty level of holiness, would be guilty of insulting and degrading our fellow man were we to call him by a derogatory name, and it indeed would be a severe transgression, for we cannot be confident that no impure motive was mixed with our words or actions. The holy Amora'im, on the other hand, spoke only with absolute purity of intention. Hence, even words that might seem to us to be words of derision were spoken -- and understood -- by the Amora'im with the "fire of Torah" burning in them, with only the purest intentions.
(c) The BEN YEHOYADA in Bava Metzia (20b) gives alternate explanations for the word "Tarda." He explains that the word is actually made up of two other words, "Tor" and "Da." "Tor" is an expression of alertness. The Gemara in Megilah (18b) describes someone in a semi-sleeping state as "Tir v'Lo Tir" ("alert and not alert"). "Da" means "this" or "here." Thus, "Tarda" means "be alert to this matter."
Alternatively, "Tor" means "carry," as in the expression "Tir Minach Sha'atach," or "your time should carry you" (see Avodah Zarah 34b; ARUCH, Erech Tor). Accordingly, "Tarda" means "carry this with you" and is not an insulting remark. (Y. MONTROSE)
QUESTION: The Beraisa states that one who is in doubt whether he transgressed an Isur on Yom Kippur is exempt from bringing an Asham Taluy, because "the entire day provides atonement."
This Beraisa contradicts an opinion cited by TOSFOS in Shevuos (beginning of 13b) that Yom Kippur provides atonement only at the last moment of the day. He proves this from the fact that the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach was brought on Yom Kippur to atone for our sins. If Yom Kippur would provide atonement at the beginning of the day, then it would not be necessary to bring the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach! (See Insights to Kerisus 7:2.)
How does that opinion understand the Gemara here that states explicitly that "every moment of Yom Kippur atones," and not just the end of the day? (GEVUROS ARI to Yoma 85a)
ANSWER: The OLAS SHLOMO suggests that while every moment of Yom Kippur atones, the atonement is only realized retroactively at the end of the day. The Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach, in contrast, provides atonement immediately, even for those who expire before the end of Yom Kippur.